Ad.Law - Assignment Essays %

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Minnesota State Legislature was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily established a Railroad & Warehouse Commission that could set price ceilings on hauling rates for intrastate freight transport.

- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the __________________ normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized Expertise, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.

- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized Expertise, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.

- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides a[n] __________________ to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized __________________, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Expertise

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Legislative Burden

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a[n] __________________ to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent __________________ by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when kosher butchers were indicted for violating regulations imposed by their local "advisory committee" under the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), a statute that gave the President the power to establish such industry-specific committees and to officially recognize their local-level regulations.

- The butchers argued that the advisory committees had lacked Constitutional authority to create new law, and therefore the regulations forming the charges against them—which included sale of "unfit poultry" and allowing customers to select specific chickens for purchase—did not carry the Force of Law.

- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the __________________ because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted Unfettered Discretion by the advisory committees and therefore was not an "Intelligible Guiding Principle."

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the Nondelegation Doctrine because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted Unfettered Discretion by the advisory committees and therefore was not a[n] __________________.

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Force of Law

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the Nondelegation Doctrine because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted __________________ by the advisory committees and therefore was not an "Intelligible Guiding Principle."

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without a[n] __________________ included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's Unfettered Discretion; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a[n] __________________ without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the __________________, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as a[n] __________________, as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's Unfettered Discretion; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant __________________.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's __________________; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily empowered itself with the ability to invalidate the Attorney General's decisions to suspend the deportation of individual aliens through a unicameral majority vote, which is called a[n] __________________.

- Supreme Court held that Congress' reservation of authority over the actions of Executive Agencies violated the Constitution's Presentment Clause, which limits Congressional lawmaking to formal statutes that achieve a bicameral majority and are signed by the President.

- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the Nondelegation Doctrine by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.

answer

I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983); Legislative Veto

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that Congress' reservation of authority over the actions of Executive Agencies violated the Constitution's __________________, which limits Congressional lawmaking to formal statutes that achieve a bicameral majority and are signed by the President.

- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the Nondelegation Doctrine by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.

answer

I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983); Presentment Clause

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the __________________ by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.

answer

I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed a statute that required the President to seek approval from the Senate in order to remove "first, second, or third class" postmasters from their offices.

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the __________________ for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); Removal Power

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove __________________, and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); Principal Officers

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that __________________ may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); Inferior Officers

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to __________________.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); For-Cause Removal

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an independent agency tasked with regulating business whose members served a limited term and could be removed only for deficient performance.

- President Roosevelt had fired a member of the FTC for political reasons, but defended himself by arguing that the requirement for __________________ was an unconstitutional restriction on his Removal Power.

- Supreme Court held that the firing was improper because FTC members perform a direct "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function," and that this denotes them as "Inferior Officers" whose removal by the President may be limited.

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); For-Cause Removal

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- President Roosevelt had fired a member of the FTC for political reasons, but defended himself by arguing that the requirement for For-Cause Removal was an unconstitutional restriction on his __________________.

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); Removal Power

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the firing was improper because FTC members perform a direct __________________, and that this denotes them as "Inferior Officers" whose removal by the President may be limited.

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the firing was improper because FTC members perform a direct "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function," and that this denotes them as __________________ whose removal by the President may be limited.

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); Inferior Officers

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.

- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's __________________—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.

- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Public Rights

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.

- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's __________________—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Private Rights

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court explained that __________________ is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's __________________ (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Fundamental Findings of Fact

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to __________________; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); De Novo Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court also explained, however, that __________________ dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Article III

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates __________________ over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Judicial Exclusivity

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it concluded that an employee's termination was retaliatory despite the fact that an adjudicative agent determined the firing to have been non-retaliatory.

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a[n] __________________ must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."

- Further, the Court stressed that the conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge are part of the Entire Administrative Record and deserve substantial weight by the agency, who must provide an explanation for reaching an alternative conclusion.

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "__________________ on the record as a whole."

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."

- Further, the Court stressed that the conclusions of a[n] __________________ are part of the Entire Administrative Record and deserve substantial weight by the agency, who must provide an explanation for reaching an alternative conclusion.

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Administrative Law Judge

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."

- Further, the Court stressed that the conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge are part of the __________________ and deserve substantial weight by the agency, who must provide an explanation for reaching an alternative conclusion.

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .
- Railroad Commissioners of Nebraska (RCN), a state executive agency, was accused of Improper Adjudication when it found that the maximum rates that could be charged for freight transport within the state were too high, and ordered that they be reduced to a lower level.
- RCN argued that the order—which was the product of what we would call Formal Adjudication today—had been issued after fulfilling all procedural requirements and was not overly harsh since it still left the railway companies with enough money to operate.
- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that De Novo Review is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.
- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's __________________ only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record.

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Railroad Commissioners of Nebraska (RCN), a state executive agency, was accused of Improper Adjudication when it found that the maximum rates that could be charged for freight transport within the state were too high, and ordered that they be reduced to a lower level.

- RCN argued that the order—which was the product of what we would call Formal Adjudication today—had been issued after fulfilling all procedural requirements and was not overly harsh since it still left the railway companies with enough money to operate.

- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that and De Novo Review is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.

- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of __________________ on the Entire Administrative Record.

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by __________________, which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record.

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that and __________________ is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.

- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record.

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); De Novo Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it determined that a natural gas company had been setting unreasonable rates and issued an order for the company to set specific rates that the FPC had found "fair and reasonable" under some formula.

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a[n] _________________ if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by _________________ on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the _________________ or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of _________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of _________________.

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Smyth v. Ames (1881)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide _________________ as required under APA § 556-57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Trial-Type Proceedings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under _________________.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); APA § 556-57

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- NLRB was accused of Improper Interpretation when it ordered a newspaper publisher to collectively bargain with a union of "newsboys" on the grounds that they fell within the meaning of "employees" entitled to protection under the National Labor Relations Act.

- Ninth Circuit overturned the order, finding that the newsboys were independent contractors, and that the NLRB's use of "employee" was incorrect.

- Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NLRB satisfied the contemporary requirements for deference to an Interpretive Rule: (1) the agency's conclusion has "warrant in the record," and (2) the agency's interpretation has a "reasonable basis in law."

- Ruling was made alongside the case of __________________.

answer

N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications (1944); Skidmore v. Swift (1944)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

- Fifth Circuit Court found that the time spent by firefighters on-call did not count towards overtime according to the DOL's regulation, despite the firefighters' contention that the regulation was issued without meeting the procedural requirements for __________________.

- Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the DOL's regulation was procedurally sound because, as an Interpretive Rule and not substantive law, it was exempt from the requirement for Notice and Comment under under APA § 553.

- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive __________________ deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Low-Level Skidmore

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of __________________ by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Thorough Consideration

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed __________________ with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Administrative Consistency

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- EPA was accused of Improper Interpretation when it changed its official definition for sources of air pollution under the Clean Air Act to refer to entire plants or factories rather than individual pollution-emitting devices, the so-called "bubble policy."

- Supreme Court held that decisions of Agency Interpretation should be subject to a two-part inquiry: (1) was there a[n] __________________ by Congress on the issue in the statute; if not, then (2) was the agency's interpretation on the issue "Reasonable or Permissible."

