In the case of __________________ . . .
- Minnesota State Legislature was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily established a Railroad & Warehouse Commission that could set price ceilings on hauling rates for intrastate freight transport.
- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the __________________ normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized Expertise, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.
- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Minnesota State Legislature was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily established a Railroad & Warehouse Commission that could set price ceilings on hauling rates for intrastate freight transport.
- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized Expertise, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.
- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides a[n] __________________ to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Minnesota State Legislature was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily established a Railroad & Warehouse Commission that could set price ceilings on hauling rates for intrastate freight transport.
- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized __________________, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.
- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Minnesota State Legislature was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily established a Railroad & Warehouse Commission that could set price ceilings on hauling rates for intrastate freight transport.
- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized Expertise, or which would result in undue __________________ if handled by the legislature.
- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Minnesota State Legislature was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily established a Railroad & Warehouse Commission that could set price ceilings on hauling rates for intrastate freight transport.
- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized Expertise, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.
- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a[n] __________________ to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent Unfettered Discretion by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Minnesota State Legislature was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily established a Railroad & Warehouse Commission that could set price ceilings on hauling rates for intrastate freight transport.
- Minnesota Supreme Court explained that, although the Nondelegation Doctrine normally prevents a legislative body from delegating the power to make laws, it may still delegate the power to conduct tasks "under and pursuant to law"; this ability is especially useful for tasks which require the specific or localized Expertise, or which would result in undue Legislative Burden if handled by the legislature.
- The Court stated that the legislature's assignment of a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" to an agency is permissible as long as the Enabling Statute provides an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" to prevent __________________ by the agency; here, the legislature required that all rates set by the Commission must be "equal and reasonable."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when kosher butchers were indicted for violating regulations imposed by their local "advisory committee" under the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), a statute that gave the President the power to establish such industry-specific committees and to officially recognize their local-level regulations.
- The butchers argued that the advisory committees had lacked Constitutional authority to create new law, and therefore the regulations forming the charges against them—which included sale of "unfit poultry" and allowing customers to select specific chickens for purchase—did not carry the Force of Law.
- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the __________________ because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted Unfettered Discretion by the advisory committees and therefore was not an "Intelligible Guiding Principle."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when kosher butchers were indicted for violating regulations imposed by their local "advisory committee" under the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), a statute that gave the President the power to establish such industry-specific committees and to officially recognize their local-level regulations.
- The butchers argued that the advisory committees had lacked Constitutional authority to create new law, and therefore the regulations forming the charges against them—which included sale of "unfit poultry" and allowing customers to select specific chickens for purchase—did not carry the Force of Law.
- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the Nondelegation Doctrine because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted Unfettered Discretion by the advisory committees and therefore was not a[n] __________________.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when kosher butchers were indicted for violating regulations imposed by their local "advisory committee" under the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), a statute that gave the President the power to establish such industry-specific committees and to officially recognize their local-level regulations.
- The butchers argued that the advisory committees had lacked Constitutional authority to create new law, and therefore the regulations forming the charges against them—which included sale of "unfit poultry" and allowing customers to select specific chickens for purchase—did not carry the __________________.
- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the Nondelegation Doctrine because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted Unfettered Discretion by the advisory committees and therefore was not an "Intelligible Guiding Principle."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when kosher butchers were indicted for violating regulations imposed by their local "advisory committee" under the National Industry Recovery Act (NIRA), a statute that gave the President the power to establish such industry-specific committees and to officially recognize their local-level regulations.
- The butchers argued that the advisory committees had lacked Constitutional authority to create new law, and therefore the regulations forming the charges against them—which included sale of "unfit poultry" and allowing customers to select specific chickens for purchase—did not carry the Force of Law.
- Supreme Court, ruling unanimously, found that the NIRA violated the Nondelegation Doctrine because the only direction provided by Congress was the goal of preventing "unfair methods of competition," language which essentially permitted __________________ by the advisory committees and therefore was not an "Intelligible Guiding Principle."
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.
- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without a[n] __________________ included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.
- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's Unfettered Discretion; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.
- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a[n] __________________ without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.
- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's Unfettered Discretion; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.
- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the __________________, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.
- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's Unfettered Discretion; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.
- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.
- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as a[n] __________________, as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's Unfettered Discretion; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.
- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant __________________.
- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's Unfettered Discretion; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed the Economic Stabilization Act (ESA), granting the President broad authority to set prices and wages.
- D.C. District Court cited Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S. (1935) as precedent for the Nondelegation Doctrine, which invalidates any legislation that empowers the executive branch to perform a "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function" without an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" included by Congress in the relevant Enabling Statute.
- The Court expanded on this, however, finding that other law or even circumstantial factors could function as an "Intelligible Guiding Principle," as long as it prevents or reigns in the executive branch's __________________; here, the ESA had a lifetime of only six months, so it was upheld as valid.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily empowered itself with the ability to invalidate the Attorney General's decisions to suspend the deportation of individual aliens through a unicameral majority vote, which is called a[n] __________________.
- Supreme Court held that Congress' reservation of authority over the actions of Executive Agencies violated the Constitution's Presentment Clause, which limits Congressional lawmaking to formal statutes that achieve a bicameral majority and are signed by the President.
- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the Nondelegation Doctrine by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily empowered itself with the ability to invalidate the Attorney General's decisions to suspend the deportation of individual aliens through a unicameral majority vote, which is called a Legislative Veto.
- Supreme Court held that Congress' reservation of authority over the actions of Executive Agencies violated the Constitution's __________________, which limits Congressional lawmaking to formal statutes that achieve a bicameral majority and are signed by the President.
- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the Nondelegation Doctrine by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it statutorily empowered itself with the ability to invalidate the Attorney General's decisions to suspend the deportation of individual aliens through a unicameral majority vote, which is called a Legislative Veto.
- Supreme Court held that Congress' reservation of authority over the actions of Executive Agencies violated the Constitution's Presentment Clause, which limits Congressional lawmaking to formal statutes that achieve a bicameral majority and are signed by the President.
- DISSENT: Justice White criticized holding on the grounds that it weakened the __________________ by implying that Congress could not enforce limitations on agency action.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed a statute that required the President to seek approval from the Senate in order to remove "first, second, or third class" postmasters from their offices.
- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the __________________ for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.
- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed a statute that required the President to seek approval from the Senate in order to remove "first, second, or third class" postmasters from their offices.
- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.
- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove __________________, and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed a statute that required the President to seek approval from the Senate in order to remove "first, second, or third class" postmasters from their offices.
- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.
- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that __________________ may only be subject to For-Cause Removal.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it passed a statute that required the President to seek approval from the Senate in order to remove "first, second, or third class" postmasters from their offices.
- Supreme Court held that the President alone has the Removal Power for officers within the Executive Branch, and thus that any requirement to receive Legislative approval was invalid.
- However, Chief Justice Taft indicated that the President only has complete discretion to remove "Principal Officers," and that "Inferior Officers" may only be subject to __________________.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an independent agency tasked with regulating business whose members served a limited term and could be removed only for deficient performance.
- President Roosevelt had fired a member of the FTC for political reasons, but defended himself by arguing that the requirement for __________________ was an unconstitutional restriction on his Removal Power.
- Supreme Court held that the firing was improper because FTC members perform a direct "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function," and that this denotes them as "Inferior Officers" whose removal by the President may be limited.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an independent agency tasked with regulating business whose members served a limited term and could be removed only for deficient performance.
- President Roosevelt had fired a member of the FTC for political reasons, but defended himself by arguing that the requirement for For-Cause Removal was an unconstitutional restriction on his __________________.
- Supreme Court held that the firing was improper because FTC members perform a direct "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function," and that this denotes them as "Inferior Officers" whose removal by the President may be limited.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an independent agency tasked with regulating business whose members served a limited term and could be removed only for deficient performance.
- President Roosevelt had fired a member of the FTC for political reasons, but defended himself by arguing that the requirement for For-Cause Removal was an unconstitutional restriction on his Removal Power.
- Supreme Court held that the firing was improper because FTC members perform a direct __________________, and that this denotes them as "Inferior Officers" whose removal by the President may be limited.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Congress was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it created the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), an independent agency tasked with regulating business whose members served a limited term and could be removed only for deficient performance.
- President Roosevelt had fired a member of the FTC for political reasons, but defended himself by arguing that the requirement for For-Cause Removal was an unconstitutional restriction on his Removal Power.
- Supreme Court held that the firing was improper because FTC members perform a direct "Quasi-Legislative or Quasi-Judicial Function," and that this denotes them as __________________ whose removal by the President may be limited.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.
- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's __________________—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.
- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.
- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.
- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's __________________—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.
- Supreme Court explained that __________________ is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.
- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.
- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.
- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's __________________ (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.
- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.
- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to __________________; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.
- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.
- The Court also explained, however, that __________________ dictates Judicial Exclusivity over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Alabama District Court was accused of violating the Separation of Powers when it overturned a decision by the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) finding a longshoreman was entitled to worker's compensation after finding that the longshoreman was never actually employed by the defendant, despite statutory language exempting ECC adjudications from such review.
- Supreme Court explained that Judicial Review is NOT required for an agency's adjudication of a person's Public Rights—which are statutorily created and give her some entitlement against the government, e.g. taxes, disability benefits, business licenses—because Congress may entrust such final power to that agency without violating the Constitution.
- The Court also explained, however, that Article III dictates __________________ over a person's Private Rights—her entitlements against another person, e.g. private causes of action—and therefore an agency's "Fundamental Findings of Fact" (such as constitutional or jurisdictional matters) in such case are always open to De Novo Review; the longshoreman's case fell under this category, so the District Court's review was proper.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it concluded that an employee's termination was retaliatory despite the fact that an adjudicative agent determined the firing to have been non-retaliatory.
- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a[n] __________________ must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."
- Further, the Court stressed that the conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge are part of the Entire Administrative Record and deserve substantial weight by the agency, who must provide an explanation for reaching an alternative conclusion.
- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it concluded that an employee's termination was retaliatory despite the fact that an adjudicative agent determined the firing to have been non-retaliatory.
- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "__________________ on the record as a whole."
- Further, the Court stressed that the conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge are part of the Entire Administrative Record and deserve substantial weight by the agency, who must provide an explanation for reaching an alternative conclusion.
- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it concluded that an employee's termination was retaliatory despite the fact that an adjudicative agent determined the firing to have been non-retaliatory.
- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."
- Further, the Court stressed that the conclusions of a[n] __________________ are part of the Entire Administrative Record and deserve substantial weight by the agency, who must provide an explanation for reaching an alternative conclusion.
- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it concluded that an employee's termination was retaliatory despite the fact that an adjudicative agent determined the firing to have been non-retaliatory.
- Supreme Court restated that the factual conclusions of a Formal Adjudication must be supported by "Substantial Evidence on the record as a whole."
- Further, the Court stressed that the conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge are part of the __________________ and deserve substantial weight by the agency, who must provide an explanation for reaching an alternative conclusion.
- Applying the test, the Court found that NLRB reached its decision despite substantial evidence that the firing was not retaliatory, and thus that its decision had inadequate justification.
- Railroad Commissioners of Nebraska (RCN), a state executive agency, was accused of Improper Adjudication when it found that the maximum rates that could be charged for freight transport within the state were too high, and ordered that they be reduced to a lower level.
- RCN argued that the order—which was the product of what we would call Formal Adjudication today—had been issued after fulfilling all procedural requirements and was not overly harsh since it still left the railway companies with enough money to operate.
- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that De Novo Review is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.
- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's __________________ only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Railroad Commissioners of Nebraska (RCN), a state executive agency, was accused of Improper Adjudication when it found that the maximum rates that could be charged for freight transport within the state were too high, and ordered that they be reduced to a lower level.
- RCN argued that the order—which was the product of what we would call Formal Adjudication today—had been issued after fulfilling all procedural requirements and was not overly harsh since it still left the railway companies with enough money to operate.
- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that and De Novo Review is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.
- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of __________________ on the Entire Administrative Record.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Railroad Commissioners of Nebraska (RCN), a state executive agency, was accused of Improper Adjudication when it found that the maximum rates that could be charged for freight transport within the state were too high, and ordered that they be reduced to a lower level.
- RCN argued that the order—which was the product of what we would call Formal Adjudication today—had been issued after fulfilling all procedural requirements and was not overly harsh since it still left the railway companies with enough money to operate.
- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that and De Novo Review is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.
- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by __________________, which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Railroad Commissioners of Nebraska (RCN), a state executive agency, was accused of Improper Adjudication when it found that the maximum rates that could be charged for freight transport within the state were too high, and ordered that they be reduced to a lower level.
- RCN argued that the order—which was the product of what we would call Formal Adjudication today—had been issued after fulfilling all procedural requirements and was not overly harsh since it still left the railway companies with enough money to operate.
- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that and __________________ is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.
- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Railroad Commissioners of Nebraska (RCN), a state executive agency, was accused of Improper Adjudication when it found that the maximum rates that could be charged for freight transport within the state were too high, and ordered that they be reduced to a lower level.
- RCN argued that the order—which was the product of what we would call Formal Adjudication today—had been issued after fulfilling all procedural requirements and was not overly harsh since it still left the railway companies with enough money to operate.
- Supreme Court declined to provide any deference to the RCN's choice, stating instead that and De Novo Review is proper when an agency action results in an injury; because it felt that the rate decrease was unjustified, it overturned it.
- The majority's decision was eventually overruled by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas (1944), which held that an agency's Formal Adjudication only had to meet the substantive requirement of "Substantial Evidence" on the __________________.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it determined that a natural gas company had been setting unreasonable rates and issued an order for the company to set specific rates that the FPC had found "fair and reasonable" under some formula.
- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.
- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a[n] _________________ if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.
- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it determined that a natural gas company had been setting unreasonable rates and issued an order for the company to set specific rates that the FPC had found "fair and reasonable" under some formula.
- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.
- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by _________________ on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.
- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it determined that a natural gas company had been setting unreasonable rates and issued an order for the company to set specific rates that the FPC had found "fair and reasonable" under some formula.
- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.
- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the _________________ or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.
- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).
In the case of _________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Improper Adjudication when it determined that a natural gas company had been setting unreasonable rates and issued an order for the company to set specific rates that the FPC had found "fair and reasonable" under some formula.
- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.
- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under APA § 556–57.
- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of _________________.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.
- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide _________________ as required under APA § 556-57.
- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Circuit Court set aside the order on grounds that the FPC had not taken certain factors into account when it created its formula to determine "fair and reasonable" rates.
- Supreme Court reversed the decision and upheld the FPC's rates on the grounds that a reviewing court may only invalidate a Formal Adjudication if the agency's factual determinations were not supported by "Substantial Evidence" on the Entire Administrative Record or if the agency failed to provide "Trial-Type Proceedings" as required under _________________.
- The Court found that the FPC's "fair and reasonable" rates were both substantively and procedurally valid; its decision overturned the precedent of Smyth v. Ames (1881).
In the case of __________________ . . .
- NLRB was accused of Improper Interpretation when it ordered a newspaper publisher to collectively bargain with a union of "newsboys" on the grounds that they fell within the meaning of "employees" entitled to protection under the National Labor Relations Act.
- Ninth Circuit overturned the order, finding that the newsboys were independent contractors, and that the NLRB's use of "employee" was incorrect.
- Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NLRB satisfied the contemporary requirements for deference to an Interpretive Rule: (1) the agency's conclusion has "warrant in the record," and (2) the agency's interpretation has a "reasonable basis in law."
- Ruling was made alongside the case of __________________.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.
- Fifth Circuit Court found that the time spent by firefighters on-call did not count towards overtime according to the DOL's regulation, despite the firefighters' contention that the regulation was issued without meeting the procedural requirements for __________________.
- Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the DOL's regulation was procedurally sound because, as an Interpretive Rule and not substantive law, it was exempt from the requirement for Notice and Comment under under APA § 553.
- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.
- Fifth Circuit Court found that the time spent by firefighters on-call did not count towards overtime according to the DOL's regulation, despite the firefighters' contention that the regulation was issued without meeting the procedural requirements for Informal Rulemaking.
- Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the DOL's regulation was procedurally sound because, as an Interpretive Rule and not substantive law, it was exempt from the requirement for __________________ under under APA § 553.
- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.
- Fifth Circuit Court found that the time spent by firefighters on-call did not count towards overtime according to the DOL's regulation, despite the firefighters' contention that the regulation was issued without meeting the procedural requirements for Informal Rulemaking.
- Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the DOL's regulation was procedurally sound because, as an Interpretive Rule and not substantive law, it was exempt from the requirement for Notice and Comment under under APA § 553.
- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive __________________ deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.
- Fifth Circuit Court found that the time spent by firefighters on-call did not count towards overtime according to the DOL's regulation, despite the firefighters' contention that the regulation was issued without meeting the procedural requirements for Informal Rulemaking.
- Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the DOL's regulation was procedurally sound because, as an Interpretive Rule and not substantive law, it was exempt from the requirement for Notice and Comment under under APA § 553.
- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of __________________ by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed Administrative Consistency with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- DOL was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a regulation stating "on-call waiting time" did not fall under the definition of "work" as it is used in the FLSA.
- Fifth Circuit Court found that the time spent by firefighters on-call did not count towards overtime according to the DOL's regulation, despite the firefighters' contention that the regulation was issued without meeting the procedural requirements for Informal Rulemaking.
- Supreme Court upheld the Fifth Circuit decision, finding that the DOL's regulation was procedurally sound because, as an Interpretive Rule and not substantive law, it was exempt from the requirement for Notice and Comment under under APA § 553.
- Further, the Court expressed that an agency's statutory interpretation deserves some persuasive Low-Level Skidmore deference if (1) it was the product of "Thorough Consideration" by the agency, (2) the agency provided valid reasoning, (3) the interpretation showed __________________ with other agency actions, or (4) other persuasive factors existed, such as the agency's Expertise.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- EPA was accused of Improper Interpretation when it changed its official definition for sources of air pollution under the Clean Air Act to refer to entire plants or factories rather than individual pollution-emitting devices, the so-called "bubble policy."
- Supreme Court held that decisions of Agency Interpretation should be subject to a two-part inquiry: (1) was there a[n] __________________ by Congress on the issue in the statute; if not, then (2) was the agency's interpretation on the issue "Reasonable or Permissible."
- Congress had failed to provide a definition of the word "source" in the Clean Air Act and the Court felt that the EPA's interpretation was a reasonable policy choice; therefore, the "bubble policy" was to be given high-level Chevron Stage 2 deference.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- EPA was accused of Improper Interpretation when it changed its official definition for sources of air pollution under the Clean Air Act to refer to entire plants or factories rather than individual pollution-emitting devices, the so-called "bubble policy."
- Supreme Court held that decisions of Agency Interpretation should be subject to a two-part inquiry: (1) was there an "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress on the issue in the statute; if not, then (2) was the agency's interpretation on the issue __________________.
