Admin Law Cases

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Intelligible Principle Test: A delegation is permissible when Congress lays down by legislative act an intelligible prinicple to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform

A broadly stated set of stautory purposes was not sufficient to save the statue from invalidation under the nondelegation doctrine

Problem with both cases is that the President could legally decline to take action under any set of circumstances

This is a non deferential aggressive construe of the statue to avoid the non delegation doctirie.

Argued that the Statue violats the non-delegation doctrine because the agency's choice of when to pursue the goal of a virtually risk-free workplace is statutorily unconstrained

1. Forces Congress to makes important policy choices
2.Increases guidance under which agencies act
3. facilitates judicial review by requiring more definite statutory standards against which courts can measure administrative decisions


Rehnquist failed

see American Trucking Case

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One house legislative veto was unconstitutional.

It looks like judicial review of the Atty generals decision in the case because the house was exercising judicial powers when it tried to overturn the deportation.

Congress's only constitutional method of legally nullifying agency action is through legislation that passes both houses of Congress is presented to that President

Only officers of the United States May exercise authority under the laws of the US

Such officials must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause

Congress may participate in the appointment of officials who act "merely in aid of legislation"

Ex: Officers who gather information, or do research to help Congress decide how to legislate

Any officer appointed by Congress may not exercise aurhoity under the laws of the US

Congress can only participate in removal via impeachment and conviction

Congress's restricting removal of administrative officials to "good cause"

. "Quasi-legislative/quasi-judicial functions .) can only be removed for cause, because these agencies are intended to be independen

Purely executive functions" can be removed at the President's discretion

Inferior officials" (e.g., political civil service, protected civil service, special statute protected) can only be removed for cause (Weiner)

Congress may delegate the removal power to an official under presidential control

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Inferior officers can be removed for cause

Even though prosecutor didnt have a boss, Relied on the limited scope and duration of the counsel's appointment and the AG removal power

their work was " directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate"

Employee's Standard: Low-level officials who are employed by the federal government but exercise no discretion or authority to administer federal law

Greatly increases Congress's power to restrict the President's ability to remove executive branch officials

May restrict as long as the Presidents ability to carry out his duties are not compromised

Every President Since Carter has required agencies to participate in a centralized review of regulatory proposals

Must perform a Cost-benefit analysis
Budget requests are channeled through OMB
General Supervisory power

Line Item Veto is unconstitutional

Public Rights cases

De novo judicial review for questions of law and questions of jurisdictional fact. We dont know if thats still good law

Held Art. III allowed deferential judicial review of an agency's factual determinations concerning the details of employees claims:

1. Agency function is similar to masters and juries who often aid Art III judges in their fact finding

2. Assigning the fact finding to an agency might actually preserve judical power by not overwhelming the courts, while maintaining control through de novo review of questions of law and deferential reiview of the facts

1. More likely to be consitutional if it invovles a particularized area of law related to a federal reg scheme
2. Any judgement in a private rights dispute should be enforceable only by order of an Art III court
3. Judicial reivew of private rights disputes should be available in article III courts. Questions of Law, de novo review is prefered

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Holds that circuit courts are to be less deferential and more independent. Can't just look for scintilla of evidence - must determine if substantial in relation to entire record

Reviewing Court must take the initial decisoinmaker's opinion into account when deciding whether the agency's conclusions are supported by substantial evidence

When an agency announces a rule in an adjudicatory process, it must apply the rule as written

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1. a party who lost before the agency focuses on a "finding of fact" which is based on the agency's application of some rule-of-thumb respecting the evidence

2. The reviewing court is convinced to pull that rule-of-thumb out as a device for "disguising policy-making as fact-finding" and non-deferentially rejects it (on substantive or procedural grounds)

3.The reviewing court then reconsiders the evidence (in light of its rejection of the rule-of-thumb), determining that the agency's finding was not supported by substantial evidence.

(a) The reviewing court rather than the agency makes the decision on the rule issue (relative empowering of reviewing court), and

(b) The policy issue is decided on a case-by-case basis rather than by rule, thereby reducing the "rigidity" (and so also the "predictability") of the statutory-regulatory structure.

1. lawyer representing a party who lost before the agency focuses on a "finding of fact" by the agency under which a critical procedural decision, e.g., the burden of persuasion, whether gov't witness must testify orally, was made on a case-by-case basis;

2. The reviewing court is convinced to pull that buried procedural issue out and to treat it as a question of law

3. The reviewing court non-deferentially decides that question of law (perhaps as a matter of 'procedural due process', perhaps as a matter of statutory interpretation), thereby fashioning a rule respecting the procedural issue which is applicable to a broad class of cases before the agency.

(a) The reviewing court rather than the agency makes the decision on the procedural issue (relative empowering of reviewing court), and

(b) The procedural issue is decided by rule rather than on a case-by-case basis, thereby reducing the "flexibility" (increasing the "rigidity") of the statutory-regulatory structure.

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Agency decisions are affirmed if they enjoy " warrant on the record" and a "reasonable basis in law"

Traditionally, courts have decided issues of statutory authority without deferring to an agency's interpretation of its enabling act

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A very substantial empowering of agencies (and, ordinarily, the White House) and a correlative disabling of the lower federal courts;

Increased statutory/regulatory flexibility as agencies are able to alter rules without the need for statutory amendments when conditions, priorities, policies, and Administrations change

If you want the court to defer- you want them to take the easy route and say the statute has the ordinary meaning.

if you don't want the court defer to the agency then you say that they should use all of the traditional tools of statutory construction to figure out what they think the statute says.

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A relative empowering of the lower federal courts and a correlative disabling of the agencies (and, often, the White House)

This way empowers congress because the Whitehouse has to get their help when making changes. There will be more conflicts among the circuits. This is the basic structure you now have.

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The reviewing judge looks to see whether a "dear, dear interest" is injured or put at risk by the agency action;

If the answer to (1) is 'yes', the reviewing judge looks to determine whether Congress in enacting the statute authorized the agency (expressly or by implication) to injure that "dear, dear interest" in the way the agency has injured it;

If the answer to (2) is 'no', the court holds that the agency has acted beyond its authorized powers (ultra vires), that the agency action is therefore void, and that the decision on the matter is remanded back to Congress to deal with by statute.

The reviewing court strikes the agency action while avoiding the heat of non-deferentially using heavy-duty Constitutional weapons, (though perhaps only until a later day);

The tough policy issue is allocated to Congress and the President, jointly, to decide by way of enacting or amending a statute;

A large measure of policy flexibility over time is accommodated as the decision on the tough policy issue is decided by statute rather than as a Constitutional matter and so can be changed by statute rather than by amending the Constitution or convincing the Court to overrule itself on a Constitutional question

Deferential Chevron when:
• Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law
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• tthe agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority

he agency interprets a statute in contexts where no such delegated authority is apparent