- Congress had failed to provide a definition of the word "source" in the Clean Air Act and the Court felt that the EPA's interpretation was a reasonable policy choice; therefore, the "bubble policy" was to be given high-level Chevron Stage 2 deference.

answer

Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984); Unambiguous Expression

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that decisions of Agency Interpretation should be subject to a two-part inquiry: (1) was there an "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress on the issue in the statute; if not, then (2) was the agency's interpretation on the issue __________________.

answer

Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984); Reasonable or Permissible

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984); Chevron Stage 2

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- U.S. Customs Service was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a "ruling letter" to a seller of day planners that expressed that its products were classified as "diaries, notebooks and address books, bound," and attempted to enforce this ruling broadly.

- U.S. Customs Service argued that its statute was silent on the classification of day planners and that its interpretation was reasonable, and thus that the ruling letter was to be given Chevron Stage 2 deference.

- Supreme Court expressed that its holding in __________________ was only meant to apply to agency actions that Congress intended to have a binding "Force of Law," and that other agency actions were subject to a "Chevron Exception."

- Because "ruling letters" were a form of Informal Adjudication that could be issued by any U.S. Customs office—over 10,000 were issued every year—the Court felt that Congress clearly did not intend for them to be binding on third parties.

answer

U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001); Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court expressed that its holding in Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984) was only meant to apply to agency actions that Congress intended to have a binding __________________, and that other agency actions were subject to a "Chevron Exception."

answer

U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001); Force of Law

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court expressed that its holding in Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984) was only meant to apply to agency actions that Congress intended to have a binding "Force of Law," and that other agency actions were subject to a "Chevron Exception."

- Because "ruling letters" were a form of __________________ that could be issued by any U.S. Customs office—over 10,000 were issued every year—the Court felt that Congress clearly did not intend for them to be binding on third parties.

answer

U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001); Informal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.O.L. was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it reduced the acceptable "exposure limit" of the carcinogen benzene in a workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, pursuant to its OSHA power to set "feasible" standards which prevent risks of "material impairment of health" to workers.

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was a[n] __________________ from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Adjudication and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Adjudication and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have __________________ to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the __________________; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Burden of Proof

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after __________________ and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the __________________ of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Department of State (DOS) was accused of Improper Interpretation and violating Due Process when it used its statutory authority to "grant and issue passports" to justify a policy of requiring suspected communists to submit an affidavit on their political memberships as a prerequisite for the Informal Adjudication of their passport application.

- DOS argued that there was no __________________ by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was "Reasonable or Permissible" in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.

- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a "Protected Interest" subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.

- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Unambiguous Expression

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOS argued that there was no "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was __________________ in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Reasonable or Permissible

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOS argued that there was no "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was "Reasonable or Permissible" in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.

- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a[n] __________________ subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Protected Interest

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court declared that __________________ deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Chevron Stage 2

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a[n] __________________ of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Clear Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of __________________ to allow that interest to be abridged.

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.

- DOT argued that the approval was a[n] __________________ that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.

- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.

- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Action Committed to Agency Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under __________________.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); APA § 701

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of __________________ and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Informal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be __________________ according to APA § 706.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all __________________; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been __________________ or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear __________________ to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."

- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the __________________ and with all Relevant Factors being considered, and therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.

- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all Relevant Factors being considered, and therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.

- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the __________________ standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the __________________ review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all __________________ being considered, and therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all Relevant Factors being considered, therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.

- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in __________________, which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look Review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be __________________ and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from __________________, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look Review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of __________________, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Informal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of a[n] __________________ on which Judicial Review might be made.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under __________________ review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with a[n] __________________, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be __________________ under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under __________________; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with __________________ and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers __________________ on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Attorney General (AG) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, acting in his role as departmental head of INS, he issued a regulation which barred any alien who received "transit" status from applying to him for status adjustment, and then began automatically denying all transit-status applicants.

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make __________________ on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Individualized Rulings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

- Second Circuit Court stated that __________________ such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Adjudication by Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any __________________ in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's __________________; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG __________________ to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its justification of a "sell order" issued against an investment firm that had conducted insider trading during the reorganization of a public water company.

- Although SEC had initially justified its order on the basis of case law precedent and "equitable principles," it later asked a reviewing court to uphold the order out of deference to its experience with such matters.

- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged __________________ could not play a part in the Judicial Review of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through Post Hoc Rationalizations and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the Chenery Doctrine.

- The Court determined that the SEC's cited precedent and "equitable principles" were misapplied and thus remanded the order for further considerations, which would result in the case eventually returning to the Supreme Court.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Expertise

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged Expertise could not play a part in the __________________ of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through Post Hoc Rationalizations and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the Chenery Doctrine.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged Expertise could not play a part in the Judicial Review of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through __________________ and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the Chenery Doctrine.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Post Hoc Rationalizations

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged Expertise could not play a part in the Judicial Review of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through Post Hoc Rationalizations and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the __________________.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Chenery Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through __________________ in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an individual adjudication.

- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.

- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Prospective Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent __________________, and could not be created during an individual adjudication.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Undue Surprise

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

- Supreme Court expressed its concern for __________________, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Retroactive Liability

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of __________________, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

- In the Court's view, __________________ is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Rulemaking by Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive __________________ (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, __________________ review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, three years after setting a high maximum rate for shipping sugar from California to Arizona, it determined that shipping companies had made undue profits, lowered the rate, and ordered the shipping companies to pay reparations to their clients.

- Shipping companies protested the reparations order on the grounds that they had only made the alleged "undue profits" by following the regulations that ICC itself had found reasonable.

- Supreme Court expressed that an agency is bound by its own promulgated rules, may not repeal or replace those rules without sufficient explanation, and may only enforce the new framework "as it affect[s] future actions"; this is known as the __________________.

- The Court overturned the reparations order, holding that ICC had improperly combined its rulemaking and adjudicative functions and imposed Retroactive Liability by holding the shipping companies to a standard that did not exist at the time of their alleged wrongdoing.

answer

Arizona Grocery v. Atchison (1932); Arizona Grocery Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Shipping companies protested the reparations order on the grounds that they had only made the alleged "undue profits" by following the regulations that ICC itself had found reasonable.

- The Court overturned the reparations order, holding that ICC had improperly combined its rulemaking and adjudicative functions and imposed __________________ by holding the shipping companies to a standard that did not exist at the time of their alleged wrongdoing.

answer

Arizona Grocery v. Atchison (1932); Retroactive Liability

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court was accused of Improper Estoppel when it held that Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) was estopped from denying retroactive benefits to a woman who had delayed filing an application for "mother's insurance benefits" in reliance on the erroneous advice of the Social Security Administration (SSA).

- Supreme Court set aside the Second Circuit decision, stating that it would create a[n] __________________ if the government was estopped from adjudicating a case whenever a government employee makes a minor mistake.

- However, the Court made a carveout that Equitable Estoppel against the government was still available in cases of "Affirmative Misconduct" by government employees.

answer

Schweiker v. Hansen (1981); Significant Social Cost

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court set aside the Second Circuit decision, stating that it would create a "Significant Social Cost" if the government was estopped from adjudicating a case whenever a government employee makes a minor mistake.