- Congress had failed to provide a definition of the word "source" in the Clean Air Act and the Court felt that the EPA's interpretation was a reasonable policy choice; therefore, the "bubble policy" was to be given high-level Chevron Stage 2 deference.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- EPA was accused of Improper Interpretation when it changed its official definition for sources of air pollution under the Clean Air Act to refer to entire plants or factories rather than individual pollution-emitting devices, the so-called "bubble policy."
- Supreme Court held that decisions of Agency Interpretation should be subject to a two-part inquiry: (1) was there an "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress on the issue in the statute; if not, then (2) was the agency's interpretation on the issue "Reasonable or Permissible."
- Congress had failed to provide a definition of the word "source" in the Clean Air Act and the Court felt that the EPA's interpretation was a reasonable policy choice; therefore, the "bubble policy" was to be given high-level __________________ deference.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- U.S. Customs Service was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a "ruling letter" to a seller of day planners that expressed that its products were classified as "diaries, notebooks and address books, bound," and attempted to enforce this ruling broadly.
- U.S. Customs Service argued that its statute was silent on the classification of day planners and that its interpretation was reasonable, and thus that the ruling letter was to be given Chevron Stage 2 deference.
- Supreme Court expressed that its holding in __________________ was only meant to apply to agency actions that Congress intended to have a binding "Force of Law," and that other agency actions were subject to a "Chevron Exception."
- Because "ruling letters" were a form of Informal Adjudication that could be issued by any U.S. Customs office—over 10,000 were issued every year—the Court felt that Congress clearly did not intend for them to be binding on third parties.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- U.S. Customs Service was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a "ruling letter" to a seller of day planners that expressed that its products were classified as "diaries, notebooks and address books, bound," and attempted to enforce this ruling broadly.
- U.S. Customs Service argued that its statute was silent on the classification of day planners and that its interpretation was reasonable, and thus that the ruling letter was to be given Chevron Stage 2 deference.
- Supreme Court expressed that its holding in Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984) was only meant to apply to agency actions that Congress intended to have a binding __________________, and that other agency actions were subject to a "Chevron Exception."
- Because "ruling letters" were a form of Informal Adjudication that could be issued by any U.S. Customs office—over 10,000 were issued every year—the Court felt that Congress clearly did not intend for them to be binding on third parties.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- U.S. Customs Service was accused of Improper Interpretation when it issued a "ruling letter" to a seller of day planners that expressed that its products were classified as "diaries, notebooks and address books, bound," and attempted to enforce this ruling broadly.
- U.S. Customs Service argued that its statute was silent on the classification of day planners and that its interpretation was reasonable, and thus that the ruling letter was to be given Chevron Stage 2 deference.
- Supreme Court expressed that its holding in Chevron v. N.R.D.C. (1984) was only meant to apply to agency actions that Congress intended to have a binding "Force of Law," and that other agency actions were subject to a "Chevron Exception."
- Because "ruling letters" were a form of __________________ that could be issued by any U.S. Customs office—over 10,000 were issued every year—the Court felt that Congress clearly did not intend for them to be binding on third parties.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- D.O.L. was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it reduced the acceptable "exposure limit" of the carcinogen benzene in a workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, pursuant to its OSHA power to set "feasible" standards which prevent risks of "material impairment of health" to workers.
- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was a[n] __________________ from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Adjudication and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.
- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- D.O.L. was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it reduced the acceptable "exposure limit" of the carcinogen benzene in a workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, pursuant to its OSHA power to set "feasible" standards which prevent risks of "material impairment of health" to workers.
- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Adjudication and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.
- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have __________________ to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- D.O.L. was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it reduced the acceptable "exposure limit" of the carcinogen benzene in a workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, pursuant to its OSHA power to set "feasible" standards which prevent risks of "material impairment of health" to workers.
- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.
- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the __________________; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- D.O.L. was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it reduced the acceptable "exposure limit" of the carcinogen benzene in a workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, pursuant to its OSHA power to set "feasible" standards which prevent risks of "material impairment of health" to workers.
- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.
- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the __________________ to demonstrate the contrary.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- D.O.L. was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it reduced the acceptable "exposure limit" of the carcinogen benzene in a workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, pursuant to its OSHA power to set "feasible" standards which prevent risks of "material impairment of health" to workers.
- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after __________________ and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.
- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the Congressional Intent of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- D.O.L. was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it reduced the acceptable "exposure limit" of the carcinogen benzene in a workplace from 10 ppm to 1 ppm, pursuant to its OSHA power to set "feasible" standards which prevent risks of "material impairment of health" to workers.
- Secretary argued that the "feasible" language was an "Intelligible Guiding Principle" from Congress to set exposure limits at the lowest feasibly attainable level, and also that the 1 ppm rule had been issued after Formal Rulemaking and must therefore be upheld unless it was not supported by Substantial Evidence.
- Supreme Court invalidated the reduction, finding that the __________________ of OSHA was to address major workplace hazards and not minor health risks, and also that the D.O.L. was not intended to have Unfettered Discretion to impose exposure limits in light of the Nondelegation Doctrine; the Court assigned D.O.L. the Burden of Proof to demonstrate the contrary.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Department of State (DOS) was accused of Improper Interpretation and violating Due Process when it used its statutory authority to "grant and issue passports" to justify a policy of requiring suspected communists to submit an affidavit on their political memberships as a prerequisite for the Informal Adjudication of their passport application.
- DOS argued that there was no __________________ by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was "Reasonable or Permissible" in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.
- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a "Protected Interest" subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.
- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Department of State (DOS) was accused of Improper Interpretation and violating Due Process when it used its statutory authority to "grant and issue passports" to justify a policy of requiring suspected communists to submit an affidavit on their political memberships as a prerequisite for the Informal Adjudication of their passport application.
- DOS argued that there was no "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was __________________ in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.
- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a "Protected Interest" subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.
- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Department of State (DOS) was accused of Improper Interpretation and violating Due Process when it used its statutory authority to "grant and issue passports" to justify a policy of requiring suspected communists to submit an affidavit on their political memberships as a prerequisite for the Informal Adjudication of their passport application.
- DOS argued that there was no "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was "Reasonable or Permissible" in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.
- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a[n] __________________ subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.
- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Department of State (DOS) was accused of Improper Interpretation and violating Due Process when it used its statutory authority to "grant and issue passports" to justify a policy of requiring suspected communists to submit an affidavit on their political memberships as a prerequisite for the Informal Adjudication of their passport application.
- DOS argued that there was no "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was "Reasonable or Permissible" in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.
- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a "Protected Interest" subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.
