Preclusion of Judicial Review

The vast majority of agency decisions are actually not judicially reviewable: the costs of developing an elaborate record are not always feasible / when the agency is engaged in mundane tasks, review not always efficient

(1) When statute precludes judicial review / there is "no law to apply" (no way for the court to review whether the agency followed some guideline)

(2) When agency action is committed to agency discretion by law / congress has specifically has delegated a decision to the agency via the

Congress, or perhaps a court, may decide that some agency actions should not be subject to judicial re-examination

Judicial review affects that agencies operate, if they know they might be hauled before a court to justify their decisions, they are going to create the record and understand their decision

A conscientious objector was denied VA benefits bc he was not a combat veteran and he argued that unequal benefits violated his 5thA right to EP and his 1stA right to free exercise of religion - the statute precluded judicial review but was held not to bar constitutional claims

(1) statute hinged on the word "under;" there were categorical distinctions about which types of claims were no judicially reviewable. There was a

(2) Constitutional Avoidance Canon: need to construe statute so that constitutional claims are preserved

A CIA employee was fired for being gay under the guise that he was a "security risk," and the statute says that within the agency, "termination is permitted if the director...shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the US" = No judicial review bc congress committed agency action to agency discretion by law (APA 701)

FDa failed to bring enforcement action when inmates alleged lethal drugs for execution not approved by the FDA. Presumption against reviewing agency decisions not to bring an enforcement action. This is a rebuttable presumption that can be combatted by specific statutory language forcing the agency to act. In such cases where the statute requires agency action, inaction is treated as an agency action that is reviewable unless the APA 701 exceptions to reviewability apply

The APA itself says that agency inaction = agency action (so presumption of reviewability rather than unreviewability)

Statute quite clearly withdrew discretion from the agency and provided guidelines for exercises of its enforcement power - statute rebuts the presumption of unreviewability of agency inaction

Chaney was not a shield to reviewability- presumption of unreviewability of agency inaction does not apply here where Agency fails to confer DAPA benefits to immigrants and undocumented persons

P's filed a rulemaking petition asking the EPA to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles under the CAA. EPA denied the rulemakign petition. Distinguishes Chaney and the decision not to regulate GHGs is actually reviewable.

If party petitions an agency to make a rule, agency has to justify/state the grounds for denial of rulemaking if the person who asked for the rulemaking petition is an interested party connected to the issue (APA 555(e)).
CAA also has action forcing language requiring the EPA to regulate the GHGS, which were also deemed to count as an air pollutant for purposes of the statute

In Heckler v. Chaney, the decision not to bring an enforcement action is equivalent to the decision not to adjudicate something. On the other hand, in Mass v. EPA, the decision about whether to engage in rulemaking is generally judicially reviewable unless the 2 APA restrictions apply.

If someone petitions an agency to make a rule, the agency has to be able to justify the grounds for denial if the person requesting rulemaking petition is an interested party connected to the issue. (APA 555(e))