- However, the Court made a carveout that __________________ against the government was still available in cases of "Affirmative Misconduct" by government employees.

answer

Schweiker v. Hansen (1981); Equitable Estoppel

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- However, the Court made a carveout that Equitable Estoppel against the government was still available in cases of __________________ by government employees.

answer

Schweiker v. Hansen (1981); Affirmative Misconduct

question

In the case of __________________ . . .
- City government was accused of violating Due Process when it imposed an individualized tax on a few property owners who paved their street without providing the property owners with an opportunity to be heard.
- City defended its action by arguing that the creation of taxes was a form of rulemaking, not adjudication, and therefore that the property owners had no right to due process under the 14th Amendment.
- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) Fair Notice, (2) a[n] __________________, and (3) an opportunity for Pre-Deprivation Hearing or a Post-Deprivation Hearing.

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Neutral Adjudicator

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- City government was accused of violating Due Process when it imposed an individualized tax on a few property owners who paved their street without providing the property owners with an opportunity to be heard.

- City defended its action by arguing that the creation of taxes was a form of rulemaking, not adjudication, and therefore that the property owners had no right to due process under the __________________.

- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) Fair Notice, (2) a Neutral Adjudicator, and (3) an opportunity for Pre-Deprivation Hearing or a Post-Deprivation Hearing.

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); 14th Amendment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) __________________, (2) a Neutral Adjudicator, and (3) an opportunity for Pre-Deprivation Hearing or a Post-Deprivation Hearing.

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Pre-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Colorado Board of Equalization (BOE) was accused of violating Procedural Due Process when it ordered that the valuation of all taxable property in Denver be increased by 40%, increasing the tax liability of all city residents without providing a hearing to any of them.

- Supreme Court acknowledged that the BOE's order was the product of adjudication and therefore required Due Process, but felt that it would be unrealistic to require the city to provide __________________ to its entire population.

- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Individualized Rulings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of __________________; while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Londoner v. City of Denver (1908)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a[n] __________________ or Post-Deprivation Hearing disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Pre-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or __________________ disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it declared that it was an unfair business practice for gas pumps to fail to post octane ratings, despite the agency's Enabling Statute only authorizing it to perform adjudicative functions.

- Supreme Court cited __________________ and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

- The Court upheld the FTC's regulation, finding that there was significant support that failure to post octane ratings was an unfair practice and that Congress' failure to expressly bar the FTC from rulemaking was sufficient authorization because allowing the FTC to issue rules would make for more effective execution of its mission.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive __________________ (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it declared that it was an unfair business practice for gas pumps to fail to post octane ratings, despite Congress only formally authorizing the FTC to perform adjudicative functions.

- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear __________________ in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, __________________ review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the __________________ to limit the agency's authority.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through __________________ under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under __________________.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); APA § 556-57

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for __________________ if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its __________________ requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a[n] __________________; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Hearing On-the-Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered __________________, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only __________________ and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Concise General Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of __________________, which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for __________________ is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Individualized Rulings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for __________________ under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under __________________, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are __________________ and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a[n] __________________ explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Concise General Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation __________________ under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass __________________ review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are __________________ that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit __________________ under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under __________________, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should nevertheless follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow __________________ under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full __________________, because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Hearing On-the-Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's __________________ were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying __________________ review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under __________________ because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's __________________ cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all __________________ or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- USDA was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it issued an internal memorandum to Administrative Law Judges that enclosures for big cats to be surrounded by walls of at least 8 feet in order to satisfy an existing agency rule requiring "structural strength" in animal facilities.

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for __________________ under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.

- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely an "Arbitrary Choice" among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under __________________, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from __________________; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was a[n] __________________ based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Interpretive Rule

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.

- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely a[n] __________________ among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Arbitrary Choice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a[n] __________________ on the basis of the rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Concise General Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- City of Chicago was accused of violating Due Process when it found that chicken in possession of a food storage company was unsafe and ordered its immediate surrender, with an opportunity for a hearing after the fact.

- Company argued that it was entitled to a[n] __________________, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.

- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain Emergency Circumstances may make it so that a Post-Deprivation Hearing is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator.

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Pre-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Company argued that it was entitled to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.

- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain __________________ may make it so that a Post-Deprivation Hearing is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator.

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Emergency Circumstances

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain Emergency Circumstances may make it so that a[n] __________________ is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator.

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .
- City of Chicago was accused of violating Due Process when it found that chicken in possession of a food storage company was unsafe and ordered its immediate surrender, with an opportunity for a hearing after the fact
- Company argued that it was entitled to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.
- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain Emergency Circumstances may make it so that a Post-Deprivation Hearing is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a[n] __________________.

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Neutral Adjudicator

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- Commissioner argued that the expedited termination was necessary to prevent Administrative Burden, and that aid recipients had low barriers to receive the aid and therefore should have low barriers for its termination.

- Supreme Court held that recipients had a[n] __________________ in federally-funded financial aid because there was a Statutory Source establishing it; therefore, Procedural Due Process necessitated Fair Notice, a Neutral Adjudicator, and an opportunity to be heard.

- In order to meet these requirements, the Court ordered the imposition of Pre-Deprivation Hearings; although Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) had not yet been decided, the choice to impose this kind of hearing would have been supported under that case's balancing test because (1) the recipients' interest in avoiding Undue Hardship from unjust termination was strong, (2) the government interest in minimizing Administrative Burden is weak, and (3) imposing the additional protection would likely be an improvement.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Protected Interest

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- Supreme Court held that recipients had a "Protected Interest" in federally-funded financial aid because there was a[n] __________________ establishing it; therefore, Procedural Due Process necessitated Fair Notice, a Neutral Adjudicator, and an opportunity to be heard.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Statutory Source

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- Supreme Court held that recipients had a "Protected Interest" in federally-funded financial aid because there was a Statutory Source establishing it; therefore, Procedural Due Process necessitated Fair Notice, a Neutral Adjudicator, and an opportunity to be heard.

- In order to meet these requirements, the Court ordered the imposition of __________________; although Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) had not yet been decided, the choice to impose this kind of hearing would have been supported under that case's balancing test because (1) the recipients' interest in avoiding Undue Hardship from unjust termination was strong, (2) the government interest in minimizing Administrative Burden is weak, and (3) imposing the additional protection would likely be an improvement.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Pre-Deprivation Hearings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- In order to meet these requirements, the Court ordered the imposition of Pre-Deprivation Hearings; although __________________ had not yet been decided, the choice to impose this kind of hearing would have been supported under that case's balancing test because (1) the recipients' interest in avoiding Undue Hardship from unjust termination was strong, (2) the government interest in minimizing Administrative Burden is weak, and (3) imposing the additional protection would likely be an improvement.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Mathews v. Eldridge (1976)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- Commissioner argued that the expedited termination was necessary to prevent __________________, and that aid recipients had low barriers to receive the aid and therefore should have low barriers for its termination.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Administrative Burden

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- In order to meet these requirements, the Court ordered the imposition of Pre-Deprivation Hearings; although Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) had not yet been decided, the choice to impose this kind of hearing would have been supported under that case's balancing test because (1) the recipients' interest in avoiding __________________ from unjust termination was strong, (2) the government interest in minimizing Administrative Burden is weak, and (3) imposing the additional protection would likely be an improvement.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Undue Hardship

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- Supreme Court held that recipients had a "Protected Interest" in federally-funded financial aid because there was a Statutory Source establishing it; therefore, Procedural Due Process necessitated __________________, a Neutral Adjudicator, and an opportunity to be heard.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- Supreme Court held that recipients had a "Protected Interest" in federally-funded financial aid because there was a Statutory Source establishing it; therefore, Procedural Due Process necessitated Fair Notice, a[n] __________________, and an opportunity to be heard.

answer

Goldberg v. Kelly (1970); Neutral Adjudicator

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Board of Regents of Odessa Junior College was accused of violating Due Process by declining to renew a professor who had been working under successive one-year contracts without providing reasons or an opportunity to challenge the termination.

