Admin holdings (no facts)

The Secretary's discretion was arbitrary and capricious. He should have considered the cost and disruption to the community.

Legislature must give intelligible guiding principle so the agency can make the regulations pursuant to those principles

Congressional act (new deal) authorizing the President to create laws regulating businesses, practically without parameters, violates the non-delegation doctrine.

Under OSHA authority, the Sec. of Labor improperly tightened a standard on the airborne concentration of Benzene in working environments. Merely demonstrating a link between exposure to Benzene and leukemia was not enough. The Sec. of Labor did not determine that exposure to Benzene at 10 ppm would cause leukemia and at 1 ppm would not

Intelligible guiding principle DOES NOT need to be in the statute's text, may be circumstantial. Legislature may delegate power to agencies so long as there is a way to determine whether the will of Congress is being effected. Some circumstances require the grant of broad authority so that problems can be addressed without delay involved in the legislative process.

House of Representatives unconstitutionally exercised a legislative veto overruling AG's (executive) reccomendation. Congress cannot participate in formal adjudication (legislative veto)

A Congressional act providing that postmasters (purely executive) must be appointed and removed with input from the Senate is unconstitutional. Those powers solely belong to the President

Distinction between(1) high-level execs subject to Presidential removal, and(2) appointed executive officials who work independent of Presidential influence and can be removed only with advice and consent of the Senate"

Even if Congress has bestowed fact-finding power on an administrative court, the federal courts may review facts (de novo) as necesary to determine the administrative court's jurisdiction.

Questions of fact must be reviewed since agencies are motivated to pursue their own agency, and may lean toward rewriting the statute or law to shift toward a way that benefits them. Courts should use the substantial evidence test to review

Agencies are empowered to adjudicate (exception: matters of fact going to Constitutional Rights)

Personal liberties are more important than a property right to a utility. Judges should not be expected to comb through enormous administrative records and should thus mostly defer

A legal question is one that a court or administrative agency answers by applying legal principles (not the facts of a case). Legal question here: what does wild mean in 19 USC Sect. 1527 (dispute of a legal term)No estoppel from government; Congress deferred to the agency by law

When reviewing an agency decision involving a mixed question of law and fact, courts review:

(1) the facts found by the agency to determine whether the agency's conclusion has ""warrant in the record"" and

(2) the agency's explanation of its decision to determine whether the decision has a reasonable basis in law

Administrative guidings may be used by reviewing courts BUT are not binding over the courts. The weight to be given to these types of materials depends on the:

(1) thoroughness of the agency's determination

(2) validity of the agency's reasoning

(3) agency's consistency on the issue

(4) other considerations (factors that made it persuasive,

Skidmore = low deference)

If a statute administered by an agency is silent or ambiguous on a specific issue, a reviewing court may not simply impose its own construction on the statute.

Stage 1: Did Congress answer this question in the statute, did they express a clear and specific intent on this precise question (explicit authority)
- not just confined to text, can use any accepted tool of statutory construction/interpretation (non-arbitrary)
- If there is an answer, then the case is over (no Congressional intent)

Stage 0: (implicit granting of authority) decide whether to use stage 2 or skidmore

Stage 2 (most decided here, high deference)
- Basic idea: agency does not have to come up with a convincing interpretation, instead it merely needs to come up with a reasonable interpretation

Skidmore 4-part test

NOT GOOD LAW ANYMORE, USE FOR HISTORICAL REFERENCE

If an agency used formal adjudication or formal rulemaking, then the agency gets Chevron Stage 2 high deference. If informal rulemaking, then Skidmore low deference rulemaking

Congress can delegate implicitly and grant the power to agencies to make binding rules which are worthy of Chevron stage 2 high deference. Congress may enact statutes containing gaps designed to be filled by an agency

When a statute is silent or ambiguous as to a specific issue, a reviewing court must sustain an agency's interpretation of the statute as long as the interpretaion is based on a permissible construction of the law (5-factor tet)

(1) is it a broad determination or an interstitial issue? (if broad, defer to agency)

(2) does expertise play a role? (if so, defer to agency)

(3) the importance of the term for administration of the statute (if key to effective administration, defer to the agency)

(4) administrative complexity (if highly complex, defer to the agency)

(5) has the agency taken care and consideration of the issue (don't want to penalize an intelligent change of an agency's position)

If an agency is going to interfere with a Constitutional right then it must meet the ""clear and specific"" standard of the Major Questions Doctrine (Congress must clearly and specifically say that the agency can make rules about a Constitutional right). This applies to ""practically important liberty interests"" as well (Constitution right-adjacent)

Hard look requires agencies to develop an evidentiary record reflecting the factual and analytical basis for their decisions, to explain in considerable detail their reasoning, and to give ""adequate consideration"" to the evidence and analysis submitted by the private parties"

ConEd's application to the Federal Power Commission for a license to build a pumped-storage hydroelectric project was improperly granted since the Commission did not address the economic and environmental concerns on the record

Systemless (except denying due to high income) access to NYC housing authority units (only 10k available per year) lacks fair notice, clarity, and consistency. There's too much potential for corruption and bias (housing authority won't tell you where you are in line, reason for denial, etc.), the authority needs some sort of non-arbitrary system

An agency is not required to offer an individualized hearing if it has exercised its discretion "once and for all"

A court of appeals MAY NOT uphold an administrative agency's order on grounds other than those in which the agency relied in making the original determination

Generally, an agency must follow its own internal rules until they have explained adequately why they have changed their opinion.

No equitable estoppel against government, except in cases of affirmative misconduct (a deliberate lie)

Hearings are necessary if they are not unreasonable, unweildly, or an abuse of resources.

