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Article

Decolonising the Terrorism Industry: Indonesia

Mohammed Ilyas

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Citation: Ilyas, Mohammed. 2021.

Decolonising the Terrorism Industry:

Indonesia. Social Sciences 10: 53.

https://doi.org/10.3390/

socsci10020053

Received: 9 October 2020

Accepted: 27 January 2021

Published: 2 February 2021

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4.0/).

Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 3BX, UK;
m.ilyas@liverpool.ac.uk

Abstract: Over the last few decades, discussion of decolonisation and decolonial thinking has gained
much traction in many countries. Scholars and students have called on their institutions to decolonise
their curriculums and argued for why their respective disciplines need to be decolonised. They have
recognised that the knowledge produced by the social sciences remains Western-centric. However,
unlike the other social sciences, the terrorism industry, on the other hand, has not reflected on its
Western centrism. This situation is especially the case with the security side of the terrorism industry,
which is the most visible and arguably the most problematic side. By adopting a decolonial approach
and Indonesia as a case study, this paper highlights some of the ways through which the terrorism
industry reproduces Western centrism. The paper concludes by raising several issues regarding the
role that the industry plays in Indonesia and urges scholars to research them.

Keywords: colonisation; decolonisation; terrorism; Western; non-Western; Muslim; securitisation;
war on terror

1. Introduction

Over the last few decades, intellectual imperialism has been challenged by Western
and non-Western scholars. They have recognised that despite decolonisation, knowledge
production (facts, information, theories and concepts) remains Western centric and under-
pinned by ideas about racial and cultural superiority (Kurzman 2017). Scholars such as
(Alatas 2000, 2003; Agozino 2003; Connell 2007; Mignolo 2011) have challenged the West’s
knowledge supremacy in their fields of expertise by highlighting the connection between
colonialism and the present day and intellectual dependency.

However, unlike the other social sciences, which, to some extent, have started to
reflect on their Western centrism (Connell 2007), the terrorism industry, which is composed
of many actors and is based mainly in Western countries, has not. The definition of the
terrorism industry employed in this paper is based on the one developed by Herman and
O’Sullivan (1989, pp. 55–213). It consists of powerful Western governments (Members of
the Five Eyes (US, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) and Fourteen Eyes intelligence
gathering networks) and their intelligence agencies, as well as their non-Western allies;
think tanks, research centres, universities and scholars based in Western countries and in
some non-Western countries; military companies and tech companies based in Western
countries; NGOs, lobbyists and media organisations based in Western countries. Although
all the different parts of the terrorism industry are in urgent need of decolonisation because
of their role in perpetuating coloniality, this paper will focus on the relationship between
actors from Western countries that are part of the terrorism industry and Indonesian actors
like NGOs and scholars.

Given the impact of the ‘War on Terror’, it is remarkable that decolonial scholars
have not paid much attention to the terrorism industry. Two examples will illustrate the
point clearly. Firstly, a simple word search using the term decoloniality was used to look
for terrorism articles in the Critical Terrorism Studies Journal, which is the most critically
reflective journal among the many terrorism journals, but it bought up no results. Secondly,
decoloniality was also used as a search term to look for terrorism articles on the Scopus and

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Web of Science websites, but this also brought up no results. This situation suggests that
there is a blind spot in terrorism research that needs to be addressed by scholars, especially
by those that have non-Western heritage and Western scholars that are concerned with
the coloniality of non-Western countries. Addressing the blind spot is a huge challenge
and may require a non-Western epistemology because of the deep economic, political and
scholarly entanglements that exist between different actors within the terrorism industry
(Grosfoguel 2013; Mignolo 2011).

This paper aims to start a discussion among terrorism scholars, especially among those
that have non-Western heritage and Western scholars that are concerned with the coloniality
of non-Western countries. The paper takes Indonesia as a case study and argues that the
relationship between actors from Western countries and Indonesia is one of dependency,
where the latter are receivers of knowledge and funding, which is counterproductive for
indigenous knowledge production about terrorism. The paper has several parts, with the
first part discussing the history of terrorism and ethnic violence in Indonesia. The second
part discusses the theoretical influences that inform the paper, and the third part details the
methodological approach taken to conduct the research. The fourth and fifth parts discuss
the structure of the CVE and PVE sector in Indonesia and NGOs and scholar funding.
The sixth and seventh parts discuss research among NGOs and scholars and knowledge
dependency among Indonesian NGOs and scholars. The eighth part discusses the problems
associated with using terrorism Knowledge originating from Western countries, in the
form of theories, models and concepts in the Indonesian context. The final part details
some steps Indonesian NGOs and scholars can take to produce indigenous knowledge
about terrorism. The paper concludes by making two points. Firstly, by suggesting that the
Indonesian government needs to invest more in universities and support NGOs, which will
enable scholars to produce knowledge about terrorism and reduce the impact of intellectual
imperialism and coloniality. Secondly, it raises several issues regarding the ‘possible’ role
that the terrorism industry plays outside of the scholarly world in non-Western countries
and urges fellow scholars to research into them.

2. Political Violence in Indonesia

Islamist groups or groups that are organised around Islamic principles have a long
history in Indonesia, initially being part of the anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch
(Solahudin 2013; Abuza 2007). An excellent example of this struggle is the Acehnese people
of northern Sumatra fighting the Dutch. The Acehnese were defeated after 30 years of
conflict in 1873. However, this did not mean that all the resistance ended. Instead, the
Acehnese chiefs tried to reorganise a sustained resistance against the Dutch but were
unsuccessful, partly due to infighting (Dale 1988). The failure by the chieftains resulted
in local Islamic leaders reorganising the resistance and unifying the Acehnese under the
banner of Islam, which was termed as a jihad against the Dutch. The resistance was
defeated after 15 years of fighting because the Dutch had a superior army. The failures led
to guerrilla tactics being employed by the Acehnese against the Dutch, which was termed
as a private jihad (Dale 1988).

The anti-colonial struggle re-emerged during the 1940s after the Second World War
because the Dutch came back to reclaim Indonesia, which led to some Indonesians or-
ganising themselves around Islamic principles, which took the shape of small groups
that employed guerrilla tactics. Initially, these groups were independent but soon were
brought together by Sekarmadji Meridian Kartosuwiryo under the banner of Darul Islam.
Although Kartosuwiryo was the ideologue of Darul Islam and formulated a doctrine of
jihad, he did not start his political activism as an Islamist. Instead, his background was
secular, and he received his education in Dutch schools and was a nationalist until he
moved to Jong Islamieten Bond, which was an Islamic youth organisation. It is here that
he received his Islamic education (Solahudin 2013). The Darul Islam movement initially
fought alongside the Indonesian army against the Dutch. However, later, Darul Islam
fought the Indonesian army and the Dutch in a triangular war until its defeat in 1963

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 3 of 16

(Solahudin 2013; Abuza 2007). Despite the defeat, the movement resurfaced and spread to
different parts of Indonesia and integrated ideas from other Islamists such as Qutb and
Maududi into its ideology (Solahudin 2013).

In the 1980s, the Indonesian government passed a law obliging all political parties
to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological basis and targeted Islamic groups, including
Darul Islam, which resulted in its members either going into hiding or fleeing the coun-
try. Two members fled to Malaysia and are called Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Ba’asyir.
While in Malaysia, they regrouped and eventually, with other Darul Islam members, trav-
elled to Afghanistan to take part in the war against the Soviet Union in the mid-1980s
(Solahudin 2013). While in Afghanistan, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Ba’asyir, as well
as other Darul Islam members, came under the influence of violent Islamist ideologues
and fighters from other Muslim majority countries and embraced Salafi-jihadi ideas and
worldviews (Solahudin 2013). Some of these men returned to Indonesia and started to
recruit and train locals and participated in local ethnic conflicts, but avoided confrontation
with the Indonesian government (Cragin 2017). However, all this changed when Osama bin
Laden in the late 1990s declared war on the US and its allies. This declaration resulted in
the Afghan veterans becoming involved in conflicts within Indonesia and other Southeast
Asian countries (Cragin 2017). The Afghan experience enabled Abdullah Sungkar, and Abu
Ba’asyir to refine their Islamist ideas and establish networks with other violent Islamists
that were fighting in Afghanistan (Oak 2010).

In 1992, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Ba’asyir returned to Malaysia from Afghanistan
and founded Jema’ah Islamiyah (Oak 2010; Abuza 2007). However, not all the Afghan
veterans joined the group, which attests to the split among the veterans (Cragin 2017).
Jema’ah Islamiyah not only waged jihad against governments that they deemed as apos-
tates, but also sided with al-Qaeda in its war against the US and its allies. The group
had divisions across Southeast Asia and was involved in escalating religious tensions
between Muslims and Christians by bombing churches and facilitating al-Qaeda attacks
(Abuza 2007). Perhaps the most well-known attack carried out by Jema’ah Islamiyah, at
least outside Southeast Asia, was the bombing of a nightclub in Bali in 2002, which resulted
in 88 Australian and 38 Indonesian citizens losing their lives (Sunesti 2014).

One would have assumed that with the emergence of ISIS in Syria, Jema’ah Islamiyah
would have pledged allegiance, but according to Jones and Solahudin (2015), the group
took an anti-ISIS stance. This stance was a reflection of its 2007 decision, which forbids its
members from engaging in violence because there was no community support. Jema’ah
Islamiyah renouncing violence is part of a broader split among Islamist groups in Indonesia.
Some groups supported violence, while others rejected violence. According to Jones and
Solahudin (2015), the groups that supported violence are also those that supported ISIS.
Groups, such as Mujahidin Indonesia Timur, included remnants of Mujahidin Indonesia
Barat and Jamaah Anshorul Tauhid (Jones and Solahudin 2015). ISIS had considerable
traction in Indonesia, especially among women (Nuraniyah 2018). The ISIS appeal was
such that, it also led a small number of men, women and families travelling to Syria, and
some returning after the collapse of ISIS (Soufan Group 2015; Schulze 2018). Although
ISIS may have collapsed, the returnees present a risk to Indonesia’s security because
they may have embraced ISIS ideology and may radicalise fellow Indonesians and carry
out attacks because of instructions from ISIS (Sumpter 2018). The resurgence of violent
Islamist groups and global groups like al Qaeda and ISIS has resulted in the Indonesian
and other governments that have a geopolitical and geoeconomic interest in Indonesia
and in the Southeast Asia region, such as the US and Australia, as well as Indonesian and
international NGOs, taking steps to prevent radicalisation and carry out de-radicalisation
work (Sumpter 2017).

Aside from Islamist violence, Indonesia has also suffered from ethnic violence. In
some cases, there were riots, and in other cases, all-out conflict. The most serious conflicts
erupted in the late 1990s and lasted into the 2000s in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, and West
Kalimantan (Schulze 2017). This period also coincided with the resignation of Surhato,

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 4 of 16

the Asian economic crisis and resurgence of violent Islamist groups. Although ethnic
and economic tensions caused the conflicts, as Aragon (2001, p. 47) notes, “the political
economy of being Protestant or Muslim” played a central role in framing the conflicts,
which led to local and international support for the protagonists. These conflicts were not
sudden. Instead, they were a consequence of a combination of Dutch colonial policy to
divide and conquer through the Christianization of Animist populations to counter Muslim
Indonesians, government policies, political provocation, inaccurate media coverage, change
in ethnic demography, loss of ancestral land, and the lack of economic and political
opportunities (Trihartono and Viartasiwi 2015; Schulze 2017; Aragon 2001; Nasrum 2016).
This situation led to much violence, and in some cases, religious terms being used to
explain the conflicts. Since the conflicts, much has been done to restore peace between the
groups, which has involved Indonesian NGOs, but tensions remain high (Aragon 2001;
Al Qurtuby 2013).

3. Social Science Knowledge Producers and Receivers

Over the last few decades, many scholars such as (Schwab 1984; Said 1978; Con-
nell 2007; Agozino 2003; Alatas 2000, 2003; Mignolo 2011) have detailed the negative
impact that colonialism has had on the colonised world, which has resulted in the under-
development of colonised countries. These scholars and others like them, including
political activists, have argued for historical wrongs to be put right. Some scholars such as
Tuck and Yang (2012) have argued for decolonisation to go beyond the ‘academic world’
and engage in ‘practical decolonisation’. In the case of South Africa, this has been to call
for redistributive justice, which means land reclaim (Kepe and Hall 2018). On the other
hand, scholars have called for knowledge to be decolonised, meaning the decolonisation of
universities (Bhambra et al. 2018).

However, for this paper, the work of Raewyn Connell and Syed Hussein Alatas
is essential because of the conceptual tools that both provide, which compliments the
decolonial approach that the paper adopts. Collectively, they shed light on how the
terrorism industry perpetuates colonial knowledge production relations in Indonesia
through fostering dependency and exporting knowledge about terrorism produced by
Western scholars, often based in powerful Western countries to Indonesia. Connell, in her
book titled ‘Southern Theory’, traces the relationship back to colonialism and argues that
sociology is a product of modern imperialism and embodied an intellectual response to the
colonised world (Connell 2007).

What is striking about the early sociology and its authors is how they constructed
the world along racial hierarchies, where the coloniser was deemed as a superior race and
the colonised as inferior and incapable of self-rule and producing knowledge (Connell
2007, pp. 16–17). However, more relevant for this paper is what Connell says about
the relationships between Western and non-Western countries. She notes that data were
gathered from non-Western countries and theorised by scholars in the centres of knowledge
production in Western countries, especially in former colonial powers. Thinkers from non-
Western countries were and are excluded from the canon of social science subjects, such
as sociology. There is no mention of Ibn Khaldun (14th-century Muslim sociologist from
modern-day North Africa), Syed Hussain Alatas (Malaysia), Jose Rizal (Philippines) and
Ali Shariati (Iran). This situation has resulted in scholars from Western countries theorising
about the world, such as the work by Marx, and their work dominates the sociological
canon. In contrast, the work of non-Western scholars is excluded and deemed as local and
empirical, rather than theoretical or Global.

The next author who is relevant to this paper is Syed Hussain Alatas. He was a
scholar from Malaysia who was ahead of his time. In his work, he discussed the knowledge
production relationship between Western and non-Western countries and the need to
decolonise knowledge. In an article titled “Intellectual Imperialism”, which was initially
published in 1972 and republished in 2000, he discusses the impact of imperialism on
non-Western countries. He introduces the idea of intellectual imperialism and argues that

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 5 of 16

it not only operates in the same way as political and economic imperialism, but does so at a
deeper level and in a more devastating way because it penetrates the mind and influences
the behaviour of the colonised people. It has a long-lasting impact on the colonised, in
that, it conditions and controls the mind of the colonised long after independence has
been won. Examples of the impact are found in education, economics, culture, politics and
security, which replicate Western countries. In more concrete terms, intellectual imperialism
constructs a mental architecture in the minds of the colonised to think that they and their
culture are inferior to that of the coloniser and, as individuals, they cannot produce
knowledge at the same level as the coloniser, which is clear in the case of Indonesian
scholars that were interviewed for this paper. By extension, this leads to dependency,
where the colonised uncritically embrace all the ideas of the coloniser, including religious
ones. Alatas (2000) did not see intellectual imperialism as somehow disconnected from
the other types of imperialism. Instead, he argued that imperialism should be seen as a
cluster, operating at different levels from structure and agency. Alatas (2000) forwards two
terms that provide a lens through which we can see how Western countries operated in
the past, and continue to do so today, in non-Western countries in the areas of knowledge
production, culture, economy, politics and security. The two terms are compradore and
the captive mind. A compradore is someone that works against the interests of his or her
group or nation. In the past, firms from Western countries would use locals to extract raw
material, which would be sent back to their home countries, where it would be converted
into products. These products would be sold at huge profits and often back to nations
that supplied the raw material. Alatas (2000) argued that a similar relationship exists in
intellectual imperialism, where scholars from Western countries employ scholars from
non-Western countries to gather data, which is analysed and theorised by the former,
which is evidenced by the Indonesian NGOs and scholars that were interviewed for this
paper. Although the compradore is a useful concept to begin to understand the complex
relationships between actors from Western and non-Western countries, it does not account
for individual agency. The scholars and NGOs may be involved in the relationship knowing
that it is exploitative, but have no choice because of the economic situation, which makes
them dependent on actors from Western countries for employment. The captive mind,
on the other hand, describes how an individual’s thinking and behaviour replicates that
of people living in the West. As Alatas (2000, p. 37) notes, the “captive mind is one that
is imitative and uncreative, whose thinking is based on Western categories and modes
of thought”. Good examples of this are the use of the English concepts “radicalisation,
extremism and terrorism and the radicalisation models” by Indonesian NGOs and scholars,
which will be discussed later in this paper.

4. Methodological Approach

The paper is interested in the relationship between actors from Western countries that
are part of the terrorism industry and actors from Indonesia that work in academia and the
NGO sector. As such, the paper employed the semi-structured interview method. The data
were gathered using semi-structured interviews. The interview sample size consisted of
eleven NGO representatives and four scholars, and the interviews took place in Jakarta.
All the interviews were recorded, and the names of interviewees and their organisations
have been anonymised to protect their identities at the request of the interviewees. Before
the interviews took place, all the interviewees were asked to complete a consent form that
explained to them the nature of the research. Ethics approval was gained from the Islamic
University of Jogjakarta.

Research participants were gained by using snowball sampling because the partic-
ipants researched into and worked with extremists and terrorists on de-radicalisation
programmes. Although the subject of this paper does not infringe any legislation, it is
nevertheless sensitive, because some Muslims in Indonesia view Western countries and
Western organisations, especially those that were once colonial powers and those that par-
ticipated in the War on Terror as Islamophobic. They also view Indonesian organisations

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 6 of 16

that work with them as collaborators, informants, spies, and in some cases, enemies (NGO
Interview 8, 2020; Scholar Interview 2, 2020). This opinion is similar to what Alatas (2000)
describes as the role of a ‘compradore’. Consequently, working with actors from Western
countries such as Western embassies can result in stigma, which was a cause of concern for
the interviewees. Aside from the concerns around stigma, for some interviewees working
with the embassies and actors from other Western countries raised critical ethical issues.
Firstly, the interviewees were aware of the benefits their research could bring to actors
from Western countries, especially economic and political benefits. Secondly, actors from
Western countries provide work for them, which makes it difficult for them to be too critical
of the former because they were worried that they could lose funding or not be funded
again.

5. Data Analysis

The interviews were analysed by using content analysis. Content analysis is a method
that allows a researcher to systematically examine text data, which allows the researcher to
recognise patterns, themes, and meaning of the information gathered (Hsieh and Sarah
2005). The analysis process started by comparing the interview data with the literature on
colonialism and decoloniality.

6. Reflexive Dialogue

This process led to a reflexive dialogue between the interview data, literature on
colonialism and decoloniality and the author. The reflexive process resulted in several
questions regarding the author’s role, as a scholar from a Western country, but residing in
and researching a topic that concerns a non-Western country. Although there is no space to
have a full discussion on the reflexive journey that the author took, it is nevertheless essen-
tial to highlight a few points. Firstly, why are scholars from Western countries afforded
a great deal of privilege in non-Western countries? Secondly, are scholars from Western
countries researching in non-Western countries perpetuating intellectual imperialism and
reproducing coloniality? Finally, is there a way for scholars from Western countries re-
searching in non-Western countries to escape reproducing intellectual imperialism and
coloniality?

7. Structure of the Indonesian CVE and PVE Sector

At the top of the CVE and PVE sector in Indonesia is the Indonesian government and
its counter-terrorism agencies like Detachment 88, National Counter-Terrorism Agency,
Indonesian State intelligence and the Indonesian Military Intelligence. Following the
government are the many NGOs such as IPAC, PAKAR, YPP, C-Save, PSPR, AIDA, Whaid
Foundation and AMAN. Following the NGOs are the research centres such as the Habibie
Centre, which are followed by the universities. Only the University of Indonesia and
Defence University have dedicated terrorism degrees, whereas other universities discuss
terrorism and counter-terrorism as part of their international relations, political science and
sociology degrees. According to one NGO representative, the reason why there are so few
dedicated terrorism degrees is due to the country not having many scholars on terrorism
(NGO Interview 8, 2020). Although there are many Indonesian NGOs and scholars working
on counter-terrorism, not all of them are specialists on terrorism and counter-terrorism.
Some of the leading scholars on terrorism are Noor Huda, Prof Hamdi Muluk, Dr Mirra
Noor Milla and Sidney Jones (USA), who also act as advisors to the Indonesian government
(Scholar Interview 2, 2020). Other scholars also act as advisors to the government, but they
are from Islamic studies and religious studies.

8. Western Actors and Funding

In a previous section, it was mentioned that Indonesia had experienced ethnic vio-
lence and terrorism in the past. In order to deescalate and prevent future violence and
terrorism, Indonesian NGOs (religious and non-religious) have taken up this challenge

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 7 of 16

(Al Qurtuby 2013; Trihartono and Viartasiwi 2015; Duncan 2016; Hwang 2018). Although
Indonesian NGOs engage in much needed preventative work, sustainable funding is
always a source of concern. One NGO representative mentioned that the Indonesian
government inadequately supports them to do their work. What is meant by this is that
the Indonesian government does not financially support the work of the NGOs, and if it
does, it is on an ad hoc basis (NGO Interview 3, 2018).

This situation has left many NGOs looking for alternative sources of funding. In
the case of some NGOs, this has resulted in them relying on foreign actors for funding.
Representatives of two NGOs mentioned that this situation had led their NGOs and other
Indonesian NGOs to rely on funding from actors from Western countries, such as embassies,
NGOs, universities and think tanks. That said, the two biggest funders of Indonesian NGOs
and scholars are Australian, and the US embassies but embassies from other countries such
as the Netherlands, Canada, Singapore and Norway, and international organisations like
the UNDP and EU also fund them (NGO Interview 3, 2018; Scholar Interview 5, 2020;
Australia-DFAT 2020; US Department of State 2020). The reason why Australia and the US
are the biggest funders of Indonesian NGOs and scholars is primarily driven by economic
concerns and then by regional security (NGO Interview 8, 2020). However, both economic
and security concerns are interdependent and raise the issue of coloniality of Indonesia.

Western actors fund Indonesian NGOs and scholars to carry out research on issues
such as the radicalisation of Indonesian schoolchildren, radicalisation in prisons and
Indonesian women’s involvement in terrorism and to roll out CVE and PVE programmes
(NGO Interview 1, 2018; Scholar Interview 5, 2020). However, this type of funding in some
cases is short term but also has conditions attached to it (Hwang 2018; NGO Interview
8, 2020). The conditions, according to one NGO representative, exert control and place
restrictions on how the funding can be spent on CVE and PVE programmes (Scholar
Interview 5, 2020). He mentioned that the funders exert control over CVE and PVE
programmes by employing what he calls the ‘top-down approach’, by which he means
that funders control all aspects of the CVE and PVE programmes (NGO Interview 8, 2020).
These comments suggest that the funders like to maintain control over the CVE and PVE
programmes from conceptualisation to execution. The same NGO representative further
added that some funders do not fund the right type of CVE and PVE programmes. He
added that some funders only fund CVE and PVE programmes for moderate Muslim
Indonesians, but for him, such funding was not productive because moderates are less
vulnerable to radicalisation and extremism. The funders should fund de-radicalisation
programmes because they will prevent recidivism and reduce the protentional extremists
who have left extremism from radicalising others and re-joining extremist groups (NGO
Interview 8, 2020). From these comments, it seems that the NGO representative thinks that
funders have got their priorities wrong about what type of CVE and PVE programmes that
they should fund, because for him, moderates are not vulnerable to radicalisation because
they are moderates. For him, funding should go towards disengaging and rehabilitating
extremists (prisoners and former prisoners), because if they are not helped to disengage
then the chances of re-joining their former extremist groups and radicalising others increase
(NGO Interview 8, 2020). By some funders wanting fund CVE and PVE programmes that
target moderate Indonesian Muslims implies that they are working on the assumption that
moderate Indonesian Muslims are already ‘pre-radicalised’. This assumption raises several
issues concerning the Western centrism about radicalisation, which will be discussed in
later sections.

Another NGO representative stated that some funders are exploitative because they
expect NGO researchers to be available 24 h a day. For example, they call researchers at
midnight and expect them to either give them information about the project or do some
research for them, which means that the researcher gets no rest (NGO Interview 9, 2020).

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 8 of 16

9. Western Actors and Research

Western actors ask Indonesian NGOs and scholars to research for them on a range
of issues, such as community conflicts in Indonesia, Islamic institutions in Indonesia, the
Indonesian education system, the Indonesian government’s counter-terrorism policies and
radicalisation among Indonesian children and women (NGO Interview 6, 2018; Scholar
Interview 6, 2020). The NGOs are employed to gather data in a similar way to how data was
collected during colonial times. During colonial times, the relationship was exploitative
because it benefited the scholars from Western countries, in terms of profit, knowledge
production and publications at the expense of locals. A few examples from the NGOs will
sufficiently illustrate the continuity of the aforementioned type of relationship. The first
example is of an NGO representative who stated that her NGO has carried out research and
written reports on the effectiveness of CVE programmes run by leading Islamic institutions
in Indonesia for funders but does not know how the research has been used (NGO Interview
1, 2018). The second example is of an NGO representative who mentioned that his NGO
researched on radicalisation in Indonesian schools for a funder, but like the previous NGO,
he does not know how their research has been used (NGO Interview 2, 2018). A third
example is of an NGO representative who said that his colleague had been recruited as a
researcher by a funder to gather data on extremism in Indonesia because he has access to
hard-to-reach extremist groups (NGO Interview 3, 2018). A fourth example is of an NGO
representative who said that his NGO has researched extremism in Indonesia for funders
because they have access to extremists and former extremists, but he does not know how
his NGO’s research has been used. Furthermore, the representative added that he does
not feel that Indonesian NGOs get enough credit for the research that they do, despite
the research process being emotionally and labour intensive (NGO Interview 8, 2020). A
fifth example is of an NGO representative who explained that most funders that fund his
NGO do not join in the research. According to him, not taking part in the research means
that the funders do not fully understand the situation on the ground because the only
way to understand the phenomena entirely is to join in the research. (NGO Interview 8,
2020). A final example is of an NGO representative who said that the funders sometimes
offer short-term and long-term research scholarships and short-term training courses on
different areas of CVE and PVE (NGO Interview 1, 2018; Scholar Interview 6, 2020). She
mentioned that she turned down a scholarship from a funder because the conditions and
momentary value of the scholarship were exploitative. The scholarship was designed in
such a way that made her feel like if she would be doing intelligence gathering on her own
country or being a native informer, which she ethically and morally found very problematic
(NGO Interview 9, 2020).

In all the above examples, the research and reports produced by the NGOs are passed
onto the funders for analysis and theorisation, without any further input from the NGOs or
knowledge about how their research will be used (NGO Interview 6, 2018; NGO Interview
7, 2018). All the examples above reflect Alatas’s (2003) sixth dimension of academic
dependency, which is ‘brain drain’ because the NGOs do all emotionally and labour-
intensive work and, in some cases, dangerous work. This situation raises the question of
whether the funders or the NGOs themselves carry out risk assessments or monitor the
mental health of their researchers.

Although it may seem that the NGOs have no reflective thinking about working
with actors from Western countries, in reality, this is not the case, and the contrary is true.
All the NGO representatives were aware of the unequal relationship between them and
their funders, and for some, it raised ethical and political issues. One NGO representative
mentioned that funders are interested in Indonesia because of their economic interests
and our research helps them to achieve their economic goals (NGO Interview 5, 2018;
NGO Interview 8, 2020). However, due to a range of economic problems, NGOs are
forced to rely on actors from Western countries, and this situation has meant that some
NGOs do not think about the consequences of how their research may be used and how
detrimental it could be to Indonesia’s future (NGO Interview 6, 2018; NGO Interview 8,

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 9 of 16

2020). According to one NGO representative, for NGOs to move forward and have greater
control over the research and about how their research will or could be used, they need
to have some agreement in place before the research starts on issues, such as how the
research will be used (NGO Interview 8, 2020). The current situation that Indonesian NGOs
find themselves in is one of dependency, which they can only escape if the Indonesian
government sufficiently funds Indonesian NGOs and for this matter scholars to carry out
research and build effective indigenous CVE and PVE programmes.

10. Knowledge Dependency

As mentioned by Connell (2007) and Alatas (2000), the relationship between Western
countries and non-Western countries is one of dependency, where the latter is always in a
weaker position. This dependency is due to two things. Firstly, coloniality, and secondly,
a broader problem with the social sciences, where the West is regarded as the home of
innovative and creative knowledge production (Bhambra 2007). In contrast, the rest of
the world is seen as backwards and unable to produce knowledge. This situation, as
Alatas (2000) points out, has led to the marginalisation of knowledge produced by former
colonised societies because they are considered as backwards, and as such, have become
dependent on Western knowledge. The dependency that Connell (2007) and Alatas (2000)
highlight is indicative of the relationship between Western and non-Western countries
with regards to the flow of knowledge and the production of knowledge on terrorism,
including Indonesia. This relationship is evident in how the knowledge about terrorism
produced by scholars from Western countries such as the UK, Australia and the US is
exported to non-Western countries as part of the global fight against terrorism, in the form
of workshops, seminars, training courses, academic publications, reports and specialised
lectures (Seniwati 2016; Kundani and Hayes 2018; Security Council Counter-Terrorism
Committee 2017; NGO Interview 9, 2020).

The knowledge about terrorism travels in a unidirectional way, meaning that it flows
from Western to non-Western countries through organisations that have been directly set
up by the UN, the US, the EU and EU member states. One such organisation that has
been set up for global counter-terrorism purposes is the Global Counterterrorism Forum
(GCTF). It was set up by the EU and twenty-nine other countries, including Indonesia,
the UK, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the USA, the Netherlands and France (GCTF 2019a).
GCTF closely follows the Ankara memorandum, which is a comprehensive approach
to CVE and PVE. It involves the tech companies, governments, NGOs, private sector
organisations and community leaders, including moderate Muslim groups. Ultimately,
the aim appears to be to change societies, and in the case of Muslim societies, it is to make
Muslims moderate, with the RAND organisation, a US government-aligned think tank
proposed for Majority Muslim countries in the early 2000s (Rabasa et al. 2006; GCTF 2019b).
The GCTF organisation has several working groups, and the CVE group is co-chaired by
Indonesia and Australia but is led by Switzerland and the UK through the British-based
counter-terrorism think tank, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and the Geneva-
based Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). According to
Kundani and Hayes (2018, p. 9), the reason behind setting up GCTF was to strengthen
counter-terrorism and capacity-building in Muslim countries such as Indonesia that were
invested in the War on Terror. Moreover, other organisations, such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASAN), have also adopted CVE and PVE programmes proposed
by GCTF (Kundani and Hayes 2018).

The knowledge about terrorism accumulated by GCTF is also exported through, but
not restricted to, organisations that have been set up by the GCTF. One such organisation is
called Hedaya Counter Violent Extremism, which is based in Abu Dhabi. Hedaya aims to
be the leading centre for expertise on counter-violent extremism (Hedaya 2012). However,
as Kundani and Hayes (2018) note, these organisations have not paused to question if the
knowledge about terrorism and the CVE and PVE programmes that they are exporting
is actually suitable or will work in the countries that are importing them. Neither have

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 10 of 16

they paused to think about the long-term impact that such knowledge and programmes
could have on local scholarship and stability of countries. This situation is similar to what
Agozino (2003) and Cohen (2017) have argued regarding criminological theories and crime
prevention models that are exported to non-Western countries.

One good example of a counter-terrorism strategy that does not work in its home
country but has been exported to other countries like Indonesia is the UK PREVENT
strategy (NGO Interview 8, 2020; Kundani and Hayes 2018; Grierson and Dodd 2019;
Scholar Interview 4, 2018). The PREVENT strategy is based on the premise that extremism,
radicalisation and terrorism among Muslims are directly caused by Islam, which British
Muslims, British NGOs, human rights organisations, British critical terrorism scholars and
British politicians have strongly criticised because it has resulted in the securitisation and
stigmatisation of Muslims, as well as increasing Islamophobia in the UK (Kundani and
Hayes 2018; Awan 2012; Abbas 2019a, 2019b; McAuley 2020; CAGE 2015; HAC 2017; Taylor
2018).