- Supreme Court found no __________________ for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a Circumstantial Source for the professor's expectation.

- Given this, the Court held that the professor had a "Protected Interest" in the renewal of his contract and that a decision to deprive him of that renewal had to meet the Procedural Due Process requirements of Fair Notice, a Neutral Adjudicator, and either a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing.

- Companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Statutory Source

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found no Statutory Source for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a[n] __________________ for the professor's expectation.

- Companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Circumstantial Source

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found no Statutory Source for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a Circumstantial Source for the professor's expectation.

- Given this, the Court held that the professor had a[n] __________________ in the renewal of his contract and that a decision to deprive him of that renewal had to meet the Procedural Due Process requirements of Fair Notice, a Neutral Adjudicator, and either a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing.

- Companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Protected Interest

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found no Statutory Source for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a Circumstantial Source for the professor's expectation.

- Given this, the Court held that the professor had a "Protected Interest" in the renewal of his contract and that a decision to deprive him of that renewal had to meet the __________________ requirements of Fair Notice, a Neutral Adjudicator, and either a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing.

- Companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Procedural Due Process

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found no Statutory Source for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a Circumstantial Source for the professor's expectation.

- Companion case to __________________, where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth (1972)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found no Statutory Source for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a Circumstantial Source for the professor's expectation.

- Given this, the Court held that the professor had a "Protected Interest" in the renewal of his contract and that a decision to deprive him of that renewal had to meet the Procedural Due Process requirements of __________________, a Neutral Adjudicator, and either a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing.

- Companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found no Statutory Source for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a Circumstantial Source for the professor's expectation.

- Given this, the Court held that the professor had a "Protected Interest" in the renewal of his contract and that a decision to deprive him of that renewal had to meet the Procedural Due Process requirements of Fair Notice, a[n] __________________, and either a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing.

- Companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Neutral Adjudicator

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found no Statutory Source for the professor's expectation of a new contract, but rather found that the college's de facto policy of automatic contract renewal had functioned as a Circumstantial Source for the professor's expectation.

- Companion case to Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), where a professor did not have a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Perry v. Sindermann (1972); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Board of Regents of Wisconsin State University was accused of violating Due Process by declining to renew a professor's one-year contract without providing him justifications or an opportunity for a hearing; the professor claimed it was retaliatory for his criticism of the university.

- Supreme Court found that the professor had no entitlement to automatic contract renewal, as there was no __________________ dictating such renewal for professors, nor any Circumstantial Source that would reasonably create an expectation for such renewal.

- Given this, the Court concluded that the professor's contract had rightfully expired and that he had no "Protected Interest" in receiving a new one, and thus Procedural Due Process had not been violated.

- Companion case to Perry v. Sindermann (1972), where a professor had a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Board of Regents v. Roth (1972); Statutory Source

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found that the professor had no entitlement to automatic contract renewal, as there was no Statutory Source dictating such renewal for professors, nor any __________________ that would reasonably create an expectation for such renewal.

- Companion case to Perry v. Sindermann (1972), where a professor had a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Board of Regents v. Roth (1972); Circumstantial Source

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court found that the professor had no entitlement to automatic contract renewal, as there was no Statutory Source dictating such renewal for professors, nor any Circumstantial Source that would reasonably create an expectation for such renewal.

- Given this, the Court concluded that the professor's contract had rightfully expired and that he had no __________________ in receiving a new one, and thus Procedural Due Process had not been violated.

- Companion case to Perry v. Sindermann (1972), where a professor had a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Board of Regents v. Roth (1972); Protected Interest

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Given this, the Court concluded that the professor's contract had rightfully expired and that he had no "Protected Interest" in receiving a new one, and thus __________________ had not been violated.

- Companion case to Perry v. Sindermann (1972), where a professor had a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Board of Regents v. Roth (1972); Procedural Due Process

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Companion case to __________________, where a professor had a reasonable expectation of renewal on his one-year contract.

answer

Board of Regents v. Roth (1972); Perry v. Sindermann (1972)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

- Supreme Court held that recipients have a[n] __________________ in their benefits, but their need for stricter procedures requires a balance of (1) the strength of the party's interest and any Undue Hardship that would result from its unjust deprivation, (2) the government's interest in accomplishing goals while minimizing Administrative Burden, and (3) the possibility that the current procedure could be improved.

- Weighing the factors, the Court held that there was no constitutional requirement for a Pre-Deprivation Hearing for social security benefits under Procedural Due Process; a Post-Deprivation Hearing was sufficient, as long as Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator were also provided.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Protected Interest

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

- Supreme Court held that recipients have a Protected Interest in their benefits, but their need for stricter procedures requires a balance of (1) the strength of the party's interest and any Undue Hardship that would result from its unjust deprivation, (2) the government's interest in accomplishing goals while minimizing Administrative Burden, and (3) the possibility that the current procedure could be improved.

- Weighing the factors, the Court held that there was no constitutional requirement for a __________________ for social security benefits under Procedural Due Process; a Post-Deprivation Hearing was sufficient, as long as Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator were also provided.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Pre-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

- Supreme Court held that recipients have a Protected Interest in their benefits, but their need for stricter procedures requires a balance of (1) the strength of the party's interest and any Undue Hardship that would result from its unjust deprivation, (2) the government's interest in accomplishing goals while minimizing __________________, and (3) the possibility that the current procedure could be improved.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Administrative Burden

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

- Weighing the factors, the Court held that there was no constitutional requirement for a Pre-Deprivation Hearing for social security benefits under __________________; a Post-Deprivation Hearing was sufficient, as long as Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator were also provided.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Procedural Due Process

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

- Weighing the factors, the Court held that there was no constitutional requirement for a Pre-Deprivation Hearing for social security benefits under Procedural Due Process; a __________________ was sufficient, as long as Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator were also provided.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

- Weighing the factors, the Court held that there was no constitutional requirement for a Pre-Deprivation Hearing for social security benefits under Procedural Due Process; a Post-Deprivation Hearing was sufficient, as long as __________________ and a Neutral Adjudicator were also provided.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Neutral Adjudicator

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Social Security Administration was accused of violating Due Process when it terminated social security benefits without providing a hearing prior to termination.

- Supreme Court held that recipients have a Protected Interest in their benefits, but their need for stricter procedures requires a balance of (1) the strength of the party's interest and any __________________ that would result from its unjust deprivation, (2) the government's interest in accomplishing goals while minimizing Administrative Burden, and (3) the possibility that the current procedure could be improved.

answer

Mathews v. Eldridge (1976); Undue Hardship

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA was accused of Improper Adjudication when it rejected a petition from death row inmates alleging that lethal injection drugs had not been approved for human use, and therefore the FDA was required to enjoin their use under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).

- D.C. Circuit Court decided that the FDA's decision not to enforce its __________________ was effectively a type of Informal Rulemaking, and found that in this case it was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706.

- Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an agency's decision to practice Nonenforcement was an "Action Committed to Agency Discretion" under APA § 701, and therefore was not subject to Judicial Review.