- The Court declared that __________________ deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Department of State (DOS) was accused of Improper Interpretation and violating Due Process when it used its statutory authority to "grant and issue passports" to justify a policy of requiring suspected communists to submit an affidavit on their political memberships as a prerequisite for the Informal Adjudication of their passport application.
- DOS argued that there was no "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was "Reasonable or Permissible" in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.
- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a "Protected Interest" subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.
- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a[n] __________________ of Congressional Intent to allow that interest to be abridged.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Department of State (DOS) was accused of Improper Interpretation and violating Due Process when it used its statutory authority to "grant and issue passports" to justify a policy of requiring suspected communists to submit an affidavit on their political memberships as a prerequisite for the Informal Adjudication of their passport application.
- DOS argued that there was no "Unambiguous Expression" by Congress limiting the grounds for denying passports, and that denial due to political ideology was "Reasonable or Permissible" in light of policy allowing denial for non-citizenship or criminal history.
- Supreme Court declined to declare that the "right to travel" was a "Protected Interest" subject to Due Process protection, but classified it as an "important aspect of the citizen's 'liberty'" and thus entitled to some protection.
- The Court declared that Chevron Stage 2 deference is unavailable in cases involving an "Important Liberty Interest" unless the agency can show a "Clear Statement" of __________________ to allow that interest to be abridged.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was a[n] __________________ that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under __________________.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of __________________ and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be __________________ according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to __________________.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all __________________; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as __________________ review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been __________________ or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear __________________ to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the Entire Administrative Record available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Secretary of DOT was accused of Inadequate Justification when he approved highway through a public park without formally concluding that no "feasible and prudent" alternate routes existed and that "all possible planning to minimize harm" was done, as was required by statute.
- DOT argued that the approval was an Action Committed to Agency Discretion that is exempt from judicial review under APA § 701.
- Supreme Court rejected the DOT's argument, stating that the approval was the product of Informal Adjudication and must therefore not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" according to APA § 706.
- The Court reasoned that the Secretary's approval would fail this standard if it was found to have been "Clearly Erroneous" or made without consideration of all "Relevant Factors"; this would come to be known as "Hard Look" review.
- Although the Court found that the Secretary had approved the highway despite clear Congressional Intent to protect parkland, it ultimately remanded the case because it did not have the __________________ available to it.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."
- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the __________________ and with all Relevant Factors being considered, and therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.
- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."
- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all Relevant Factors being considered, and therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.
- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the __________________ standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."
- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all Relevant Factors being considered, and therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.
- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the __________________ review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."
- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all __________________ being considered, and therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.
- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."
- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all Relevant Factors being considered, therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.
- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look review established in __________________, which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."
- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all Relevant Factors being considered, therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.
- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from APA § 706, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look Review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be __________________ and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Power Commission (FPC) was accused of Inadequate Justification when, during adjudication to grant a license to a major hydroelectric project, it refused to accept third-party evidence of alternative designs because it determined the evidence was "not timely."
- Second Circuit Court held that FPC was required by statute to make its adjudications based on the Entire Administrative Record and with all Relevant Factors being considered, therefore that its decision to refuse evidence of feasible alternatives was a procedural violation; the decision was remanded for further justification, but the project ran out of funding before it was resolved.
- NOTE: Although the Court did not invoke the "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" standard from __________________, its holding closely mirrors the Hard Look Review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), which requires that informal agency action not be "Clearly Erroneous" and be made with all "Relevant Factors" in mind.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of __________________, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of a[n] __________________ on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under __________________ review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with a[n] __________________, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making __________________ decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be __________________ under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under __________________; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with __________________ and had essentially given decision-makers Unfettered Discretion on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- New York City Housing Authority was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its system for allocating public housing, under which applicants were never told if they were eligible or ineligible, whether they were still on the waiting list, or what the criteria for selection even were.
- Second Circuit Court pointed out that public housing selection was the product of Informal Adjudication, and therefore must not be "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706; under Hard Look review, the adjudicating agency is required to support its decision with an Entire Administrative Record, and is forbidden from excluding consideration of "Relevant Factors" and from making "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
- The Court struck down the Housing Authority's system on grounds that, by failing to provide any criteria for selection, it was failing to provide applicants with Fair Notice and had essentially given decision-makers __________________ on who received public housing, as well as preventing the creation of an Entire Administrative Record on which Judicial Review might be made.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Attorney General (AG) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, acting in his role as departmental head of INS, he issued a regulation which barred any alien who received "transit" status from applying to him for status adjustment, and then began automatically denying all transit-status applicants.
- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make __________________ on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.
- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Attorney General (AG) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, acting in his role as departmental head of INS, he issued a regulation which barred any alien who received "transit" status from applying to him for status adjustment, and then began automatically denying all transit-status applicants.
- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.
- Second Circuit Court stated that __________________ such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Attorney General (AG) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, acting in his role as departmental head of INS, he issued a regulation which barred any alien who received "transit" status from applying to him for status adjustment, and then began automatically denying all transit-status applicants.
- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.
- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any __________________ in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Attorney General (AG) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, acting in his role as departmental head of INS, he issued a regulation which barred any alien who received "transit" status from applying to him for status adjustment, and then began automatically denying all transit-status applicants.
- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.
- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's __________________; here, Congress had essentially given the AG Unfettered Discretion to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Attorney General (AG) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, acting in his role as departmental head of INS, he issued a regulation which barred any alien who received "transit" status from applying to him for status adjustment, and then began automatically denying all transit-status applicants.
- Rejected applicants acknowledged that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) stated that AG may make status adjustments "in his discretion," but argued that the AG is bound to make Individualized Rulings on the applications that he chooses to consider and cannot decide similar cases en masse by simply passing a regulation.
- Second Circuit Court stated that "Adjudication by Rulemaking," such as that performed by the AG, is permissible so long as it does not betray any Congressional Intent in the adjudicating agency's Enabling Statute; here, Congress had essentially given the AG __________________ to make status adjustments, and the AG's regulation was simply a use of that discretion.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its justification of a "sell order" issued against an investment firm that had conducted insider trading during the reorganization of a public water company.
- Although SEC had initially justified its order on the basis of case law precedent and "equitable principles," it later asked a reviewing court to uphold the order out of deference to its experience with such matters.
- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged __________________ could not play a part in the Judicial Review of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through Post Hoc Rationalizations and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the Chenery Doctrine.
- The Court determined that the SEC's cited precedent and "equitable principles" were misapplied and thus remanded the order for further considerations, which would result in the case eventually returning to the Supreme Court.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its justification of a "sell order" issued against an investment firm that had conducted insider trading during the reorganization of a public water company.
