Important Cases: Holdings

There were no grounds to overrule the Board's decision because the Board applied the regulation as written. All parties are charged with notice of binding, substantive regulations.

The regulation was published in the Federal Register, which serves as legal notice to all parties.

There can be no estoppel against the government, for courts cannot estop the constitution. Equitable estoppel will not lie against the government as against private citizens.

An agency can impose additional requirements beyond those contained in the APA. These additional requirements are contained in the enabling statute.

An agency must adhere to its own rules and regulations. Ad hoc departures from those rules, even to achieve laudable aims, cannot be sanctioned.

Absent constitutional restraints or extremely compelling circumstances, federal courts have no power to impose more restrictions on the agency than § 553 itself. § 553 is the floor for agencies, but the ceiling for federal courts.

Unless the enabling statute says "on the record after opportunity for agency hearing" or something very similar, §§ 556 and 557 are not triggered.

The court will not order disqualification of a rulemaker absent the most compelling proof that he is unable to carry out his duties in a constitutionally permissible manner.

Even though the Excelsior rule was found to be invalid bc it didn't comply with § 553, the order by the Board was unquestionably valid bc it followed legitimate adjudicatory procedures under §§ 556 and 557

Due process demands that an individual be afforded an opportunity for a trial-type hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits.

A student does have a due process right to public education that was created by statute. He is due minimal procedures, including notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have, and a chance to present his side of the story.

Due process does not require an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of SSDI.

Roth did not have a valid liberty interest claim because there was no moral stigma attached to his termination, nor could he show that it was impossible to get another job. He also didn't have a property interest bc there needs to be more than a unilateral need or expectation to establish an entitlement.

Loudermill didn't have a valid liberty interest claim bc his lawyer failed to allege that the reasons for the dismissal were published. However, Loudermill had a statutory entitlement to continued employment, which gave him a valid property interest. Thus, he was entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond.

Hedrich's liberty interest claim failed bc there were no allegations of moral turpitude, the allegation was not published, and she was still able to get another job.

Failure to assert a right to a hearing constitutes a waiver of that right.

In order to safeguard the public interest, some audience participation must be allowed in license renewal proceedings. The FCC must allow standing to one or more of the petitioners as responsible representatives to assert and prove the claims urged.

An agency may not switch theories midstream without giving the other side reasonable notice of this change.

The ALJ apparently didn't give a fair hearing (Teeter thinks ALJ gave a damn good offer)

Even though Powell's 4A rights were violated, in administrative proceedings that evidence will virtually always be allowable.

The decisionmaker must consider and appraise the evidence to some extent.

Courts won't find a violation of Morgan simply because an agency acted in a fast and expeditious manner.

Because this involved a constitutional issue, the legislature could not completely bar judicial review.

§ 701(a)(2) of the APA (review for abuse of discretion) applies only in the rare circumstances when a statute is drawn in such broad terms that there is no identifiable standard to apply.

There is a general presumption that judicial review is available.

The language and structure of § 102(c) indicate that Congress meant to commit employee discharge to the director's discretion, and § 701(a)(2) accordingly precludes judicial review of these decisions under the APA.

The plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not demonstrate an injury-in-fact or redressability.

In cases raising issues of fact or issues not within the conventional expertise of the judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over.

The agency has jurisdiction to create its own jurisdiction, so there is no exception to the exhaustion doctrine when claiming that the agency was acting without jurisdiction.

There must be much more than a permissible hunch in order to invoke the bias/futility McCarthy exhaustion exception.

When talking about issues of credibility, that part of the ALJ's factfinding will not be reversed, unless its conclusion is against the clear preponderance of the evidence.

The standard of proof required of the NLRB by both the Taft-Hartley Act and the Admin Procedure Act is the same. The factfinding of the Board will be affirmed if its decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.

Because the Sec.'s decision was not an exercise of a rulemaking function, review under the substantial evidence standard was unavailable, and his decision was entitled to a presumption of regularity.

The substantial evidence standard under both the APA and the Bank Holding Act were the same. Additionally, there the substantial evidence standard is no more demanding than the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.

When talking about internal memos, policy announcements, and press comments, the federal courts may give whatever amount of deference it feels like when reviewing the agency's statutory interpretation.

If Congress has spoken clearly to the issue, it's will must be followed. But when Congress is silent or ambiguous as to the issue being litigated, the federal courts must defer to the agency's interpretation so long as it's a permissible interpretation of the statute.

Official notice is an exception to the exclusivity principle. When the trier of fact is possessed with appropriate expertise, he may take official notice so long as he informs the parties and explains is use of official notice in the record.

An ALJ can only use his eyes in the courtroom.