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court decided that the FDA's decision not to enforce its Enabling Statute was effectively a type of __________________, and found that in this case it was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706.

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court decided that the FDA's decision not to enforce its Enabling Statute was effectively a type of Informal Rulemaking, and found that in this case it was __________________ under APA § 706.

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court decided that the FDA's decision not to enforce its Enabling Statute was effectively a type of Informal Rulemaking, and found that in this case it was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under __________________.

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an agency's decision to practice __________________ was an "Action Committed to Agency Discretion" under APA § 701, and therefore was not subject to Judicial Review.

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); Nonenforcement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an agency's decision to practice Nonenforcement was a[n] __________________ under APA § 701, and therefore was not subject to Judicial Review.

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); Action Committed to Agency Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an agency's decision to practice Nonenforcement was an "Action Committed to Agency Discretion" under __________________, and therefore was not subject to Judicial Review.

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); APA § 701

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Heckler v. Chaney (1985); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- California District Court was accused of Improper Judicial Review when it granted an environmental special interest group's request for preliminary injunction against the U.S. Forest Service, preventing it from issuing permits for construction in Mineral King Valley, a particular piece of National Forest land.

- Special interest group argued that it had __________________ to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

- Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the group lacked standing because they had only a "General Interest" in preventing the construction, but would not truly suffer an "Injury-in-Fact" since none of its members claimed to have used Mineral King Valley's resources.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); Constitutional Standing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was a[n] __________________ to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); Injury-in-Fact

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a[n] __________________ in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); Fairly Traceable Cause

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was __________________ through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); Redressable

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had __________________ under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); Statutory Standing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under __________________, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); APA § 702

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the __________________ of the Forest Service's mission.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); Arguable Zone of Interests

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

- Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the group lacked standing because they had only a[n] __________________ in preventing the construction, but would not truly suffer an "Injury-in-Fact" since none of its members claimed to have used Mineral King Valley's resources.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); General Interest

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Special interest group argued that it had Constitutional Standing to sue the Forest Service because the construction in Mineral King Valley (1) was an Injury-in-Fact to their environmental cause, (2) had a "Fairly Traceable Cause" in the Forest Service's permit, and (3) was Redressable through injunctive relief.

- Group also argued it had Statutory Standing under APA § 702, since its interest in preserving nature was in the "Arguable Zone of Interests" of the Forest Service's mission.

- Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the group lacked standing because they had only a "General Interest" in preventing the construction, but would not truly suffer a[n] __________________ since none of its members claimed to have used Mineral King Valley's resources.

answer

Sierra Club v. Morton (1971); Injury-in-Fact

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Drug manufacturer was accused of Improper Pursuit of Remedy when it sued the Commissioner of the FDA, alleging that he had exceeded his statutory authority by issuing a regulation requiring manufacturers to display the "generic name" of a drug alongside their respective brand names.

- Third Circuit Court dismissed the manufacturer's suit on grounds that the allegedly invalid regulation had never actually been enforced on it.

- Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit decision, holding that the manufacturer established sufficient __________________ for judicial intervention on an agency action by showing (1) the Judicial Fitness of the issue due to its purely law-centric (rather than fact-centric) nature, and (2) a likelihood of Undue Hardship without a prompt court decision.

- NOTE: this requirement is different from a plaintiff's need for Constitutional Standing or Statutory Standing under APA § 702.

answer

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967); Ripeness

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Third Circuit Court dismissed the manufacturer's suit on grounds that the allegedly invalid regulation had never actually been enforced on it.

- Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit decision, holding that the manufacturer established sufficient Ripeness for judicial intervention on an agency action by showing (1) the __________________ of the issue due to its purely law-centric (rather than fact-centric) nature, and (2) a likelihood of Undue Hardship without a prompt court decision.

- NOTE: this requirement is different from a plaintiff's need for Constitutional Standing or Statutory Standing under APA § 702.

answer

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967); Judicial Fitness

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Third Circuit Court dismissed the manufacturer's suit on grounds that the allegedly invalid regulation had never actually been enforced on it.

- Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit decision, holding that the manufacturer established sufficient Ripeness for judicial intervention on an agency action by showing (1) the Judicial Fitness of the issue due to its purely law-centric (rather than fact-centric) nature, and (2) a likelihood of __________________ without a prompt court decision.

- NOTE: this requirement is different from a plaintiff's need for Constitutional Standing or Statutory Standing under APA § 702.

answer

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967); Undue Hardship

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Third Circuit Court dismissed the manufacturer's suit on grounds that the allegedly invalid regulation had never actually been enforced on it.

- Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit decision, holding that the manufacturer established sufficient Ripeness for judicial intervention on an agency action by showing (1) the Judicial Fitness of the issue due to its purely law-centric (rather than fact-centric) nature, and (2) a likelihood of Undue Hardship without a prompt court decision.

- NOTE: this requirement is different from a plaintiff's need for __________________ or Statutory Standing under APA § 702.

answer

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967); Constitutional Standing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Third Circuit Court dismissed the manufacturer's suit on grounds that the allegedly invalid regulation had never actually been enforced on it.

- Supreme Court overturned the Third Circuit decision, holding that the manufacturer established sufficient Ripeness for judicial intervention on an agency action by showing (1) the Judicial Fitness of the issue due to its purely law-centric (rather than fact-centric) nature, and (2) a likelihood of Undue Hardship without a prompt court decision.

- NOTE: this requirement is different from a plaintiff's need for Constitutional Standing or Statutory Standing under __________________.

answer

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967); APA § 702

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Plaintiff draftee was accused of Improper Pursuit of Remedy when, after being drafted following improper removal of his "sole surviving son" status, he simply declined to appear for his medical exam on anti-war principles and was charged and indicted for avoiding service.

- Although plaintiff argued that his drafting was improper from the beginning, the Sixth Circuit Court declined his request for appeal on grounds of Common Law Exhaustion, saying that he was not entitled to __________________ because he had not pursued all possible administrative remedies within the adjudicating agency.

- Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit decision, holding that the case was governed by Statutory Exhaustion under APA § 704, which requires the pursuit of all administrative remedies only if (1) mandatorily imposed by the Enabling Statute, or (2) government interest in minimizing Judicial Burden outweighs any possible Undue Hardship; neither option applied here.

answer

McKart v. U.S. (1969); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although plaintiff argued that his drafting was improper from the beginning, the Sixth Circuit Court declined his request for appeal on grounds of __________________, saying that he was not entitled to Judicial Review because he had not pursued all possible administrative remedies within the adjudicating agency.

answer

McKart v. U.S. (1969); Common Law Exhaustion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although plaintiff argued that his drafting was improper from the beginning, the Sixth Circuit Court declined his request for appeal on grounds of Common Law Exhaustion, saying that he was not entitled to Judicial Review because he had not pursued all possible administrative remedies within the adjudicating agency.

- Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit decision, holding that the case was governed by __________________ under APA § 704, which requires the pursuit of all administrative remedies only if (1) mandatorily imposed by the Enabling Statute, or (2) government interest in minimizing Judicial Burden outweighs any possible Undue Hardship; neither option applied here.

answer

McKart v. U.S. (1969); Statutory Exhaustion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although plaintiff argued that his drafting was improper from the beginning, the Sixth Circuit Court declined his request for appeal on grounds of Common Law Exhaustion, saying that he was not entitled to Judicial Review because he had not pursued all possible administrative remedies within the adjudicating agency.

- Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit decision, holding that the case was governed by Statutory Exhaustion under __________________, which requires the pursuit of all administrative remedies only if (1) mandatorily imposed by the Enabling Statute, or (2) government interest in minimizing Judicial Burden outweighs any possible Undue Hardship; neither option applied here.

answer

McKart v. U.S. (1969); APA § 704

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although plaintiff argued that his drafting was improper from the beginning, the Sixth Circuit Court declined his request for appeal on grounds of Common Law Exhaustion, saying that he was not entitled to Judicial Review because he had not pursued all possible administrative remedies within the adjudicating agency.

- Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit decision, holding that the case was governed by Statutory Exhaustion under APA § 704, which requires the pursuit of all administrative remedies only if (1) mandatorily imposed by the __________________, or (2) government interest in minimizing Judicial Burden outweighs any possible Undue Hardship; neither option applied here.

answer

McKart v. U.S. (1969); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although plaintiff argued that his drafting was improper from the beginning, the Sixth Circuit Court declined his request for appeal on grounds of Common Law Exhaustion, saying that he was not entitled to Judicial Review because he had not pursued all possible administrative remedies within the adjudicating agency.

- Supreme Court overturned the Sixth Circuit decision, holding that the case was governed by Statutory Exhaustion under APA § 704, which requires the pursuit of all administrative remedies only if (1) mandatorily imposed by the Enabling Statute, or (2) government interest in minimizing __________________ outweighs any possible Undue Hardship; neither option applied here.

answer

McKart v. U.S. (1969); Judicial Burden

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Plaintiff consumer protection activist was accused of Improper Pursuit of Remedy when, after being unexpectedly "bumped" from an overbooked flight for which he bought a "confirmed reservation," he directly sued the offending airline for misrepresentation instead of seeking remedy through the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).

- D.C. Circuit Court stayed proceedings on plaintiff's suit, finding that CAB's __________________ gave it the right to "determine in the first instance" whether or not an air carrier's business practices were unfair or deceptive.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that the doctrine of "Primary Jurisdiction" only applies to cases where (1) a judicial decision might contradict or overturn an agency actions and essentially constitute Judicial Review, or (2) the agency's Expertise prompts the courts' deference; neither option applied here, so plaintiff's suit could proceed.

answer

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines (1976); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court stayed proceedings on plaintiff's suit, finding that CAB's Enabling Statute gave it the right to "determine in the first instance" whether or not an air carrier's business practices were unfair or deceptive.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that the doctrine of __________________ only applies to cases where (1) a judicial decision might contradict or overturn an agency actions and essentially constitute Judicial Review, or (2) the agency's Expertise prompts the courts' deference; neither option applied here, so plaintiff's suit could proceed.

answer

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines (1976); Primary Jurisdiction

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that the doctrine of "Primary Jurisdiction" only applies to cases where (1) a judicial decision might contradict or overturn an agency actions and essentially constitute __________________, or (2) the agency's Expertise prompts the courts' deference; neither option applied here, so plaintiff's suit could proceed.

answer

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines (1976); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that the doctrine of "Primary Jurisdiction" only applies to cases where (1) a judicial decision might contradict or overturn an agency actions and essentially constitute Judicial Review, or (2) the agency's __________________ prompts the courts' deference; neither option applied here, so plaintiff's suit could proceed.

answer

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines (1976); Expertise

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make __________________ to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- The review process for an information request is considered an Informal Adjudication subject to "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review under APA § 706; agency officers may face disciplinary action for tampering with or delaying the review process.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Reasonable Efforts

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- The review process for an information request is considered an Informal Adjudication subject to __________________ review under APA § 706; agency officers may face disciplinary action for tampering with or delaying the review process.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- The review process for an information request is considered an Informal Adjudication subject to "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review under __________________; agency officers may face disciplinary action for tampering with or delaying the review process.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); APA § 706

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to __________________, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); National Security

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency __________________, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Personnel Rules and Practices

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to __________________, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Statutory Exemption

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a[n] __________________, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Trade Secret

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be __________________ in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Privileged Material

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of __________________, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Personal Privacy

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to __________________, (8) pertains to Financial Institutions, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Law Enforcement

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

- Agencies or their officers may invoke a "Sensitivity and Privacy" exception to decline disclosure, stating that the requested information: (1) is classified as important to National Security, (2) relates only to agency Personnel Rules and Practices, (3) is subject to Statutory Exemption, (4) is a Trade Secret, (5) would be Privileged Material in litigation involving the agency, (6) is a matter of Personal Privacy, (7) relates to Law Enforcement, (8) pertains to __________________, or (9) concerns geological information on Oil Wells.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Financial Institutions

question

Under the __________________ . . .

- Executive agencies are required to make Reasonable Efforts to comply with requests by the public for documents and information.

answer

Freedom of Information Act (1967); Oil Wells

question

Under __________________ . . .

- Provides a person with a cause of action against individual officials or agents of a state government who, acting "under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage" endeavor to deprive that person of their civil rights.

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, state government officials performing __________________ receive Qualified Immunity from this cause of action for violating unenumerated rights, under the precedent of Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982).

- However, even immune officials can be sued for violating 1st Amendment freedom of speech, press, assembly, worship; 4th Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force; 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment protection against deprivation without due process and compensation, unequal protection; or 8th Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; Discretionary Functions

question

Under __________________ . . .

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, state government officials performing Discretionary Functions receive __________________ from this cause of action for violating unenumerated rights, under the precedent of Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982).

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; Qualified Immunity

question

Under __________________ . . .

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, state government officials performing Discretionary Functions receive Qualified Immunity from this cause of action for violating unenumerated rights, under the precedent of __________________.

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; Harlow v. Fitzgerald (1982)

question

Under __________________ . . .

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, even immune officials can be sued for violating __________________ freedom of speech, press, assembly, worship; 4th Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force; 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment protection against deprivation without due process and compensation, unequal protection; or 8th Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; 1st Amendment

question

Under __________________ . . .

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, even immune officials can be sued for violating 1st Amendment freedom of speech, press, assembly, worship; __________________ protection from unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force; 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment protection against deprivation without due process and compensation, unequal protection; or 8th Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; 4th Amendment

question

Under __________________ . . .

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, even immune officials can be sued for violating 1st Amendment freedom of speech, press, assembly, worship; 4th Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force; 5th Amendment and __________________ protection against deprivation without due process and compensation, unequal protection; or 8th Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; 14th Amendment

question

Under __________________ . . .

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, even immune officials can be sued for violating 1st Amendment freedom of speech, press, assembly, worship; 4th Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force; __________________ and 14th Amendment protection against deprivation without due process and compensation, unequal protection; or 8th Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; 5th Amendment

question

Under __________________ . . .

- This cause of action is intended to protect both enumerated and unenumerated rights.

- However, even immune officials can be sued for violating 1st Amendment freedom of speech, press, assembly, worship; 4th Amendment protection from unreasonable search and seizure, excessive force; 5th Amendment and 14th Amendment protection against deprivation without due process and compensation, unequal protection; or __________________ protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

answer

42 U.S.C. § 1983; 8th Amendment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- U.S. Customs Service (USCS) was accused of Improper Adjudication when, pursuant to a statute permitting seizure of imported "wild" animals from countries restricting their export, it ordered forfeiture of a number of birds that a trader had illegally exported from Indonesia, despite never including information about the Indonesian law in its Customs Manual.