- Although SEC had initially justified its order on the basis of case law precedent and "equitable principles," it later asked a reviewing court to uphold the order out of deference to its experience with such matters.
- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged Expertise could not play a part in the __________________ of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through Post Hoc Rationalizations and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the Chenery Doctrine.
- The Court determined that the SEC's cited precedent and "equitable principles" were misapplied and thus remanded the order for further considerations, which would result in the case eventually returning to the Supreme Court.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its justification of a "sell order" issued against an investment firm that had conducted insider trading during the reorganization of a public water company.
- Although SEC had initially justified its order on the basis of case law precedent and "equitable principles," it later asked a reviewing court to uphold the order out of deference to its experience with such matters.
- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged Expertise could not play a part in the Judicial Review of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through __________________ and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the Chenery Doctrine.
- The Court determined that the SEC's cited precedent and "equitable principles" were misapplied and thus remanded the order for further considerations, which would result in the case eventually returning to the Supreme Court.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice for its justification of a "sell order" issued against an investment firm that had conducted insider trading during the reorganization of a public water company.
- Although SEC had initially justified its order on the basis of case law precedent and "equitable principles," it later asked a reviewing court to uphold the order out of deference to its experience with such matters.
- Supreme Court held that the SEC's alleged Expertise could not play a part in the Judicial Review of its actions, since agencies cannot justify their decisions through Post Hoc Rationalizations and instead must have them reviewed under their original justifications; this principle which is known today as the __________________.
- The Court determined that the SEC's cited precedent and "equitable principles" were misapplied and thus remanded the order for further considerations, which would result in the case eventually returning to the Supreme Court.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through __________________ in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an individual adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent __________________, and could not be created during an individual adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for __________________, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of __________________, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, __________________ is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive __________________ (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, __________________ review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- SEC was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, upon remand of the "sell order" on an investment firm's stock in a public water company from an earlier Supreme Court case, it concluded that the order was appropriate under its interpretation of the fiduciary duties in the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
- Investment firm argued that, since the sell orders were the product of Formal Adjudication, the parameters for their issuance had to be laid out through Prospective Rulemaking in order to prevent Undue Surprise, and could not be created during an adjudication.
- Supreme Court expressed its concern for Retroactive Liability, but stated that regulated parties should not be able to get away with improper activity simply because an agency had not anticipated a particular issue.
- In the Court's view, "Rulemaking by Adjudication" is a reasonable way to plug holes in the law with immediate effect, and an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between either method of introducing policy as long as its decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, Substantial Evidence review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the __________________ to limit the agency's authority.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, three years after setting a high maximum rate for shipping sugar from California to Arizona, it determined that shipping companies had made undue profits, lowered the rate, and ordered the shipping companies to pay reparations to their clients.
- Shipping companies protested the reparations order on the grounds that they had only made the alleged "undue profits" by following the regulations that ICC itself had found reasonable.
- Supreme Court expressed that an agency is bound by its own promulgated rules, may not repeal or replace those rules without sufficient explanation, and may only enforce the new framework "as it affect[s] future actions"; this is known as the __________________.
- The Court overturned the reparations order, holding that ICC had improperly combined its rulemaking and adjudicative functions and imposed Retroactive Liability by holding the shipping companies to a standard that did not exist at the time of their alleged wrongdoing.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of insufficient Clarity, Consistency, and Fair Notice when, three years after setting a high maximum rate for shipping sugar from California to Arizona, it determined that shipping companies had made undue profits, lowered the rate, and ordered the shipping companies to pay reparations to their clients.
- Shipping companies protested the reparations order on the grounds that they had only made the alleged "undue profits" by following the regulations that ICC itself had found reasonable.
- Supreme Court expressed that an agency is bound by its own promulgated rules, may not repeal or replace those rules without sufficient explanation, and may only enforce the new framework "as it affect[s] future actions"; this is known as the "Arizona Grocery Principle."
- The Court overturned the reparations order, holding that ICC had improperly combined its rulemaking and adjudicative functions and imposed __________________ by holding the shipping companies to a standard that did not exist at the time of their alleged wrongdoing.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Second Circuit Court was accused of Improper Estoppel when it held that Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) was estopped from denying retroactive benefits to a woman who had delayed filing an application for "mother's insurance benefits" in reliance on the erroneous advice of the Social Security Administration (SSA).
- Supreme Court set aside the Second Circuit decision, stating that it would create a[n] __________________ if the government was estopped from adjudicating a case whenever a government employee makes a minor mistake.
- However, the Court made a carveout that Equitable Estoppel against the government was still available in cases of "Affirmative Misconduct" by government employees.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Second Circuit Court was accused of Improper Estoppel when it held that Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) was estopped from denying retroactive benefits to a woman who had delayed filing an application for "mother's insurance benefits" in reliance on the erroneous advice of the Social Security Administration (SSA).
- Supreme Court set aside the Second Circuit decision, stating that it would create a "Significant Social Cost" if the government was estopped from adjudicating a case whenever a government employee makes a minor mistake.
- However, the Court made a carveout that __________________ against the government was still available in cases of "Affirmative Misconduct" by government employees.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Second Circuit Court was accused of Improper Estoppel when it held that Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) was estopped from denying retroactive benefits to a woman who had delayed filing an application for "mother's insurance benefits" in reliance on the erroneous advice of the Social Security Administration (SSA).
- Supreme Court set aside the Second Circuit decision, stating that it would create a "Significant Social Cost" if the government was estopped from adjudicating a case whenever a government employee makes a minor mistake.
- However, the Court made a carveout that Equitable Estoppel against the government was still available in cases of __________________ by government employees.
- City government was accused of violating Due Process when it imposed an individualized tax on a few property owners who paved their street without providing the property owners with an opportunity to be heard.
- City defended its action by arguing that the creation of taxes was a form of rulemaking, not adjudication, and therefore that the property owners had no right to due process under the 14th Amendment.
- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) Fair Notice, (2) a[n] __________________, and (3) an opportunity for Pre-Deprivation Hearing or a Post-Deprivation Hearing.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City government was accused of violating Due Process when it imposed an individualized tax on a few property owners who paved their street without providing the property owners with an opportunity to be heard.
- City defended its action by arguing that the creation of taxes was a form of rulemaking, not adjudication, and therefore that the property owners had no right to due process under the __________________.
- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) Fair Notice, (2) a Neutral Adjudicator, and (3) an opportunity for Pre-Deprivation Hearing or a Post-Deprivation Hearing.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City government was accused of violating Due Process when it imposed an individualized tax on a few property owners who paved their street without providing the property owners with an opportunity to be heard.
- City defended its action by arguing that the creation of taxes was a form of rulemaking, not adjudication, and therefore that the property owners had no right to due process under the 14th Amendment.
- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) __________________, (2) a Neutral Adjudicator, and (3) an opportunity for Pre-Deprivation Hearing or a Post-Deprivation Hearing.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City government was accused of violating Due Process when it imposed an individualized tax on a few property owners who paved their street without providing the property owners with an opportunity to be heard.
- City defended its action by arguing that the creation of taxes was a form of rulemaking, not adjudication, and therefore that the property owners had no right to due process under the 14th Amendment.
- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) Fair Notice, (2) a Neutral Adjudicator, and (3) an opportunity for __________________ or a Post-Deprivation Hearing.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City government was accused of violating Due Process when it imposed an individualized tax on a few property owners who paved their street without providing the property owners with an opportunity to be heard.
- City defended its action by arguing that the creation of taxes was a form of rulemaking, not adjudication, and therefore that the property owners had no right to due process under the 14th Amendment.
- Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the "tax" had been imposed by order after an adjudication, and Procedural Due Process dictates that each be given (1) Fair Notice, (2) a Neutral Adjudicator, and (3) an opportunity for Pre-Deprivation Hearing or a[n] __________________.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Colorado Board of Equalization (BOE) was accused of violating Procedural Due Process when it ordered that the valuation of all taxable property in Denver be increased by 40%, increasing the tax liability of all city residents without providing a hearing to any of them.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that the BOE's order was the product of adjudication and therefore required Due Process, but felt that it would be unrealistic to require the city to provide __________________ to its entire population.
- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Colorado Board of Equalization (BOE) was accused of violating Procedural Due Process when it ordered that the valuation of all taxable property in Denver be increased by 40%, increasing the tax liability of all city residents without providing a hearing to any of them.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that the BOE's order was the product of adjudication and therefore required Due Process, but felt that it would be unrealistic to require the city to provide Individualized Rulings to its entire population.
- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of __________________; while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or Post-Deprivation Hearing disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Colorado Board of Equalization (BOE) was accused of violating Procedural Due Process when it ordered that the valuation of all taxable property in Denver be increased by 40%, increasing the tax liability of all city residents without providing a hearing to any of them.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that the BOE's order was the product of adjudication and therefore required Due Process, but felt that it would be unrealistic to require the city to provide Individualized Rulings to its entire population.
- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a[n] __________________ or Post-Deprivation Hearing disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Colorado Board of Equalization (BOE) was accused of violating Procedural Due Process when it ordered that the valuation of all taxable property in Denver be increased by 40%, increasing the tax liability of all city residents without providing a hearing to any of them.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that the BOE's order was the product of adjudication and therefore required Due Process, but felt that it would be unrealistic to require the city to provide Individualized Rulings to its entire population.
- The Court effectively imposed a limit on the precedent of Londoner v. City of Denver (1908); while an agency's adjudication requires adherence to Due Process, the requirement for agencies to provide an individual with a Pre-Deprivation Hearing or __________________ disappears if the adjudication affects enough people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it declared that it was an unfair business practice for gas pumps to fail to post octane ratings, despite the agency's Enabling Statute only authorizing it to perform adjudicative functions.
- Supreme Court cited __________________ and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
- The Court upheld the FTC's regulation, finding that there was significant support that failure to post octane ratings was an unfair practice and that Congress' failure to expressly bar the FTC from rulemaking was sufficient authorization because allowing the FTC to issue rules would make for more effective execution of its mission.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it declared that it was an unfair business practice for gas pumps to fail to post octane ratings, despite the agency's Enabling Statute only authorizing it to perform adjudicative functions.
- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive __________________ (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
- The Court upheld the FTC's regulation, finding that there was significant support that failure to post octane ratings was an unfair practice and that Congress' failure to expressly bar the FTC from rulemaking was sufficient authorization because allowing the FTC to issue rules would make for more effective execution of its mission.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it declared that it was an unfair business practice for gas pumps to fail to post octane ratings, despite Congress only formally authorizing the FTC to perform adjudicative functions.
- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear __________________ in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
- The Court upheld the FTC's regulation, finding that there was significant support that failure to post octane ratings was an unfair practice and that Congress' failure to expressly bar the FTC from rulemaking was sufficient authorization because allowing the FTC to issue rules would make for more effective execution of its mission.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it declared that it was an unfair business practice for gas pumps to fail to post octane ratings, despite the agency's Enabling Statute only authorizing it to perform adjudicative functions.
- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, __________________ review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the Enabling Statute to limit the agency's authority.
- The Court upheld the FTC's regulation, finding that there was significant support that failure to post octane ratings was an unfair practice and that Congress' failure to expressly bar the FTC from rulemaking was sufficient authorization because allowing the FTC to issue rules would make for more effective execution of its mission.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it declared that it was an unfair business practice for gas pumps to fail to post octane ratings, despite the agency's Enabling Statute only authorizing it to perform adjudicative functions.
- Supreme Court cited S.E.C. v. Chenery II (1947) and its rule that an agency facing a novel issue may freely choose between adjudication or rulemaking as long as the agency's decision (1) passes substantive Judicial Review (in this case, "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" review), and (2) does not violate any clear Congressional Intent in the __________________ to limit the agency's authority.
- The Court upheld the FTC's regulation, finding that there was significant support that failure to post octane ratings was an unfair practice and that Congress' failure to expressly bar the FTC from rulemaking was sufficient authorization because allowing the FTC to issue rules would make for more effective execution of its mission.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through __________________ under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under __________________.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for __________________ if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its __________________ requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a[n] __________________; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered __________________, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only __________________ and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a[n] __________________ under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under __________________.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of __________________, which held that the need for Individualized Rulings is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it had only accepted written comment prior to issuing a rule imposing daily charges on rail companies for keeping another's railcars, despite language in the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) that only allows ICC to issue rules "after hearing."
- Rail companies argued that the requirement for prior hearing essentially meant that ICC could only pass valid rules through Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57.
- Supreme Court stated that an agency is only bound to the procedures for Formal Rulemaking if its Enabling Statute requires a "Hearing On-the-Record"; when only a regular hearing is required, the process is considered Informal Rulemaking, which needs only Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement under APA § 553.