Another way that knowledge about terrorism travels in a unidirectional way is through
scholarly publications by Western scholars. Indonesian NGOs and scholars tend to rely
more on knowledge about terrorism produced by scholars from Western countries, than
knowledge produced by local scholars. According to scholars and NGOs interviewed for
this paper, more than 70% of literature about terrorism consumed or taught in Indonesia
universities is authored by scholars from Western countries (Scholar Interview 1, 2020;
Scholar Interview 4, 2020; Scholar Interview 6, 2020. American scholars such as Martha
Crenshaw and Arie Kruglanski from the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START) centre at the University of Maryland and Mia Bloom from George State University
are the most popular (Scholar Interview 4, 2018; Scholar Interview 1, 2020; Scholar Interview
2, 2020; Scholar Interview 3, 2020; NGO Interview 9, 2020). The reason for the scholars from
SART being popular is not only because of their scholarship, but also due to the centre
having many collaborations with NGOs and universities in the Southeast Asia region. That
said, Indonesian NGOs also rely on workshops and short training programmes organised
by embassies of different countries, universities and NGOs, to either learn about or to gain
advanced knowledge about counter-terrorism (NGO Interview 2, 2018; NGO Interview 6,
2018; NGO Interview 9, 2020).

This situation indicates three issues. Firstly, what Alatas (2003) has called “depen-
dence on ideas”, which is one of his six dimensions that constitute academic dependency.
Secondly, this situation has resulted in Indonesian NGOs and scholars being knowledge re-
ceivers, rather than producers (Alatas 2003). Thirdly, this situation is increasingly creating a
“mono-culture of terrorist thinking and minds”. Finally, the knowledge dependency among
Indonesian scholars and NGOs is contributing to the continued dominance of knowl-
edge about terrorism produced by Western scholars, which also continues the intellectual
imperialism in Indonesian scholarship (Alatas 2000, 2003; Connell 2007).

11. Terrorism through the Western Lens

Indonesian Muslims adhere to various interpretations of Islam, such as Islam Nu-
santara (indigenous Islam), Sufism and Salafism, Shi’ism, liberal Islam and the Ahmadi
interpretation of Islam (Ahmadi Muslims are not considered as Muslims by many Muslim).
However, on social issues such as homophobia and abortion, they hold conservative views
(Scholar Interview 3, 2020; Scholar Interview 4, 2020). That said, according to one NGO
representative, Indonesians that adhere to the Salafi or conservative interpretations of Islam
are deemed as ‘pre-radicalised’ and as such considered as ‘at risk of being radicalised’, even
if they do not hold ideas that go against or act against the Pancasila (national philosophy
of Indonesia).

Although Indonesian NGOs and scholars largely depend on knowledge about ter-
rorism developed by Western scholars in the form of theories, models and concepts, this
knowledge, in some instances, is poorly understood, and in others, not suitable for the
Indonesian context and has to be adapted (Scholar Interview 3, 2020; NGO Interview

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 11 of 16

5, 2018). That said, this situation reflects several deeper problems, which are connected
to viewing terrorism through the lens of knowledge produced in Western countries, as
discussed below.

The first example is how radicalisation is understood in Indonesia. In Indonesia,
many NGOs are working on countering terrorism (Sumpter 2017), and they employ many
models and concepts developed by Western scholars to understand how one becomes an
extremist, radicalised and a terrorist. For example, they use a model such as the “staircase to
terrorism” model developed by Fathali M. Moghaddam, “Model of Jihadization” developed
by Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt and Thomas Prechet’s “Typical Radicalisation Pattern”
model (Borum 2011a). Although all the models are similar, the most popular model seems
to be the Model of Jihadization. Like the other models, the Jihadization model describes
the point of origin for radicalisation as starting at the ‘pre-radicalisation’ phase and Islam.
There are several problems with this phase and the models at large. The first criticism is
that the ‘pre-radicalisation’ phase is so vague and general that it describes the average
person, who has little or no criminal history, as being pre-radicalised. The second criticism
of these models is that they construct the Salafi and conservative interpretations of Islam
as precursors to radicalisation (Aly and Striegher 2012). According to Roy (2008, p. 2),
“the process of violent radicalisation has little to do with religious practice, while radical
theology, as salafisme, does not necessarily lead to violence”. Kundani (2012, p. 21) makes
a similar argument and states that “while a Salafi semantic register might be part of the way
that groups articulate their narrative, this alone is not evidence that religious ideology is
causing violence, but merely that, within this milieu, legitimacy is secured using theological
references”. Sageman (2014) is another scholar that is critical of what he has called the
“blame Islam” narrative and argues that ideology may play a role in political violence, but
we do not know-how. A third criticism of these models is that they are underpinned by
a combination of cultural, theological and psychological essentialism, which encourages
security services to believe that they can pre-empt future terrorist attacks through extensive
surveillance (Kundani 2014). Such an understanding of radicalisation is problematic
because it deems millions of Indonesian Muslims as being pre-radicalised and needing pre-
emptive intervention to “modernise” their understanding of Islam. Moreover, as Aly and
Striegher (2012) note, radicalisation models that give primacy to religion conflate a range of
motivations, issues and historical events and present them as religious. A fourth criticism
of the models is that they conflate cognitive and behavioural radicalisation (Sageman 2017).
A fifth criticism of these models, which can also be applied to other theories and concepts,
is mentioned by one NGO representative and a scholar. Both mention that Western theories,
models and concepts are built by using data from the Western context, while the Muslim
and the Southeast Asian context is very different from that in the West and consequently
there is a mismatch (Scholar Interview 4, 2018; Scholar Interview 3, 2020). A final criticism
concerns the dominance of Western scholars using a blend of psychological, cultural and
theological approaches to identify the causes of extremism, radicalisation and terrorism
among Muslims (Kundani 2014). In doing so, they privilege Islam as being the cause. This
dominance “directs” Indonesian NGOs and scholars to reach the same conclusions as some
of their Western counterparts (Scholar Interview 4, 2020).

The second example is the use of popular terrorism industry concepts such as ex-
tremism, violent extremism and terrorism. The confusion over what these concepts mean
has been well documented in the works of scholars such as Borum (2011b); Sedgewick
(2010); Schmid (2004); Sageman (2017); Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2009); Lowe (2017);
Richards (2017); Lambert and Githens-Mazer (2010); Silva (2018); Kundani (2014) and
Schuurman and Taylor (2018). In the case of Indonesia, the confusion over the aforemen-
tioned concepts is a reflection over the broader contestation over the concepts in terrorism
literature. Indonesian NGOs and scholars tend to use the aforementioned concepts inter-
changeably to mean engaging in violence, but this does not distinguish between holding
ideas and engaging in violence (NGO Interview 10, 2020; Sageman 2017). For example, one
NGO representative mentioned that extremists are those that believe in intolerance and

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 12 of 16

are far away from moderates (NGO Interview 11, 2020). A second NGO representative
stated that for him, extremism is like radicalism (NGO Interview 11, 2020). A third NGO
representative mentioned that for her extremism, and violent extremism is the same, ex-
tremism is when thoughts are acted on (NGO Interview 10, 2020). Moreover, the Indonesian
government, according to a fourth NGO representative, does not use violent extremism;
instead, they use terrorism (NGO Interview 9, 2020). The likely reason for this is not that
the Indonesian government does not understand what violent extremism is but rather they
recognise the difficulty in defining extremism, as well as the need to tolerate some ideas
held by some religious and political groups that are deemed as extremist but do not sway
too far away from the Pancasila.

Aside from the conceptual contestation in terrorism literature over what extremism,
violent extremism and terrorism are, there is also another reason for the confusion among
some Indonesian NGOs and scholars. The other reason is the numerous workshops,
conferences and short CVE and PVE training courses that NGOs and scholars attend,
which are organised by the embassies of Western countries like Australia and the US
and Western universities. As one NGO representative mentioned, the terminology that
we learn from workshops and two-week short training courses also confuses us because
most of us have not studied terrorism before and English is not our first language. The
representative gave an example of how her colleague learned about ‘gender mainstreaming’
at a counter-terrorism training course she attended, but she was unable to explain what it
was (NGO Interview 9, 2020).

Despite Indonesian NGOs and scholars primarily being consumers rather than pro-
ducers of knowledge about terrorism, some do see concepts like extremism and terrorism
as bias and Western-centric (Scholar Interview 4, 2020; NGO Interview 4, 2018). The type of
Western centrism that the scholars and NGOs are referring to is articulated by one scholar,
who mentioned that if we apply a religious fundamentalism questionnaire that has been
developed by Western scholars, then every Indonesian will be a religious fundamentalist
and pre-radicalised or radicalised (Scholar Interview 3, 2020).

Although this situation necessitates the need for Indonesian NGOs and scholars to
develop Indigenous theories and concepts to understand the Indonesian context, there has
been little movement in this direction. Among the NGOs and scholars, there is a recognition
that indigenous theories and concepts need to be developed, but for several reasons, this
has not happened (NGO Interview 8, 2020; Scholar Interview 2, 2018; Scholar Interview
3, 2020). The first reason according to an NGO and scholar is that Indonesian NGOs and
scholars only use Western concepts like radicalism, extremism and terrorism or their direct
translations of them such as ekstremisme and terorisme, because there are no indigenous
concepts (Scholar Interview 3, 2020). The second reason given why no Indigenous theories
and concepts exist according to Indonesian NGOs and scholars is because the Western
theories and concepts are very popular among Indonesian people, NGOs and scholars
(Scholar Interview 3, 2020; Scholar Interview 5, 2020). The third reason is connected to the
second, and according to one scholar, if indigenous theories and concepts were developed,
then Indonesian people and Western scholars would not be able to understand them and
us (Scholar Interview 3, 2020). The reasons for not developing indigenous theories and
concepts are products of a combination of two things. Firstly, this situation reflects what
Alatas (2000) calls the captive mind and intellectual imperialism, which is imitative and
not creative. Secondly, the global dominance of the terrorism industry and the impact
that it has had on Indonesian NGOs and scholars make it challenging form them to think
outside the theories and concepts produced by Western scholars. This situation reduces the
potential of indigenous theoretical and conceptual development to occur and reinforces
intellectual dependency and coloniality.

12. Producing Indigenous Knowledge

Indonesian NGOs and scholars have to follow three steps to decolonise the terrorism
industry and produce indigenous knowledge about terrorism. The first step is to adopt

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 13 of 16

border thinking (Mignolo and Madina 2006). The second step is to de-link from the Western
episteme that Western scholars use to produce knowledge about terrorism. The final step
is decolonisation (Mignolo 2011). Employing border thinking is essential because it is the
epistemology of the exteriority created by modernity and is grounded in non-Western
epistemes. Without border thinking, de-linking and a new horizon cannot be imagined or
take place (Mignolo and Madina 2006; Sayyid 2014). By not employing border thinking,
coloniality will continue because the Western episteme will continue to be used, rather
than de-linking and decolonising, and empowering non-Western epistemes. Given that
Indonesia has many cultures, ethnicities and religions, there is no shortage of indigenous
epistemes, which Indonesians call ‘local wisdom’ for NGOs and scholars to draw upon to
produce knowledge, not only about terrorism, but also about other socio-political issues.
By effectively using indigenous epistemes, Indonesian NGOs and scholars can overcome
intellectual imperialism and the cumulative impact of colonialism and coloniality that has
fostered a colonised and captive mind among some NGOs and scholars (Thiong’o 1986).

The knowledge produced through indigenous episteme could provide alternative
ways to theorise and conceptualise terrorism in Indonesia, as well as to develop more
effective CVE and PVE programmes that are more suitable for the Indonesian and possibly
Southeast Asian context. Given that Indonesia is a Muslim majority country, Indonesian
indigenous epistemes could be used to understand terrorism better and help to develop
more suitable and effective CVE and PVE programmes for other Muslim majority countries.
Moreover, Indonesian indigenous episteme could also inspire NGOs and scholars from
other Muslim majority countries to develop their episteme to understand terrorism better
and develop context-relevant CVE and PVE programmes. In doing so, they can also be
intellectually independent.

13. Conclusions

The aim of this paper is not to take up the challenge of decolonising the whole of the
terrorism industry, which does need to happen. Instead, the paper has a modest focus on
one aspect of the industry, which is the relationship between actors from Western countries
and Indonesian NGOs and scholars.

The paper has argued that the relationship between Indonesian NGOs and scholars
and actors from Western countries working in the area of terrorism is a continuation of
colonial ‘knowledge production’ relations. This situation has resulted in academic depen-
dency and a lack of interest among Indonesian NGOs and scholars to produce indigenous
knowledge about terrorism. The dependency is maintained because the Indonesian govern-
ment inadequately supports or encourages the NGOs and scholars to produce indigenous
knowledge to develop indigenous CVE and PVE programmes. This situation means that
NGOs and scholars continue to rely on knowledge produced by Western scholars that
are part of the terrorism industry on funding from actors from Western countries to carry
out CVE and PVE work. However, this situation does not mean that NGOs and scholars
lack the ability to produce indigenous knowledge about terrorism or are unaware of the
unequal relations between them and their funders.

The relationship between Indonesian NGOs and scholars and actors from Western
countries raises several important geo-economic and geopolitical issues connected to colo-
niality, which are listed below and need researching into by using a decolonial approach.
(1) Why are actors from Western countries interested in funding Indonesian NGOs and
scholars to carry out research on extremism and radicalisation? (2) What benefits do West-
ern actors gain from funding Indonesian NGOs and scholars? (3) How do Western actors
use the data collected by Indonesian NGOs and scholars on extremism and terrorism? (4)
How is the knowledge generated from the data gathered by Indonesian NGOs and scholars
on extremism and terrorism used by Western actors? (5) Is there a relationship between the
knowledge produced by actors from Western countries on extremism and terrorism con-
nected to Indonesia’s fossil fuel and mining industries? (6) Is there a relationship between
the knowledge produced from the data gathered by Indonesian NGOs and scholars by

Soc. Sci. 2021, 10, 53 14 of 16

actors from Western countries on extremism and terrorism connected to gaining or further-
ing economic and political influence in Indonesia? (7) Is the knowledge generated from the
data gathered by Indonesian NGOs and scholars on extremism and terrorism by Western
actors, including social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter, shared among
Western countries and their regional allies to further marginalise and securitise Indonesia?
(8) What type of relationship exists between actors from Western countries? (9) The final
issue concerns what is terms as “digital data colonialism”, which reproduces coloniality,
which is connected to issue 7 (Chouldry and Mejias

2019).

Indonesian NGOs and scholars
need to adopt a decolonial approach and research into digital data colonialism and be
vigilant and push the Indonesian government to legislate against digital data colonialism
by tech companies like Facebook, technology corporations, media companies and foreign
governments.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Ethics approval was gained from the Islamic University of
Jogjakarta.

Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all interviewees.

Data Availability Statement: Data can be found in the article.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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Introduction
Political Violence in Indonesia
Social Science Knowledge Producers and Receivers
Methodological Approach
Data Analysis
Reflexive Dialogue
Structure of the Indonesian CVE and PVE Sector
Western Actors and Funding
Western Actors and Research
Knowledge Dependency
Terrorism through the Western Lens
Producing Indigenous Knowledge
Conclusions

References

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European Security

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Fighting terrorism at the local level: the European
Union, radicalisation prevention and the
negotiation of subsidiarity

Francesca Melhuish & Charlotte Heath-Kelly

To cite this article: Francesca Melhuish & Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2022) Fighting terrorism at
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Fighting terrorism at the local level: the European Union,
radicalisation prevention and the negotiation of subsidiarity
Francesca Melhuish and Charlotte Heath-Kelly

Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

ABSTRACT
In this article, we investigate how the EU mobilises a spatio-
temporal imaginary of the “local” in its counter-radicalisation
activities as a means of navigating subsidiarity principles and
expanding its remit as a “holistic security actor” (cf. Baker-Beall
[2016]. The European Union’s fight against terrorism: discourse,
policies, identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press). Extant
work on the EU’s terrorism prevention efforts has focused on how
the organisation constructs transnational terror threats that
require supranational, EU-level responses. Our research makes an
original contribution to these literatures by demonstrating how
the EU also seeks to intervene “below” the level of the nation
state. EU counter-radicalisation works directly with subnational
actors in municipalities, cities, and frontline public services across
Member States. Employing the first systematic analysis of the EU’s
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) outputs, we demonstrate
how “the local” frames pre-emptive counter-terrorism
interventions as “upstream”. “Closer”, or “localised”, reads as
“earlier” in this discourse. We also unpack how EU institutions and
Member States have voiced concerns about the circumvention of
subsidiarity (through engagement with local actors across the
Union), by criticising the “effectiveness” of RAN. While the
European Commission has taken steps towards addressing these
grievances, its proposals reflect a further renegotiation and
repositioning of the EU as a security “facilitator” across spaces
deemed simultaneously local and transnational.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 19 August 2021
Accepted 18 November 2021

KEYWORDS
Counter-radicalisation;
European Union;
Radicalisation Awareness
Network; terrorism
prevention; radicalisation
prevention; subsidiarity

Introduction

As scholars of International Politics, our attention is often drawn to the international and
transnational domains. Indeed, academic literature from Migration Studies and Security
Studies frequently attests that the European Union (EU) “operationalises” international
challenges to consolidate and extend its governance remit. Scholars have pointed to
the EU’s construction of a “migration crisis” that centralises the transnational dynamics
of irregular migration flows and opens space for remit expansion by its institutions
(Kaunert and Léonard 2012, Vianelli 2017a, 2017b). An international frame is also typically

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medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.

CONTACT Francesca Melhuish f.melhuish@warwick.ac.uk

EUROPEAN SECURITY
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applied to the problem of terrorism and is understood to inform the EU’s radicalisation
prevention work, contributing to the expansion of its governance sphere. Here, “the
notion of ‘radicalisation’ helps to provide legitimacy for the development of a complex
mode of governance, which extends out from the European level and cuts across national
and local boundaries” (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 143).

While such analyses focus on how the framing of threats as “international” has enabled
the EU to expand its remit as a “holistic security actor” (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 177), our
article foregrounds how a spatio-temporal imaginary of the “local” functions similarly
within the EU’s radicalisation prevention work. A local frame, we argue, opens space
for EU action against terrorism not just at the frontiers of Europe or at the transnational
level, but at the heart of cities and towns throughout the Union, contributing to the
organisation’s efforts to carve out a governance mandate that sits above that of
Member States. These developments can be located within broader EU claims of a
“Europe of the Regions”, which also endeavour to “connect localities” at the EU level,
engaging sub-national actors in the project of a federal Europe (Loughlin 1996).

In the field of EU counter-terrorism, appeals to the local level are not only spatially
articulated but also operate via a “counter-radicalisation” ontology with significant tem-
poral dimensions. The radicalisation ontology (Heath-Kelly 2013), while fluid and con-
tested, imagines that early or “upstream” intervention through social policy and
frontline services can divert someone from a progressively dangerous path towards ter-
rorism. This framing speaks to the commonality between radicalisation and social crime
prevention (Bjørgo 2016, Hardy 2020, Johansen 2020) – highlighting how social policy’s
local frontline services are steadily being recruited to serve “preventive” and anticipatory
functions.

Importantly, the EU’s subsidiarity architecture has also shaped this focus on locality. In
general, subsidiarity refers to the principle by which Member States retain control over
certain policy domains, such as national security, unless it is multi-laterally agreed that
EU coordination and action could provide added value beyond these retained competen-
cies. The long and nuanced history of EU subsidiarity has been documented elsewhere
(Barroche 2007, 2012). Significantly for our analysis, such genealogies have highlighted
the concept’s ambiguity and its consequent malleability as a resource for EU actors oper-
ating at different levels. As such, subsidiarity has political as well as strictly legal connota-
tions, and can be mobilised to support a “sovereigntist” reading, favoured by Member
States, or a “federalist” reading, typically deployed by the European Commission (Bar-
roche 2007, 2012). Here, as in the Europe of the Regions discourse, an ostensible commit-
ment to subsidiarity allows the Commission to soothe Eurosceptic complaints of EU
overreach while advancing its federalist ambitions (Barroche 2007, 2012).

This reading of subsidiarity chimes with our analysis, where we chart how the EU has
navigated its apparent constraints and produced a distinctive field of knowledge and
practice through the creation of transnational networks of local radicalisation prevention
practitioners, such as the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). The dual political
meaning of subsidiarity, however, ensures that such efforts to expand the EU’s govern-
ance remit do not pass unchecked by Member States and other EU institutions. We
also explore how these actors have pushed back against EU encroachment and show
how attempts to reassert national sovereignty in the field of radicalisation prevention
use the discourse of “effectiveness”. This analysis highlights how the EU’s own legal

314 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

definition of subsidiarity, as expressed in Article 5 of the so-called Maastricht Treaty where
it is understood in terms of the perceived effectiveness of EU action compared with “action
taken at national, regional or local level” (see European Union 2012, p. 6, n.d.), has been
increasingly used to challenge the organisation’s incursion into its constitutive nations.

To develop these arguments, our article provides the first systematic discourse analysis
of RAN, its creation and operations, and the High-Level Commission Expert Group on
Radicalisation (HLCEG-R) – which redesigned and refreshed the EU’s approach to preven-
tion. While RAN initially promised to allow the EU to navigate national subsidiarity con-
straints by connecting local and transnational spheres, persistent cross-institutional
battles have resulted in at least three iterations of the network, whose “added-value”
and effectiveness have increasingly been called into question. Our analysis reveals how
subsidiarity claims are an important hidden transcript behind these narratives, enabling
critics to claw back some operational space from the EU’s radicalisation prevention struc-
ture, causing the organisation to once more reimagine itself as a multi-level security
interlocutor.

European Security and counter-radicalisation

The steady development of the EU security agenda has manifested through the creation
of an “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (AFSJ) and a “Common Foreign and Security
Policy” (CFSP), operating within the frame of Member State cooperation, followed by an
extension of the EU’s security ambit into external regions through the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy (Manners 2013). Alongside such measures, the EU has simultaneously
developed a range of transnational organisations and networks which govern internal
security. These internal protection policies frame migration, organised crime and terror-
ism as the main security threats to the Union (Léonard 2010, Kirchner and Sperling
2018), to be combatted by strengthening transnational agencies such as Europol and
FRONTEX.

A dedicated literature explores how the EU’s counter terrorism policies have developed
in response to “transnational” threats, illuminating the policies’ history (Bossong 2013),
effectiveness (Bures 2006) and coherence (Argomaniz 2011), and enhancing our under-
standing of EU security policy formation. Further contributions have used such develop-
ments to interrogate the EU’s evolution as a “holistic security actor” (Zwolski 2012, Baker-
Beall 2016), speaking to broader work on EU “actorness”, which assesses the organis-
ation’s ability to generate foreign and security policies that reflect its guiding principles
and are accepted by its Member States and external partners (Kaunert 2010, p. 658). As
such, scholars have identified EU security frameworks’ co-option of “new” security chal-
lenges like climate change (Zwolski 2012), and highlighted how the framing of terrorism
as a transnational threat with both internal and external dimensions has enabled the EU
to expand its governance remit (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 177).

Studies of EU counter-terrorism have also centred the organisation’s specific attempts
to develop competence in preventing radicalisation, foregrounding its persistent focus on
engaging Muslim communities (Baker-Beall 2016) and emerging efforts to intervene
online (Léonard et al. 2020). Several contributions have questioned the effectiveness of
the EU as a counter-radicalisation actor (Bakker 2015, Martins and Ziegler 2018), with
some expressing specific scepticism about the potential of RAN (Bossong 2014). While

EUROPEAN SECURITY 315

these interventions have highlighted recurring deficiencies in EU counter-radicalisation
policy, they are reticent as to what criticisms of effectiveness reveal about contestations
over subsidiarity. Our article speaks to this gap by commenting not on the efficacy of EU
counter-radicalisation per se, but on what critiques of an effectiveness deficit mean for
different EU actors in a broader political-institutional sense.

Importantly, while much work on EU counter-radicalisation remains pre-occupied by a
transnational frame, some have begun to unpack the relevance of a local level to the
“fight against terrorism”. Contributions have highlighted the EU’s securitisation of loca-
lised public services within its expanding governance agenda (de Goede and Simon
2013), pointing to the development of a “European Security Culture” that prioritises
early, preventive action against perceived terrorist threats (de Goede 2011, Baker-Beall
2016). Others have specifically noted the EU’s creation of fractious transnational networks
of security professionals – dubbed “professional managers of unease” – that “transcend
national frontiers and localize the spaces of political decision-making” (Bigo 2008, pp.
12–13). As we explore further below, although these insights hold promise for the
study of the EU’s RAN (de Goede and Simon 2013, p. 332), the network is yet to receive
sustained attention.

While extant treatments of EU counter-radicalisation have begun to shed light on the
importance of local actors, they have dedicated little space to exploring how this devel-
opment has been led by, and increasingly borrows from, the EU’s broader crime preven-
tion work. An early driver of the “localism” approach in European crime prevention (and
later, terrorism prevention) was the European Forum on Urban Security (EFUS) – formed in
1987 as an NGO oriented towards knowledge exchange and partnerships between Euro-
pean cities. EFUS has continually lobbied for local integration and social service-based
interventions to prevent crime – and terrorism – often receiving EU funding for their
work. In 2006, the EFUS SECUCITIES project (funded by the Commission) turned its atten-
tion to terrorism, arguing for the first time that it should no longer be securitised and
“hived off” from crime policy. Instead, the situational and social measures used in crime
prevention should be applied to terrorism, introducing localism, frontline workers and
local authorities to the agenda of European Security (Shaftoe and Turksen 2006, p. 19).

The EU’s RAN represents the most recent and significant embodiment of these prin-
ciples and it is therefore the focus of this article. We detail the history of RAN below to
situate our discourse analysis. For the purposes of this literature review, it is important
to underline that little academic literature has engaged substantively with RAN. Gordillo
and Ragazzi (2017) explore RAN as a core institution in the production of a European
Security Agenda – but frame RAN’s localism through Nikolas Rose’s thesis on advanced
liberalism and governing through society. On this view, the communities deemed
“suspect” or vulnerable to radicalisation by RAN are simultaneously conceived as the
vehicles with which to deliver security policy, through assumptions made about the
“credibility” of local religious and community figures in halting radicalisation (Gordillo
and Ragazzi 2017, p. 57).

While the chapter provides an essential analysis of RAN’s appropriation of the “local” in
its security work, the political-institutional dynamic of what localism means for the EU
Security Union is not considered. Other mentions of RAN similarly neglect to examine
its institutional dynamics as an EU foray into local towns and cities, and the negotiations
– and contestations – of subsidiarity that this involves. Such omissions may be attributed

316 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

to the limited treatment that RAN typically receives within broader studies of EU counter-
radicalisation and counter-terrorism (e.g. Baker-Beall 2016, pp. 151–163, Martins and
Ziegler 2018), or to a diverting focus on the network’s intervention in specific sectors,
such as education (Mattsson et al. 2016) and religion (Foret and Markoviti 2020).

By contrast, our contribution explores the political significance of RAN for the EU as a
security actor, its production of a spatio-temporal nexus where local proximity is associ-
ated with upstream prevention, and the tensions over subsidiarity that this distinctive,
preventive localism agenda has created between the European Commission, RAN, and
other actors, such as the Committee of the Regions and Member States.

Methodology

Our article provides the first substantial discourse analysis of the EU’s RAN and associated
bodies. “Traditional” work on EU counter-terrorism by scholars, including Argomaniz,
Bossong and Bures, typically advances a “problem-solving” frame that provides good-
faith assessments of the EU’s policy effectiveness, bypassing any critical engagement
with the nature and function of the organisation’s counter-terrorism discourses (Baker-
Beall 2016, pp. 15–16). By contrast, our approach is informed by critical counter-terrorism
literatures, which explore how discourse facilitates “an embedding of “expert knowledge”
on “radicalisation”” that enlists frontline professionals in pre-emptive security practices
(Baker-Beall 2016, p. 162, cf. Heath-Kelly 2013), and also is politically consequential for
EU governance. While particular discursive representations, or language, provide the
entry-point for such an analysis, discourse itself is, therefore, conceived in broader
terms of its productive power.

Practically, this approach necessitates our engagement with a wide range of written
documents. As our analysis is primarily concerned with RAN, it takes in official documents
publicly released on the network’s website between its inception in 2011 and the present
day. This corpus includes documents from all of RAN’s annual “High Level Conferences”
and plenary meetings in the period, which help us to trace the network’s overall evol-
ution. It also includes the complete activities of the RAN working groups on policing
(RAN POL), health and social care (RAN HEALTH), and local authorities (RAN LOCAL)
during this timeframe. While the limited extant work on RAN has focused on its interven-
tion in education and religious sectors, as noted above, our concern is for how a “local”
frame is mobilised in the network’s materials. RAN LOCAL clearly speaks directly to this
theme. A local sphere of action also animates the other working groups we consider,
focusing on key localised public service professionals.

In addition to RAN’s own materials, our analysis also incorporates a wider range of
sources. Our corpus, therefore, includes documents from a broader timeframe and a
set of actors, such as those produced directly by the European Commission, the European
Council and the Committee of the Regions. Examining these documents enables us to
trace RAN’s formation and – later – its contestation in relation to broader trends in EU
counter-terrorism policy and governance. While our empirical analysis is the first to
engage with many of our primary texts, where necessary and available, we also consult
a limited number of secondary sources to provide further context.

After assembling our primary corpus, we subjected our documents to a qualitative, the-
matic analysis (Braun and Clarke 2014). This process initially involved identifying keywords

EUROPEAN SECURITY 317

and phrases that expressed RAN’s localism. Although the “local” is sometimes directly
invoked by RAN, it is often merely implied in references to the “community” police (RAN
POL) and “frontline” practitioners (RAN HEALTH) deemed close enough to target groups
to be able to detect supposed vulnerability to radicalisation at a very early stage (e.g. RAN
HEALTH 2012, RAN POL 2012). Once we had identified how the local was represented we
could then aggregate our analysis to detect common patterns or themes (Baker-Beall
2016, p. 43). Here, our extant understanding of crime prevention discourse guided our
interpretation of how texts borrowed from social or situational crime prevention philos-
ophies. This thematic analysis, coupled with further assessment of how the varied docu-
ments in our corpus interacted, then enabled us to evaluate the discursive function of the
“local”, both for RAN’s counter-radicalisation efforts and for EU governance more broadly.

Understanding the history of RAN

The EU has carved out the prevention of terrorism as a specific area of competence in
response to the supposed extreme and continuous threat of terror attacks “anywhere,
anytime, anyone” (Solana, 2005 cited in Baker-Beall 2016, p. 1). The requirement to
“prevent” terrorism is codified as the first of four pillars in the EU’s 2005 counter-terrorism
strategy, followed by the remaining pillars of “protect”, “pursue” and “respond” (European
Council 2005, p. 3). Although the European Commission described this strategy in 2010 as
the “main reference framework for EU action in this field”, a review of the policy requested
by the European Parliament progressively incorporated counter-terrorism into a broader
EU “Internal Security Strategy” (ISS) targeted at keeping pace with “future challenges”
(European Commission 2010b, p. 2, European Council 2010, p. 33). The ISS cites terrorism
as the primary threat to EU security positioned as a “basic right” of European populations
(European Council 2010, p. 19). The document’s overarching framing of security as an
urgent matter of European rights and values is consistent with the EU’s tendency,
already observed by critical counter-terrorism scholars, of narrating terrorism as a
threat to its identity (Baker-Beall 2016). Consequently, EU counter-terrorism policy has
become an important site through which the organisation’s identity can be continually
(re)produced (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 172).

Given that terrorism has become a central issue for the Security Union – sometimes
framed with the rhetoric of existential threat, it is perhaps unsurprising that its prevention
has become a key concern. As noted above, the inherent temporality of terror prevention
is anticipation and pre-emption – that is, intervening before a terror attack occurs. In the
realms of prevention work this temporality has been further cemented through a specific
focus on radicalisation. The ontology of radicalisation advances the premise that terror
attacks can be prevented not only before they happen but also perhaps before they
have even been considered (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 185). To this end, the EU has long
been pre-occupied by a desire to inculcate the “best” ways for preventing radicalisation
leading to violent extremism and terrorism within and across its Member States. Policy
transfer between those responsible for preventing terrorism was an explicit goal of
early EU-funded initiatives, such as the European Policy Planners Network on Countering
Polarisation and Radicalisation, hosted by London think-tank, the Institute for Strategic
Dialogue. Indeed, the EU has founded successive networks of experts designed to
share counter-radicalisation knowledge and best practice throughout the Union. Early

318 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

iterations included the Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (EGVR), 2006–2008, and the
European Network of Experts on Radicalisation (ENER), 2008–2010 (European Commission
2010a, p. 4, 2010b, p. 5).

Despite these initial attempts at cultivating networks of counter-radicalisation exper-
tise, the European Commission’s 2010 review of EU counter-terrorism policy identified
a need to establish the “most effective” ways of countering radicalisation and recruitment
and survey Member State experiences in these fields (European Commission 2010b, p. 5).
Such language, coupled with the ISS’s preference for a collaborative and multi-agency
civil society approach to tackling terrorism (European Council 2010, pp. 22–24), set the
scene for the EU’s creation of RAN. Although RAN is not mentioned directly in the
initial ISS document, it emerges from the five-step ISS action plan later released by the
EC, under Objective 2 (Prevent terrorism and address radicalisation and recruitment),
Action 1 (Empower communities to prevent radicalisation and recruitment) (European
Commission 2010c, p. 7). Much like the networks that preceded it, RAN is conceived as
a collective of European practitioners who convene to share expertise in countering radi-
calisation (RAN 2013, p. 1). As senior RAN consultant Maarten van de Donk describes, the
network aims “to connect people who are dealing with radicalisation throughout Europe,
and our main goal within that is to build an exchange of knowledge and an exchange of
discussion to find out about violent extremism” (Fitzgerald 2016, p. 131).