- Trader argued (1) that individual birds born in captivity were not "wild"; and (2) that a very old USCS regulation stating that information on foreign export laws "will be published" in the Customs Manual was an interpretation of its __________________ that essentially made publication of a foreign law a prerequisite to liability for its violation.

- Ninth Circuit Court held that the the USCS's assertion about the definition of "wild"—that it referred to species "normally found in a wild state"—prevailed against the trader's individual-based interpretation since the latter would create undue Administrative Burden by requiring Individualized Rulings for every offending organism.

- The Court also found that, even if the trader's meaning for it were adopted, the old USCS regulation was inconsequential since an Interpretive Rule loses its Force of Law if it is not followed.

answer

U.S. v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots (9th Cir. 1982); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Trader argued (1) that individual birds born in captivity were not "wild"; and (2) that a very old USCS regulation stating that information on foreign export laws "will be published" in the Customs Manual was an interpretation of its Enabling Statute that essentially made publication of a foreign law a prerequisite to liability for its violation.

- Ninth Circuit Court held that the the USCS's assertion about the definition of "wild"—that it referred to species "normally found in a wild state"—prevailed against the trader's individual-based interpretation since the latter would create undue __________________ by requiring Individualized Rulings for every offending organism.

- The Court also found that, even if the trader's meaning for it were adopted, the old USCS regulation was inconsequential since an Interpretive Rule loses its Force of Law if it is not followed.

answer

U.S. v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots (9th Cir. 1982); Administrative Burden

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Trader argued (1) that individual birds born in captivity were not "wild"; and (2) that a very old USCS regulation stating that information on foreign export laws "will be published" in the Customs Manual was an interpretation of its Enabling Statute that essentially made publication of a foreign law a prerequisite to liability for its violation.

- The Court also found that, even if the trader's meaning for it were adopted, the old USCS regulation was inconsequential since an Interpretive Rule loses its Force of Law if it is not followed.

answer

U.S. v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots (9th Cir. 1982); Individualized Rulings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Trader argued (1) that individual birds born in captivity were not "wild"; and (2) that a very old USCS regulation stating that information on foreign export laws "will be published" in the Customs Manual was an interpretation of its Enabling Statute that essentially made publication of a foreign law a prerequisite to liability for its violation.

- The Court also found that, even if the trader's meaning for it were adopted, the old USCS regulation was inconsequential since a[n] __________________ loses its Force of Law if it is not followed.

answer

U.S. v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots (9th Cir. 1982); Interpretive Rule

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Trader argued (1) that individual birds born in captivity were not "wild"; and (2) that a very old USCS regulation stating that information on foreign export laws "will be published" in the Customs Manual was an interpretation of its Enabling Statute that essentially made publication of a foreign law a prerequisite to liability for its violation.

- The Court also found that, even if the trader's meaning for it were adopted, the old USCS regulation was inconsequential since an Interpretive Rule loses its __________________ if it is not followed.

answer

U.S. v. Fifty-Three Eclectus Parrots (9th Cir. 1982); Force of Law

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued an opinion letter stating that the FLSA only permitted an employer to require employees to spend their accrued "compensatory time" if it had received the employees' prior agreement.

- Texas District Court invoked the opinion letter to enter a declaratory judgment against a local government, stating that the Sheriff's Department had violated the DOL's __________________ by suddenly imposing a policy of required expenditure of compensatory time.

- Supreme Court reversed the District Court decision, holding that an Interpretive Rule contained in a mere opinion letter is not entitled to deference under Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984) because it is not an agency document that carries the Force of Law; at most, such a document deserved only Low-Level Skidmore deference.

- The majority's opinion would be echoed shortly after in U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001).

answer

Christensen v. Harris County (2000); Interpretive Rule

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Texas District Court invoked the opinion letter to enter a declaratory judgment against a local government, stating that the Sheriff's Department had violated the DOL's Interpretive Rule by suddenly imposing a policy of required expenditure of compensatory time.

- Supreme Court reversed the District Court decision, holding that a[n] __________________ contained in a mere opinion letter is not entitled to deference under Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984) because it is not an agency document that carries the Force of Law; at most, such a document deserved only Low-Level Skidmore deference.

- The majority's opinion would be echoed shortly after in U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001).

answer

Christensen v. Harris County (2000); Interpretive Rule

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court reversed the District Court decision, holding that an Interpretive Rule contained in a mere opinion letter is not entitled to deference under __________________ because it is not an agency document that carries the Force of Law; at most, such a document deserved only Low-Level Skidmore deference.

- The majority's opinion would be echoed shortly after in U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001).

answer

Christensen v. Harris County (2000); Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court reversed the District Court decision, holding that an Interpretive Rule contained in a mere opinion letter is not entitled to deference under Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984) because it is not an agency document that carries the __________________; at most, such a document deserved only Low-Level Skidmore deference.

- The majority's opinion would be echoed shortly after in U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001).

answer

Christensen v. Harris County (2000); Force of Law

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The majority's opinion would be echoed shortly after in U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001).

answer

Christensen v. Harris County (2000); Low-Level Skidmore

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The majority's opinion would be echoed shortly after in __________________.

answer

Christensen v. Harris County (2000); U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

- Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the DOL's regulation was procedurally sound because, as a[n] __________________ and not substantive law, it was exempt from the requirement for Notice and Comment under under APA § 553.

- Further, the Court expressed that agencies' statutory interpretations deserves some persuasive Skidmore deference if it (1) was the product of "Thorough Consideration," (2) is supported by valid reasoning, (3) demonstrates Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, and (4) is supported other persuasive factors, such as the agency's Expertise.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Interpretive Rule

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Expertise

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Ninth Circuit overturned the order, finding that the newsboys were independent contractors, and that the NLRB's use of "employee" was incorrect.

- Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NLRB satisfied the contemporary requirements for deference to a[n] __________________: (1) the agency's conclusion has "warrant in the record," and (2) the agency's interpretation has a "reasonable basis in law."

- Ruling was made alongside the case of Skidmore v. Swift (1944).

answer

N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications (1944); Interpretive Rule

question

Under __________________ . . .

- A distinction is drawn between agencies' "regular" rules/regulations and so-called __________________, which are those likely to result in either (1) an Annual Economic Effect of $100 million or more, (2) a major increase in costs or prices, or (3) "Significant Adverse Effects" on U.S. enterprises.

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Benefit is outweighed by its Societal Cost.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Major Rules

question

Under __________________ . . .

- A distinction is drawn between agencies' "regular" rules/regulations and so-called "Major Rules," which are those likely to result in either (1) a[n] __________________ of $100 million or more, (2) a major increase in costs or prices, or (3) "Significant Adverse Effects" on U.S. enterprises.

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Costs outweigh its Societal Benefits.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Annual Economic Effect

question

Under __________________ . . .

- A distinction is drawn between agencies' "regular" rules/regulations and so-called "Major Rules," which are those likely to result in either (1) an Annual Economic Effect of $100 million or more, (2) a major increase in costs or prices, or (3) __________________ on U.S. enterprises.

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if it Societal Costs outweigh its Societal Benefits.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Significant Adverse Effects

question

Under __________________ . . .

- All agencies are bound to perform a[n] __________________ prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Costs outweigh its Societal Benefits.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Regulatory Impact Analysis

question

Under __________________ . . .