Where an agency rule applies to a large number of people, the Due Process Clause does not require that each person have an opportunity to be heard regarding the rule's adoption. Doing so would be impracticable

Since the statute granting the FTC power to adjudicate did not specifically prohibit rulemaking, the FTC could create rules. FTC changes its mind on whether it can draft rules when it decided that gasoline pumps must have their octane rating displayed

shows the potentially broad powers of agencies to make rules regulating the parties who fall under their mandate"

Courts will not presume a requirement for a formal hearing process unless Congressional intent is made clear from the statutory language

Congress must be explicit to insist on an agency engaging in FORMAL RULEMAKING

An agency creating a rule through informal notice and comment must provide a concise general statement IDing major issues of policy consideration of the agency and the rationale (APA)

The reviewing court cannot require an agency take additional action beyond the hard look notice and comment requirements of Section 553.

An agency rule making a reasonable choice among methods of implementation of a statute or regulation is a legislative rule, not an interpretative rule

A property interest does not necessarily guarantee a pre-deprivation hearing (probably overruled by Eldridge). In an emergency, the due process clause does not require a person be granted a hearing, as long as they get a meaningful hearing after at a meaningful time

Statutory benefits, like welfare, count as property. You also have to be able to bring your lawyer if you have the means to do so

A property interest must be mutual and agreed upon. Need for the job is not enough for a property interest

Even without formal tenure, a junior state college professor may have a property interest in the job, and is entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. Tenure would be a property interest, and the handbook says it wants the professor to feel he has tenure given the prof's services are satisfactory

Whether an administrative procedure meets the Constitutional guarantees of the Due Process Clause requires a consideration of three factors:

(1) The private interest at stake in the administrative action

(2) The risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures used

(3) The government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail

(1) National security (where are our submarines located)
(2) Personnel rules (how long is your lunch?)
(3) Nondisclosure statutes (sometimes with criminal records)(4) Trade secrets/confidential info
(5) Attorney client priviledge
(6) Privacy invasions
(7) Investigatory records (agency does not have to respond when the mob writes into agency and ask where the wire taps and phone bugs are located)(8) Bank transactions, ETC (savings, loans, credit unions)
(9) Oil wells, ETC (what is the location of all the oil wells so that I know where not to drill)

Courts may not hear cases when, under the APA, there is no meaningful standard by which the court may exercise discretion. Lots of agency discretion. An agency's decision not to take enforcement action is presumed immune from judicial review under APA 702. This presumption of unreviewability may be rebutted where a statute provides the agency with guidelines for the exercise of the agency's enforcement powers (where courts may base review)

Need to show connection in order to have standing. You cannot just allege generalized harm to the environment

Ripeness test:In determining whether a case or controversy is ripe for adjudication, a court must evaluate the:

(1) fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the

(2) hardship to the parties of witholding court consideration

Judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless Congress clearly intended to prevent such review

While McKart had not exhausted his adminisrative remedies, the result of not having his case heard was undue hardship (federal imprisonment). Generally tho, under doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, judicial review is not available for arguments that a litigant failed to raise in the course of an available adminstrative-review process

The issue involved determination of law regarding fraud. This was not a technical question that needed an agency's expertise.

A method by which citizens may sue members or agencies of State governments (not Federal) for violation of Federal Civil rights. State actor you point to must be responsible, generally more than negligent, of depriving you of a federal right (almost any will suffice but there are exceptions: non-practicable rights (written down but not enforced), and rights that are exclulsively enforced through a specified statutory process

Section 1983 is an exception to the Exhaustion requirement

If you're the prevailing party vs the gov in a section 1983 case, under Section 1988, you get reasonable attorneys fees (not the case by default in other instances). State of IN cannot be a defendant under Section 1983

ONLY APPLIES TO STATE ACTORS, NOT FEDERAL

Executive Order by Ronald Reagan requiring Executive Agencies to perform cost-benefit analysis for all major rules. Does not apply to independent agencies

each authority of the US gov is entitled to judicial review, barring:

(1) statutory provision
(2) agency has discretion by law (rare)

a pre-deprivation hearing does not always have to be _________

you can always engage in hard look on the ________ and not the policy

(if agency always grants workers comp or never does it, they're overturning the policy and _____ would need a hard look)

agency needs:

(1) notice and comment, AND
(2) concise general statement of the rule

for rescission of a regulation to be lawful, agency must...

Section 1983. P (against state actor) must allege more than just a violation of federal law, they must allege the violation of a _____________

(fake rights/bogus rights like student loan discharge)

agency informal rule-making requirements

(1) notice and comment

(2) agency response to significant comments in a meaningful way (concise general statement)

review of agency actions

(arbitrary and capricious)

interpreted rules are __________, just explain the law (law is found elsewhere)

when interpreting its own rule, the agency can use any reasonable interpretation by the agency that adopted the rule under 553

(very deferential)

__________ , even if real important, do not need notice and comment requirements of 553

(1) notice and comment
(2) concise general statement

notice
hearing
ALJ
only needed when statute expressly states that rulemaking must take place "on the record" (FL East Coast Ry.)

the more serious the problem, the more likely it is to require this. It's rare and time consuming and expensive (FL East Coast)

meaningful hearing at a meaningful time

opportunity to make a statement

right to confront and cross-examine a cross witness

in Overton Park, the secretary signing off on the road was an __________ (no APA section)

it is unconstitutional for Congress to give an administrative agency or private entity the power to make legally binding regulations, unless Congress provides sufficient limits on that power

generally, court applies nondelegation doctrine ________

nondelegation doctrine ________ to an agency rule

if an informal adjudication, ________ applies