Such exchanges are primarily organised around what are now nine working groups,
covering different areas of counter-radicalisation, including policing, healthcare and
municipalities. Although the need for more information sharing and collaboration
between such public agencies is a recurring theme throughout RAN’s papers, its
working groups remain ironically siloed, coming together only in occasional collaborative
events, or at RAN’s wider annual meetings. Nevertheless, the examples above indicate
how the EU is using the network to constitute a field of knowledge through which terror-
ism – previously understood in terms of organisational and strategic violence – is framed
through a broad conception of crime prevention where social policy sectors are respon-
sibilised to intervene, alongside other mechanisms of government. Crucially, in addition
to its temporal dimension of early, pre-emptive action, this field of knowledge is also
organised around a distinctive spatial axis that brings together a transnational network
of local terror prevention partners.

As we explore further in the next section, a local level is deemed necessary to work
effectively with “susceptible individuals” and “vulnerable communities” (European Com-
mission 2010c, p. 7). Such language alludes to a spatio-temporal dynamic of counter-radi-
calisation in which “local” stands for “upstream” and pre-emptive interventions – a logic
borrowed from broader approaches to crime prevention, as noted above. RAN’s broad
concern for the local is demonstrated from its very first HLC in 2013, which was explicitly
organised around the theme of “Empowering local actors to prevent violent extremism”
(RAN 2013, emphasis added). Such actors are further defined as frontline practitioners and
those “culturally close” to suspect communities that meet an implied profile of the likely
future terrorist offender (RAN 2013, pp. 1–3). As we highlight below, RAN’s mobilisation of
a spatio-temporal logic of the local also infuses the statements of its dedicated working
groups from their very early stages.

A local sphere of prevention is also useful for the EU in other ways, enabling it to nego-
tiate a distinctive, complex mode of governing around the principle of subsidiarity, where

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the transnational and local are understood to meet. As counter-terrorism policy is “closely
linked to the sovereignty of member states” (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 156), the EU has had to
find ways of justifying its encroachment. One way is to present terrorism as a global
problem, requiring a transnational solution (as detailed in our introductory section).
Another way of negotiating national contexts, which has received little specific attention
in the academic literature, is to speak directly to the local level. As we unpack further
below, RAN facilitates such an agenda by incorporating municipalities, local counter-ter-
rorism coordinators and frontline practitioners.

Nevertheless, the EU’s negotiation of subsidiarity through its deployment of the radi-
calisation ontology has caused tensions within and around RAN from its very beginning.
RAN was initially created through a partnership of the EC and the Committee of the
Regions (CoR) – an EU “advisory body” that represents Europe’s regional and local auth-
orities (CoR 2016b). The CoR has long positioned itself as a subsidiarity “watchdog”, and
even has monitoring powers to ensure that the subsidiarity principle is being respected
across the Union’s activities (Wassenberg 2020, pp. 157–167). As such, it has sought to
emphasise that the ISS (from which RAN stems) must provide “real added value” to
Member States (CoR 2011b, p. 2), and later even directly asserts, along with the European
Parliament, that the ISS must respect the subsidiarity principle (CoR 2011a, p. 27). The
CoR’s increasing concern for subsidiarity is part of a pattern in its official Opinions on a
range of topics, which the EC has noted (CoR 2012, p. 31). Such tensions have played
out and evolved throughout RAN’s lifespan, recently culminating in its overhaul during
a review process, as we discuss below.

Indeed, RAN has had a bumpy trajectory since its inception in 2011. It was already
subject to at least two substantive iterations prior to its most recent scrutiny by the Com-
mission in the form of the HLCEG-R. According to de Donk, a “first generation” of RAN,
active between 2011 and 2015, gave way in autumn 2015 to a second iteration (Fitzgerald
2016, p. 131). Autumn 2015 also crops up as a regenerative moment in RAN’s own
materials, with the RAN POL working group mentioning in November 2015 that it had
recently been “rebooted” under new leadership (RAN POL 2015, p. 2). The reasons
behind this period of renewal are not articulated within RAN’s own papers. Nevertheless,
the timing seems to reflect a 2014 Commission communication that encouraged the
network to improve its utility to the Member States, and the subsequent launch in
October 2015 of the RAN Centre of Excellence (CoE), designed to lead RAN’s activities
and support its stakeholders (Martins and Ziegler 2018, pp. 333–339).

Further evidence suggests that RAN’s initial phase was hampered by an effectiveness
deficit – a criticism related to the subsidiarity principle that had also beset its predecessor
networks, the EGVR and ENER, and which would continue to plague the collective. Such a
critique can be discerned in de Donk’s new desire for RAN to “engage more with aca-
demics” and be “more overarching [as a secretariat] than we were before” (Fitzgerald
2016, pp. 131–132). Indeed, at one point, de Donk even directly invokes RAN’s need to
“build towards a more sustainable impact” in its second generation (Fitzgerald 2016,
p. 132). As we discuss further below, however, in the eyes of its most recent reviewers,
these goals have remained largely unachieved. Indeed, concern over RAN’s lack of
“impact” became a key theme animating its reappraisal by the HLCEG-R, including the
reformation of a Network of Prevent Policymakers. Crucially, this lack of impact is articu-
lated in terms that suggest a dissatisfaction by multiple parties with how the EU has

320 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

navigated subsidiarity through RAN, and necessitated a renegotiation of the organis-
ation’s relationship with these principles. We explore these themes further in the final
section of the article. First, however, we turn to a deeper discussion of the function of
the spatio-temporal imaginary of the local both for RAN and for the broader EU.

RAN’s localism: a spatio-temporal nexus of prevention

A spatio-temporal counter-radicalisation ontology, which frames local action which can
deliver prevention, is pervasive throughout RAN’s written materials. As noted above,
the notion that it is possible to intervene and prevent terror attacks before they occur
– and also before they have even been considered – overlaps with broader approaches
to crime prevention and shares their propensity to operationalise local rather than
national actors. RAN’s materials exhibit frequent references to the existence of a “pre-
criminal” temporal phase in which urgent action is required to divert individuals from a
(potentially) violent path (e.g. RAN HEALTH 2012, pp. 1–3, 2016b, p. 10, 2020, p. 2, RAN
POL 2012, p. 4, 2016a, p. 2, 2016b, pp. 3–4, 2018a, p. 5, 2020, pp. 4–5). The resonance
of the counter-radicalisation ontology with broader crime prevention approaches is
also articulated in more specific senses throughout RAN. In broad terms, the RAN POL
working group, comprising law enforcement officials, is primarily organised around a
model of situational crime prevention – the idea that the “pre-criminal” phase is best dis-
rupted by taking action in specific “places of radicalisation”. This theme is discernible in
the group’s references to the need to address (violent) “extremist milieus” (e.g. RAN
POL 2017b, p. 1, 2018c, p. 3, 2018d, pp. 1–4, 7, 9–12).

By contrast, a model of social crime prevention, which understands corrective action in
the pre-criminal phase as a form of care, best characterises the RAN HEALTH working
group, comprised frontline healthcare practitioners. In this group, the primary focus is
on how targeted mental health interventions can counter an individual’s apparent
mental “vulnerability” to radicalisation and violent extremism (e.g. RAN HEALTH 2018a,
2018b, 2019b). Both RAN POL and RAN HEALTH sometimes exhibit aspects of the
other’s favoured crime prevention discourse. The combination of these discourses is,
however, most strikingly apparent in the RAN LOCAL working group, comprising repre-
sentatives of European municipalities. Notable examples of this hybrid discourse
include the group’s references to tackling “social vulnerability in certain neighbourhoods
and groups” (RAN LOCAL 2018, p. 3), and its assertion that (far-right) radicalisation “takes
place at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory” (RAN
LOCAL 2019, p. 7).

Although there are nuances in how specific working groups operationalise the
counter-radicalisation ontology, they remain connected by a spatio-temporal focus on
the local. As noted above, the local occupies a special position within the counter-radica-
lisation ontology as the key sphere in which preventive “upstream” counter-terrorism
work becomes manageable. Such themes are discernible in both explicit and implicit
forms throughout RAN. The statement that “Local is key”, is listed as point five of ten
of the “RAN DNA” – an inventory of the network’s guiding principles (e.g. RAN POL
2016a, p. 3). Further specific references to the desirability of the local sphere of preventive
action infuse RAN’s working groups. The appropriate level for “concrete implementation”
of a national strategy is, the regional and local, following a collaborative multi-agency

EUROPEAN SECURITY 321

approach (RAN HEALTH 2016b, p. 6). Intervention with the so-called vulnerable commu-
nities is also considered “best done on a local level” (RAN LOCAL 2016a, p. 2).

Although RAN often frames its preference for the local in rather benign, functional
terms – as a means through which different public agencies are best coordinated (RAN
HEALTH 2016a, p. 2) – a spatio-temporal preference for the local also betrays the insidious
racialised aspects of the counter-radicalisation ontology. As Baker-Beall (2016, pp. 20–21,
146) notes, while in recent years the EU has largely departed from an exclusive and expli-
cit focus on violent “Islamic” extremism, a “disproportionate” concern over the activities of
Muslim communities remains the subtext of much of its counter-terrorism discourse.
Specifically, “the “Muslim” other is thought to represent a member of a community
that must be “engaged” if terrorism is to be defeated” (Baker-Beall 2016, p. 142). RAN’s
focus on the local is highly relevant to these discursive claims. RAN, in general, is designed
to produce knowledge that makes radicalisation “governable” (cf. Baker-Beall 2016, p.
163). On this view, the Muslim Other becomes knowable and controllable only within a
local context, with support from local actors. Put differently, the nation-state is both tem-
porally and spatially inept at tackling such “communities”, being too out-of-touch and
slow to respond to perceived threats. Such an understanding is exhibited across RAN.
The RAN POL working group argues that “[l]ocal communities have an intense knowledge
of the ground” (RAN POL 2018b, p. 9) and that such familiarity makes local actors like com-
munity police best suited to prevention work (RAN POL 2016a, pp. 2–4). The RAN LOCAL
working group concurs in its statement that

Within the local communities there is knowledge of the people who live in your municipality.
Information needed to make the right assessments. Individuals that play key roles in their
communities are credible and able to use fast, practical, and local interventions, while
using their religious or cultural background and connections where needed. (RAN LOCAL
2016a, pp. 2–3)

RAN’s racialised spatio-temporal focus on the local has also been articulated acutely in the
context of the Syrian civil war, which has generated concerns about a European migration
or “refugee crisis” and about the threat of returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). A
major RAN conference held in 2014 positioned returning FTFs explicitly as a problem
for cities to address (RAN 2014a, 2014b). Meanwhile, the trauma experienced by FTFs,
migrants, and their families – whether in their “origin” countries, en route to the EU, or
when resettled – is presumed to constitute a vulnerability to radicalisation (e.g. RAN
2014a, p. 1, 2014b, p. 1, 2016a, 2016b, p. 6, 2018, p. 6, 2019a, p. 5, RAN HEALTH 2018b,
RAN LOCAL 2020b, pp. 5–6, RAN POL 2017c, pp. 7–8, RAN Policy & Practice 2018, 2019,
pp. 2–4). Such perceived vulnerabilities, in turn, require the interventions of local
health workers and increased efforts to “integrate” such individuals into local commu-
nities such that societal alienation does not precipitate violence against the “host”
nation (e.g. RAN 2014a, p. 1, 2014b, p. 1, 2016a, pp. 6–8, 2016b, p. 1, 3–4, 2018, p. 6,
RAN HEALTH 2016c, p. 1, 2019a, RAN LOCAL 2016b, pp. 2–3, 2020b, p. 5, RAN POL
2012, p. 4, 2016c, p. 9, 16–17, RAN Policy & Practice 2018, pp. 9–12, 2019, pp. 2–4, 7–8).
Indeed, the arrival of migrants is also narrated as an additional challenge to localised
counter-radicalisation “community policing” in that the presence of such racialised
“Others” can stimulate far-right extremism and spark a cycle of “reciprocal radicalisation”
(e.g. RAN POL 2016c, pp. 16–17, 2017a, 2018d, p. 7).

322 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

RAN’s spatio-temporal association of prevention with the local level also serves further
purposes for the network and for the EU more broadly. Operating as a transnational
network of local counter-radicalisation practitioners, RAN frequently bypasses national
structures. RAN’s localism enables the EU to negotiate subsidiarity constraints by speaking
directly to local actors, such as frontline practitioners, who are the “eyes and ears on a
local level” (RAN LOCAL 2020a, p. 2) and the core recipients of the network’s training
programmes. Indeed, it is also striking how the RAN Collection of “inspiring best practices”
is primarily organised around examples of counter-radicalisation activities and initiatives
derived from, or delivered at, local, often city or regional, level (RAN 2019b, 2021). RAN’s
ability to connect the transnational (EU) and local levels was also highlighted by its senior
consultant. Here, de Donk suggests that RAN’s strengths lie in its constitution as a “virtual
network” that operates “around and about Europe” and “across state borders” (Fitzgerald
2016, p. 132). More specifically, he states:

I would say that one of the advantages we have is that we are not directly involved in radi-
calisation work as made by states. Being commissioned by the European Commission and,
for example, not by national governments, we can easily reach out to most countries. We
are kind of neutral, in that sense […]. (Fitzgerald 2016, emphasis original)

As we explore further in the following section, the EU’s negotiation of national subsidiarity
constraints through RAN’s local focus has become increasingly perceived not as one of
the network’s major strengths but perhaps as its primary weakness.

Subsidiarity bites back?

RAN has been subject to intense criticism in recent years, reflecting increasing concern
for how the EU configures its relationship with the local, national and supranational.
One of RAN’s founding institutions – the Committee of the Regions, the primary Euro-
pean institutional representative of municipalities – has been rather vocal in this
regard. In a dedicated 2016 Opinion document, the CoR implies that an effectiveness
deficit persists within RAN (CoR 2016c). Although it “highlights the important role of
[RAN] and the newly established centre of excellence”, it also “Underlines the need
for an EU network to be developed to help achieve stronger EU local and regional col-
laboration on combatting radicalisation and violent extremism and terrorism” (CoR
2016c, p. 4). It also “further encourages” RAN to continue “the development of
effective preventive measures, especially by improving early detection of signs of radi-
calisation at local level” (CoR 2016c, p. 4).

The CoR then proceeds to admonish RAN for insufficient “effort” in engaging smaller
cities and communities, and for its insufficient dissemination of expertise between local
and national levels. It asks for the European Commission to “assist Member States […]
by sharing the information and experience gained by local and regional authorities”
and to “focus on further collecting and publicising best practices”, already collated by
the RAN CoE (CoR 2016c, p. 8). The underlying theme of these criticisms is that RAN is
failing to provide the Member States with the “added value” that has always been impor-
tant to the CoR’s conception of subsidiarity, as noted above. The criticisms also imply that
the CoR desires a greater role in overseeing the local sphere of counter-radicalisation and
counter-terrorism – a theme we return to below.

EUROPEAN SECURITY 323

In response to the CoR’s Opinion, the European Commission largely rejected the claims
made against RAN (European Commission 2016). Indeed, its response suggests some
bemusement about the criticisms raised by the CoR and seeks to highlight how RAN
has already adopted or is already developing effective measures in the targeted areas.
The Commission directly refutes the CoR’s calls for an anti-radicalisation network, con-
necting European localities by proffering the example of the extant RAN CoE (European
Commission 2016, p. 44). It also points to the current work by the RAN CoE and the
new RAN LOCAL working group to answer charges about the network’s insufficient dis-
semination of best practices and engagement with local actors (European Commission
2016, pp. 44–46).

Despite the Commission’s spirited defence of RAN in 2016, by 2017, it had initiated a
formal review of EU prevention policies, subjecting RAN to further scrutiny and sub-
sequently targeting the network for overhaul. Following a series of terror attacks in
major European cities in 2017 – in Belgium, Paris, and Manchester – the High Level Com-
mission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R) was formed (European Commission
2017c, pp. 3–4). The HLCEG-R responds to a sense that extant EU counter-radicalisation
and counter-terrorism work is failing and falling behind “new challenges” (e.g. European
Commission 2017a, p. 9) – a criticism that has always haunted the EU’s activities in this
field (as above). Given such a focus on “new challenges”, the group is initially concerned
with evaluating the EU’s approach to radicalisation in prisons, online terrorist propaganda
and returning FTFs (European Commission 2017c, pp. 3–4).

At this stage, RAN was still discussed in a rather positive light, reflecting the Commis-
sion’s prior defence of the network. In this view, RAN has undertaken valuable work at the
“forefront” of the EU’s counter-terror response, and the HLCEG-R review is intended only
to “bolster” this further (European Commission 2017c, pp. 3–4). Despite such claims,
between 2017 and 2018 the HLCEG-R advanced a critique of the “coordination and
cooperation, outreach and impact” of EU prevention schemes (European Commission
2017a, pp. 21–22), which progressively targets the network singling it out for reform.

A special report by the European Court of Auditors (ECoA) is particularly striking for its
extended two-page critique of RAN (ECoA 2018, pp. 22–24). Indeed, throughout 2017 and
2018, RAN is increasingly criticised in official EC and HLCEG-R documents for its insuffi-
cient dissemination of expertise and engagement with the Member States (e.g. European
Commission 2017b, p. 17, ECoA 2018, pp. 4–5, 22–23, 31), including its provision of train-
ing that lacks specificity to the policy frameworks and requirements of national contexts
(e.g. European Commission 2017b, p. 17, ECoA 2018, pp. 22–24, HLCEG-R 2017b, p. 14). Its
failure to work with external parties or “third countries” is similarly flagged (e.g. European
Commission 2017b, p. 17, HLCEG-R 2017a, p. 15, 2017b, p. 14; HLCEG-R sub-group (Pre-
vention of Radicalisation) 2017, p. 6). RAN’s lack of effectiveness and impact is further nar-
rated as its alleged inability to identify research gaps (e.g. HLCEG-R 2017b, p. 14) and
evaluate the success of its measures (e.g. European Commission 2017b, p. 17, ECoA
2018, pp. 25–29, 32). It is also accused of being insufficiently transparent (HLCEG-R sub-
group (Prevention of Radicalisation) 2017, p. 6).

In sum, the criticisms levelled at RAN during the HLCEG-R review process suggest that
its “added value is not maximised in practice” (ECoA 2018, p. 22). The centrality of “added
value” and “effectiveness” in these retorts can be read as coded critiques of how the EU
uses the spatio-temporal ontology of radicalisation to navigate subsidiarity. The HLCEG-R

324 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

review is marked by a notable desire for the Member States to be invited back into the
EU’s terror prevention architecture. Many of the criticisms come directly from the
Member States themselves via surveys of their experiences (ECoA 2018). A key criticism
is that RAN’s focus on local practitioners sidelines substantive engagement with national
policymakers and those working at EU level (e.g. ECoA 2018, p. 24, HLCEG-R 2017b, p. 14).
Additionally, RAN’s lack of “permanent structures” appears as a cause for concern (Euro-
pean Commission 2017a, p. 19, 2017b, p. 17). The RAN CoE is managed through a four-
year contract with an external supplier, signalling to some of its transience and attending
lack of long-term effectiveness (e.g. European Commission 2017b, p. 17, HLCEG-R 2017b,
p. 14).

A solution initially proposed to this particular issue of institutional impermanence is
the creation of a dedicated EU Centre on Radicalisation, designed to operate as a centra-
lised, EU-level structure (HLCEG-R 2017b, p. 7). Yet in the debate over the desirability of
such a centre, further tensions over subsidiarity arose reflecting persistent EU power
dynamics. The so-called EU “core” or “EU2” of France and Germany appeared enthusiastic
about this novel EU institution (HLCEG-R 2017b, p. 7). Other Member States, however,
reportedly “stressed the need for flexibility and avoiding overly heavy structures. There
was some scepticism as to the establishment of overly centralised or bureaucratic struc-
tures” (HLCEG-R sub-group (Prevention of Radicalisation) 2017, p. 6). Indeed, it seems that
the latter view ultimately prevailed. By Spring 2018, the proposed EU Centre had been
dropped from the HLCEG-R agenda in favour of taking more gradual steps to enhance
cooperation and collaboration between the Member States (HLCEG-R 2018, p. 20). The
subsequent solution attempted to bring the Member States back into the fold – the
HLCEG-R sits above RAN and provides a Member State-led “Steering Board” and “Task
Force” for knowledge sharing at the European level (HLCEG-R 2018, p. 14). Additionally,
a Network of Prevent Policymakers (NPP) will be reinvigorated to enhance counter-radi-
calisation coordination between the national policymakers of the Member States
(HLCEG-R 2018, p. 14, 17; HLCEG-R sub-group (Prevention of Radicalisation) 2017, p. 5).

Such a focus on better engaging with the Member States is also explicitly articulated in
EU Security Commissioner Julian King’s remarks to the RAN HLC in October 2018. Accord-
ing to King, the HLCEG-R process aims “to better focus our actions towards the needs and
policy priorities in Member States” (RAN 2018, p. 2). As he continues, “whilst local prac-
titioners are undoubtedly best placed to provide the necessary interventions, there is
often a need for further resources, or other forms of support at a national or European
level” (RAN 2018, p. 3). For King, this means that, in addition to the provisions the
HLCEG-R makes for the steering board, NPP, and task force, RAN should now focus its
activities on “Policy and Practice” events – forums where national policymakers are reinte-
grated into the RAN architecture and can learn from the local sphere of counter-radicali-
sation (RAN 2018, pp. 4–5, HLCEG-R 2018, pp. 14, 17; HLCEG-R sub-group (Prevention of
Radicalisation) 2017, p. 5)

Despite such an increasing emphasis on the national contexts of its Member States ten-
sions regarding subsidiarity persist in the EC’s reforms of RAN. Further evidence suggests
that the EC has not so much found a new respect for subsidiarity as it has renegotiated it
by positioning itself as an interlocutor or “facilitator” across local, national and inter-
national frames. These tendencies are particularly apparent in the latest output from
the HLCEG-R process – a Commission strategy document for the prevention of

EUROPEAN SECURITY 325

radicalisation (European Commission 2021). On the one hand, this document suggests
that the Commission seeks to intervene “below”, connecting localities to their nation
states and the broader European context. The Commission proposes an “EU Overview”
of local prevention efforts (European Commission 2021, p. 6) and, in the case of an “EU
Cities against Radicalisation” initiative, positions itself explicitly as an organisational
“bridge between actions at city level and national level” (European Commission 2021,
p. 12).

On the other hand, the Commission also seeks to intervene “above”, connecting
Europe and its members with “third countries” through “EU level” analysis and recommen-
dations of how such states might be better engaged (European Commission 2021, pp. 9–
10). A sentence at the end of the document encapsulates this multifaceted approach to
the EU’s expansion as an “holistic security actor”, stating that the EC aims to

enhance the cooperation with and among stakeholders at local, national, European and inter-
national level and will strengthen our evidence base and capabilities of preventing radicalisa-
tion in a more effective way at EU level. (European Commission 2021, p. 13, emphasis added).

Nevertheless, such attempts at remit expansion remain inherently unstable. As noted
above, the CoR, once a founding partner of RAN, became increasingly critical of the
network in its second generation. Many of the same themes were later taken up by the
HLCEG-R review, in which the CoR participated “actively” (CoR 2017, pp. 40–41), precipi-
tating RAN’s third generation. However, the CoR’s participation in this process suggests
that an institutional battle over who is best suited to the role of multi-level counter-radi-
calisation facilitator may yet reignite between it and the EC. Like the Commission, the CoR
also understands itself as “the main interlocutor dealing with subnational governments”
(CoR 2016a, pp. 30–31). Indeed, an anniversary history of the CoR has recently highlighted
how such a self-understanding can be traced back to the body’s earliest days, where
archives show the committee’s desire for “federalism and subsidiarity [to] join forces”
(see Wassenberg 2020, p. 70). Such evidence suggests that political tensions regarding
subsidiarity remain baked into the institutional framework of RAN and will continue to
restructure how the EU is able to deploy the spatio-temporal counter-radicalisation
logic of the local to expand its remit.

Conclusion

In this article, we have explored how the EU has employed a spatio-temporal imaginary of
the “local” in its counter-radicalisation programmes as a means of navigating subsidiarity
and expanding its remit as a “holistic security actor”. Extant work on the EU’s terror pre-
vention efforts has focused on how the organisation constructs terrorism as a transna-
tional threat that requires a supranational, EU-level response. Our research makes a
substantive contribution to these literatures by demonstrating how the EU also seeks
to intervene “below” the level of the nation state. On this view, the EU bolsters its “actor-
ness” in the realms of counter-radicalisation by speaking directly to subnational actors in
municipalities, cities, and frontline public services across its Member States.

Using evidence from RAN’s major working groups, high-level conferences and plenary
meetings, we dissected how the network borrows from broader approaches to crime pre-
vention within a counter-radicalisation ontology that understands the local level as the

326 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

optimal sphere for “upstream” pre-emptive interventions. We further argued that such a
focus on the local has been useful for the EU more broadly, enabling it to navigate the
subsidiarity principle by connecting subnational actors to transnational EU structures,
sidestepping nation states to expand its remit as a “holistic security actor”.

However, this approach has not been without its controversies. In the final section of
the article, we charted how criticisms, regarding RAN’s perceived lack of effectiveness,
have resurfaced in recent years, reflecting inter-institutional battles between the Euro-
pean Commission and the Committee of the Regions, and the growing frustrations of
EU Member States that feel sidelined by RAN’s appeals to the local level of terror preven-
tion. While the Commission has attempted to reform RAN in a way that ostensibly invites
Member States back into the fold, we provided further evidence to suggest that the EU
has simply found a new way of navigating subsidiarity and expanding its remit, position-
ing itself as a counter-radicalisation “facilitator” operating between local, national and
international spheres.

Our analysis also speaks to broader themes in European integration, and particularly to
work that interrogates the existence, nature or purpose of a Europe of the Regions (e.g.
Keating 2008). Some have urged caution in interpreting the European Commission’s
increasing appeals to subnational actors – through, for example, its award of Structural
Funds to European regions from the late 1980s – as an active strategy for bypassing
Member States and recruiting federalist “allies” (Keating 2008, pp. 630–631). Others
have highlighted how nation state contexts have been effectively bypassed from
“below”, with some subnational actors seeking to form transnational, EU-level activist net-
works (Tatham 2010), particularly targeting issues such as climate change (Kern 2019, pp.
130–133). Much less has been written about the political function that a spatio-temporal
focus on the local level serves for the EU itself in leading contemporary policy domains.
Our analysis of the EU’s counter-radicalisation policy suggests potential parallels with
other pressing transnational issues that are navigated via the local level, such as
climate change, opening new pathways for future research.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers and Sadi Shanaah for their incisive
comments on earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Funding

This work was supported by H2020 European Research Council project “Neoliberal Terror: The Radi-
calisation of Social Policy in Europe” [851022].

ORCID

Francesca Melhuish http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2952-5607
Charlotte Heath-Kelly http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5237-4691

EUROPEAN SECURITY 327

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2952-5607

http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5237-4691

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https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_role_for_police_officers_
utrecht_212016_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2016c. Training programmes for Europe’s police officers. Available from: https://ec.europa.
eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_guide_on_training_programmes_for_police_
officers_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2017a. Ex post paper: meeting on polarisation. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_edu_pol_meeting_polarisation_management_
stockholm_10-11_05_2017_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2017b. Ex-post paper: police, families and family workers. Available from: https://ec.
europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2018-03/ran_pol_foster_closer_engagement_families_
family_workers_lisbon_12-13_10_2017_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2017c. The role of police officers in dealing with jihadist returnees. Available from: https://
ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_role_of_police_officers_dusseldorf_30-
31_03_2017_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2018a. Ex post paper: the role of police online in PVE and CVE. Available from: https://ec.
europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_the_role-of_police_online-in_pve-and-
cve_oslo_01-02_03_2018_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2018b. Ex post paper: dealing with violent extremist and terrorist offenders: formalising
cooperation among police, prison, probation and prosecution. Available from: https://ec.europa.
eu/home-affairs/system/files/2019-02/ran_pol_p-p_optimising_triple-p_cooperation_en
[Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2018c. Ex post paper: lessons from crime prevention. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/
home-affairs/system/files/2018-08/ran_pol_lessons_from_crime_prevention_dresden_12-13_
june_2018_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN POL, 2018d. Police prevention and countering of far-right and far-left extremism. Available
from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_police_prevention_and_
countering_of_far-right_and_far-left_extremism_rome_12-13_april_2018_en [Accessed 26
Oct 2021].

332 F. MELHUISH AND C. HEATH-KELLY

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2016-12/ex_post_ran_local_athens_23-24_05_2016_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_local_what_can_we_learn_from_adjacent_phenomena_lisbon_15-16052018_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2019-02/ran_local_rotterdam_far_right_extermism_20190124_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2021-02/ran_local_strategy_in_times_of_covid-19_30-01_112020_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-07/ran_local_conclusions_communication_26-25_5_2020_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-high-level-conference/docs/proposed_policy_recommendations_ran_pol_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2016-12/ran_pol_ex_post_paper_aarhus_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2016-12/ran_pol_ex_post_paper_athens_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_role_for_police_officers_utrecht_212016_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_guide_on_training_programmes_for_police_officers_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_edu_pol_meeting_polarisation_management_stockholm_10-11_05_2017_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2018-03/ran_pol_foster_closer_engagement_families_family_workers_lisbon_12-13_10_2017_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_role_of_police_officers_dusseldorf_30-31_03_2017_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_the_role-of_police_online-in_pve-and-cve_oslo_01-02_03_2018_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2019-02/ran_pol_p-p_optimising_triple-p_cooperation_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2018-08/ran_pol_lessons_from_crime_prevention_dresden_12-13_june_2018_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-09/ran_pol_police_prevention_and_countering_of_far-right_and_far-left_extremism_rome_12-13_april_2018_en

RAN POL, 2020. Issue paper: lessons from crime prevention in preventing violent extremism by
police, 15th January 2020. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-
01/ran_pol_lessons_from_crime_prevention_012020_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN Policy & Practice, 2018. Ex post paper: building resilience among young children raised in extre-
mist environments – specifically child returnees. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/system/files/2018-08/ran_policy_practice_event_building_resilience_among_young_
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2018_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

RAN Policy & Practice, 2019. Ex post paper: preventing radicalisation of asylum seekers and refugees.
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refugees_rome_11122019_en [Accessed 26 Oct 2021].

Shaftoe, H. and Turksen, U., 2006. SecuCities cities against terrorism: training local representatives in
facing terrorism. Report from the 1st local seminar in Bristol, 28–29 September 2006. Bristol.
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25 Jun 2021].

Tatham, M., 2010. With or without you’? Revisiting territorial state-bypassing in EU interest represen-
tation. Journal of European public policy, 17 (1), 76–99.

Vianelli, L., 2017a. Europe’s uneven geographies of reception. Excess, differentiation, and struggles
in the government of asylum seekers. Etnografia e ricerca qualitativa, 3 (Oct–Dec), 363–392.

Vianelli, L., 2017b. Governing asylum seekers: logistics, differentiation, and failure in the European
Union’s reception regime. Dissertation (PhD). University of Warwick, Coventry. Available from:
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/103082/1/WRAP_Theses_Vianelli_2017 [Accessed 30 Jun 2021].

Wassenberg, B., 2020. The history of the committee of the regions (1994–2019): 25 years of cities and
regions furthering European integration. Available from: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-
detail/-/publication/5429c527-4e13-11ea-aece-01aa75ed71a1/language-en [Accessed 26 Oct
2021].

Zwolski, K., 2012. The EU as an international security actor after Lisbon: finally a Green light for a
holistic approach? Cooperation and conflict, 47 (1), 68–87.

EUROPEAN SECURITY 333

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-01/ran_pol_lessons_from_crime_prevention_012020_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2018-08/ran_policy_practice_event_building_resilience_among_young_children_raised_in_extremist_environments_-_specifically_child_returnees_warsaw_4_july_2018_en

https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/system/files/2020-01/ran_asylum_seekers_refugees_rome_11122019_en

https://www.marc-coester.de/daten/module/media/5/cat_bristol-18

http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/103082/1/WRAP_Theses_Vianelli_2017

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/5429c527-4e13-11ea-aece-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

Abstract

Introduction

European Security and counter-radicalisation

Methodology

Understanding the history of RAN

RAN’s localism: a spatio-temporal nexus of prevention

Subsidiarity bites back?