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its __________________ outweigh its Societal Benefits.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Societal Costs

question

Under __________________ . . .

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Costs outweigh its __________________.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Societal Benefits

question

Under __________________ . . .

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Costs outweigh its Societal Benefits.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest __________________.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Net Societal Benefit

question

Under __________________ . . .

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Benefit is outweighed by its Societal Cost.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all __________________, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Independent Agencies

question

Under __________________ . . .

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Benefit is outweighed by its Societal Cost.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all __________________ under APA § 556–57, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); Formal Rulemaking

question

Under __________________ . . .

- All agencies are bound to perform a Regulatory Impact Analysis prior to performing any regulatory action, and shall forgo such action if its Societal Benefit is outweighed by its Societal Cost.

- In the event that an agency has many alternative actions available to address a regulatory need, it must choose the option with the greatest Net Societal Benefit.

- These requirements are waived for all Independent Agencies, as well as for all Formal Rulemaking under __________________, as long as neither waiver would be statutorily or constitutionally violative.

answer

Executive Order 12,291 (1981); APA § 556–57

1 of 281

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized __________________, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Expertise

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Legislative Burden

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent __________________ by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."

answer

State ex rel. Railroad v. Mees (Minn. 1888); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Force of Law

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the Nondelegation Doctrine because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted __________________ by the advisory committees and therefore was not an "Intelligible Guiding Principle."

answer

Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a[n] __________________ without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant __________________.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.

- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.

- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's __________________; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.

answer

Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally (1971); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the Nondelegation Doctrine by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.

answer

I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983); Legislative Veto

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the Nondelegation Doctrine by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.

answer

I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983); Presentment Clause

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the __________________ by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.

answer

I.N.S. v. Chadha (1983); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the __________________ for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); Removal Power

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove __________________, and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); Principal Officers

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that __________________ may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); Inferior Officers

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.

- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to __________________.

answer

Myers v. U.S. (1926); For-Cause Removal

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); For-Cause Removal

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); Removal Power

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Humphrey's Executor v. U.S. (1935); Inferior Officers

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Public Rights

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Private Rights

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's __________________ (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Fundamental Findings of Fact

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to __________________; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); De Novo Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Article III

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Crowell v. Benson (1932); Judicial Exclusivity

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a[n] __________________ must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "__________________ on the record as a whole."

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Administrative Law Judge

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."

- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.

answer

Universal Camera v. N.L.R.B. (1951); Entire Administrative Record

question

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record.

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); De Novo Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Smyth v. Ames (1881); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the _________________ or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of _________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of _________________.

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Smyth v. Ames (1881)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide _________________ as required under APA § 556-57.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); Trial-Type Proceedings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.

- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under _________________.

- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).

answer

F.P.C. v. Hope Natural Gas (1944); APA § 556-57

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Ninth Circuit overturned the order, finding that the newsboys were independent contractors, and that the NLRB's use of "employee" was incorrect.

- Ruling was made alongside the case of __________________.

answer

N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications (1944); Skidmore v. Swift (1944)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Low-Level Skidmore

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Thorough Consideration

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.

- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed __________________ with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.

answer

Skidmore v. Swift (1944); Administrative Consistency

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984); Unambiguous Expression

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984); Reasonable or Permissible

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984); Chevron Stage 2

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001); Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001); Force of Law

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

U.S. v. Mead Corp. (2001); Informal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Intelligible Guiding Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have __________________ to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the __________________; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Nondelegation Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Burden of Proof

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after __________________ and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.

answer

Indus. Union v. Am. Petroleum Institute (1979); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Unambiguous Expression

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Reasonable or Permissible

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Protected Interest

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Chevron Stage 2

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Clear Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Kent v. Dulles (1958); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was a[n] __________________ that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Action Committed to Agency Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under __________________.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); APA § 701

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Informal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be __________________ according to APA § 706.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.

answer

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in __________________, which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Scenic Hudson Preservation v. F.P.C. (2d Cir. 1965); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Informal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of a[n] __________________ on which Judicial Review might be made.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under __________________ review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with a[n] __________________, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Entire Administrative Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under __________________; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers __________________ on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.

answer

Holmes v. N.Y.C. Housing Authority (2d Cir. 1968); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Individualized Rulings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Adjudication by Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's __________________; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.

- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG __________________ to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.

answer

Fook Hong Mak v. I.N.S. (2d Cir. 1970); Unfettered Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Expertise

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Post Hoc Rationalizations

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. I (1943); Chenery Doctrine

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Prospective Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Undue Surprise

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Retroactive Liability

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Formal Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Rulemaking by Adjudication

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive __________________ (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, __________________ review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Substantial Evidence

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.

answer

S.E.C. v. Chenery Corp. II (1947); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Shipping companies protested the reparations order on the grounds that they had only made the alleged "undue profits" by following the regulations that ICC itself had found reasonable.

answer

Arizona Grocery v. Atchison (1932); Arizona Grocery Principle

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Shipping companies protested the reparations order on the grounds that they had only made the alleged "undue profits" by following the regulations that ICC itself had found reasonable.

answer

Arizona Grocery v. Atchison (1932); Retroactive Liability

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- However, the Court made a carveout that Equitable Estoppel against the government was still available in cases of "Affirmative Misconduct" by government employees.

answer

Schweiker v. Hansen (1981); Significant Social Cost

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- However, the Court made a carveout that __________________ against the government was still available in cases of "Affirmative Misconduct" by government employees.

answer

Schweiker v. Hansen (1981); Equitable Estoppel

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- However, the Court made a carveout that Equitable Estoppel against the government was still available in cases of __________________ by government employees.

answer

Schweiker v. Hansen (1981); Affirmative Misconduct

question

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Neutral Adjudicator

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); 14th Amendment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Fair Notice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Pre-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Individualized Rulings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Londoner v. City of Denver (1908)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a[n] __________________ or Post-Deprivation Hearing disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Pre-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or __________________ disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.

answer

Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Judicial Review

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear __________________ in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Congressional Intent

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, __________________ review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the __________________ to limit the agency's authority.

answer

National Petroleum Refiners v. F.T.C. (1973); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through __________________ under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under __________________.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); APA § 556-57

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Hearing On-the-Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered __________________, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only __________________ and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Concise General Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of __________________, which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Bi-Metallic Investment v. Board of Equalization (1915)

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.

answer

U.S. v. Florida East Coast Railway (1973); Individualized Rulings

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for __________________ under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under __________________, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are __________________ and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a[n] __________________ explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Concise General Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass __________________ review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are __________________ that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.

answer

U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products (1977); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Formal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full __________________, because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Hearing On-the-Record

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's __________________ were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Enabling Statute

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying __________________ review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Hard Look

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under __________________ because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); APA § 706

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all __________________ or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Relevant Factors

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.

answer

Vermont Yankee v. N.R.D.C. (1978); Clearly Erroneous

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Informal Rulemaking

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); APA § 553

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Notice and Comment

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Interpretive Rule

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Arbitrary Choice

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a[n] __________________ on the basis of the rule.

answer

Hoctor v. U.S.D.A. (1996); Concise General Statement

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Pre-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Emergency Circumstances

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Post-Deprivation Hearing

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Fair Notice

question

answer

North American Cold Storage v. City (1908); Neutral Adjudicator

question

In the case of __________________ . . .

- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.

- Supreme Court held that recipients had a[n] __________________