- The Court supported its decision with the precedent of Bi-Metallic Investment v. State Board of Equalization (1915), which held that the need for __________________ is lessened when a rule affects multiple people.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for __________________ under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under __________________, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are __________________ and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a[n] __________________ explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation __________________ under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass __________________ review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are __________________ that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding "Clearly Erroneous" decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- FDA was accused of Inadequate Justification when it imposed unfavorable "time-temperature-salinity" regulations on hot-smoked whitefish products without providing scientific data or addressing criticism that the regulation would render certain species of fish unsellable.
- FDA argued that it had met both requirements for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, which are Notice and Comment and a Concise General Statement explaining the basis for the new rule.
- Supreme Court acknowledged that FDA had performed Notice and Comment, but still found the regulation "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because its Concise General Statement had failed to address important criticisms and alternatives, which are "Relevant Factors" that agencies must take into account to pass Hard Look review, in addition to avoiding __________________ decisions.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit __________________ under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under __________________, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should nevertheless follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow __________________ under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full __________________, because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's __________________ were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying __________________ review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under __________________ because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's __________________ cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all __________________ or otherwise made a "Clearly Erroneous" decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was accused of Improper Rulemaking when, in order to pass a rule on whether fuel reprocessing and disposal should be factored into nuclear plant licensure proceedings, it instituted rulemaking procedures that included a hearing but did not allow for discovery, cross-examination, creation of a record, or proposal of alternatives.
- D.C. Circuit Court recognized that AEC's Enabling Statute described a process that fit Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, but concluded that AEC's rulemaking procedures should actually follow Formal Rulemaking under APA § 556-57 and include a full "Hearing On-the-Record," because this would allow greater participation of relevant entities in the process.
- Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit decision, holding that Judicial Review of an agency's Informal Rulemaking cannot include the imposition of additional procedures simply because they would be "better," but rather may only consider (1) whether the procedures in the agency's Enabling Statute were followed, and (2) whether, applying "Hard Look" review, the rulemaking was "Arbitrary, Capricious, or an Abuse of Discretion" under APA § 706 because the agency failed to consider all "Relevant Factors" or otherwise made a[n] __________________ decision.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- USDA was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it issued an internal memorandum to Administrative Law Judges that enclosures for big cats to be surrounded by walls of at least 8 feet in order to satisfy an existing agency rule requiring "structural strength" in animal facilities.
- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for __________________ under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.
- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely an "Arbitrary Choice" among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- USDA was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it issued an internal memorandum to Administrative Law Judges that enclosures for big cats to be surrounded by walls of at least 8 feet in order to satisfy an existing agency rule requiring "structural strength" in animal facilities.
- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under __________________, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.
- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely an "Arbitrary Choice" among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- USDA was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it issued an internal memorandum to Administrative Law Judges that enclosures for big cats to be surrounded by walls of at least 8 feet in order to satisfy an existing agency rule requiring "structural strength" in animal facilities.
- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from __________________; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.
- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely an "Arbitrary Choice" among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- USDA was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it issued an internal memorandum to Administrative Law Judges that enclosures for big cats to be surrounded by walls of at least 8 feet in order to satisfy an existing agency rule requiring "structural strength" in animal facilities.
- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was a[n] __________________ based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.
- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely an "Arbitrary Choice" among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- USDA was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it issued an internal memorandum to Administrative Law Judges that enclosures for big cats to be surrounded by walls of at least 8 feet in order to satisfy an existing agency rule requiring "structural strength" in animal facilities.
- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a "Concise General Statement" on the basis of the rule.
- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely a[n] __________________ among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- USDA was accused of Improper Rulemaking when it issued an internal memorandum to Administrative Law Judges that enclosures for big cats to be surrounded by walls of at least 8 feet in order to satisfy an existing agency rule requiring "structural strength" in animal facilities.
- Although the "8 foot fence" rule was passed without allowing "Notice and Comment" as required for Informal Rulemaking under APA § 553, USDA argued that it was an Interpretive Rule based on the "structural strength" language and therefore exempt from "Notice and Comment"; in USDA's view, the only procedure that was required was a[n] __________________ on the basis of the rule.
- Seventh Circuit Court disagreed, overturning the rule on grounds that the USDA's decision to place the minimum fence height at 8 feet was merely an "Arbitrary Choice" among many different height variations which may provide "structural strength," and thus was not truly an Interpretive Rule.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City of Chicago was accused of violating Due Process when it found that chicken in possession of a food storage company was unsafe and ordered its immediate surrender, with an opportunity for a hearing after the fact.
- Company argued that it was entitled to a[n] __________________, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.
- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain Emergency Circumstances may make it so that a Post-Deprivation Hearing is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City of Chicago was accused of violating Due Process when it found that chicken in possession of a food storage company was unsafe and ordered its immediate surrender, with an opportunity for a hearing after the fact.
- Company argued that it was entitled to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.
- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain __________________ may make it so that a Post-Deprivation Hearing is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City of Chicago was accused of violating Due Process when it found that chicken in possession of a food storage company was unsafe and ordered its immediate surrender, with an opportunity for a hearing after the fact.
- Company argued that it was entitled to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.
- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain Emergency Circumstances may make it so that a[n] __________________ is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a Neutral Adjudicator.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- City of Chicago was accused of violating Due Process when it found that chicken in possession of a food storage company was unsafe and ordered its immediate surrender, with an opportunity for a hearing after the fact
- Company argued that it was entitled to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.
- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain Emergency Circumstances may make it so that a Post-Deprivation Hearing is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with __________________ and a Neutral Adjudicator.
- City of Chicago was accused of violating Due Process when it found that chicken in possession of a food storage company was unsafe and ordered its immediate surrender, with an opportunity for a hearing after the fact
- Company argued that it was entitled to a Pre-Deprivation Hearing, but Chicago argued that the chicken was such a health risk that it rose to the level of an emergency, and it was thus necessary to forgo a hearing prior to its surrender.
- Supreme Court, recognizing that the company may be made whole after the fact if the seizure is improper, found that certain Emergency Circumstances may make it so that a Post-Deprivation Hearing is all that is necessary for Procedural Due Process, along with Fair Notice and a[n] __________________.
In the case of __________________ . . .
- N.Y.C. Social Services Commission was accused of violating Due Process for its policy of terminating federally-funded financial assistance without prior notice or an in-person hearing.
- Commissioner argued that the expedited termination was necessary to prevent Administrative Burden, and that aid recipients had low barriers to receive the aid and therefore should have low barriers for its termination.
- Supreme Court held that recipients had a[n] __________________