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

Disclosure statement

ORCID

References

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About the Program on Extremism

The Program on Extremism at George Washington University provides analysis on issues related
to violent and non-violent extremism. The Program spearheads innovative and thoughtful
academic inquiry, producing empirical work that strengthens extremism research as a distinct
field of study. The Program aims to develop pragmatic policy solutions that resonate with
policymakers, civic leaders, and the general public.

Please note that the views expressed in the chapters of this publication are the opinions of the
authors, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Program on Extremism or the George
Washington University.

Acknowledgements

The editor would like to thank the Program on Extremism’s Director Lorenzo Vidino and Deputy
Director Seamus Hughes for their unwavering support of this project.

The Program on Extremism’s staff and its Research Assistants Paige Pascarelli, Brianne
O’Connor, Janaki Goudar, Emily Blackburn, Andrew Mines, Morgane Fiere, and Benjamin
Aziza helped make this series possible.

Additionally, the editor would like to say a special thanks to Aleksandra Dier, Farah Kasim,
David Wells, and Natasha Lamoreux.

Table of Contents

Introduction

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 4

Audrey Alexander

Negating Stereotypes: Women, Gender, and Terrorism in Indonesia and Pakistan ……………… 11

Sara Mahmood

Not Just Victims: Women in Terrorism from the Western Balkans ……………………………………. 21

Vesë Kelmendi

How Women Advance the Internationalization of the Far Right ………………………………………… 32

Julia Ebner and Jacob Davey

The Changing Roles of Women in Violent Islamist Groups ……………………………………………….. 40

Devorah Margolin

Key Considerations: Forward Thinking About Women, Gender, and Violent Extremism ……. 50
Audrey Alexander

Introduction
Policymakers, practitioners, and scholars are increasingly aware of women’s participation in
terrorist and violent extremist groups; this affects how members of the international community
attempt to mitigate risks tied to these threats. Growing concerns about women’s interactions with
groups like the

Islamic State

(IS) and Boko Haram appear to have instigated this shift, despite a
long and dynamic history of women’s participation in terrorism, violent extremism, and
insurgencies around the world. Although the intersection of women, gender, and terrorism recently
became a higher priority to stakeholders tasked with addressing these threats, international
organizations, governments, and civil society groups are still grappling with what it means to
pursue this multifaceted agenda.1 This paper series adds to a small but growing body of research
on the topic and highlights some considerations regarding the future of women, gender, and violent
extremism.2

Before exploring how matters concerning women, gender, and violent extremism intermingle, it
is essential to contextualize terminology and to situate this series within the broader discussion of
conflict and security. A wide range of analyses examines how sex and gender intersect with
political violence and peace.3 Terrorism, violent extremism, and responses to these challenges
represent a small segment of the broader conversation. In the discussion that follows, gender
pertains to “how women, men, and nonbinary persons act according to feminine, masculine, or
fluid expectations of men and women.”4 Since factors such as culture, personal preference, and
time shape conceptions of gender, it is dynamic and highly context-specific.5 To complicate
matters more, “terrorism,” “violent extremism,” and “extremism,” as well as the policies made to
address them, are prone to semantic ambiguity. Instead of attempting to pin down elusive
terminology, this series embraces the imprecision of these terms to allow the editor and
contributors to pull from a more extensive body of research and present a range of perspectives.
While imperfect, the priority of this series is to confront the countless ways gender weaves into
these challenges and vice-versa.

To lay the groundwork for this series, it is important to emphasize that matters concerning the links
between women, gender, terrorism, and violent extremism are a relatively recent endeavor in the
field of national and international security.6 Historically, five main barriers have constricted the
field’s recognition of these links. First, while women’s participation in violent political movements
is not unique to the twenty-first century, documentation of group membership, specifically
women’s involvement, remains inconsistent and unreliable.7 Second, although there is a propensity
to cast individuals as either victims or perpetrators of terrorism and violent extremism, these
experiences are not necessarily mutually exclusive.8 Third, the emphasis on combatants and
attackers within much of the academic literature eclipses the non-violent contributions of many
participants, especially women, but also men and minors. Fourth, research circles devote
disproportionate attention to select conflicts and demographics, which leaves other conflicts
understudied. Fifth, Western perspectives and stereotypes dominate discourse on the topic,
drowning out a range of alternative assessments of matters concerning sex, gender, and violent
extremism.9 Ultimately, since these barriers make data on men and women’s participation difficult
to trust, trace, and interpret, it is unsurprising that the security community insufficiently integrates
dimensions of gender in contemporary policies. In sum, these challenges make it difficult to learn
from the past to inform efforts to cope with the present and prepare for the future.

Today, these barriers endure because latent misconceptions about gender and violent extremism
oversimplify complex movements and trends. By dividing experiences into black and white, the
security community struggles to see shades of gray. For example, appraisals tend to entangle an
individual’s motives for participation with the role an individual assumes, without weighing the
different opportunities afforded to men and women in violent extremism. To date, there is still
“little to no evidence that male and female terrorists are fundamentally different in terms of their
recruitment, motivation, ideological fervor, and brutality,”10 even if there are slight variances from
case to case.11 Validating these claims, a range of scholars note that women’s and men’s motives
for participation in terrorism and violent extremism appear similar.12 While individual reasons for
participation do not vary significantly by gender, men and women’s opportunities to serve in select
roles are not always equal. Terrorist and violent extremist groups selectively delineate appropriate
roles for their members, particularly based on factors like gender and age. Even when organizations
draw parameters for engagement, they are not always static, clear-cut, or enforced.13 One analysis
poignantly notes that “while violence and violent actors are easily visible, the norms permitting
violence… are less apparent.”14 Whether male or female, the factors shaping an individual’s
interactions and role within violent extremist movements tend to derive from organizational,
ideological, religious, cultural, personal, and logistical considerations. Gender is one dimension
that crosscuts all of these factors, touching processes from radicalization and recruitment to
detection, disruption, and demobilization.

Despite these nuances, challenges arise as latent gender stereotypes tint contemporary perceptions
of women in terrorism and violent extremism. For example, a range of analyses finds that
portrayals of women in terrorism tend to be misleading, reductive, and often emphasize personal
reasons for participation.15 Conversely, although little research discusses media portrayals of men
in terrorism,16 men’s motives are conventionally assumed to be political rather than personal.17 If
gendered stereotypes like these inform perceptions of the threats posed by violent extremists,
additional risks may arise when policymakers and practitioners inadvertently translate misguided
views into policies and legal responses.18 This dynamic is detrimental to security, stability, and
human rights for myriad reasons.

As one example, gender stereotypes can weaken security by creating strategic, operational, and
tactical benefits for terrorist and violent extremist groups that integrate women. Some analysts
posit that since “women are not considered credible or likely perpetrators of terrorist violence, they
can more easily carry out attacks and assist their organizations.”19 Scholars believe the practice of
recruiting women is spreading as terrorist and violent extremist organizations embrace the
“potential of women” members, who better circumvent detection by authorities,20 but eventually
garner more media attention for their actions.21 In other words, if the opportunity exists, terrorist
groups can “exploit gender stereotypes and cultural clichés to their advantage.”22 In some cases,
researchers note that women aligned with terrorist groups also appear to leverage gender dynamics
for their benefit by claiming ignorance in an attempt to minimize their culpability.23 Others indicate
that extremist groups strategically leverage gender in communications and information operations
to mobilize members.24 Ultimately, creating security gaps is just one of many ways misconceptions
about women and gender hinder efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

In addition, misinformed perceptions can negatively influence formal responses to terrorism and
violent extremism. When officials view men and women adherents as distinct threats bearing
different degrees of risk, such perceptions may translate into flawed policy design or
implementation. In a preliminary assessment of how gender affects the treatment of terrorists, for

example, one study notes that “from arrest to sentencing to post-conflict reintegration and
disarmament programming, evidence suggests that governments tend to be less responsive to
women in terrorism” compared to men.25 Some data show that terrorism-related offenders who are
women “are less likely to be arrested, less likely to be convicted, and receive more lenient
sentences compared to men.”26 Women, like men, are not monolithic in the ways they contribute
to terrorist and violent extremist groups.27 Consequently, it is vital for justice systems and counter-
extremism programs to push against stereotypes and recognize the spectrum of agents who support
terrorist and violent extremist groups. Doing so can improve the state’s abilities to cope with the
range of circumstances that arise from conflict, including stereotype-defying cases where men
serve in support roles or women more actively facilitate or perpetrate violence.

Assumptions about gender and political violence are not unique to the study of terrorism, and it is
useful to discuss how these premises play out in other security arenas.28 Beyond the criminal justice
system, these factors influence counter-insurgency strategies and disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration (DDR) programming. Research on the national DDR program in Sierra Leone,
for instance, finds that the effort was “effective in reaching out to male combatants,” but ultimately,
“women and children were underserved.”29 As an initial condition for entry into the program,
individuals had to surrender a weapon and sometimes demonstrate their ability to disassemble and
reassemble a gun.30 While disproportionately affecting women and minors, this standard likely
excluded a wide array of people who served as combatants without owning a weapon, as well as
those who assumed auxiliary roles such as care providers, facilitators, and spies.31 Even though
the program eventually afforded limited opportunities for “wives” to participate in its final phase,
women still faced overwhelming barriers to entry.32 As demonstrated by the case of Sierra Leone,
among others, state-led responses to political violence that chronically fail to see gender as a
serious dimension of the conflict are inadequate for security, stability, and post-conflict
reintegration.33

While perhaps overly optimistic, increasing awareness of the gap between assumptions and reality
may help calibrate responses to terrorism and violent extremism. Evolving discourse among
policymakers, practitioners, and scholars on how to gender DDR programming, for example,
offers some hope to the overlapping community of stakeholders working to prevent and counter
terrorism and violent extremism. Comparatively, the research, analyses, and recommendations
concerning DDR programs benefit from more time, experience, and opportunities to reflect on
missteps and failure. In many ways, the body of literature on the DDR process offers a greater
number of nuanced perspectives on the importance of addressing gender dynamics beyond sex,
like masculinity and femininity.34 Even though the focus of DDR is largely on the post-conflict
phase, research on these initiatives may help flag more context-specific, tailored ways to gender
counter-terrorism and P/CVE efforts.

Over the last ten years, the international community’s thinking on the role of women and gender
in terrorism and counterterrorism changed in significant ways.35 Today, experts note that entities
like international organizations and states broadly “know they have to gender their counter-
terrorism and P/CVE approaches, [but] there is very little idea of what this actually means in
practice.”36 While likely unintentional, this often results in policy measures that synonymize
“women” and “gender,” and subsequently try to gender approaches to counter-terrorism and
P/CVE by integrating women as part of the process.37 This logic leads to an “oversimplified and
instrumental strategy to just ‘add women and stir.’”38 While it is necessary for women to participate
in the counter-terrorism and P/CVE agenda, there is no consensus that this approach is a sufficient

or productive way to gender policy design and implementation. Some critics argue that integrating
women in counter-terrorism and P/CVE efforts is a facile approach to gender mainstreaming.39
Others suggest that the approach of leveraging women to prevent and counter terrorism and violent
extremism rests on a lack of evidence and enduring assumptions that women are more peaceful
than men.40 These points, among others, highlight the complexity of the challenges facing
stakeholders tasked with addressing the intersection of gender, terrorism, and violent extremism.

Although there is not complete agreement within the field on what should be done, who should do
it and how, this lack of consensus may actually improve decision-making. Evidence-based
perspectives hailing from different vantage points serve as a critical strength to policy design and
implementation in different regions, nations, communities, and networks around the world.
Diverse perspectives may help hold governments accountable for balancing priorities like
international law, national security, human rights, and gender equality. Ultimately, if gender,
terrorism, and violent extremism are relatively context-specific and dynamic phenomena, perhaps
approaches to these threats might benefit from adopting some of the same characteristics. It is
crucial to see the challenge of integrating gender into counter-terrorism and P/CVE strategies as a
work-in-progress designed to enhance mission effectiveness while practicing good governance.

Since matters concerning women, gender, and violent extremism warrant further study, this series
adds to the slight but meaningful body of evidence-driven policy work by experts and leaders in
the field.41 The contributors to this series navigate their respective topics in nuanced and purposeful
ways. In the first essay, Sara Mahmood shows that viewing violent extremism through a gendered
lens hinders practical understanding of people’s contributions to violent extremist organizations,
and weakens effective policymaking in Indonesia and Pakistan. Turning to mobilization trends in
the Western Balkans, Vesë Kelmendi highlights the effects of regional dynamics on women with
ties to the conflict in Iraq and Syria, and advocates for context-specific approaches to prevent and
counter involvement in violent extremism. Next, Julia Ebner and Jacob Davey posit that while
many far-right militant movements in North America and Western Europe remain predominantly
comprised of men, the landscape is transforming as women take more responsibility for spreading
messages across the spectrum of worldviews that comprise the international far-right. Lastly,
Devorah Margolin explores how violent Islamist groups struggle to find consensus on the
appropriate roles for women within their ranks, particularly during times of duress. While still
directing much of the conversation towards women and their experiences with different
organizations, these papers take a more holistic approach in highlighting the various ways in which
dimensions of gender affect organizations. A better comprehension of these trends helps
policymakers and practitioners anticipate new and evolving threats concerning women, gender,
and violent extremism.

By investigating key knowledge gaps and learning from the past to prepare for the future, cross-
cutting, evidence-based analyses can help inform responses to emerging challenges. As a research
product that is meant to engage a range of stakeholders, particularly those tasked with preventing
and countering violent extremism, this series is designed to stimulate thinking and discussion
among policymakers, practitioners, and scholars alike. While the collection of papers undoubtedly
demonstrates that women make dynamic contributions to their respective movements, it also works
to integrate additional perspectives on how gender dimensions affect violent extremism and
responses to violent extremism.

Citations

1Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part I.”
Just Security. May 1, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55522/gendering-counterterrorism-to/; Ní Aoláin,
Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part II.” Just
Security. May 3, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55670/gendering-counterterrorism-to-part-ii/; Powell,
Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism.” Council on Foreign
Relations. January 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism.
2The author would like to note that although the series does not intend to advance binary conceptions of gender by
discussing women and femininity and men and masculinity, these conceptions of gender identity are the most
pertinent among the terrorist and violent extremist movements discussed in this paper series.
3Cohen, Dara Kay. 2016. Rape During Civil War. New York: Cornell University Press; Hudson, Valerie, and Hilary
Matfess. 2017. “In Plain Sight: The Neglected Linkage between Bride Price and Violent Conflict,” International
Security, 42:1; Satterthwaite, Margaret, and Jayne Huckerby. 2013. Gender, National Security, and Counter-
Terrorism: Human Rights Perspectives. Routledge; “A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering
Terrorism and Violent Extremism.” 2016. Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security.
https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL
4Ortbals, Candice, and Poloni-Staudinger. 2018. “How Gender Intersects With Political Violence and Terrorism.”
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, February. 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.308.
5Kimmel, Michael, and Amy Aronson. 2014. The Gendered Society. Fifth. New York: Oxford University Press.
6 See, for example, Jaques, Karen and Paul Taylor. 2009. “Female Terrorism: A Review,” Terrorism and Political
Violence, 21:3; Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How
Not to – Part I.” Just Security. May 1, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55522/gendering-counterterrorism-to/.
7As one example, Alexis Henshaw points to the ways in which movements depreciate and deny the official status of
women. Henshaw, Alexis. 2015. “Where Women Rebel.” International Feminist Journal of Politics 18 (1).
https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2015.1007729.
8Darden, Jessica Trisko, Alexis Henshaw, and Ora Szekely. 2019. Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil
Wars. Georgetown University Press; Margolin, Devorah. 2018. “Neither Feminists nor Victims: How Women’s
Agency Has Shaped Palestinian Violence.” The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
9For examples of research that discuss varying perspectives on gender in different parts of the world, see: Brunner,
Claudia. 2005. “Female suicide bombers – Male suicide bombing? Looking for Gender in reporting the suicide
bombings of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.” Global Society 19:1, 29-48.
10Nacos, Brigitte. 2005. “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the
News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:5, 436.
11Davis, Jessica. 2017. Women in Modern Terrorism. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
12Cragin, Kim, and Sara Daly. 2009. Women as Terrorists: Mothers, Recruiters, and Martyrs. Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO; O’Rourke, L. 2009. “What’s special about female suicide terrorism.” Security Studies, 18:4; Ortbals,
Candice, and Poloni-Staudinger. 2018. “How Gender Intersects With Political Violence and Terrorism.” Oxford
Research Encyclopedia of Politics, February. 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.308. Blee, Kathleen. 1991.
“Women in the 1920s’ Ku Klux Klan Movement,” Feminist Studies.
13For more research on this point, see: Dalton, Angela and Victor Asal. 2011. “Is It Ideology or Desperation: Why
Do Organizations Deploy Women in Violent Terrorist Attacks?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34:10.
https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.604833. For a more specific example, see: Bryson, Rachel and Audu
Bulama Bukarti. “Boko Haram’s Split on Women in Combat.” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. 2018.
https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence
14Pearson, Elizabeth. “Why Men Fight and Women Don’t: Masculinity and Extremist Violence.” Tony Blair
Institute for Global Change. 2018. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-
masculinity-and-extremist-violence.
15Loken, Meredith and Anna Zelenz. 2018. “Explaining Extremism: Western Women in Daesh,” European Journal
of International Security 3:1; Nuraniyah, Nava. 2018. “Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of
Indonesian Female Supporters of the Islamic State.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 30:6; Gowrinathan, Nimmi.
2017. “Of Monsters & Women.” Guernica, February 15, 2017. https://www.guernicamag.com/of-monsters-women/;
Nacos, Brigitte. 2005. “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News
Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:5, 436. Conway, Maura and
Lisa McInerney. 2012. “What’s love got to do with it? Framing ‘JihadJane’ in the US press.” Media, War & Conflict

Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part I

Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part II

https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism

https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL

about:blank

Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part I

https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2015.1007729

about:blank

https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.604833

https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence

Of Monsters & Women

5:1; Stack, Alisa. 2011. “Zombies versus Black Widows: Women as Propaganda in the Chechen Conflict.” In
Women, Gender, and Terrorism, edited by Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, 83-95. Athens: University of
Georgia Press; Davis, Jessica. 2017. Women in Modern Terrorism. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers; Naaman,
Dorit. 2007. “Brides of Palestine/Angels of Death: Media, Gender, and Performance in the Case of the Palestinian
Female Suicide Bombers.” Signs, 32:4; Gardner, Elizabeth. 2007. “Is There a Method to the Madness?” Journalism
Studies, 8:6.
16Alexander, Audrey. 2016. Mass mediated misconceptions of female terrorists. In E. Mastors & R. Siers (Eds.), The
theory and practice of terrorism: Alternative paths of inquiry. New York: Nova Science.
17Naaman, Dorit. 2007. “Brides of Palestine/Angels of Death: Media, Gender, and Performance in the Case of the
Palestinian Female Suicide Bombers.” Signs, 32:4; Kimmel, Michael. 2018. “Almost All Violent Extremists Share
One Thing: Their Gender,” The Guardian, April 8. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/violent-
extremists-share-one-thing-gender-michael-kimmel; Nacos, Brigitte. 2005. “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in
the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism.” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism, 28:5.
18Cunningham, Karla J. 2003. “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
26:3.
19Cunningham, Karla J. 2003. “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
26:3. For more on this logic, see also: Ness, Cindy D. 2008. Introduction to Female Terrorism and Militancy:
Agency, Utility, and Organization, edited by Cindy D. Ness. New York: Routledge.
20Cunningham, Karla J. 2003. “Cross-Regional Trends in Female Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
26:3.
21MacDonald, Eileen. 1991. Shoot The Women First. New York: Random House. Stone, Jennie, and Katherine
Pattillo. 2011. “Al-Qaeda’s Use of Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq: A Case Study.” In Women, Gender, and
Terrorism, edited by Laura Sjoberg and Caron E. Gentry, 159-173. Athens: University of Georgia Press; Bloom,
Mia. 2011. “Bombshells: Women and Terrorism.” Gend. Issues 28; Conway, Maura and Lisa McInerney. 2012.
“What’s love got to do with it? Framing ‘JihadJane’ in the US press.” Media, War & Conflict 5:1; Nacos, Brigitte.
2005. “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the
News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:5.
22Bloom, Mia. 2011. “Bombshells: Women and Terrorism.” Gend. Issues 28:1–21;
23Matfess, Hilary. 2017. Women and the War on Boko Haram: Wives, Weapons, Witnesses. Zed Books
24Ingram, Kiriloi M. 2017. “The Islamic State’s Manipulation of Gender in their Online Information Operations,”
VOXPOL, https://www.voxpol.eu/the-islamic-states-manipulation-of-gender-in-their-online-information-operations/
25Alexander, Audrey, and Rebecca Turkington. 2018. “Treatment of Terrorists: How Does Gender Affect Justice?”
CTC Sentinel 11 (8). https://ctc.usma.edu/treatment-terrorists-gender-affect-justice/
26Alexander, Audrey, and Rebecca Turkington. 2018. “Treatment of Terrorists: How Does Gender Affect Justice?”
CTC Sentinel 11 (8). https://ctc.usma.edu/treatment-terrorists-gender-affect-justice/; Please note that this observation
is not unique to women in terrorism within the criminal justice system. Some of the broader criminal justice
literature examines this phenomenon in greater detail, particularly within the United States, and contextualizes how
and why courts treat female defendants differently than their male counterparts. To offer one interesting example,
one study finds that for federal offenders, “having dependents (more specifically, dependent children) creates
leniency at sentencing, especially for women.” For more on this topic and research, see Doerner, Jill and Stephen
Demuth. 2014. “Gender and Sentencing in the Federal Courts: Are Women Treated More Leniently?” Criminal
Justice Policy Review, 25:2; See also Strommen, Ester. 2017. “Jihadi Brides or Female Foreign Fighters? Women in
Da’esh – from Recruitment to Sentencing,” Policy Brief, Peace Research Institute Oslo.
https://www.prio.org/News/Item/?x=2164;
27Bigio, Jamille. 2018. “Women’s Contributions to Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism.” Council on
Foreign Relations. February 27, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/report/womens-contributions-countering-terrorism-and-
violent-extremism;
28 Pearson, Elizabeth. 2018. “Why Men Fight and Women Don’t: Masculinity and Extremist Violence.” Tony Blair
Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-
masculinity-and-extremist-violence
29Mazurana, Dyan and Kristopher Carlson. 2014. “From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone,”
Policy Brief, Women Waging Peace and Policy Commission.
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/NGO/PartPPGIssueDisp_CombatToCommunty_WomenWagePe
ace_2004

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/08/violent-extremists-share-one-thing-gender-michael-kimmel

The Islamic State’s Manipulation of Gender in their Online Information Operations

https://ctc.usma.edu/treatment-terrorists-gender-affect-justice/

https://www.prio.org/News/Item/?x=2164

https://www.cfr.org/report/womens-contributions-countering-terrorism-and-violent-extremism

https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence

30Mazurana, Dyan and Kristopher Carlson. 2014. “From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone,”
Policy Brief, Women Waging Peace and Policy Commission.
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/NGO/PartPPGIssueDisp_CombatToCommunty_WomenWagePe
ace_2004
31For more on these points, see: MacKenzie, Megan. 2009. “Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers
and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone,” Security Studies, 18:2; See also, Mazurana, Dyan
and Kristopher Carlson. 2014. “From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone,” Policy Brief,
Women Waging Peace and Policy Commission.
32Mazurana, Dyan and Kristopher Carlson. 2014. “From Combat to Community: Women and Girls of Sierra Leone,”
Policy Brief, Women Waging Peace and Policy Commission.
http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/NGO/PartPPGIssueDisp_CombatToCommunty_WomenWagePe
ace_2004
33MacKenzie, Megan. 2009. “Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of
Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone,” Security Studies, 18:2. For additional examples of how this dynamic
influences other conflicts see also: Matfess, Hilary. 2017. Women and the War on Boko Haram: Wives, Weapons,
Witnesses. Zed Books; Isabella Flisi. 2016. “The reintegration of former combatants in Colombia: addressing violent
masculinities in a fragile context.” Gender & Development, 24:3; Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. Maneuvers: The
international politics of militarizing women’s lives. Berkeley: University of California Press.
34While this observation is anecdotal, please consider the following works as examples: Zuckerman, Elaine, and
Marcia Greenberg. 2004. “The Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: An Analytical Framework for
Policymakers.” Gender & Development 12 (3): 70–82. https://doi.org/10.1080/13552070412331332330;
Theidon, Kimberly. 2009. “Reconstructing Masculinities: The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of
Former Combatants in Colombia.” Human Rights Quarterly, 31:1; Wenche, Hauge. 2015. “Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration Processes (DDR): The Gender Asset The Potentials of Changing Gender
Patterns.” Peace Research Institute Oslo.
https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=103&type=publicationfile; Mazurana, Dyan, Roxanne Krystalli,
and Anton Baaré. 2017. Gender and Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Edited by Fionnuala Ní
Aoláin, Naomi Cahn, Dina Francesca Haynes, and Nahla Valji. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199300983.013.35.;
35“A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism.” 2016.
Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security. https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL ;
36Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part
II.” Just Security. May 3, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55670/gendering-counterterrorism-to-part-ii/.
37Powell, Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism.” Council on
Foreign Relations. January 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism;
38Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part
II.” Just Security. May 3, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55670/gendering-counterterrorism-to-part-ii/.
39Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part
II.” Just Security. May 3, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55670/gendering-counterterrorism-to-part-ii/; Powell,
Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism.” Council on Foreign
Relations. January 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism;
40Winterbotham, Emily. 2018. “Do Mothers Know Best? How Assumptions Harm CVE.” Tony Blair Institute for
Global Change. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/do-mothers-know-best-how-assumptions-harm-cve.
41To offer some examples, see: “A Man’s World? Exploring the Roles of Women in Countering Terrorism and
Violent Extremism.” 2016. Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security.
https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL ; “Debunking Myths on Gender
and Extremism.” 2018. Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. http://institute.global/insight/co-
existence/debunking-myths-gender-and-extremism;

https://doi.org/10.1080/13552070412331332330

https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=103&type=publicationfile

https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199300983.013.35

https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL

Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part II

https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism

Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part II

https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism

https://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/AMansWorld_FULL

http://institute.global/insight/co-existence/debunking-myths-gender-and-extremism

Negating Stereotypes: Women, Gender, and Terrorism

in Indonesia and Pakistan
Sara Mahmood

Sara Mahmood is a Senior Research Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research
in Singapore, which is based at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Mahmood’s research focuses on
the intersection between gender and violent extremism, terrorism, and insurgent groups in Pakistan. She has a Master’s
in international Relations with a Specialization in Terrorism Studies from the Nanyang Technological University in
Singapore.

Introduction

Although research on women’s involvement in Islamist terrorism and violent extremism
experienced a rise in attention since the declaration of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in 2014,
it remains dominated by Western case studies. As such, literature and policy debates on women’s
participation in terrorism in parts of South and Southeast Asia remain limited. In Indonesia and
Pakistan, androcentric perspectives and women as a minority in numbers within Islamist terrorist
groups contributed towards perceptions of women’s participation as an anomaly, rather than the
norm. This paper discusses how gendered assumptions regarding masculinity and femininity
influence women’s recruitment, roles, and motivations in terrorism. It aims to counter the gendered
assumptions and challenge stereotypical notions of femininity and masculinity during conflict
through case studies from the terrorist landscape in Indonesia and Pakistan. Islamist terrorist
groups in Indonesia and Pakistan are increasingly recruiting women in various capacities. Multiple
studies establish the importance of women in preventing and countering violent extremism
(P/CVE) in the South and Southeast Asian context, and yet, they are marginalized within these
programs. In this regard, gendered assumptions from states and policymakers continue to
underestimate the capabilities of women as violent actors in terrorism, hindering the effectiveness
of P/CVE programs and curbing the implementation of holistic policies that encapsulate women
as violent and non-violent actors. By examining the cases of Indonesia and Pakistan, this paper
moves beyond a static perspective of women as victims and men as perpetrators, and towards
promoting gender-inclusive policy responses and increasing the efficacy of existing programs.

Background of Terrorism in Indonesia & Pakistan

Indonesia

Indonesia faces a threat from Islamist extremist groups, whose origins can be traced to Darul Islam,
an insurgent movement that sought to impose Islamic law and eventually led to the creation of
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in 1993.1 During the rise of Al-Qaeda, JI was the most significant terrorist
group in Indonesia and responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200 people.
A splinter group of JI continued to engage in violence until the leader of the group, Noordin
Muhammad Top, was killed in 2009.2 By 2011, the Indonesian authorities determined that JI had
largely been defeated, as significant segments of its membership were either killed or
incarcerated.3 In 2014, a few JI members, including Aman Abdurrahman4 and four of his
supporters attempted to bring together all pro-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS) organizations in

the country and formed Ansharut Dawlah Indonesia (ADI), which later became Jamaah Ansharut
Dawlah (JAD).5 JAD represents the most violent group in the country, as it is currently coupled
with other smaller IS-linked networks.6

Pakistan

The Islamist terrorist threat in Pakistan today, and its links to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, traces back
to the Soviet-Afghan war and Afghan jihad.7 Formed in 2007, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), has been one of the major threat groups with links to Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban.
Sectarian terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and groups advocating for separation
of Indian Administered Jammu & Kashmir from India such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, now Jamaat-
ud-Dawa) have also been involved in violence.8 Other operationally strong terrorist groups include
TTP’s breakaway faction, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JuA), and IS-linked Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Al-Alami
(LeJ-A).9 In addition, independent IS cells and networks engaging in recruitment and planning
attacks have also been reported since the rise of IS in 2014.10

In Indonesia and Pakistan, many of these local terrorist groups, regardless of their affiliations with
Al-Qaeda or IS, have sought the creation of an ‘Islamic State’ or enforcement of ‘Shariah’ (Islamic
law). In the past, these groups relied more on traditional bonds, like kinship, and physical networks
to recruit new members.11 The current wave of international terrorism is broadly underscored by
online recruitment, whereas local groups are pairing old recruitment methods with manipulation
of the online domain. As such, in both countries, radicalization through social media has reduced
the barriers to entry within these organizations. It is essential to distinguish between the enablers
of radicalization (social media, physical networks) and the motivations for radicalization (socio-
economic background, personal experiences, religious beliefs, and political factors). Each of these
groups seeks to recruit women in different capacities, yet the security agencies and policymakers
continue to leverage an androcentric approach to respond to the threat.12

Masculinity and Femininity in Violent Extremism

Conceptions of gender are overwhelmingly contextual. In that sense, masculinity and femininity
are not absolute, but vary across cultures, societies, and time.13 Yet during periods of political
violence and conflict, specific roles for men and women are discernable. In studies on political
violence, masculinity is highly militarized and linked to violence, while being dependent on
constructions of femininity that are non-violent, “supportive and complementary.”14 As such, men
are largely engaged as fighters and protectors of women and children, while women assume roles
of the “heroic housewife,” “sacrificial mother” and “loving wife.”15 Femininity during violent
conflict subscribes women to auxiliary roles, where women are classified as victims rather than
initiators.16 They are not traditionally seen as perpetrators of violence and instead need to be
protected by the “gallant” and “naturally violence-oriented” men.17 Here, femininity also strongly
correlates to women’s biological capability to give birth, implying that they are largely life-givers
as opposed to life-takers.

The narratives on masculine and feminine roles are dictated by patriarchy, hypermasculinity and
cultures of misogyny in violent extremist organizations.18 This is also evident in the structure of
Islamist terrorist groups in Indonesia and Pakistan – males make up the majority of those mobilized

to fight. It is worth mentioning that this paper will not deconstruct notions of masculinity and how
they affect the radicalization of men within terrorist groups. Since gendered assumptions of both
masculinity and femininity are interdependent, one reinforces the other. Thus, detailing the general
roles and expectations from men within these groups allows for a better understanding of women’s
roles and radicalization processes.

In the context of Islamist terrorism, the role of men encapsulates participation in violent jihad to
defend the ideology or goals of their organizations, while the women’s part is to take up a
supportive position by assisting the men in defending and facilitating violence through
supplementary functions.19 Broadly, the rigidity of masculinity as violent and femininity as non-
violent in terrorism contributes to three key misperceptions regarding women’s involvement in
terrorism in Indonesia and Pakistan. First, the assumption that men are assigned to violence-based
roles while women’s roles are non-violent is deemed to be absolute and unchanging. Second,
women are constructed as secondary actors or recruits due to their presumably non-violent nature
in a violent group. This logic correlates to the idea of women’s irrelevance to the broader
functioning of the group as they represent a fraction of the overall membership. Third, women’s
motivations are cast as personal and gendered. For instance, men are believed to join extremist
groups for political reasons, while women’s participation is linked to personal (feminine) reasons.
These key misperceptions are challenged through discussing the diversity in roles, recruitment
logic, and motivations of women in violent extremism in both Pakistan and Indonesia below.

(i) Women in Non-Violent and Violent Roles

Masculine and feminine divisions conventionally place both gender identities in categorically
different roles based on stereotypical interpretations of their strengths. In both countries, women’s
roles in terrorism are predominantly confined to the private sphere as mothers, daughters, and
wives. Despite the traditional division, women’s roles are not static as they continue to evolve with
the emergence of new groups and challenges. In addition, they are assigned critical roles in the
public sphere as financiers, propagandists, and recruiters. Women showcase their potential to serve
in violent roles (as fighters or suicide bombers) at lower rates than men.20 Security agencies and
policymakers still perceive women in combat roles as a complete anomaly and exception rather
than the norm.

David Cook discusses the acceptability and prevalence of women waging jihad in Islamist terrorist
groups and establishes that women are more visible as suicide bombers in more secular contexts
(Chechnya and Palestine).21 Nelly Lahoud analyzes how the ideology of Islamist terrorist groups
traditionally excluded women from combat roles, even though the classical doctrine of jihad urges
all Muslims, including men, women, and children to fight and defend their religion.22 Even within
Islamist terrorism, more pronounced changes to these narratives concerning femininity and non-
violence were witnessed after the rise of IS in 2014, where women were explicitly called on to
become suicide bombers and contribute to ‘building the caliphate.’ As such, with the rise of IS,
tactical considerations and women’s attempt to renegotiate their roles have surpassed ideological
justifications for women’s non-violence in Indonesia and Pakistan as Muslim majority countries.
Historically, women mostly contributed within feminine (non-violent) capacities, but there is a
somewhat contentious yet growing permissibility for their involvement in fighting.

In Pakistan, women’s involvement in terrorism can be traced across three waves – from the Afghan
jihad (1980s) to the Kashmir jihad and formation of the TTP (2000s) and now IS-linked groups.
During the Afghan jihad, women provided logistic and financial support to the mujahideen and
were usually confined to the private sphere.23 After the formation of the TTP, women’s roles
became more diversified as Mullah Fazlullah (then emir of the TTP) focused on women as an
active support base through his radio broadcasts in the Swat region.24 Fazlullah urged women to
support the group by selling their jewelry to raise funds for the organization. In other roles, women
made suicide jackets for men, acted as informants, and raised funds for the group’s operations.25
Some terrorist groups still exclusively tapped into traditional ‘feminine roles.’ For example,
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD, previously known as Lashkar-e-Taiba) heavily relied on women’s roles as
mothers and wives, but did not encourage them to engage in violence.26 In comparison, TTP was
more open to violent roles for women by enlisting as suicide bombers, with the first case reported
in 2010 in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).27 In 2017, after the rise of IS, local
cells recruited Noreen Leghari to conduct a suicide bombing targeting a church during Easter
celebrations in Pakistan.28 The authorities arrested Leghari before she could conduct the attack and
Leghari later admitted to being influenced by IS propaganda. Leghari’s efforts are particularly
interesting given that IS does not advocate for women to predominantly act as suicide bombers.29
This then highlights a divergence in women’s roles based on the local context of decentralized IS
cells and networks in Pakistan.30

In Indonesia, a similar trajectory is evident across the three waves of religiously motivated violent
extremism – from Darul Islam (DI) to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and currently IS-linked/inspired
groups.31 DI was formed in 1942 and waged an armed struggle to establish an Islamic state in
Indonesia. The group only began recruiting women in the 1980s, understanding that they could
have a key role in spreading the ideology through religious study groups in schools and
universities. While JI also forbade women from getting involved in combat,32 the group focused
on actively recruiting women through family-specific networks. This meant that male JI members’
wives, mothers, sisters and daughters also become members of the group. In addition, while
women have gone to Syria and Iraq from Indonesia, they did not travel to Afghanistan after the
United States invasion in 2001.33 Some JI members were also encouraged by their leadership to
keep their extremist activities private to prevent their wives from “leaking secrets.”34 In
comparison, Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), an extremist group based in Poso, enlisted its
female members (wives of senior leaders) in combatant roles. In 2014, women were trained in self-
defense, shooting and throwing grenades to ward off advances from the Indonesian security forces.
In both cases, regardless of the group’s assignment of ‘feminine’ roles to women, women
themselves wanted to engage in violence in the hopes of attaining martyrdom. Alternately, in
incidences where women are not involved in combat, they still adopt powerful roles. For instance,
in 2017, the Philippine authorities arrested Farhana Maute, known as the matriarch of the IS-linked
Maute group.35 Farhana’s sons – Abdullah and Omar – were the leaders of IS’ Maute group
involved in the siege of Marawi City in May 2017. Reports noted that Farhana was the main funder
of her son’s operations and had links to IS, leading to her arrest by the authorities.36

In the cases of both Indonesia and Pakistan, the first two waves of terrorism before the emergence
of IS depicted more rigidity in the masculine (violent) and feminine (non-violent) divide. However,
despite the continued preference for these traditional divisions, exceptions are becoming common
and acceptable. More women are being trained in combat and as suicide bombers, challenging the

absolutist nature of their roles in Islamist terrorist groups in the two countries. Yet, it still remains
unlikely that male members of Islamist terrorist groups will permit women to fight alongside them
in the battlefield. 37 Instead, they will continue to enlist them as suicide bombers, propagandists,
recruiters, fundraisers and, as a last resort, to fight their opposition.

(ii) ‘Strategic Benefits’38 of Women’s Recruitment

Although men represent the majority of fighters in Islamist terrorist groups, women are actively
recruited. The presence of women in smaller numbers is often misunderstood as a sign of their
insignificance within these groups. But the inclusion of women is based on a ‘strategic logic’ that
brings terrorist groups closer to their goals in more ways than one. In this sense, there is a
significant disparity between what motivates women to join a terrorist group, and what encourages
a group to recruit women.39 In this sense, women’s recruitment is explained by the tactical and
strategic benefits their participation offers to terrorist organizations.

Women deployed as attackers allow these groups to gain publicity or ‘renown’ as referred to by
Louise Richardson.40 Other scholars discuss how female suicide bombers generate more shock
value and media attention, giving more publicity to a terrorist group’s cause.41 In Indonesia and
Pakistan, women dressed in burqas can perpetrate suicide bombings with relative ease because of
the lack of physical security checks. Moreover, organizations use the participation of women as a
way to shame men into participating in violent jihad, especially if they are trained in combat and
enlisted as suicide bombers.

Some scholarship argues that “state-building jihadi organizations” that seek to build a ‘state’
through violent means need women to ensure the longevity of the group.42 This includes family-
based efforts, where women supplement the ‘people is power’ discourse by giving birth and
increasing the multi-generational impact of the group. It also extends to women’s deployment in
social services for women in the form of doctors, teachers and police officers.43 In comparison,
other groups such as TTP, JuD (Pakistan) and JI, JAT and MIT (Indonesia) represent operation-
based jihadi organizations that rely on guerrilla warfare. These groups divide into smaller cells and
networks which do not hold territory and are unlikely to include women in state-building roles,
but still acknowledge their importance in violent and non-violent capacities. Moreover, the active
competition from female-centric recruitment campaigns of groups such as IS means that they are
more accommodative of women and understand their strategic value in achieving goals. In
September 2017, TTP released Sunnat-e-Khaula, its first English magazine targeted towards
women after state-led media operations and competition from rival groups (IS and LeJ-A)
weakened the organization.44 The magazine urged women to wage jihad by getting physical
training in operating weapons and grenades, distributing the group’s propaganda and training their
children. Bahrun Naim, Indonesian leader of IS based in Syria, planned several terrorist plots
remotely, but failed due to preemptive measures from the security agencies. After these
unsuccessful attempts, he decided to incorporate female suicide bombers as a critical tactic because
they draw less attention from the authorities.

(iii) Women’s Personal and Political Motivations

Mainstream media and policymakers continue to offer overwhelmingly gendered explanations of
participation in violent extremism based on masculine and feminine characteristics. Within this
logic, men are seen to join terrorist groups for political reasons, while women’s motivations are
assumed to be personal.46 While men’s motivations are usually linked to fighting against the
persecution of Muslims and defending Islam, women’s participation is presumed to be linked to
personal reasons, such as finding a husband, protecting her children or taking revenge for atrocities
against her family.

In other words, the importance of physical and emotional motivating factors is undermined in
research on men, while it is overrepresented and perceived as a powerful determinant in the
radicalization process of women. Elizabeth Pearson and Emily Winterbotham state that both
personal and political factors are key contributors in the radicalization processes of men and
women.47 This research highlights five key factors that played a role in the radicalization process
of both genders: belonging and identity, the internet, youth, status, and inaccurate interpretations
of religion. Case studies in Indonesia and Pakistan also indicate mixed motivations for women’s
participation in terrorism. Both men and women’s participation in terrorist groups can be
influenced by multiple factors – cultural norms, political and religious reasons. Women, then, are
not solely joining terrorist groups to take revenge for their family members, seek romantic
relationships with male recruiters or out of coercion by husbands or fathers.48

In certain cases, personal motivations can play a role in facilitating the radicalization process.
Noreen Leghari, a Pakistani suicide bomber was recruited by a few male IS members, one of whom
she later married. Leghari was supposed to conduct a suicide bombing with her husband before
her arrest during a raid.49 In other cases, romantic relationships and male influence is not a vital
element of the radicalization process many women undergo. In 2015, Bushra Cheema traveled
with her four children to Syria from Pakistan to join IS. Cheema’s case received media attention
specifically after a voice note to her husband surfaced, where she said, “I want to die a martyr’s
death…if you can’t join us then pray your wife and children die in jihad.”50 This evidence aids to
show that Cheema was not radicalized because of her husband joining an extremist group; instead,
perhaps she made an independent politically and religiously influenced decision to join IS. In 2016,
Ika Puspitasari, an Indonesian domestic worker who had spent more than 17 years in Hong Kong
and Malaysia, had plans to conduct a suicide attack at a tourist site in Bali. Ika acted as an
independent ‘jihadi talent hunter’ who formed her own cell and recruited male IS members,
planned an attack and attempted to fund the operation. Ika did not wait for approval from IS
leadership or networks regarding her permissibility to wage jihad and underwent an independent
religious transformation through regular exposure to extremist websites and social media content.

Mainstream media and policymakers regard women as instruments for the male-dominated
leadership that manipulates them, undermining their agency.51 Devorah Margolin discusses the
myth of women’s victimization at the hands of men and the inability to account for their political
agency in terrorist groups.52 This is linked to the static masculine and feminine roles, where
violence for men is linked to power and non-violence for women is associated with passivity and
weakness.53 It also partly explains the label of ‘jihadi brides’ that has been used to refer to IS
recruits who traveled to Iraq and Syria. Brigitte L. Nacos has argued that female politicians are
more likely to be identified based on their marital status in comparison to male politicians.54 She
further adds that a similar logic is also applicable to media reports on male and female terrorists.

In this case, while IS also expects male terrorists to get married, the variable is overemphasized
for women and rarely discussed in the context of men.

Lessons on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism

This paper shows that viewing violent extremism through a gendered lens, which conventionally
divides men into violent roles and women into non-violent functions, hinders practical
understanding of women’s contribution to such organizations. Flawed analysis of women’s roles
in terrorism, recruitment, and motivations in Islamist extremist groups in Indonesia and Pakistan
weakens effective policy-making and action planning at the state level.

First, lack of recognition of women’s potential to be violent impedes effective security responses
to avert and counter this threat. In Pakistan, according to a 2011 survey by the National Bureau of
Police, women represent less than one percent of the police force in the country.55 In Indonesia,
women represent only five percent of the Indonesian National Armed Forces and the National
Police.56 Women’s appointment within the security sector is critical due to gender segregation
norms that do not permit men to conduct physical checks of women at security checkpoints. In the
Counter Terrorism Department of Pakistan, cultural perceptions regarding women in combat have
prevented their induction and training in response teams.57

Second, when policymakers deconstruct their understanding of women’s roles as domestic, in the
form of mothers and wives, countering violent extremism initiatives are likely to have reduced
effectiveness.58 Simply restricting women’s participation in this context also risks falling within
stereotypical gendered perceptions of women as non-violent, while neglecting other crucial
capacities in which women can be utilized to their full potential within their communities. Aman
Indonesia and Amn-oNisa in Pakistan are two key civil society initiatives, among others, geared
towards peacebuilding and CVE through empowering and educating women in their communities.
In comparison, PAIMAN Alumni Trust has focused on training 655 mothers to deradicalize 1,024
young boys and men, reintegrating them back into society.59 This approach rests on the assumption
that women are uniquely placed to spot early indicators of radicalization in their children and have
the ability to influence their children to denounce violent extremism. While tapping into this
potential of women might be beneficial in some circumstances, this maternalistic capability is not
applicable in all contexts within traditional societies with a strong family-based structure. For
instance, in certain cases of radicalization within Afghanistan, mothers and wives have not been
aware of their male family members joining terrorist groups.60 Anecdotally, Pashtun tribes tend to
confine women to the private sphere and limit their decision-making authority and influence over
their family members. Within this context, it is pertinent that research and academic studies have
established that the inextricable link between female terrorists as mothers is flawed, with women
showcasing the capacity to independently engage in violent extremism as well.61

For the sake of scope and clarity, the discussion of gender dynamics in terrorist groups focused on
women. Conversely, masculinity and the link with violence and fighting in the case of terrorist
organizations is not sufficiently studied or understood within existing literature.62 Some scholars
have raised the notion of ‘men-streaming’ or considering men as gendered beings in the
radicalization process and understanding how conventions of hegemonic masculinity are

contributing factors.63 Ultimately, men’s roles centered exclusively on violence need to be
critically analyzed to formulate better policies to understand why men fight and how to prevent it.

Lastly, terrorist groups have evolved in their recruitment methods, strategies, and target audiences.
In both Indonesia and Pakistan, terrorist groups actively recruit women into a wide variety of roles.
In other words, they have moved away from a narrow, static and non-violent jihad to a broader,
more fluid and violent conception of jihad for women. States and policymakers need to evolve
accordingly and account for the differing key roles women assume within these groups. The
gendered presumption that women are ‘naturally’ non-violent, or agents of peace and are coerced
by male-counterparts to engage in violence has acted as an impediment towards effective policy
responses to identify and mitigate the threat from female terrorists. As such, the translation of more
gender-nuanced initiatives into state-run holistic P/CVE programs remain critical.

Citations

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3Singh, Bilveer. 2017. “Jemaah Islamiyah: Still a Latent Threat.” RSIS Commentaries. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/CO17075 .
4Aman Abdurrahman, a 46-year-old radical cleric, is considered the de facto head of IS supporters in Indonesia and
founded the IS-linked Jamaah Ansharut Dawlah. In June 2018, he was sentenced to death for his involvement in
terrorist attacks in the country.
5“The Surabaya Bombings and the Future of ISIS in Indonesia.” 2018. Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict.
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6A part of the JAD membership also includes defectors from JI. It is important that not all IS-linked activity in
Indonesia relates to JAD and many lone-wolf/isolated networks of IS supporters are also present.
7Rana, Muhammad Amir. 2018. “Pakistan-based militant groups & prospects of their reintegration: A Structural
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8Pakistan also faces an active security threat from the separatist insurgency in the province of Balochistan, which
remains beyond the scope of this paper.
9These three groups are currently active and have perpetrated multiple large-scale attacks, leading to their
identification are major threat groups by the Pakistani state.
10Rana, Muhammad Amir. 2015. “The Impact of the Islamic State on Pakistan.” Norwegian Peace Building
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11As these groups were linked to Al-Qaeda, they did maintain a small online presence in forums and websites.
However, this did not form the base of their recruitment and outreach tactics.
12There are no official statistics available on the gendered membership of these terrorist groups. However, it is
broadly known that men formulate a majority in terms of membership and as perpetrators of attacks.
13Kimmel, Michael. 2010. The Gendered Society. Oxford University Press.
14Enloe, Cynthia. 2004. “All the Men Are in the Militias, All the Women Are Victims: The Politics of Masculinity
and Femininity in Nationalist Wars.” In The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire,
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15Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1987. Women and War. New York: Basic Books Inc.
16Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1987. Women and War. New York: Basic Books Inc.
17Ortbals, Candice, and Lori Poloni-Staudinger. 2018. “How Gender Intersects With Political Violence and
Terrorism.” Contentious Politics and Political Violence. Oxford Research Encyclopedias.
http://oxfordre.com/politics/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-308
18Mahmood, Sara. 2018. “The Link Between Masculinity and Violent Extremism.” TODAY Online.
https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/link-between-masculinity-and-violent-extremism-0.
19Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 1987. Women and War. New York: Basic Books Inc.
20Lahoud, Nelly. 2017. “Can Women Be Soldiers of the Islamic State?” Survival, 59:1; Sjoberg, Laura and Caron E.
Gentry. 2011. Women, Gender and Terrorism. University of Georgia Press.

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Political Violence, 26:5. 780-802.
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Peace Studies. https://pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/205 .
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radio-mullah/.
25Qadeem, Mossarat. 2018. “Engendering Extremism: Women Preventing And Countering Violent Extremism In
Pakistan.” London School of Economics (Centre for Women Peace and Security). http://www.lse.ac.uk/women-
peace-security/assets/documents/2018/wps16Qadeem .
26Yasmeen, Samina. 2016. Pakistan, Muslim Womanhood and Social Jihad: Narratives of Umm Abd Muneeb, Islam
and Christian–Muslim Relations 27:3, 251-265.
27Indonesia’s first case of a female suicide bomber emerged with the onset of IS in 2017. Pakistan’s first case
occurred much earlier in 2010, where a woman dressed in a burqa targeted a distribution camp of the World Food
Program (WFP).
28Mahmood, Sara. 2017. “Pakistan’s Women Jihadis.” The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/pakistans-
women-jihadis/.
29al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. 2017. “ISIS’ Female Suicide Bombers are No Myth.” Foreign Affairs.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-09-22/isis-female-suicide-bombers-are-no-myth.
30Local IS networks and cells face strong competition from other Islamist terrorist groups that actively engaging in
violence and thus, have more visibility. Deploying Leghari as a suicide bomber acts as a effective tactic that would
grant IS significant media attention and visibility in the country and elsewhere.
31Nuraniyah, Navah. 2018. “Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalization of Indonesian Female
Supporters of the Islamic State.” Terrorism and Political Violence 30:6, 1-21.
32The Handbook of Womanhood released by the Al-Mumkin School, established by the founding members of JI,
explicitly prohibited women from fighting until the group was faced with extreme circumstances. These
circumstances were cited as the inability of men to fight. Instead, the handbook relegated women to patriarchal, non-
violent and gendered roles as mothers, wives and daughters.
33“Mothers To Bombers: The Evolution Of Indonesian Women Extremists.” 2017. Institute For Policy Analysis of
Conflict. http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/01/IPAC_Report_35 .
34“Mothers To Bombers: The Evolution Of Indonesian Women Extremists.” 2017. Institute For Policy Analysis of
Conflict. http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/01/IPAC_Report_35 .
35Fonbuena, Carmela. 2017. “Who is Farhana Maute?” Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/nation/172523-farhana-
maute-marawi-siege.
36Fonbuena, Carmela. 2017. “Who is Farhana Maute?” Rappler. https://www.rappler.com/nation/172523-farhana-
maute-marawi-siege.
37Lahoud, Nelly. 2014. “The Neglected Sex: The Jihadis’ Exclusion of Women From Jihad.” Terrorism and
Political Violence, 26:5: 780-802.
38This term is as discussed by Khelghat-Doost, Hamoon. 2018. “The Strategic Logic of Women in Jihadi
Organizations.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism.
39Von Knop, Katharina. 2007. “The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda’s Women.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30:5, 397-
414.
40Richardson, Louise. 2007. What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy and Containing the Threat. Penguin
Random House Trade.
41Speckhard, Anne. 2008. “The Emergence of Female Suicide Terrorists.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31:11,
995-1023; Bloom, Mia. 2011. Bombshell: Women and Terrorism. University of Pennsylvania Press.
42Khelghat-Doost, Hamoon. 2018. “The Strategic Logic of Women in Jihadi Organizations.” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism.
43The concept of gender segregation is key in Islamist terrorist groups, where a spatial separation between men and
women is customary. As such, female doctors, teachers and police officers are needed to provide social services to
other women.
44Jadoon, Amira, and Sara Mahmood. 2017. “Militant Rivalries Extend to Female Recruitment in Pakistan.”
https://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-perspectives-militant-rivalries-extend-to-female-recruitment-in-pakistan/.
45Nuraniyah, Navah. 2018. “Not Just Brainwashed: Understanding the Radicalisation of Indonesian Female
Supporters of the Islamic State.” Terrorism and Political Violence, 1:21.

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https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/pakistans-women-jihadis/

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/syria/2017-09-22/isis-female-suicide-bombers-are-no-myth

http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2017/01/IPAC_Report_35

https://www.rappler.com/nation/172523-farhana-maute-marawi-siege

https://ctc.usma.edu/ctc-perspectives-militant-rivalries-extend-to-female-recruitment-in-pakistan/

46Nacos, Brigitte. 2005. “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar framing patterns in the news
coverage of women in politics and in terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 28:5, 435–451.
47Pearson, Elizabeth and Emily Winterbotham. 2017. “Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation.” The RUSI
Journal, 162:3, 60-72.
48It is key to note that relationships developed in the physical and social media networks intensify the radicalization
process rather than acting as a core motivation.
49Gabol, Imran. 2017. “Woman held after encounter in Lahore went to Syria for training.” Dawn.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1327453.
50Shah, Benazir and Rimmel Mohydin. 2016. “Pray your Wife and Children Die in Jihad.” Newsweek Pakistan.
http://newsweekpakistan.com/pray-your-wife-and-children-die-in-jihad/.
51Gowrinatham, Nimmi. 2014. “The Women of ISIS.” Foreign Affairs.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-08-21/women-isis.
52Margolin, Devorah. 2018. “Neither Feminists nor Victims: How Women’s Agency Has Shaped Palestinian
Violence.” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/womens-agency-
palestinian-violence.
53Poloni-Staudinger, Lori and Candice D. Ortbals. 2013. Terrorism and Violent Conflict: Women’s Agency,
Leadership, and Responses. Springer.
54Nacos, Brigitte. 2005. “The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News
Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28:5, 435-451.
55Peters, Allison and Jahanara Saeed. 2017. “Promoting Inclusive Policy Frameworks For Countering Violent
Extremism Bridging Theory And Practice: A Pakistani Policewomen Case Study.” Georgetown Institute for Women,
Peace and Security (Inclusive Security). https://giwps.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Pakistan-CVE-
Case-Study .
56Siddharta, Amanda. 2018. “Virginity tests put Indonesian women off military service; often performed by men,
they are seen as degrading.” South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/2160023/virginity-
tests-put-indonesian-women-military-service-often-performed-men.
57Interview with representative of Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Department (CTD). September 2018.
58Winterbotham, Emily. 2018. “Do Mothers Know Best? How Assumptions Harm CVE.” Tony Blair Institute for
Global Change. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/do-mothers-know-best-how-assumptions-harm-cve.
59O’Reilly, Marie. 2015. “Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies.” Inclusive Security.
https://www.inclusivesecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Why-Women-Report-2017 .
60Ahmadi, Belquis and Sadaf Lakhani. 2016. “Afghan Women and Violent Extremism Colluding, Perpetrating, or
Preventing?” United States Institute of Peace.
61“Countering Violent Extremism in Asia: The Role of Development Assistance.” 2017. The Asia Foundation.
62Ismail, Noor Huda. 2018. “Masculinity in Radicalization.” Asia Global Online.
https://www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/masculinity-in-radicalization-a-case-study-of-a-returned-isis-fighter-in-
indonesia/.
63Ezekilov, Jossif. 2017. “Gender “Men-Streaming” CVE: Countering Violent Extremism By Addressing
Masculinities Issues.” Reconsidering Development, 5:1; Chant, Sylvia and M. C. Gutmann. 2002. ‘Men-streaming’
gender? questions for gender and development policy in the twenty-first century. Progress in Development Studies,
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‘Pray Your Wife and Children Die In Jihad’

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Not Just Victims: Women in Terrorism from the Western Balkans

Vesë Kelmendi
Vesë Kelmendi completed her studies at the University of Prishtina, in the department of Political Science. As part of
civil society, she conducts various activities related to the promotion and protection of human rights. Since September
2015, Ms. Kelmendi has worked in the Kosovar Center for Security Studies as a Researcher and Project Officer. In
this role, she contributes to initiatives related to the prevention of violent extremism in Kosovo and parliamentary
oversight of the security sector. She also played a key role in different projects to collect, analyze, and interpret data
regarding violent extremism in the Balkan region. Moreover, she partners with local communities, especially the
youth, on preventing violent extremism through discussions and focus groups. Ms. Kelmendi is part of the European
Networking Exchange program, which aims to develop the best practices and rehabilitation programs for the foreign
fighters that have returned from conflict zones. Over the last couple of years, she studied the root causes of violent
extremism in the region and honed her expertise of the ideologies that dominate the Balkans. Ms. Kelmendi’s research
interest includes gender, security, and violent extremists’ dissemination of propaganda on social media.

Introduction

A growing body of research sheds light on the complicated relationship between women and
violent extremist organizations, as women in terrorism range from victims and forced participants
to supporters, facilitators, and perpetrators. These roles are evident in the latest trends of women
joining terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS), among other violent
extremist movements worldwide. In order to add to the discussion, this paper focuses on the
contribution of women from Western Balkan countries and highlights consequences deriving from
their involvement in terrorist organizations. The data show that Kosovo is not immune to the
ongoing phenomena of violent extremism, and a thorough examination of the experience of
women from this region helps explain the nuances of why they participate in conflict, and what
roles they assume in violent extremist groups like IS. In addition to discussing women who travel
to IS-controlled territory, a significant part of this paper addresses the broader trend of women
from Western Balkan countries who support homegrown terrorism. The second aspect of the paper
analyzes the response of Western Balkan countries, such as Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina,
to women participating in terrorist groups and highlights the demand for rehabilitation and
reintegration programs. In sum, it is important to understand these dynamics in the region to help
relevant stakeholders do more to prevent and counter women’s involvement in terrorism and
violent extremism.

Western Balkans: Context of women’s participation in terrorist organizations

Broadly speaking, trends in the radicalization and recruitment of women by terrorist organizations
in Balkan countries sometimes differ from their European counterparts in countries such as
Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.1 At least in part, this difference is likely related to the
experience of women in the Balkan region, who face greater challenges concerning domestic
violence, discrimination in employment and property ownership, and financial instability, among
other issues.2 These matters are especially common in extremism-related cases from Kosovo,
Albania, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where conservative and patriarchal societies
deny women empowerment.

Initially, policy discussions concerning people’s participation in foreign conflicts treated the topics
as an issue that affected men, not women. At least in the beginning, this perspective was offered

despite a lack of research on the driving factors of women’s involvement in terrorist organizations
from Balkan countries. To date, the involvement of women in modern terrorist organizations like
IS is often overlooked, while male violence is cast as the status quo in research and views of the
wider society.3 Some commentators dismiss men’s participation in violent extremist groups with
the explanation that ‘boys will be boys,’4 suggesting that there is no need to ask ‘why?’ when men
become violent. These assumptions are often based on gender stereotypes rather than evidence,5
defaulting to qualities that are conventionally ascribed to males and females for biological reasons.

In patriarchal societies such as Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania, husbands serve as authoritative
figures within the family, offering some insight to radicalization and recruitment dynamics. In
Western Balkan countries, women tend to think that due to the man’s assumed power, they must
obey their husbands and follow their orders. An Imam in Kosovo articulated this dynamic,
suggesting that the mentality of Albanians assumes that “women are behind men or they need to
follow their husbands.” As such, these women might be influenced to follow their husband’s
desires to join the conflict in Syria and Iraq.6 In this context, it is also important to examine the
role of domestic violence in countries like Kosovo. While striking, research suggests that citizens
of Kosovo are relatively tolerant of physical violence.7 Statistics from a survey by the Kosovo
Agency of Statistics and UNICEF show that about 33 percent of female respondents (age 15-49)
from Kosovo stated that beatings from their husbands were justified in instances when she neglects
the children, challenges her partner, refuses to have sex, or burns the food.8 This problem is related
to the masculine culture and education in which men and women developed their ideas. Boys are
taught by their mothers and family that they should be authoritative, stay prepared for war, hide
their emotions, and act strong and protective.9 Age adds another layer to these dynamics as younger
generations in Kosovo grow up in a society that recognizes contributions of men in discussions of
war and ignores the efforts of women.10

To further contextualize these trends, it is useful to review rates concerning the number of men,
women, and children who joined the conflict in Syria and Iraq and highlight the same figures for
other countries in the Western Balkans. According to a report by the British Council, between
2012 and 2018, approximately 400 citizens of Kosovo participated in Middle Eastern conflicts as
foreign fighters and migrants.11 The majority of those that remain in conflict zones are defined as
“non-combatants,” meaning they do not directly engage in fighting; figures show that a total
number of 139 non-combatants, consisting of 47 women and 92 children.12 Moreover, estimates
suggest an additional 66 men, who potentially served in combat roles, remain in conflict zones.13
Furthermore, figures from the police state that 127 citizens returned to Kosovo from Syria and
Iraq, including 117 men, seven women, and three children.14 Data from law enforcement and
intelligence in the region indicates that up to 1,075 individuals (women, children, and the elderly)
traveled to Syria and Iraq between 2012 and 2016.15 In the table below, there is data presented
from the latest report of the British Council’s Western Balkans Extremism Research Forum (ERF).

Western Balkans Men in Syria
and Iraq

Women in Syria
and Iraq

Children in
Syria and Iraq

Total

Albania 96 13 31 140

Bosnia and
Herzegovina

177 63 57 297

Kosovo 255 48 95 398

Macedonia 140 14 No data 154

Montenegro 18 5 4 27

Serbia 37 12 10 59

Table 1. Men/Women and Children who joined the conflict to Syria and Iraq from Western
Balkans Countries16

Drivers and Profiles of Women joining in Syria and Iraq

A range of internal and external drivers influence the women who join terrorist groups in Syria
and Iraq from Western Balkan countries. Research shows that there is no “single profile” of women
who join the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.17 The roles, motivations, and experiences of women are
not monolithic, but diverse and shaped by context, community, and history.18 While some women
are compelled or threatened to join the conflict by their husbands or other male family members,
other women join IS on a voluntary basis and have unique drivers and motives for participation.19
Among other precipitants, push and pull factors in this region are often related to socio-economic
conditions, ideological views, family relations, identity crises, and trauma.20 Despite being
portrayed as passive agents, women in IS also serve in a range of contributing roles. Even as care
providers, women promote violent extremist ideologies and enable others to join the movement.21

As articulated earlier, many of the women from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia
traveled to conflict zones with their husbands and families in order to perform traditional family-
oriented roles and duties.22 Following the broader trend of family departures, women from Bosnia
and Herzegovina started traveling to Syria in 2013.23 Similar to mobilization trends in other parts
of the world and the region, women from Kosovo traveled to Iraq and Syria with their families at
increased rates in 2015, after the official declaration of the self-proclaimed Caliphate.24 Whether
forced to migrate or willing participants, women from the Western Balkans living in Iraq and Syria
generally serve in supportive roles. Based on a report by the Atlantic Initiative and interviews with
Kosovar women who returned from Syria, Bosnian and Kosovar women are generally limited to
domestic life, and do not actively engage in the conflicts in Syria and Iraq.25 Furthermore, evidence
suggests that most of the women from Kosovo stayed in groups mainly with other women from
Albania and some ethnic Albanians from Macedonia due to language similarities. Some of the
latest research also suggests that some of the women participants from Albania and Kosovo
married foreign fighters from Macedonia, Kosovo, or Albania after their first husband died on the
battlefield.26

Although women from the Balkans who travel to IS-held territory face grim conditions in Syria
and Iraq, it is important to note that some women returning from the conflict still express positive
feelings about their experience. As an example, one woman described her involvement in IS as
“great opportunity” compared to the lives they lead in their country of origin.27 Even after leaving
IS-controlled territory, some women remain committed to the cause; Kosovo alone has instances
where well-educated women continued to support IS after they return to their native country.28

Emerging Threats and Ongoing Challenges: Women as Domestic Plotters, Online
Supporters, and Returnees

Next, it is important to discuss the latest threats and risks posed by women from the Balkan region
who join terrorist organizations. Beyond the issue of women traveling to join IS, some recent cases
show that female sympathizers from the region are willing to support or engage in violent
extremism from their home countries. Additionally, Balkan countries face major challenges when
it comes to addressing the women who return from Syria and Iraq. These instances show that there
is an urgent need to address the problem through public policy and adopt approaches that recognize
the complicated relationship between women and violent extremist groups.

As one aspect of these evolving threats, some women in Balkan countries appear eager to conduct
domestic attacks. Four years after being prevented by authorities in Kosovo from joining IS, a
Kosovar with Belgian citizenship named Gramos Shabani was arrested with his girlfriend Edona
Haliti for planning a suicide attack on a military KFOR mission in Kosovo.29According to the
court proceedings, in June 2018 Gramos and Edona planned to commit the terrorist attack together
but were stopped when Kosovo Police arrested the couple after being under surveillance. Media
reports suggested that her boyfriend recruited her to plan an attack, but there is not sufficient
evidence to support this claim. Ultimately, this case demonstrates that the risk women pose should
be considered as seriously as that of men. Additionally, transcripts from a prosecutor in Kosovo
who works on terrorism-related indictments show that some of the wives of foreign fighters
motivate their husbands in the conflict zones by portraying them as heroes and actively supporting
their “jihad” in Syria.30 In text messages, women express their desire to join the group, remind
their husbands that their only purpose is jihad, and encourage them not to focus on material
earnings like money.31

Some of the latest research from Kosovar Center for Security Studies (KCSS) shows instances
where citizens of Kosovo living abroad also become part of terrorist organizations.32 One example
of this phenomenon is the arrest of a minor from Kosovo who was living in Vienna, Austria.
According to prosecutors, she was in contact with IS operatives for the preparation of a terrorist
attack with poison.33 She was reportedly introduced on social networks to a man called “Davud”
and used “chat applications” to connect with other IS supporters to discuss plans to carry out a
terrorist attack in Vienna.34According to news reports, she was particularly interested in poison
attacks in places where food products were sold, and was given information on how to use
chemicals such as “Agent Orange.”35 A range of cases from different parts of Europe and North
America also suggest that roles for women in terrorist groups like IS are expanding beyond the
traditional family-based roles, especially outside of IS-controlled territory, as authorities have
identified some attack plots involving women.36

Another aspect of the threat involving women in terrorism pertains to their online behavior, a trend
that is studied using KCSS’s database of extremist social networks on platforms like Facebook,

Telegram, and YouTube. Anecdotally, it appears Balkan countries have started to propagate more
for the role of women in the so-called Islamic State. Moreover, individual profiles and pages such
as “Caliphate/Hilafet Sisters” or “The protections of Ummah” have been re-activated.37 On
Facebook, one group advertises a Telegram channel that offers operational security instructions
like avoiding using their real names or identification when they register for an Apple ID or Android
application. More explicitly, the post states: “Our beloved sisters please share and follow this
channel (in Telegram). The Kuffar don’t want us to be safe but we have a duty to protect our
Ummah and our Islamic State. These apps downloaded from this channel ensure that you don’t
provide your personal information to apple or android, keeping you more safe.”38 Although this
type of online activity poses a less immediate threat to society than women who join terrorist
organizations or conduct plots, counter-extremism policymakers and practitioners should not
overlook or underestimate virtual contributions. Both online and offline, women from the Balkan
region continue to make meaningful additions to terrorist organizations without perpetrating
violence.

Moreover, the repatriation, reintegration, and rehabilitation of women from the conflict in Syria
and Iraq continue to be a point of tension for political debates in Balkan countries. Governments
and local communities struggle to address issues related to people that return from conflict zones,
and women returnees sometimes complicate the process, particularly when their children are
involved. In many Balkan countries, returning women face prejudice from their families and
stigmatization from their communities. These issues are, at least in part, made worse by conflict
reporting that discusses instances where women married, remarried, or had children with men from
non-Albanian nationalities. Patriarchal societies such as Kosovo fail to institute reintegration and
rehabilitation programs for these women and the communities lack the understanding needed to
address these phenomena without judging their “moral aspect.” Recent statistics from Western
Balkan countries indicate that 319 citizens have returned to their countries.39 While data show that
the majority of returnees are men, evidence suggests that some women and children remain in Iraq
and Syria; researchers explain that women “play a significant role in carrying forward the ideology
and legacy of IS after the physical fall of ‘Caliphate.’”40

A recent report by the International Center for the Study and Radicalization (ICSR) stated that
around 41,490 international citizens from 80 countries became affiliated with IS in Iraq and
Syria.41 Figures presented in the report suggest that up to 4,761 (13%) of these individuals were
recorded as women, while approximately 4,640 (12%) of the people were thought to be
minors.42As a result of this mobilization, an enduring challenge for governments today is deciding
how to effectively cope with the men, women, and minors who traveled in order to the join the
conflict. Data suggest that 7,366 persons have now returned to their home countries (20%), or
appear to be in process of repatriation.43 Out of this figure, however, only 256 (4%) of total
returnees are women; this means that a mere 5% of the women who traveled to Syria and Iraq have
returned from the conflict zone.44 Of the women that do make it back to their country of origin,
few appear to receive support from the government in the form of reintegration and re-socialization
programs. One report that assesses threats posed by returning foreign fighters in the Western
Balkans notes, “There are few if any rehabilitation and reintegration programs meeting the needs
of both returnees and their families.”45 The assessment goes on, adding, “Notably lacking are
programs for non-combatant returnees,” which the report classifies as women and children, “who
made up one-third of the Western Balkans’ contingent in Syria and Iraq.”46

In the context of Kosovo, there is a lack of awareness among policymakers and the general
community on how to handle the problem, and women and children are generally lumped together
as non-combatants. For example, in a recent interview, the Kosovo Prime Minister spoke very
vaguely about female returnees in Syria and Iraq saying that the problem is “[IS] women have
children with non-Kosovars,” and that “sometimes we do not know who these women had babies
with” or “they could be children of IS commanders.47 Unfortunately, such statements do not help
the problem of prejudice against returnees, nor parse out the unique needs of women returnees
compared to their children. When it comes to the reintegration of these demographics, nuanced
responses are necessary regardless of the stigma attached to getting married and giving birth in
conflict zones.

In a translated interview, the brother of “Nesa,” a woman who left Kosovo to join the conflict in
Syria and Iraq, discussed his fears about the consequences facing his sister after she moved to the
region.48 At the time of the interview, Nesa was believed to be living in a Kurdish-run camp for
internally displaced persons called Ajnisa (also known as Ayn Issa). According to Nesa’s brother,
prior to her departure for Syria, “she was wise, sometimes sensitive as [a] character and not very
sociable.”49 Apparently the man she married only showed signs of increased religiosity after
marriage. At the age of 18 and pregnant with her first child, Nesa and her husband left Kosovo for
Syria. Nesa’s brother explained the events, describing that, “the last time [he] met her she was very
sad and crying constantly but [they] as family of her were not informed where she [was] going.”50
Next, Nesa’s husband died two weeks before their baby was born, and she was left alone under
jihadist-controlled territory.51

After the death of her husband, Nesa attempted to return to Kosovo, but it was impossible;
according to her brother, Nesa was only allowed to communicate with her family at times when
they (the men she was with) let her use the phone and the internet.52 After a few months, she
married a man from a country neighboring Kosovo, with whom she had another child. When she,
her husband, and two other families from Kosovo finally attempted to leave Syria, they were
caught by the Kurdish forces.53 Her brother explained, “For two years we did not have any
information about our sister [and] we thought she died together with her children. After two years,
my phone was ringing, and it was Nesa on the phone telling me that she ended up on Kurdish
Camp.”54 Nesa’s brother noted that, “she was very worried, bored and hopeless about her fate.”
According to his conversations with her, the conditions in the camp are terrible, there is not enough
food, and life is very difficult.55 Nesa also told her brother that “all women were separated from
their husbands.”56 While the ultimate fate of Nesa remains unknown, her brother expects her to
survive and return home; he plans to support her despite the stigma.57

While Nesa’s case provides some hope, as her brother offers his unwavering support,
contemporary responses to female returnees in Kosovo and the Balkan region are broadly
insufficient. As one priority, women, like men, need programming that is tailored to their unique
needs and experiences. Children deserve similar resources and might benefit from initiatives that
involve their parents and family. Ideally, programs for these demographics would include
professional social and mental health workers capable of identifying and treating the trauma that
arises from living in conflict zones. Practitioners could also account for the challenges that might
emerge in the process of reintegration. For example, although rates of sexual violence against
women from the Balkans in Syrian and Iraq are difficult to find, media reports about life in the so-
called Islamic State regularly highlight the prevalence of rape and torture.58 Women returning to

Balkan countries from Syria and Iraq will likely find it very difficult to talk about such trauma,
particularly sexual violence, given the deeply patriarchal nature of communities in the region.

While working to understand and reintegrate women who return from Syria and Iraq, policymakers
and practitioners in the Balkans should not strictly regard women as the victims of violent
extremism. As discussed earlier in this paper, there are several instances where women who
returned to Kosovo express continued support for the so-called Islamic State. As an example, one
woman who left the war-torn region explained, “I missed the life in Syria and Iraq, if there were
no conflicts and killings I would continue to live there. The only solution for Muslims around the
world is Islamic State and Caliphate.”59 Ultimately, in order to create a sufficient response to the
full range of women touched by violent extremism, it is necessary to consider all the factors that
affect an individual’s involvement, gender-related and otherwise.

Conclusive Recommendations

The issue of women in terrorist organizations has gained increasing attention at the international
level, as entities like the United Nations Security Council address the matter through channels like
the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the Committee’s Executive Directorate (CTED).60 This
recent focus appears motivated by increasing awareness about the participation of women in
terrorism, along with a broader push to identify and promote roles for women in efforts to prevent
and counter violent extremism. Several governments in Europe and the Western Balkan countries
also see women in terrorism as a problem, but they do not usually approach the issue with the same
treatment or sincerity as male fighters who join in the conflict to Syria and Iraq. In Kosovo, for
example, the national strategy for the prevention of violent extremism leading to terrorism
emphasizes the role of male foreign fighters the main risk.61 Moreover, the strategy only mentions
the role of women preventing violent extremism once,62 further illustrating that gender-related
considerations are not a priority.

Policymakers, practitioners, and scholars in the Western Balkans and beyond should consider the
following points to create a more gender-aware response to terrorism and violent extremism:

● Governmental and non-governmental organizations working to prevent and counter violent
extremism should advocate for programs that address the experiences of all people returning
from conflict zones, including women, rather than focusing exclusively on men as foreign
fighters. In this way, policymakers who are responsible for creating action plans to prevent and
counter violent extremism can also pay greater attention to the social fabric of terrorist groups
and work to understand the involvement of women.

● Women returning from the conflict in Iraq and Syria must be taken seriously by authorities,
including law enforcement, because some women continue to carry extremist ideology into
their communities. At the same time, government institutions and communities should also
offer assistance to reintegrate women that are not believed to be dangerous.

● Community engagement is critical to the success of state-sponsored programs designed to
prevent and counter violent extremism. When it comes to reintegration, for example, the
government must work with communities to reduce the stigmatization of men, women, and
children returning from conflict zones. Government officials, for example, must be especially
careful about the language and rhetoric they use to discuss returnees because their voices

influence the public’s perception of the problem. Ultimately, women returning from Syria and
Iraq appear disproportionately affected by prejudice and rejection from society, particularly if
they remarried or had children abroad. While challenging, overcoming this barrier is crucial
for the integration of these individuals.

● Entities tasked with preventing and countering violent extremism should promote the voices
of those who can credibly speak against terrorist organizations, including women. The families
of violent extremists, returnees, and others touched by violent extremism can provide
especially compelling narratives and perspectives to condemn such actions. Additionally, in
the Balkans, some women resisted pressure from their families and husbands to join the
conflict in Syria and Iraq. Unfortunately, many of these women, particularly those who still
have relatives living in Syria, are excluded from institutions. These women should be treated
better and highlighted as role models for pushing against violent extremism. These women
could be especially good at educating others in at-risk communities.

● Although increasing the participation of women in government and counter-extremism efforts
is not necessarily a solution to terrorism and violent extremism, the empowerment of women
in the Western Balkans is critical to progress. If women become a more significant part of the
government’s make-up and agenda, perhaps with time, there will be greater chances to address
systemic issues regarding gender dynamics in these countries. The prevalence of domestic
violence, for example, appears to relate to mobilization trends. Consequently, without
addressing these underlying dynamics, governments may struggle to prevent and counter
radicalization and recruitment in the future.

Citations

1Jakupi, Rudinë & Vesë Kelmendi. 2018. “Women in Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Kosovo.” Kosovar
Center for Security Studies: 19-21. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236
2GAP Institute. 2018. “Punësimi dhe përfaqësimi i grave në Kosovë Raport Statistikor – 2018”
http://www.institutigap.org/documents/27857_Raporti%20statistikor%20per%20punesimin%20e%20grave .
Additionally, this news report cites police in Kosovo on the increasing rate of domestic violence
https://www.koha.net/arberi/67576/dhuna-ne-familje-ne-2017-n-shenoi-rritje/.
3Pearson, Elizabeth. 2018. “Why Men Fight and Women Don’t: Masculinity and Extremist Violence.” Tony Blair
Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-
masculinity-and-extremist-violence; De Leede, Saran and Renate Haupfleisch et al. 2017. “Radicalisation and
Violent Extremism – Focus on Women: How Women Become Radicalised, and How to Empower them to Prevent
Radicalization.” Directorate General for Internal Policies, Department for Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional
Affairs Women’s Rights & Gender Equality.
4Pearson, Elizabeth. 2018. “Why Men Fight and Women Don’t: Masculinity and Extremist Violence.” Tony Blair
Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-
masculinity-and-extremist-violence
5Pearson, Elizabeth. 2018. “Why Men Fight and Women Don’t: Masculinity and Extremist Violence.” Tony Blair
Institute for Global Change. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-
masculinity-and-extremist-violence
6Interview with conservative imam in municipality of Mitrovica, November 9, 2016, Kosovo.
7“42% e grave ne Kosove arsyetojne dhunen ne familje.” 2015. Newspaper Albi Info. https://www.albinfo.ch/mbi-
42-te-grave-ne-kosove-pranojne-dhunen-ne-familje/
8“42% e grave ne Kosove arsyetojne dhunen ne familje.” 2015. Newspaper Albi Info. https://www.albinfo.ch/mbi-
42-te-grave-ne-kosove-pranojne-dhunen-ne-familje/
9Farnsworth, Nicole & Ariana Qosaj-Mustafa et al. 2015. “No More Excuses: An Analysis of Attitudes, Incidence,
and Institutional Responses to Domestic Violence in Kosovo.” Kosovo Women Network, Prishtina, 29-46.
http://www.womensnetwork.org/documents/20151124105025622

http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236

http://www.institutigap.org/documents/27857_Raporti%20statistikor%20per%20punesimin%20e%20grave

https://www.koha.net/arberi/67576/dhuna-ne-familje-ne-2017-n-shenoi-rritje/

https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence

Mbi 42 % të grave në Kosovë pranojnë dhunën në familje

http://www.womensnetwork.org/documents/20151124105025622

10“42% e grave ne Kosove arsyetojne dhunen ne familje” 2015. Newspaper Albi Info. https://www.albinfo.ch/mbi-
42-te-grave-ne-kosove-pranojne-dhunen-ne-familje/
11Please see footnote 64 of this report to see caveats about the categorization of combatants versus non-combatants
as it pertains to gender. Shpend Kursani. 2018. “Western Balkans, Extremism Research Forum: Kosovo Report”
British Council, 18. https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018
12Please see footnote 64 of this report to see caveats about the categorization of combatants versus non-combatants
as it pertains to gender. Shpend Kursani. 2018. “Western Balkans, Extremism Research Forum: Kosovo Report”
British Council, 18. https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018
13Please see footnote 64 of this report to see caveats about the categorization of combatants versus non-combatants
as it pertains to gender. Shpend Kursani. 2018. “Western Balkans, Extremism Research Forum: Kosovo Report”
British Council, 18. https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018
14Kosovo Police data, 2017.
15Vlado Azinović. 2018. “Regional Report: Understanding Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans.” British
Council & International Conflict and Research Institute (INCORE). Ulster University: 4.
https://www.britishcouncil.al/sites/default/files/erf_report_western_balkans_2018
16Vlado Azinović. 2018. “Regional Report: Understanding Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans,” British
Council & International Conflict and Research Institute (INCORE), Ulster University: 4.
https://www.britishcouncil.al/sites/default/files/erf_report_western_balkans_2018
17Jakupi, Rudinë & Vesë Kelmendi. 2018. “Women in Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Kosovo.”
Kosovar Center for Security Studies: 13. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236
18Women and Countering Violent Extremism, Summary Document and Analysis. 2014. Georgetown
University & Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the UN, NY.
19Jakupi, Rudinë &Vesë Kelmendi. 2018. “Women in Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Kosovo.” Kosovar
Center for Security Studies. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236 ;
20Jakupi, Rudinë &Vesë Kelmendi. 2018. “Women in Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Kosovo.” Kosovar
Center for Security Studies, 13-19. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236 ; Shpend
Kursani. 2018. “Western Balkans, Extremism Research Forum: Kosovo Report.” British Council, 19-22.
https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018
21Jakupi, Rudinë &Vesë Kelmendi. 2018. “Women in Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Kosovo.”
Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 23. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236
22A.S interview with returned woman from Syria and Iraq in ISIS camp, October 4, 2016.
23A total of 24 women traveled in 2013, followed by 10 in 2014. In 2015, approximately 25 women traveled.
Azinović, Vlado & Muhamed Jusić. 2015. “The Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters’ Bosnian
Contingent.” Atlantic Initiative: 32-35. https://images.derstandard.at/2015/08/06/The-Lure-of-the-Syrian-War—The-
Foreign-Fighters-Bosnian-Contingent ; Azinović, Vlado and Muhamed Jusić. 2016. “The New Lure of the Syrian
War – the Foreign Fighters’ Bosnian Contingent.” Atlantic Initiative: 28.
24Perteshi, Skender. 2018. “Journalists’ Guide: Violent Extremism Definition and Terminology.” Kosovar Center
for Security Studies, 9. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Guideline_669605_187367
25Azinović, Vlado and Muhamed Jusić. 2015. “The Lure of the Syrian War: The Foreign Fighters’ Bosnian
Contingent.” Atlantic Initiative: 35-45. https://images.derstandard.at/2015/08/06/The-Lure-of-the-Syrian-War—
The-Foreign-Fighters-Bosnian-Contingent ;
26Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. The subject of this interview is the brother of a women held in a Kurdish
Camp, “Ajnisa”- For the sake of security and anonymity, their names are not publicly available. Also her brother has
refused to be quoted by his name because of concerns regarding media reporting.
27 A.S interview with returned women from Syria and Iraq in ISIS camp. October 4, 2016.
28Jakupi, Rudinë &Vesë Kelmendi. 2018. “Women in Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Kosovo.” Kosovar
Center for Security Studies, 23. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236
29“Dështimi i planit të çiftit kosovar për sulm kamikaz kundër KFOR-it.” 2016. Telegrafi. June 11, 2016.
https://telegrafi.com/deshtimi-planit-te-ciftit-kosovar-per-sulm-kamikaz-kunder-kfor/
30Court proceeding PPS.nr25/2015, May 2015, 14.
31Analysis of the following court proceedings: PPS nr. 25/2015, May 5, 2015
32Perteshi, Skender. 2018. “Beyond the triggers: new threats of violent extremism in Kosovo.” Kosovar Center for
Security Studies, 30. http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Guideline_669605_187367
33“Adoloshentja nga Kosova arrestohet ne Austri per terrorizem.” 2018. Zeri. June 18, 2018.
http://zeri.info/kronika/203530/adoleshentja-nga-kosova-arrestohet-ne-austri-per-terrorizem/

Mbi 42 % të grave në Kosovë pranojnë dhunën në familje

https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018

https://www.britishcouncil.al/sites/default/files/erf_report_western_balkans_2018

http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236

https://kosovo.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/erf_report_kosovo_2018

http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236

https://images.derstandard.at/2015/08/06/The-Lure-of-the-Syrian-War—The-Foreign-Fighters-Bosnian-Contingent

http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Guideline_669605_187367

https://images.derstandard.at/2015/08/06/The-Lure-of-the-Syrian-War—The-Foreign-Fighters-Bosnian-Contingent

http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/women-in-ve-eng_594236

https://telegrafi.com/deshtimi-planit-te-ciftit-kosovar-per-sulm-kamikaz-kunder-kfor/

http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/Guideline_669605_187367

http://zeri.info/kronika/203530/adoleshentja-nga-kosova-arrestohet-ne-austri-per-terrorizem/

34“Adoloshentja nga Kosova arrestohet ne Austri per terrorizem.” 2018. Zeri. June 18, 2018.
http://zeri.info/kronika/203530/adoleshentja-nga-kosova-arrestohet-ne-austri-per-terrorizem/
35“Adoloshentja nga Kosova arrestohet ne Austri per terrorizem.” 2018. Zeri. June 18, 2018.
http://zeri.info/kronika/203530/adoleshentja-nga-kosova-arrestohet-ne-austri-per-terrorizem/
36Simcox, Robin. 2018. “The 2016 French Female Attack Cell: A Case Study.” CTC Sentinel 11:6.
https://ctc.usma.edu/2016-french-female-attack-cell-case-study/; Polianskaya, Alina. 2018. “Teenager Found Guilty
of Plotting Terror Attack on British Museum with UK’s First All-Woman Isis Cell.” The
Independent.https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/british-museum-terror-attack-plot-london-safaa-boular-
guilty-all-women-cell-uk-a8382736.html; Clifford, Stephanie. 2015. “Two Women in Queens Are Charged With a
Bomb Plot.” New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/nyregion/two-queens-women-charged-in-
bomb-plot.html.; Dearden, Lizzie. 2017. “Teenage Girl Jailed for Stabbing Police Officer in Germany’s First Isis-
Commissioned Attack.” The Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-terror-
attack-isis-islamic-state-hanover-train-station-police-officer-safia-s-15-teenage-a7551116.html.
37KCSS Database on Social Media- This database contains over 100 pages of extremist groups in Balkan countries,
moreover contains active profiles of individuals in the Syrian and Iraqi conflict, as well as individuals who are part
of the community and support extremist groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaida and others. Period (2015-2018)
38Example of an individual posting content in a Facebook group that is sympathetic to IS, October 15, 2018 – KCSS
Database on Social Media.
39Azinović, Vlado. 2018. “Regional Report: Understanding violent extremism in the Western Balkans.” British
Council & International Conflict and Research Institute (INCORE), 4.
tps://www.britishcouncil.al/sites/default/files/erf_report_western_balkans_2018
40Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
International Centre for the Study and Radicalization, 3. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-
From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State
41Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
International Centre for the Study and Radicalization, 3. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-
From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State
42Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
International Centre for the Study and Radicalization, 3. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-
From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State
43Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
International Centre for the Study and Radicalization, 3. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-
From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State
44Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
International Centre for the Study and Radicalization, 3. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-
From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State
45Azinović, Vlado, and Edina Bećirević. 2017. “A Waiting Game: Assessing and Responding to the Threat from
Returning Foreign Fighter.” Regional Cooperation Council. https://www.rcc.int/pubs/54/awaiting-game-assessing-
and-responding-to-the-threat-from-returning-foreign-fighters-in-the-westernbalkans
46Azinović, Vlado, and Edina Bećirević. 2017. “A Waiting Game: Assessing and Responding to the Threat from
Returning Foreign Fighter.” Regional Cooperation Council. https://www.rcc.int/pubs/54/awaiting-game-assessing-
and-responding-to-the-threat-from-returning-foreign-fighters-in-the-westernbalkans
47“Haradinaj: Gratë kosovare që shkuan në Siri kanë bërë fëmijë me komandantët e ISIS-it.” 2018. Gazeta Express.
https://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/haradinaj-grate-kosovare-qe-shkuan-ne-siri-kane-bere-femije-me-
komandatet-e-isis-it-496998/?archive=1
48Please note that researchers conducted an interview with the brother of a woman who was held in “Anjnisa,” a
Kurdish camp. Although the woman is called “Nesa” in this article, their real names will not be shared publicly for
security reasons. The woman’s brother also wanted to keep their name anonymous because of concerns regarding
media reporting. (Interview with B.A, September 26, 2018.)
49Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
50Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
51Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
52Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
53Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
54Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
55Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)

http://zeri.info/kronika/203530/adoleshentja-nga-kosova-arrestohet-ne-austri-per-terrorizem/

https://ctc.usma.edu/2016-french-female-attack-cell-case-study/

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/british-museum-terror-attack-plot-london-safaa-boular-guilty-all-women-cell-uk-a8382736.html

https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-terror-attack-isis-islamic-state-hanover-train-station-police-officer-safia-s-15-teenage-a7551116.html

https://www.britishcouncil.al/sites/default/files/erf_report_western_balkans_2018

https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State

https://www.rcc.int/pubs/54/awaiting-game-assessing-and-responding-to-the-threat-from-returning-foreign-fighters-in-the-westernbalkans

https://www.gazetaexpress.com/lajme/haradinaj-grate-kosovare-qe-shkuan-ne-siri-kane-bere-femije-me-komandatet-e-isis-it-496998/?archive=1

56Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
57Interview with B.A September 26, 2018. (The brother of a woman held in the Kurdish Camp “Ajnisa”)
58Sahak, Abdul Matin. 2018. “’Horrors that can’t be told’: Afghan women report Islamic State rapes.” Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-rape/horrors-that-cant-be-told-afghan-women-report-
islamic-state-rapes-idUSKBN1KK0WG.
59A.S interview with returned woman from Syria and Iraq in ISIS camp. October 4, 2016.
60Security Council: Counter Terrorism-Committee, “Role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism”
https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/womens-role/; Security Council, Counter Terrorism- Committee,
https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11219 .htm
61Strategy on prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation leading to terrorism 2015-2020, Prishtina,
September 2015 http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGJIA_parandalim_-_SHQIP
62Strategy on prevention of violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism 2015-2020, Prishtina,
September 2015 http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGJIA_parandalim_-_SHQIP

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-islamic-state-rape/horrors-that-cant-be-told-afghan-women-report-islamic-state-rapes-idUSKBN1KK0WG

https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/womens-role/

https://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11219 .htm

http://www.kryeministri-ks.net/repository/docs/STRATEGJIA_parandalim_-_SHQIP

How Women Advance the Internationalization of the Far-Right

Julia Ebner and Jacob Davey
Julia Ebner is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and author of the bestselling book The
Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism. On the basis of her research, which focuses on
cumulative extremism and far-right extremism, she regularly advises parliamentary working groups, frontline workers
and tech firms. Before joining ISD, she spent two years working for the world’s first counter-extremism organization
Quilliam, where she carried out research projects on terrorism prevention for the European Commission and the Kofi
Annan Foundation and gave evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee.

Jacob Davey is a Research Manager at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue where he leads on research into the far-
right, and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right. His research focuses on the role of digital
communications in inter-communal conflict, internet culture, and international far-right. He has advised national and
local policymakers on right-wing extremism, including the Home Affairs Select Committee, and regularly provides
commentary on extremism-related issues in a number of platforms including The Guardian, The Independent, and The
BBC.

Traditional Gender Roles in Extreme-Right Movements

In 2016, an image of a young Scottish woman wearing the runic insignia of the Schutzstaffel while
performing Hitler salute made global headlines as National Action, a British far-right terrorist
organization, crowned her “Miss Hitler” in the organization’s beauty pageant. According to
National Action, the purpose of the event was to raise awareness of their female supporters, who
“rarely get much spotlight or recognition.”1 In statements promoting the event, the group said,
“We hope this will grant a unique insight into our movement that will challenge the widely held
preconceptions society has about the far-right.”2

Women are traditionally underrepresented in neo-Nazi movements. When thousands of white
supremacists took to the streets in the 2016 “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia,
few female faces were visible among the protestors. However, while many militant movements
remain predominantly male, the far-right landscape is currently in the process of flux. Women are
becoming increasingly important as broadcasters, dramatically amplifying messages across the
spectrum of worldviews that comprise the international far-right, ranging from European cultural
supremacists and anti-Muslim activists, to the United States alt-right, to more traditional neo-Nazi
and Skinhead groups.

As the specter of internationalized right-wing extremists continues to grow, the success of women
in the virtual sphere becomes particularly problematic, with these broadcasters often serving as a
soft introduction to hard edge ideology, facilitating the ‘redpilling’ of individuals who are
vulnerable to radicalization.

The past two decades have seen a sharp increase in the number of female supporters of far-right
movements and the creation of many female-centered groups.3 In 1999, the Southern Poverty Law
Center concluded that the Internet gave rise to a number of newly emerging female-led white
supremacist websites, as sympathizing women were carving out their own niches in the digital
space.4 The age of social media, viral selfies, and online guerilla marketing has further accelerated
this dynamic and made women a key asset in the branding and outreach strategies of extremist
movements.

The rapid growth in the number of female far-right supporters demonstrates that women are not
immune to racist mindsets and more broadly extremist ideologies, which hold contempt for human
nature.5 A recent study conducted by Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung even concluded that women are
more susceptible to xenophobic, racist and anti-Muslim attitudes than men and equally prone to
ingroup-outgroup thinking.6 Likewise, a survey conducted in 2016 showed that women had a
significantly higher tendency to privilege the rights of native Europeans than men and were slightly
more inclined to sympathize with “new right attitudes.”7

Today, women are seen on the frontlines of protest marches and act as the public faces of extreme-
right social media campaigns. University of Pittsburgh scholar Kathleen Blee, who conducted
ethnographic studies and traced the evolution of female participation in the Ku Klux Klan,
concluded that women have increasingly become the target of white supremacist recruitment
campaigns.8 The widespread presence of women in far-right movements has played a significant
role in the mainstreaming and normalization of white nationalist, anti-migration and anti-Muslim
views. Female social media influencers have helped to generate millions of views and media
attention for far-right causes, and these figureheads are becoming more and more important in the
internationalization of the far-right, using their influence to market extreme right-wing ideology
to audiences across the Western world. Despite the increasingly prominent role of women, gender
remains a heavily contested issue in the far-right space; for instance, female figureheads often have
to negotiate their identity within a hyper-masculine ecosystem.

Hyper-Masculinity, Male and Female Anti-Feminism and Alt-Right Counter-Culture

The Gamergate Controversy is the name given to a prolonged organized harassment campaign in
August 2014, which was waged by a loose connection of trolls organizing across online platforms
such as Reddit and 4chan and targeted women in the video-game industry.9 The event was initially
sparked by a blog-post written by Eron Gjoni attacking his former girlfriend, independent game
maker Zoe Quinn, and is seen by many to be a crucial junction in the formulation of the alt-right,
helping to launch the careers of figureheads such as Milo Yiannopoulus, whilst providing political
realization to communities of online trolls.10 As a result of this, a counter-cultural backlash against
feminism was cemented as an ideological cornerstone of the alt-right. It also meant that the
pushback against progressivism became a valuable recruiting tool for young white men who feel
alienated by mainstream liberal culture both online and on campuses. This left vs. right divide
mirrors the cumulative radicalization process which has been observed between Islamist and far-
right groups.11

Against this backdrop, masculinity– a long established trait among extremist groups – has grown
as a core component in the way emergent far-right communities broker their identity against
mainstream culture. By fetishizing physical strength and traditional family values, the
contemporary far-right embraces conventional notions of masculinity and uses narratives around
the reclamation of masculinity as an important recruitment tool.12 In contrast to this perspective,
weak masculinity is identified as a defining trait of progressive culture, with tropes of cuckoldry
and effeminacy being used to ridicule left-wing men. One interesting, yet bizarre, example of this
is the so-called ‘soy boy’ meme, which associates progressive men with the consumption of soy
products, and the consumption of soy products with raised levels of estrogen.13

Within this context, a new wave of women are situating themselves within the movement, leading
to the growth of communities such as the ‘Tradwives,’ who see the rejection of feminism as a key
component in ‘redpilling’ (the alt-right’s term for radicalization), a trend which mirrors the
empowerment that western women joining the Islamic State felt through embracing traditional
gender roles.14 In particular, women identify the apparent un-yielding orthodoxy and hostile
atmosphere against conservatives from contemporary feminist culture as being driving factors for
their radicalization.15 As prominent far-right influencer Lauren Southern summarizes, “I believe
anyone who supports feminism is anti-woman even if they are not conscious of it.”16

By embracing this anti-feminist stance, individual women have found an effective mechanism to
advertise their radicalism. Doing so in an overt way appears to guide the trajectory of several
figureheads. Lauren Southern provides a notable example of this trend, starting her activist career
by publically campaigning against feminism, promoting a campaign called #TheTriggering, which
was designed to provoke feminist activists.17 Controversy has been crucial in driving digital
celebrity,18 and by embracing such a contentious topic, Southern’s fame rocketed, providing her
with a platform from which to broaden international support for far-right ideology.

One of the key drivers behind the contemporary trend for internationalization, which can be
observed in the far-right, is the creation of an active counter-culture which pushes back against the
mainstream liberalism which, until recently, has united the Western world. By identifying common
enemies in the form of institutions like the mass media, and out-groups including both Muslims,
non-whites, and feminists, European and North American far right communities construct a shared
world-view, which proves effective in attracting large-scale global support.19 The crucial power
of this counter-culture lies in the assertion of its radical difference from the status quo. Here it is
suggested that the rejection of feminism, something which is cast as sacred to many is, through its
overt and innate controversy, one of the most effective ways of establishing the international far-
right as an alternative to the contemporary order.

Generation Identity’s Influencers and the Hijacking of #MeToo

As part of the far-right’s effort to mainstream this new counter-culture, the past few years have
seen white nationalist recruiters and propagandists in Europe and the U.S. step up their efforts to
reach out to female audiences. Women have become powerful amplifiers of their rhetoric and can
be seen as part of a larger attempt by far-right movements to rebrand themselves as modern
versions of patriotic, Identitarian rebellion that have little in common with traditional neo-Nazi
movements.

The pan-European white nationalist movement Generation Identity was originally founded in the
South of France and often described as the European alt-right equivalent. Generation Identity

proactively tries to recruit young white women into their networks by playing on widespread fears
of rape and sexual harassment committed by migrant communities, and by framing themselves as
the only defenders of women’s rights. At the same time, Generation Identity’s Handbook for
Media Guerilla Warfare recommends targeting “young women, who come straight from
university” in online intimidation campaigns. The Handbook elaborates, noting, “These are classic
victims and not used to being confronted. You can usually easily take the piss out of them.”20

In the summer of 2017, Generation Identity started its controversial #DefendEurope campaign,
attempting to prevent NGOs from rescuing drowning migrants in the Mediterranean. An original
analysis of the #DefendEurope hashtag showed that female influencers were decisive for the
campaign’s global reach. Between May and September 2017, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue’s
social media monitors identified roughly 300,000 supportive tweets, coming from all across
Europe and North America. Prominent American YouTuber Brittany Pettibone, Canadian activist
Lauren Southern, and British commentator Katie Hopkins were all key in the dissemination of
campaign contents to audiences in their respective home countries.21

Brittany Pettibone, who is now engaged to the European figurehead of Generation Identity, Martin
Sellner, plays a vital role in bridging the gap between Europe and North America. Since founding
the podcast “Virtue of the West” with the white supremacist vlogger Tara McCarthy, Pettibone
has become a prominent figure among the U.S. alt-right. On Twitter, Pettibone describes herself
as ‘Barbie Fiancé,’ and draws over 135,000 followers. Pettibone’s YouTube channel features
videos of her talking to her twin sister about topics such as ‘Why is Dating Becoming So
Difficult,’22 ‘Women Are Losing Their Femininity’ and ‘Women Want Love, Men Want Respect?’
attract more than 100,000 subscribers. Videos like these make traditional gender constructs that
are popular among the far right more accessible to a general audience. White and male supremacist
organizations may take advantage of this effect, and strategically use women to soften their image
and make regressive values appear normal and even attractive.

Other prominent women
that Generation Identity uses as influencers for the movement’s campaigns include Berit Franziska
and Franziska M. They both featured as the main public faces of Generation Identity’s initiative
#120dB, which stood under the motto “women defend yourselves” and was labeled as the far-
right’s #metoo equivalent.

The following analysis of the campaign was created using the social listening tool Crimson
Hexagon to examine all Tweets which used the hashtag #120db between February and April 2018.
Nearly 300,000 tweets with the hashtag #120db were identified in that period. The graphic below
visualizes the words that were most commonly used in conjunction with #120db. It illustrates that
the campaign hijacked the #metoo hashtag as well as spreading anti-Islam messages and campaign
against migrant rape crimes. The #120db hashtag was also paired with hashtags used in the context
of campaigns for the empowerment of women such as #frauengegengewalt
(#womenagainstviolence). It is notable that despite this focus on women’s rights, about 67 percent
of the tweets using the hashtag #120db originated from male accounts.23

#120dB originally started as an unbranded, seemingly independent campaign, but was soon
exposed as a communications operation initiated by Generation Identity. The group framed the
campaign as a female-led initiative against acts of sexual violence targeting women, but only
highlighted rape crimes committed by migrants and refugees. It instrumentalized white female
victimhood to fuel anti-Muslim and xenophobic sentiments and positioned itself as a counter-
movement to #metoo. Even though Generation Identity had long been among the loudest anti-
feminist voices in Europe, the movement has managed to co-opt the topic of women’s rights for
the sake of denouncing foreign cultures in Europe.

Far-right activists have increasingly been able to capitalize on victimhood narratives that put white
women at the center of their propaganda about the threats experienced in multicultural societies,
whilst at the same time advocating fundamentally backward gender perceptions and a return to
traditional power relations between men and women. For example, the prominent British far-right
activist and founder of the English Defense League, Tommy Robinson, used migrant rape crimes
and oppression of women in Islam to paint all Muslims as potential rapists and a threat to white,
non-Muslim women. Yet, extremist groups tend to converge rhetorically in their calls for
protecting in-group women from aggression by out-group men in order to fuel anger and hatred
against the perceived enemy. Their traditionalist perceptions of gender roles and claims of
ownership over women are, however, reflected in their language. For example, many counter-jihad

accounts warn that Islam destroys “our women, our country, our sense of right and wrong and our
lives,”24 claim that the “U.K. police let Muslim gangs rape our girls” or argue that they won’t let
migrants “treat our women as easy meat.”25

Conclusive Discussion and Policy Considerations

As this piece demonstrates, a range of factors drive female involvement in contemporary far-right
movements. These include a fragility of feminine identity, reaction against the abuse of women,
and a backlash against contemporary progressive ideology and feminism. Although these issues
remain understudied, policymakers and practitioners can use this information to further develop
measures to prevent and counter extremism with strategic communications and counter-
radicalization intervention programming.

Greater attention could be paid to perceived hostility in contemporary feminist circles and the
potential this has for polarization. It is clear that the anti-feminist ideology of the contemporary
far-right has its roots in deeply ingrained misogyny and a culture of hegemonic masculinity.
However, in an oxymoronic trend, this anti-feminist ideology is proving effective in the
recruitment of women to far-right causes. A number of women identifying with far-right groups
highlight conflict with feminists and hostility towards conservatives as being driving causes for
their radicalization. Accordingly, it is suggested that further attention is paid to the apparent lack
of civil discourse in spaces for women.

Counter-strategy should focus on the apparent hypocrisy of contemporary far-right ideology. This
paper demonstrates the inherently misogynistic context within which contemporary far-right
gender politics has evolved. Even if women find empowerment through the rejection of
progressive conceptions of feminism this empowerment is nevertheless at odds with the overt and
rampant misogyny which is held by the contemporary far-right. Furthermore, even if a small
number of women rise to prominence within the movement and gain respect for their actions, most
women operating within far-right circles are simultaneously marginalized and denigrated by the
groups that claim to protect them. By publicly highlighting this fact in messaging, strategic
communicators can possibly weaken the narrative of anti-feminist far-right activists.

Women are increasingly essential to the global far-right, especially as effective figureheads who
use controversy to broadcast extreme-right wing ideology to potential recruits. As this paper
shows, the pathways of women into these movements are multifaceted and triggered by a range of
grievances. Intervention programs that focus on deradicalization from extremist ideology and
disengagement from extremist groups are a crucial tool in the push-back against extremism.
Ultimately, the most effective interventions rely on an in-depth understanding of the motivations
behind radicalization and recruitment. Consequently, relevant stakeholders should do more to
research the trends outlined above and use the gathered information to develop interventions
designed to engage women in the far-right.

The growing pool of female recruits is a tremendous asset to far-right groups that seek to bolster
their image and movement. As these groups continue to expand this will remain a pressing issue,
with women serving in valuable roles within movements, both at an ideological and a practical
level. Organizations within the far-right regularly frame white women as the victims of aggression
to rationalize radical action and justify women’s need for protection. Although these organizations
marginalize and subordinate most of their female members, some women social media influencers
and activists undoubtedly help generate massive amounts of media attention and enhance the

appeal of the far-right. By acting as an accessible and enticing part of fringe groups, these women
help normalize misogynistic gender dynamics, as well as xenophobic and racist ideologies.

In recent years, the migration crisis has sparked new anxieties and grievances that extremist
movements have skillfully leveraged to recruit women into their circles. By fueling women’s fears
of sexual crimes committed by migrants and denouncing the authorities as being inactive or even
complicit, the organizations frame themselves as the sole protectors of women’s rights.
Additionally, traditionally male-oriented agendas of the far-right have been repackaged as
reconcilable with female interests, now making an appealing offer to women searching for clear
gender roles in an increasingly fast-paced culture. By playing on female identity crisis in an age
of what Brittany Pettibone refers to as “hook up culture” or the “Tinder age,” deeply misogynistic
movements sell a return to traditional power structures as a step towards empowerment.
Furthermore, the rejection of a feminist status quo has proven essential in the establishment of far-
right ideology as a radical alternative to mainstream ideology, proving an effective recruitment
mechanism for both men and women.

The contemporary growth of far-right ideology is an issue of pressing concern. However, without
a clear understanding of the role gender dynamics have played in the creation and dissemination
of extremist ideology; the mobilization of activists; and the ideological rejection of the liberal
status quo, it will be difficult to effectively counter this threat. Most importantly, there is a need
for greater knowledge around the role women are playing – actively or passively – in the ongoing
culture wars which the far-right are propagating, and to turn this knowledge into effective counter-
measures.

Citations

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https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/01/gamergate-alt-right-hate-trump; Nagle, Angela. 2017. “Kill
all normies: online culture wars from 4chan and tumblr to Trump and the alt-right.” Zero Books.
11Ebner, Julia. 2017. The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism, I.B. Tauris.
12Mudde, Cas. 2018. “Why is the far right dominated by men?” The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/17/why-is-the-far-right-dominated-by-men
13Davey, Jacob, Erin Saltman and Jonathan Birdwell. 2017. “The mainstreaming of far-right extremism online and
how to counter it.” Trumping the Mainstream: The conquest of democratic politics by the populist radical right;
Hosie, Rachel. 2017. “Soy Boy: what is this new online insult used by the far right?” The Independent.
https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/soy-boy-insult-what-is-definition-far-right-men-masculinity-women-
a8027816.html
14Saltman, Erin and Melanie Smith. 2015. “‘Till martyrdom do us part’ Gender and the ISIS phenomenon.” Institute
for Strategic Dialogue. http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon .
15Bruce, Nicola. 2018. “From feminism to the red pill.” The Mantle. http://www.mantlethought.org/other/feminism-
red-pill.
16See for example https://www.reddit.com/r/The_Donald/comments/4zlf89/lauren_southern_ama/d6wtbfx/
17Lachenal, Jessica. 2016. “Internet jerks pledge to make internet even worse in #TheTriggering.”
https://www.themarysue.com/the-triggering-is-dumb/
18Kagan, Noah. 2017. “Why content goes viral: what analyzing 100 million articles taught us.” Huffington Post.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/noah-kagan/why-content-goes-viral-wh_b_5492767.html.
19Davey, Jacob and Julia Ebner. 2017. “The Fringe Insurgency: connectivity, convergence and mainstreaming of the
extreme right.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-fringe-insurgency-
connectivity-convergence-and-mainstreaming-of-the-extreme-right/.
20The original ‘redpilling’ manual was available at http://d-gen.de/2017/10/art-of-redpilling/, all contents were saved
by Hogesatzbau and can be accessed at https://www.hogesatzbau.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/HANDBUCH-
FÜR-MEDIENGUERILLAS .
21Davey, Jacob and Julia Ebner. 2018. “The Fringe Insurgency: connectivity, convergence and mainstreaming of the
extreme right.” Institute for Strategic Dialogue. https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-fringe-insurgency-
connectivity-convergence-and-mainstreaming-of-the-extreme-right/.
22See for example https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oDYQvAp6Ao4
23 Almost half (46 percent) of the 130,000 tweets came from accounts with an identifiable gender.
24See for example
https://www.therebel.media/tommy_robinson_first_justice_for_chelsey_march_was_just_the_start
25See for example https://twitter.com/DAYFORFREEDOM4/status/1041683411310718976/video/1

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/01/gamergate-alt-right-hate-trump

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/aug/17/why-is-the-far-right-dominated-by-men

https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/soy-boy-insult-what-is-definition-far-right-men-masculinity-women-a8027816.html

http://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Till_Martyrdom_Do_Us_Part_Gender_and_the_ISIS_Phenomenon

http://www.mantlethought.org/other/feminism-red-pill

https://www.themarysue.com/the-triggering-is-dumb/

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/noah-kagan/why-content-goes-viral-wh_b_5492767.html

The Fringe Insurgency – Connectivity, Convergence and Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right

http://d-gen.de/2017/10/art-of-redpilling/

https://www.hogesatzbau.de/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/HANDBUCH-F%C3%9CR-MEDIENGUERILLAS

The Fringe Insurgency – Connectivity, Convergence and Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right

https://www.therebel.media/tommy_robinson_first_justice_for_chelsey_march_was_just_the_start

https://twitter.com/DAYFORFREEDOM4/status/1041683411310718976/video/1

The Changing Roles of Women in Violent Islamist Groups

Devorah Margolin
Devorah Margolin is a Senior Research Analyst at Combating Jihadist Terrorism in the UK (CoJiT-UK), a Research
Fellow at the Centre for Policy Studies and a PhD Candidate in the Department of War Studies, King’s College
London. Her PhD focuses on gender in relation to violent Islamist organizations. Devorah has published in Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism and CTC Sentinel, written for Newsweek and Haaretz, and is a contributor to the BBC. Prior to
attending King’s College London, Devorah was a Researcher at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT)
and served as the ICT Internship Coordinator. Additionally, she has served as an Associate Editor on the ICT Working
Paper Series editorial board and as Senior Editor of Strife Journal in the Department of War Studies, King’s College
London.

Introduction

An increased focus on the participation of women in violent Islamism1 has not ended
misconceptions plaguing Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policies2 and questions remain
about the threat posed by women associated with violent Islamist groups.3 Ill-informed perceptions
of women’s contributions to these movements can have serious ramifications, including deferential
treatment in courts, insufficient intervention programming, and failure to disrupt the next wave of
women involved in violent-Islamist inspired activity. While it is important to understand the
motivations of women participating in violent Islamist movements, it is also critical to recognize
the ideology of the organizations they join. A better comprehension of this phenomenon helps
policymakers and practitioners anticipate new and evolving threats concerning women in violent
extremism.

Conventionally speaking, Islamism seeks to create a political order defined by Islam, specifically
in the form of a Sharia-based state.4 While institutional Islamists strive to create a Sharia-based
state through the existing political system, violent Islamists attempt to create such a state by any
means necessary, including acts of violence.5 While all violent Islamist groups desire a society
ruled by Sharia law, they differ significantly over the interpretation and implementation of Sharia
law as well as what constitutes appropriate uses of violence. Strategic and ideological differences
exist between global jihadi groups like the Islamic State and other violent Islamist groups such as

Hamas

.6 For example, groups like Hamas believe in “revolution from below,” which pushes for
change by gathering support through da’wa7 and taking part in local politics. On the other hand,
global jihadi groups like the Islamic State seek “change from above” while breaking – or even
destroying – the political status quo.8

Focusing on the strategic logic and communication tools used by violent Islamists allows for an
understanding of the tactics different groups use to recruit both men and women. While some
preliminary research on authoritarian institutions suggests that an entity’s relationship with women
can be an indicator of stability and the future success of the group, more scholarship is necessary
to understand if such dynamics manifest in violent extremist groups.9 Perhaps studying the
evolution of an organization’s relationship with women, and the group’s gendered narratives, can
help to highlight the direction of the organization and its future success.

This paper seeks to forecast the potential threat from women by looking at different violent Islamist
groups and examining their rhetorical shifts concerning women’s roles in combat. In order to do

this, this paper will first look at the historical relationship between violent Islamist ideology and
women. Next, this paper will look at Hamas and the Islamic State as case studies, both before and
after they became governing actors, to showcase that across groups of Islamist persuasion,
women’s roles tend to be dynamic and shaped by a range of factors. Finally, this paper will show
that when violent Islamist groups break from convention, they open the doors to female
participation in violence.

Violent Islamist Ideology and Women

In violent Islamist ideology, traditional gender roles are central, with women encouraged to remain
in the private sphere, the home, or in supporting roles. These groups do not see themselves as
trivializing women’s roles; rather, they emphasize the importance of returning to and upholding
conventional women’s roles in the family, support network, and as educators of the next
generation.10

Violent Islamist groups have consistently struggled with determining the appropriate role for
women within their ranks. Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood member, and one of the chief
ideologues of early al-Qaeda, Abduallah Azzam, opened the doors to debates on women and jihad.
In his book, Defense of the Muslim Lands, Azzam argued that defensive jihad was an individual
duty for all Muslims when Muslim lands were under attack11; under these conditions, Azzam
suggested that a wife could participate “without the permission of her husband.”12 Later, in his
1987 book Join the Caravan, Azzam reiterated women’s duty to carry out defensive jihad, but
stipulated that “Arab women may not come without a non-marriageable male guardian (mahram).
Their duties are confined to education, nursing, and assisting refugees. As for fighting, Arab
women may not fight because until now, Afghan women are not participating in the fighting.”13
While open to having women play a greater role in public life, Azzam was unwilling to give
women explicit permission to fight.

Sayyed Imam Al-Sharif, also known as ‘Abd al-Qadir bin ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and Dr. Fadl, was a former
mentor to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Sharif reiterated women’s duty to carry out
defensive jihad, but added: “[f]or this reason, women can receive basic training so they can be
prepared to repel their attackers.”14 Yusuf al-‘Ayyiri, an ideological leader of al-Qaeda in Saudi
Arabia15 killed in 2003, took this a step further in The Role of Women in the Jihad against Enemies,
where he wrote about contemporary women fighters and also emphasized that jihad was defensive
and a personal duty in the current time, giving women permission to carry out jihad.16

While ideologues of violent Islamism were not actively encouraging women to participate in jihad,
it is interesting to note that they were also unwilling to condemn the women who did engage in
violence.17 For example, after the June 2000 attack by the first female suicide bomber in Chechnya,
Hawa Barayev, Yusuf al-‘Ayyiri issued a fatwa titled Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Self
Sacrifice (Martyrdom) Operations.18 Though calling her “the great Mujāhidah, Hawwā’ Barayev,”
the document ruminated on the permissibility of martyrdom operations in general but did not focus
on women and jihad. Another example of this mixed-signaling was Ayman al-Zawahiri’s speech
in November 2010, titled “Who Will Support Scientist Aafia Siddiqui?”19 Coinciding with the trial
of Aafia Siddiqui, a woman convicted of attempting to kill U.S. employees in Afghanistan,
Zawahiri’s speech praised Siddiqui’s actions but did not call for other women to follow her lead.

Groups like Hamas and the Islamic State have tried to reconcile the differences between their
radical Islamist ideology and the practical role that women play in their organizations. While both
groups have Islamist roots, the divide between national-Islamist groups like Hamas, and global
jihadi groups like the Islamic State, remains vast. Nevertheless, each of these groups has broken
from convention and encouraged women to take up arms, at least rhetorically, but only under
specific circumstances and for limited periods of time.

Hamas

Hamas emerged as a wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian arena in 1987, seeking to
fight not only against Israel, but against non-Islamist forms of governance. While Hamas saw
women’s roles as being limited to the private sphere, several key events, including ongoing
struggles with Israel and other Palestinian groups, created policy changes on women’s involvement
in jihad and resistance.

In Hamas’ 1988 charter, articles 17 and 18 state that women are vital to the dissemination of their
ideology. After calling Muslim women the “maker of men,” the charter notes that women play
“the most important role in looking after the family, rearing the children and imbuing them with
moral values and thoughts derived from Islam.”20

From 1993 and 2000, increased counter-measures by Israeli forces made it so 30 percent of
Palestinian male suicide bombers were caught before carrying out their attacks.21 Due to the
perception of women as less violent, Palestinian women were able to have greater freedom of
movement and access to potential targets. In this climate, Palestinian groups, including Hamas,
were aware of women’s strategic and operational advantages and leveraged women as a way to
circumvent detection and carry out attacks.

In the 2000s, Hamas’ initial stance towards women as solely wives and mothers began to shift. In
2001, Ahlam Mazen Al-Tamimi was arrested for her supporting role in the bombing of a Sbarro
restaurant in Jerusalem.22 On Hamas’ own Al-Qassam website, the organization praised Al-
Tamimi and called her “the first female member in Al Qassam Brigades, the military wing of
Hamas.” 23

In January 2002, Wafa Idris became the first Palestinian female suicide bomber in Israel, carrying
out an attack for Fatah, Hamas’ main rival. While acknowledging women’s practical roles in
violence, Hamas continued to refuse to allow female suicide bombers but also suggested that there
was room for future female participation. As an example of this position, Sheikh Yassin, a spiritual
leader of Hamas, argued:

At the present stage, we do not need women to bear this burden of jihad and
martyrdom…meanwhile, women have no military organization in the framework of the
[Islamic] movement. When such an organization arises, it will be possible to discuss wide-
scale recruitment of women.24

In February 2002, Darin Abu Aisheh became the second Palestinian female suicide bomber,
conducting an operation for Fatah. However, she initially sought to carry out the attack in the name
of Hamas, before the organization told Aisheh, “your duty is not [to] be a suicide bomber, your
duty is to take care of children.”25

In March 2003, Yusuf al Qaradawi, Dean of Islamic Studies at the University of Qatar, noted
women’s strategic advantage in carrying out attacks and reiterated Azzam’s argument that
defensive jihad was incumbent on all, men and women.26 Hamas took this ruling very seriously,
and Qaradawi’s fatwa regarding jihad as an obligation for all was still cited on the Hamas’ Al-
Qassam website as recently as 25 June 2018.27

Three key factors forced Hamas to re-evaluate its policy regarding female suicide bombers. First,
increased strategic restraints on men (such as age restrictions upon entering Jerusalem). Second,
successful female suicide attacks by both Fatah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Third, outside
religious justifications such as those by Qaradawi.

In 2004, Reem Riyashi became Hamas’ first female suicide bomber.28 While Hamas claimed the
attack and praised Riyashi, the group also continued to emphasize that its use of women was only
a strategic necessity. In 2005, Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zurhi said: “The Palestinian resistance,
at times, purposely uses women in some operations that men cannot carry out, especially in high-
security areas, which male Palestinian Mujahideen cannot easily reach. This is why the Palestinian
woman has an important role in the Palestinian resistance, and at times she may even have roles
that the young male Palestinian Mujaheed cannot fulfill.”29 In this context, Hamas did not
encourage women to take up arms or carry out attacks unilaterally, but rather, condoned women’s
participation in only limited circumstances.

In January 2006, under the “Change and Reform” block, Hamas won a majority of the seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council, outmaneuvering its biggest electoral rival, Fatah. In June 2007,
relations broke down, and Hamas has since been the de-facto ruler of the Gaza Strip. Between
2002 and 2006, there were nine Palestinian female suicide bombers, two which carried out attacks
for Hamas. Hamas’ assumption of electoral power was accompanied by a drop in female suicide
attacks, with the last female suicide bomber carrying out her attack in 2006, just months after
Hamas won power.30

A new wave of violence in the Palestinian arena occurred between 2015 and 2016 mostly
consisting of low-intensity stabbing and shooting attacks.31 This period was marked by higher rates
of female participation, with women carrying out 27 of the 170 attacks (or 15.8 percent).32 During
this period, Hamas released several statements across their social media platforms articulating the
organization’s support for women who conducted violence.33 While Hamas spoke encouragingly
of the women who took up arms, the group itself did not seem to be organizing these women.

Recently, in May 2017, Hamas updated its charter, noting that “[t]he role of Palestinian women is
fundamental in the process of building the present and the future, just as it has always been in the
process of making Palestinian history. It is a pivotal role in the project of resistance, liberation and
building the political system.”34 While not clarifying if resistance is ideological or physical,

Hamas’ new charter clearly encourages women to assume a more active role in public life and
politics.

Islamic State

The Islamic State, which declared its so-called Caliphate in 2014, emerged out of the ashes of al-
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Crucially, the Islamic State differed from its predecessor AQI over the use
of female suicide bombers; AQI regularly used female suicide bombers and combatants in their
operations. However, the connections between AQI and the Islamic State cannot be
underestimated because, despite its numerous name changes, the organization at its core remains
the same.35 It is therefore necessary to go back and look at AQI and the practical experiences that
led to the Islamic State’s rhetorical evolution on women in combat.36

In early 2004, AQI leader Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi released a message titled “Follow the Caravan,”
where he stated: “The war has broken out and the caller to Jihad has called for it, and the doors of
the heavens have opened, if you don’t want to be [one] of the knights, then make room for the
women to commence, and take the eyeliner O you women with turbans and beards, if not then to
the horses and here are the reins and shackles.”37 Although this was not an unbridled call for
women to participate in jihad, Zarqawi was reminding his followers that defensive jihad is
incumbent on all to fight, which was especially pertinent considering the influx of foreign military
forces accompanying the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Months before AQI’s first female bomber conducted an attack, Zarqawi released another message
titled, “Will the Religion Wane While I Live” (2005).38 He unambiguously discussed the role of
women in jihad, referring to the precedent set by Umm Amarah, a female companion of the Prophet
Muhammad and noted that there are “many mujahidah sisters in the Land of the Two Rivers [Iraq]
who are requesting to perpetrate martyrdom-seeking operations.” In this announcement, Zarqawi
foreshadowed AQI’s systematic use of female suicide bombers.

In April 2007, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, a successor of Zarqawi,39 released a statement titled “The
Harvest of the Years in the Land of the Monotheists.”40 Highlighting violent Islamist groups
reluctance to give women unchecked permission to carry out acts of jihad, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi
said, “[e]ven Iraqi women were pleading for martyrdom operations, but we forbade them from
what men can do unless it is in special circumstances where men are unable to. Oh, what anguish,
for those whom [sic] were less brave than women.” 41 This speech pinpoints the struggle faced by
violent Islamic groups over the use of women in combat roles by both shaming men into action
and allowing for women’s participation under ‘special circumstances.’

The surge of female suicide bombers peaked in 2008, partially due to operational pressures on the
group, including coalition forces.42 At the turn of the decade, however, the organization seemingly
stopped using female suicide bombers. Although the organization did not formally state that
women were not supposed to engage in violence, it seemed as though the operational necessity
that led to their involvement began to dissipate with the slow withdrawal of U.S. military troops.
In other words, women’s participation in suicide attacks were, in all appearances, a pragmatic
decision, and the organization’s ideological stance could conform accordingly.

In June 2014, at the height of its power, the Islamic State declared its so-called Caliphate. Unlike
its predecessor AQI, the Islamic State framed its jihad as offensive, not defensive, and used its
magazines Dabiq, and later Rumiyah, to consistently encourage women to return to conventional
roles and be wives, mothers, and educators. In Dabiq issue 7, there was even a dedicated section
in the magazine titled “to our sisters,” which encouraged women to “[b]e a base of support and
safety for your husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons.”43

August 2014 also heralded the start of the military offensive against the Islamic State by coalition
forces. In early 2015, an organization alleging to be the media wing of ISIS’s all-female al-Khansa
Brigade released a manifesto articulating the ideal role of women in the Caliphate, as first and
foremost wives, mothers, and homemakers. However, the manifesto also acknowledged several
exceptions, including allowing women to provide medical care or teach. It even stated that under
very specific circumstances, there were cases where women could participate in combat, “if the
enemy is attacking her country, the men are not enough to protect it, and the ulama have given a
fatwa for it.”44 The document provided the legal authority for women to commit violence within
the framework of defensive jihad, while noting that those conditions were not yet met.

Between 2015 to 2016, the Islamic State continued to release several documents which began to
tease out women’s roles in combat, while simultaneously emphasizing that women were only
allowed to participate in jihad under very particular, defensive circumstances. The group reiterated
these points in Dabiq issue 11 (2015) and Dabiq issue 15 (2016),45 as well as by the Zawra’
Foundation, a female-focused pro-IS media agency, in 2015.46 In December 2016, the Islamic
State’s Arabic-language newspaper, al-Naba, argued that “jihad is not, as a rule, an obligation for
women, but let the female Muslim know as well that if the enemy enters her abode, jihad is just as
necessary for her as it is for the man, and she should repel him by whatever means possible.”47
The Islamic State continued to echo the teachings of Azzam and Zawahiri, that women can only
participate in combat in defensive actions.

While not actively encouraging women to participate in combat, the Islamic State has praised or
spoken ambivalently about women who carried out operations. Specifically, this trend speaks
mostly to women who operated beyond the organization’s territory and control. In February 2015
Sajida al-Rishawi, a failed AQI suicide bomber who was arrested in Jordan in 2005, was praised
by the Islamic State, who demanded her release from a Jordanian prison in exchange for the lives
of two hostages.48 After the 2015 San Bernardino attack, the Islamic State, while praising the attack
and actions of Tashfeen Malik to join her husband and leave behind a child for the sake of jihad,
refrained from referring to her as one of its “soldiers.”49 And finally, in 2016 when three young
women attacked a police station in Kenya, its celebration was only tentative, noting these women
“shoulder[ed] a duty that Allah had placed on the shoulders of the men of the Ummah.”50 Despite
not wanting women to actively take up arms, the Islamic State did not condemn these women for
their actions. This contradiction highlights the Islamic State’s uneasy relationship with women and
combat.

In 2017, the Islamic State began to incur significant territorial losses, including losing Mosul to
the Iraqi government in July 2017. These losses shifted the Islamic State from the offensive to the
defensive. In response to these new realities, the Islamic State has seemingly made a point to
change its rhetoric, as evidenced in an article published in Rumiyah 11 (2017), entitled “Our

Journey to Allah.” While it touched on women’s roles as supporters, wives, and mothers, the article
then veered off, calling women to

[r]ise with courage and sacrifice in this war as the righteous women did at the time of
the Messenger of Allah, not because of the small number of men but rather, due to their
love for jihad, their desire to sacrifice for the sake of Allah, and their desire for Jannah.
Among those blessed women were Umm Amarah Nasibah Bint Kab al-Ansariyyah.51

The reference to Umm Amarah signaled a return to AQI’s call for women to take up arms and
carry out suicide attacks back in 2005. An al-Naba (2017) article titled “The obligation on women
to engage in jihad against the enemies” supported this point.52 Using examples of women from the
time of the Prophet Mohammed, it called for female supporters of the Islamic State to follow their
example. The commentary in al-Naba was supported by further articles in the publication
encouraging women to follow in the footsteps of those before them who took up arms.53

Finally, in February 2018, the Islamic State released an English-language video titled “Inside the
Caliphate 7,” purportedly showing women, covered from head to toe, shooting guns and preparing
for battle.54 Although interpretations vary, including discussions about whether the figures in the
video are actually women, this footage seemingly legitimizes women’s ability to take up arms in
the conflict while maintaining their modesty under the pretext of defensive jihad. While the Islamic
State has given the impression of a change, it appears largely rhetorical.

The Threat and Conclusions

Throughout their respective evolutions, both Hamas and the Islamic State continue to emphasize
women’s traditional roles as wives and mothers. Though very different organizations with
dissimilar strategies, both groups have struggled in their relationship with women and jihad. Under
the guise of defensive jihad and strategic necessity, however, both groups demonstrate a
willingness to incorporate women in jihad in select circumstances. As such, policymakers and
practitioners might work to anticipate evolving threats in the future, as both organizations will
likely employ women in more violent roles if the outlined conditions are met.

Hamas and the Islamic State’s rhetorical evolution on women’s roles in combat offers a deeper
understanding of how other violent Islamist groups might change and adapt to shifting landscapes.
While Hamas has evolved into a more stable political actor seeking to incorporate women into
political roles, the Islamic State has lost its territory and has seemingly begun to call women to
arms. These groups have a complex relationship with women and their positions within the
organizations, and they have tried to reconcile the differences that lie between radical Islamist
ideology and the practical role that women play in the organizations. This relationship will not
remain static and will evolve as organizations continue to face different strategic threats.

As can be seen in both cases, the interplay between competing violent Islamist groups is also
important for counter-terrorism officials to consider, as the actions and religious edicts of one
group can influence the actions of other organizations and individuals. There also remains a risk
from women who are inspired by the ideology of these groups, but who act outside of an
organization’s command and control, as their actions are less predictable when compared to

women operating under organizational control. This is due to the violent Islamist ideology that
encourages women to be in the private sphere, as well as strict gender roles which govern aspects
of daily life under the control of groups like Hamas and the Islamic State. The Palestinian case has
seen women carry out low impact or stabbing attacks, outside of Hamas’ control. The Islamic State
case has seen women inspired by the goals of the Islamic State seeking to carry out attacks in North
America and Western Europe.

The threat remains that due to the deeply gendered ideology of these groups, policymakers and
analysts could see more all-female cells,55 as well as more family and relationship-based
networks.56 Scholars and practitioners will expect to see both Hamas and the Islamic State continue
to praise attacks carried out by women when they align with their goals. It is crucial to question
the impact these trends will have on other women around the world who are sympathetic to violent
Islamist groups.

Independent of women’s participation in combat, violent Islamist groups will certainly continue
to use women in non-combat and in support roles. Women are financiers, recruiters, the carriers
of the ideology to future generations, and in some cases, even combatants. Women play a vital role
in the continuation of the ideology and are critical to the survival of violent Islamist groups.

Future research should continue to track the evolving rhetoric of violent Islamist groups, seeking
to pinpoint when conditions are ripe for female participation in violence. Furthermore, despite the
international focus on global jihadi groups, research should continue to look comparatively at other
cases, seeking to find lessons learned. As policy makers and practitioners continue to create CVE
policies, they must take into consideration that misconceptions regarding women’s contributions
to these movements can have serious ramifications and that, even when not mobilized as
combatants, the threat women pose should not be underestimated.

Citations

1Please see: “Violent Islamist Extremism: A Global Problem.” 2018. The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change;
Cook, Joana, and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), Pearson, Elizabeth, and
Emily Winterbotham. 2017. “Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation: A Milieu Approach.” The RUSI Journal
162:3, 60-72; Simcox, Robin. 2018. “The 2016 French Female Attack Cell: A Case Study.” CTC Sentinel, 11:6;
Winter, Charlie, and Devorah Margolin. 2017. “The Mujahidat Dilemma: Female Combatants and the Islamic
State.” CTC Sentinel 10:7, 23-28.
2Margolin, Devorah. 2018. “Neither Feminists nor Victims: How Women’s Agency Has Shaped Palestinian
Violence.” The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change.
3Dalton, Angela and Victor Asal. 2011. “Is It Ideology or Desperation: Why Do Organizations Deploy Women in
Violent Terrorist Attacks?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34:10, 802-819.
4Mandaville, Peter. 2010. Global Political Islam. Routledge.
5Tibi, Bassam. 2014. “Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: from Jihadist to Institutional Islamism.”
Routledge.
6Moghadam, Assaf, and Brian Fishman, eds. 2011. Fault lines in global jihad: organizational, strategic, and
ideological fissures. Taylor & Francis.
7da’wa, or missionary work, means literally a “call or summons”. The missionary work performed by these groups
is used by these and other radical Islamists to spread “the word” based on their interpretation of Islam.
8Paz, Reuven. 2010. “Jihadis and Hamas.” Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within Al-Qa’ida and Its
Periphery, edited by Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman. Harmony Project: Combating Terrorism Center at West
Point: 183-201.

9Donno, Daniela, and Anne-Kathrin Kreft. 2018. “Authoritarian Institutions and Women’s Rights.” Comparative
Political Studies.
10Lahoud, Nelly. 2014. “The neglected sex: The jihadis’ exclusion of women from jihad.” Terrorism and Political
Violence 26:5, 780-802.
11Prior to the modern nation-state, Muslim scholars created a legal theory of warfare to distinguish between times of
war and peace. One of the most cited interpretations of this legal theory comes from Abdullah Azzam in his book,
Defense of the Muslim Lands. Azzam argued there were two types of jihad against non-believers, describing this as
offensive and defensive jihad. Azzam described offensive jihad as “[w]here the Kuffar [non-believer] are not
gathering to fight the Muslims. The fighting becomes Fard Kifaya with the minimum requirement of appointing
believers to guard borders, and the sending of an army at least once a year to terrorize the enemies of Allah.” On the
other hand, Azzam argued of defensive jihad, “[t]his is expelling the Kuffar from our land, and it is Fard Ayn, a
compulsory duty upon all. It is the most important of the compulsory duties…” While most violent Islamists agree
on this definition, there is less consensus about when defensive jihad should be declared and if this individual duty is
incumbent on all, including women.
12Azzam, Abduallah. 1979. “Defense of the Muslim Lands.”
13Azzam, Abdullah. 1987. “Join the Caravan”, Al-Jihaad Fesibillah (The Forgotten Obligation). 32.
14`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz, (Translated): “The Mainstay on Preparing Provisions for Jihad.” Date unknown.
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad (McCants et al. 2006). 29.
15Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia merged with Al-Qaeda in Yemen in 2009 to form Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
16al-‘Ayyiri, Yusuf. “The Role of Women in the Jihad against Enemies.” At-Tibyān Publications. (undated).
17It is important to clarify that at the organizational level, violent Islamist groups conceptualize suicide
attacks/martyrdom operations differently from combat. However, it is equally important to note that at the
operational level this distinction is often ignored. For example, Hamas and the Islamic State have praised both
suicide attacks and combat operations by women after they have already occurred.
18al-‘Ayyiri, Yusuf. “The Islamic Ruling on the Permissibility of Self-Sacrificial Operations.” Originally translated
by ‘Azzām Publications, edited, revised, references added, and further expounded upon by At-Tibyān Publications.
19al-Zawahiri, Ayman. 2010. “Who Will Support Scientist Aafia Siddiqui?” As -Sahab.
20Hamas Charter. 1988.
21Kimhi, Shaul and Shemuel Even. 2004. “Who Are the Palestinian Suicide Bombers?” Terrorism and Political
Violence 16:4, 815–840.
22“Jordanian Journalist Added to FBI’s Most Wanted Terrorist List.” 2017. CBS News.
23Al Qassam Website: Archived March 26, 2018.
24Al-Awsat, Al-Sharq. 2002. “Wafa Idris: The Celebration of the First Female Palestinian Suicide Bomber – Part I,”
via MEMRI.
25Goldenberg, Suzanne. 2002. “A mission to murder: inside the minds of the suicide bombers.” The Guardian.
26The fatwa was posted online 8 March 2003 to islamonline.net: via MEMRI
27Al Qassam Website: Archived June 25, 2018.
28McGreal, Chris. 2004. “Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint.” The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/15/israel
29Abu Zuhri, Sami, and Faraj Shalhoub. 2004. Debate, Al-Majd TV, trans. MEMRI, “On the Recruitment and
Training of Palestinian Suicide Bombers,” TV Monitor Project, Clip No. 117.
30Erlanger, Steven. 2006. “Grandmother Blows Self Up in Gaza Suicide Blast.” New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/24/world/middleeast/24mideast.html.
31A low intensity attack often involves little preparation, or even premeditated thought, and the attacker is likely to
use knives, light weapons or vehicles. A high-intensity attack is a multifaceted one involving planning and
preparation or leading to mass killing and injuries, or both. These are the author’s definitions, which are expanded
on in Margolin, Devorah. 2016. “A Palestinian Woman’s Place in Terrorism: Organized Perpetrators or Individual
Actors?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: 1–23.
32Data set created by the author, monitoring attacks between 13 September 2015 and 23 January 2016.
33These statements were collected by the author for a dataset.
34“Hamas in 2017: The document in full.” The Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/hamas-
charter-1637794876.
35Whiteside, Craig. 2016. “New Masters of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-2016).”
Perspectives on Terrorism 10:4, 4-18.
36Winter, Charlie, and Devorah Margolin. 2017. “The Mujahidat Dilemma: Female Combatants and the Islamic
State.” CTC Sentinel 10:7, 23-28.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/jan/15/israel

37al-Zarqawi, Abu Mus’ab. 2004. “Follow the Caravan.”
38al-Zarqawi, Abu Mus’ab. 2005. “Will the Religion Wane While I Live.”
39Abu Omar al-Baghdadi was leader of the Islamic State in Iraq, another incarnation of AQI as it transitioned into
the Islamic State.
40al-Baghdadi, Abu Omar. 2007. “The Harvest of the Years in the Land of the Monotheists.”
41al-Baghdadi, Abu Omar. 2007. “The Harvest of the Years in the Land of the Monotheists.”
42Davis, Jessica. 2013. “Evolution of Global Jihad: Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq.” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism, 36:4, 279-291.
43al-Hayat Media Center. 2015. “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone,” Dabiq 7: 51.
44“Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto on Women by the al-Khansa’ Brigade.” 2015. Translated by Charlie
Winter. Quilliam.
45al-Hayat Media Center. 2015. “From the Battles of Al-Ahzāb to the War of Coalitions,” Dabiq 11; al-Hayat Media
Center. 2016. “Break the Cross,” Dabiq 15.
46“Valuable Advice and Important Analysis on the Rules for Women’s Participation in Jihad.” 2015. Translated by
Charlie Winter.
47“I Will Die While Islam Is Glorious.” 2016. Al-Naba’ Issue LIX, Central Media Diwan, Translated by Charlie
Winter. 15.
48Hanna, Jason. “New Apparent ISIS Post Threatens Japanese Hostage, Jordanian Pilot.” 2015. CNN.
49al-Hayat Media Center. 2016. “The Rāfidah from Ibn Saba’ to the Dajjāl.” Dabiq 13.
50al-Hayat Media Center. 2016. “A Message from East Africa.” Rumiyah 2.
51al-Hayat Media Center. 2017. “Our Journey to Allah.” Rumiyah 11.
52“The Obligation on Women to Engage in Jihad against the Enemies.” 2017. Naba issue C. 11.
53“Stories of the Jihad of Women I.” 2017. Naba issue CII. 9.
54al-Hayat Media Center. 2018. Inside the Caliphate, #7.
55Simcox, Robin. 2018. “The 2016 French Female Attack Cell: A Case Study.” CTC Sentinel, 11:6. “First All-
Female Terror Cell Jailed over Plot to Attack British Museum.” 2018. The Telegraph.
56Faridz, Devianti, Euan McKirdy, and Eliza Mackintosh. 2018. “Three Families Were behind the ISIS-inspired
Bombings in Indonesia’s Surabaya, Police Said.” CNN.

Key Considerations: Forward Thinking About
Women, Gender, and Violent Extremism

Although definitive policy prescriptions may sound attractive to those tasked with countering and
preventing terrorism and violent extremism, it is critical for policymakers, practitioners, and
scholars to recognize how responses concerning women and gender may have varying effects on
different countries, communities, and individuals. The elements shaping an individual’s
involvement in extremism range from ideological and organizational factors to logistical and
personal considerations. The papers in this series demonstrate that gender is one of the components
that transcends these forces, continually guiding the behaviors of a group and its adherents. As
terrorist and violent extremist groups grapple with the roles they want men and women to assume,
adherents themselves concurrently attempt to advance their movements in manners that converge,
and sometimes diverge, from the roles ascribed by their organizations. In short, these dynamics
suggest that intersectional and evolving security challenges require intersectional and adaptable
policy solutions.

Policymakers, practitioners, and scholars tasked with assessing and countering the threats posed
by extremists must consider women and gender in their analysis of existing and emerging security
challenges. This is particularly important because ignoring the effects of gender dimensions like
femininity and masculinity “creates blind spots that hamper the effectiveness of prevention and
counterterrorism policies, undermining stability, security and human rights across the globe.”1
Ideally, the papers presented in this series, and the following list of considerations they inform,
can help relevant stakeholders identify responsible ways to ingrain women and gender in efforts
to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

Discussion on Context-Specific Considerations for the Future:

Since assumptions about women, gender, and violent extremism tend to translate into official
policy, the onus for creating more pragmatic and nuanced approaches to these issues rests on the
national and international security community. Stakeholders ranging from political leaders,
policymakers, intelligence analysts, law enforcement, court officials, academics, civil society, and
news producers must stay vigilant about fostering a nuanced, evidence-based discussion about
women, gender, and extremism. The discourse officials use to describe this problem-set influences
how other members of the security community, and the public writ large, perceive women, men,
and minors connected to extremist movements. Beyond reducing the use of sensationalized
misnomers like “jihadi bride,” thought leaders should be aware of how watchwords can conflate
demographics with culpability in ways that are detrimental to security, international law, and
human rights.2 Ultimately, a genuine course correction requires entities tasked with countering and
preventing terrorism and violent extremism to (1) emphasize gender, not just women, as part of
the agenda; (2) actively push back against assumption-based threat appraisals; and (3) earnestly
look for just and context-specific ways to gender policy design and implementation. The following
sections offer some illustrations of how these tenants could play out in practice.

The intersection of gender and terrorism does not exist in a vacuum, so officials must try to discern
how changing conditions influence the actions of extremist organizations and their supporters. In
some scenarios more than others, information communications technologies (ICTs), and social
media especially, optimize connectivity between like-minded sympathizers. While some

policymakers and practitioners already consider counteracting the use of ICTs by extremists as a
priority, it is crucial to consider how such tools can alter gender norms online. Beyond reducing
the geographic barriers for supporting an organization, ICTs can make extremist groups more
accessible to a range of demographics, especially women. Opportunities afforded by features like
anonymity, public and private messaging, and moderated groups, for example, concurrently offer
ways to either reinforce or subvert gender norms set by an extremist organization’s leadership.
Similarly, as discussed in this paper series, the virtual sphere may pave the way for women to
garner influence online in ways their masculine-dominant organizations might not condone in their
physical networks. These observations on gender, technology, and extremism may have crucial
implications for the future.3 As new trends emerge, relevant stakeholders should scrutinize how
such changes relate to women, gender, and extremism.

The security community should look for more opportunities to responsibly collect and share
qualitative and quantitative data regarding the intersection(s) of women, gender, terrorism, and
violent extremism. Since an individual’s roles and experiences within extremist organizations
represent a vital part of their participation, the field must continue to assess the myriad factors that
guide an individual’s trajectory. As a critical first step, those following these trends should
“delineate all data of persons affiliated with terror and extremist groups by age and gender,”4 along
with other demographic details when possible. Data and analyses recording all paths to
membership in extremist groups, not just violent roles, are critical to understanding how sex and
gender tie into processes of radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization. Conversely, research of
this nature is also vital to examining paths from violent extremism. Subsequent inquiries should
specifically assess these nuances in processes such as deradicalization, rehabilitation, and
reintegration. By building datasets that represent extremist movements and raising questions about
masculinities and femininities early and often, the security community can enhance its ability to
provide pertinent responses, tailor interventions, and predict emerging trends

Though often intersecting, the needs of the women, men, and minors touched by violent extremism
are varied.5 Whether an individual is disrupted from mobilizing or returning from a conflict zone
an, comprehensive assessments can help countries and communities identify pragmatic approaches
to deradicalize and rehabilitate individuals, families, and groups. While gender must factor into
these assessments and play a role in counter-extremism programs, the nature of that role should be
context-specific. In some scenarios, tailored measures may be the most viable solution;
masculinities and femininities, like other facets of identity, would factor into interventions as
needed. In other conditions, there may be a greater appetite to address gender-linked drivers and
experiences as a first-order priority. This approach would create a demand for initiatives that silo
the demographics into different intervention programs. As another model, alternative courses of
action are necessary when groups and families might benefit from a mix of tailored and cohort-
centric interventions. In practice, these approaches are not mutually exclusive, so countries might
blend an array of these measures to address the needs of populations affected by extremism.

Before concluding, it is essential to discuss where this series places the role of women in counter-
terrorism and P/CVE. While “it depends” serves as a satisfyingly short answer, the longer response
is far more important. Ultimately, the integration of women in efforts to prevent and counter
terrorism and violent extremism is absolutely necessary, but for several reasons, this step alone is
an insufficient way to gender such measures.6 Although there is not agreement on which approach
to take, debates on the subject can be productive. Since gender, terrorism, and violent extremism

are relatively dynamic and context-specific problems, responses could benefit from mirroring
these qualities. It is vital to see the challenge of integrating gender into counter-terrorism and
P/CVE strategies as an ongoing process that prioritizes efficacy, security, and human rights.

Political responses to contemporary issues, particularly concerning how to cope with the returnees
from the conflict in Iraq and Syria, highlight the timeliness of the topics discussed in this paper
series. By understanding how gender dynamics are ingrained in violent extremist organizations,
those tasked with confronting these threats can more comprehensively address networks in their
entirety. Piqued interest in this issue provides policymakers, practitioners, and scholars a chance
to draw from qualitative and quantitative assessments of present challenges to enhance policy
responses. In addition to understanding women’s links to violent extremism, it is useful to examine
how other aspects of gender affect individuals, organizations, and movements. Calls to better
integrate gender dimensions into counter-terrorism and P/CVE strategies demand further
consideration of how masculinities and femininities guide paths to and from extremism.7 Simply
stated, “a more productive way forward requires a comprehensive understanding of how gender
affects recruitment, radicalization processes, operational roles, sentencing, and rehabilitation—for
both men and women.”8 By recognizing the ways in which violent extremist groups are more than
the sum of their parts, those tasked with preventing and countering violent extremism can begin to
develop synergistic, gender-aware, and just solutions to current and evolving threats.

Citations

1Powell, Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism.” Council on
Foreign Relations. January 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism.
2Powell, Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism.” Council on
Foreign Relations. January 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism; Ní
Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part I.” Just
Security. May 1, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55522/gendering-counterterrorism-to/; For more on how this
fits into the broader literature, see: Carpenter, Charli. 2005. “‘Women, Children and Other Vulnerable Groups’:
Gender, Strategic Frames and the Protection of Civilians as a Transnational Issue.” International Studies Quarterly.
3For an example concerning women and the longevity of extreme networks, see: Manrique, Pedro, et al. 2018.
“Women’s connectivity in extreme networks,” Science Advances, 2:6.
http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742/tab-pdf
4Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
International Centre for the Study and Radicalization (ICSR), Department of War Studies, King’s College, 5.
https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-
Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State
5Cook, Joana and Gina Vale. 2018. “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State.”
International Centre for the Study and Radicalization (ICSR), Department of War Studies, King’s College, 5.
https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-
Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State
6Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala, and Jayne Huckerby. 2018. “Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part
II.” Just Security. May 3, 2018. https://www.justsecurity.org/55670/gendering-counterterrorism-to-part-ii/; Powell,
Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism.” Council on Foreign
Relations. January 23, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism;
7Pearson, Elizabeth. “Why Men Fight and Women Don’t: Masculinity and Extremist Violence.” Tony Blair Institute
for Global Change. 2018. https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-
and-extremist-violence; Powell, Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and
Counterterrorism.” Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-
counterterrorism;
8Powell, Catherine, and Rebecca Turkington. 2019. “Gender, Masculinities, and Counterterrorism.” Council on
Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism.

https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism

Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part I

http://advances.sciencemag.org/content/2/6/e1501742/tab-pdf

https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/ICSR-Report-From-Daesh-to-%E2%80%98Diaspora%E2%80%99-Tracing-the-Women-and-Minors-of-Islamic-State

Gendering Counterterrorism: How to, and How Not to – Part II

https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism

https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence

https://www.cfr.org/blog/gender-masculinities-and-counterterrorism

Western Balkans: Context of women’s participation in terrorist organizations

Table 1. Men/Women and Children who joined the conflict to Syria and Iraq from Western Balkans Countries

Drivers and Profiles of Women joining in Syria and Iraq

Emerging Threats and Ongoing Challenges: Women as Domestic Plotters, Online Supporters, and Returnees

Conclusive Recommendations

Traditional Gender Roles in Extreme-Right Movements

Hyper-Masculinity, Male and Female Anti-Feminism and Alt-Right Counter-Culture

Generation Identity’s Influencers and the Hijacking of #MeToo

Conclusive Discussion and Policy Considerations

Introduction

Violent Islamist Ideology and Women

Hamas

Islamic State

The Threat and Conclusions

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Critical Studies on Terrorism

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Pork, risk, or reaction? The determinants of US
counterterrorist funding

Kyle Kattelman

To cite this article: Kyle Kattelman (2021) Pork, risk, or reaction? The determinants
of US counterterrorist funding, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 14:4, 514-535, DOI:
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Pork, risk, or reaction? The determinants of US
counterterrorist funding
Kyle Kattelman

Department of Social Sciences and History, Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck, USA

ABSTRACT
A wealth of literature exists on the relationship between a country’s
domestic politics and its counterterrorism policies, yet few examine
this relationship in the US. Past studies examining counterterrorism
spending in the US find that domestic politics have little impact and
that funding is distributed to the states largely as a function of its
risk from a terrorist attack. Yet these studies suffer a number of
shortcomings, including limited data on counterterrorist funding
and a superficial conceptualisation of the variables that measure
domestic politics. Using data on US outlays from the Department of
Homeland Security Grants Program from 2003 to 2018, this study
seeks to illuminate the process of counterterrorist spending in the
US by reconciling three separate sets of predictors in the literature.
Specifically, is counterterrorist spending distributed according to
legislative politics (pork), genuine, rationally calculated population
vulnerability (risk), or public fear in the wake of particularly notor-
ious terrorist attacks (reaction)? The results support and expand the
existing literature in that risk remains an influential variable, though
grant distribution is still affected by political incentives. Finally,
states do tend to see an influx of funds in reaction to terrorist
attacks, though the source of the group plays no role.

KEYWORDS
Terrorism; counterterrorism;
funding; Homeland Security
grants

Introduction

The effects of a country’s domestic politics, culture, and public opinion on its counter-
terrorism policies is well documented, both abroad (Rees and Aldrich 2009; Perliger 2012;
Miller 2007; Kattelman 2016), as well as in the US (Crenshaw 2001; Davis and Silver 2004). Yet
few have examined how this relationship applies to counterterrorism (CT) spending. The
attacks on 9/11 drastically shifted security priorities for the West, as well as the developed
world. The most visible aspect of this shift was the advent of the US-led Global War on Terror
in which a coalition of states engaged in open military operations, strengthened law
enforcement and security, and severed the finances of terrorist organisations (US
Department of State 2002). Since then, states have been very public about the wide and far-
reaching actions taken to combat the spread of global extremism (Country Reports on
Terrorism 2020). Yet, they have been less forthcoming on how these actions are funded at
anything beyond a general assessment (Immenkamp et al. 2020).

CONTACT Kyle Kattelman ktk94@fdu.edu

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM
2021, VOL. 14, NO. 4, 514–535
https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2021.1996936

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This pattern is readily apparent in the US, which has seen an average annual increase of
$360 billion between 2001 and 2015 on homeland security spending (“European
Parliament: Think Tank” 2016). In spite of this growth, our understandings of the specific
mechanisms behind it remain obscure. One of the more visible acts in the fallout from 9/
11 was the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002. Though its tasks are
myriad, its primary responsibilities consist of preventing terrorist attacks, reducing the US
vulnerability to terrorism, and minimising damage from terrorist attacks (US Department
of Homeland Security 2005). Crucial to achieving these objectives is the Homeland
Security Grant Program (HSGP), a programme comprised of a number of individual grants
that disperse funds to US states and territories, and a programme that has endured
repeated criticism of trivial “pork” spending (Friedman 2005; Kaplan 2006).

Despite these criticisms, the few statistical studies that take a direct look at CT spend-
ing in the US find little evidence of pork behaviour, largely concluding that domestic
politics play a minimal role and that funds are primarily driven by risk assessment – that is,
funds are directed to areas of the country that are the most at risk from terrorist attacks.
One of the first to examine this in the post-9/11 era, Coats, Karahan, and Tollison (2006) do
find that funds are directed to states with larger Electoral College votes, providing some
support for political influence, but they conclude that risk of terrorist attack remains the
primary driver. Prante and Bohara (2008) expand upon this study by incorporating data
after the passage of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Appropriation Act of
2006 (2005), which allowed the DHS more discretion on grant outlays and thus more
room for potential political influence. The authors again show risk to be the primary driver
and find little evidence of political influence. However, their data only cover 2004–2006,
a limited time frame and one where the degree of party polarisation was much lower than
it is today. Taken together, these studies suggest that more work is needed in under-
standing the specific processes that affect CT spending.

Despite the DHS’ insistence that grant money is distributed according to the most
terrorism-prone areas, allegations still abound that many politicians are securing money
for constituents (Lipton 2004), special interests (de Rugy 2005), and even academic institu-
tions (US Department of Homeland Security 2005). Compounding this spending issue is
a fearful public that constantly demands visible government action after every incident of
terrorist violence (Jordan, Kosal, and Rubin 2016). Therefore, the specific goals of this study
are to analyse the sources of counterterrorist spending in the US by reconciling three
separate sets of predictors in the literature. More specifically, are HSGP outlays distributed
according to legislative politics (pork), genuine, rationally calculated citizen vulnerability
(risk), or public fear in the wake of particularly notorious terrorist attacks (reaction)?

Due to the lack of robust research upon which to build, this study serves as a first-
generation, exploratory approach to the predictors of US CT spending. The organisation
of the article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I discuss the three possible
categories of motivators gleaned from the literature. For each category I derive hypoth-
eses, which I then test using a series of OLS and logit regression models on several
comprehensive grants from the HSGP from 2003 to 2018. Following a discussion of the
results, I then draw conclusions and call on a more focused and robust approach to
understanding the allocation of CT funds.

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 515

Motivators of counterterrorist spending in the US

A large body of literature shows that electoral incentives influence the national security
politics of democratically elected governments (Hess and Orphanides 1995; Marinov,
Nomikos, and Robbins 2015; Schneider 2013; Smith 1996). Looking at US defence Thorpe
(2010, 2014) finds that economic dependence on defence spending in rural districts results
in congressional members from these districts being more likely to support weapons
expenditures, independent of whether such measures improve national security.
Constituent dependence on a war economy in these areas gives rise to candidates who
seek to gain and keep their elected seats by funnelling military expenditures back to their
home districts. The attacks of 9/11 likely deepened this dependence, as research on other
grant programmes show how exogenous shocks to the political system create “policy
windows” in which political entrepreneurs can pass legislation for a variety of unrelated
causes.1 Evidence of this shock can be seen in the dramatic increase in defence spending
earmarks shortly after 9/11 and the complaints that followed it (Newman 2021). Dubious
spending allocations in the name of national security have also plagued the HSGP specifi-
cally. For example, in 2005, landlocked Tulsa, Oklahoma, received $725,000 in port security
funds. In that same year, Grand Forks, North Dakota, received $1.5 million in federal funds to
respond to nuclear attacks (Friedman 2005). Such examples are numerous throughout the
country.

To confront the allegations of rural patronage, in 2006 the DHS announced a renewed
focus on the most vulnerable areas through its Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), which
provides recourses that cater to the needs of urban areas deemed a high threat. In spite of
this, critics are quick to point out the large number of urban areas deemed high-threat;
furthermore, a number of the included cities seat congressional members on the House
Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee (Kaplan 2006).2

In short, the evidence indicates that there should be some form of politically motivated
spending with regard to the HSGP, yet direct, statistical examinations of the programme
find that it is primarily driven by risk assessment. These findings warrant a new examination.
The next section derives a series of hypotheses of pork spending by tying it to the larger
body of literature on legislative behaviour. Following that, additional hypotheses are
derived from competing explanations (i.e. risk and reaction) before being tested against
one another.

Pork: domestic political motivators

As previously stated, there is a robust set of literature that finds electoral incentives play
a role in national security politics. Regarding the proximity of elections, Bueno de
Mesquita (2007) notes that politicians favour defence spending to the extent that it
increases security and provides an observable contribution for which they can claim
credit. These two motivations are not mutually exclusive; however, when voter and
government preferences are not perfectly aligned, the government will increasingly
favour allocating CT resources that are observable to voters. Thus, re-election preferences
play a role in the allocation process, leading governments to increase spending as their
proximity grows near (Bueno de Mesquita 2007; Lonardo 2019; Nanes 2017). Applying this
logic to the US allows for the first hypothesis:

516 K. T. KATTELMAN

H1: CT funding to states should increase during a presidential election year.

Partisanship can also play a role. With regard to government behaviour, right-leaning
parties trend more hawkish on policies of national defence than left-leaning parties
(Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Fordham 1998; Russett 1990). Translating this theory to CT
funds directed to individual US states, we can test for similar patterns of behaviour by
utilising the partisanship and ideology of individual, state-elected legislators. In the US,
federal statutes define domestic terrorism, yet there are no specific laws that prohibit it. By
contrast, there exists a robust set of federal statutes, in addition to an officially designated
list of foreign terrorist organisations which ban acts of international terrorism. As a result,
elected officials in the US primarily view terrorism as a foreign threat (Rotella 2021). From
this, it can be theorised that legislators with a conservative ideology would be in favour of
increased CT spending, both at the national level and in the interest of securing funds for
their respective state, in the name of national security from a foreign threat. This logic
results in the second hypothesis:

H2: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is conservative.

Beyond individual partisanship, majority party control can also expedite funding
approvals if the policy is in line with its interests. In his analysis of Western European
democracies, Askoy (2018) finds that CT spending during election years is conditioned on
partisan ideology, particularly when right-oriented governments are in power. This is due
to the fact that supporters of right-wing governments tend to favour strong national
security, while supporters of left-wing governments may be turned off by an increase in
counterterrorism funding, believing that the money can be used for alternative policies.
This dovetails with previous literature arguing that defence spending is partly predicated
on the ideological orientation of the elites in power (Askoy 2018; Budge and Hofferbert
1990; Fordham 1998; Russett 1990). Taken together, the findings from this subset of
research can be modified for testing within the US. That is, when right-wing governments
are in power they leverage their majority party status to acquire more CT funding, leading
to the third hypothesis:

H3: CT funding to a constituency should increase if the legislature is Republican
controlled.

Finally, a central feature of classical theories on legislative behaviour is the ability of
party leaders to advance collective partisan goals, most importantly the maintenance
of majority-party status (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Aldrich and Rohde 2000,
2001), an ability that includes influencing the distribution of spending projects (Lazarus
2009). A vast literature points to the effects that House and Senate Appropriations
Committee membership has on the value of earmarked funds to districts (Allen 2007;
Binder 2008; Lazarus 2009, 2010). Based off of the distributive model, by which
legislators utilise their advantageous committee positions to procure funds for their
district to secure re-election, it can be theorised that members of the House and
Senate Department of Homeland Security subcommittee are in an advantageous
position to engage in pork politics to direct funds to their districts, especially if one

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 517

is a chair (i.e. cardinal) of the subcommittee (Berry and Fowler 2016). Indeed, one key
criticism of the UASI is that the cities that receive eligibility have legislators in key
positions on the DHS subcommittee. These institutional characteristics lead to the final
set of hypotheses in this section:

H4: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is a member of the
DHS appropriations subcommittee.

H5: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is a chair of the DHS
appropriations subcommittee.

H6: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is a party leader.

Risk: statistical motivators

In spite of its criticisms, the DHS remains steadfast that its funding allocation is guided by
risk assessment and that the most terrorist prone areas receive the most funding. Prior to
2006, many HSGP funds were distributed by a formula that allocates 0.75% of the total to
each state with the remaining distributed proportionally to a state’s population (H.R. 2360
2005). While it is reasonable to assume that terrorist attacks would correlate with popula-
tion, this method was still noted as inefficient (Earle 2004). Thus, the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriation Act of 2006 (2005) gave the DHS more discretion in
its distribution process, ostensibly allowing them greater leeway to distribute based on
risk.

The few robustness checks on this formula seem to confirm that risk has an influence.
Prante and Bohara (2008) cite risk as the main determinant in CT distribution, more so
than their measures of political power and partisanship, which they found to be insignif-
icant. Coats, Karahan, and Tollison (2006) find that terrorism risk factors more into grant
distribution than political variables. However, they do find a political effect in that funds
are directed to states with greater Electoral College votes. Their reasoning is that the US
winner-take-all system exists as a political motivator for presidential candidates to use the
DHS as an arm of their re-election campaign to win the states with the largest number of
votes. Nevertheless, there are two methodological problems with this approach. The first
is that during the period their data cover, grant allocations were distributed according
a formula that accounts for a state’s risk, population, and population density. Hence, there
is little discretion in executive ability to manipulate this distribution pattern. Moreover,
the theoretical explanation outlined in this present study flows from literature that
stresses congressional committee oversight of the bureaucracy (MacDonald and
McGrath 2016).

The second relates to the utilisation of Electoral College votes as a political variable.
Since these vote allocations are correlated entirely with a state’s population, it is impos-
sible for the authors to separate the political effects of this variable from its relationship to
risk. Furthermore, these analyses conflict with statements from the DHS itself. A DHS
Inspector General’s audit of its Port Security Grant Program found a gross misallocation of
funds, finding that “Grant award decisions are made with the intent of expending all

518 K. T. KATTELMAN

available funding and spreading funds to as many applicants as possible.” (Office of
Inspector General 2005, 4). These discrepancies warrant a renewed look at risk-based
allocation, which leads to the seventh hypothesis:

H7: CT funding to a constituency should increase with its level of risk from a terrorist
attack.

Reaction: psychological motivators

Despite the fact that the handful of major terrorist attacks in the US that have occurred in
the past 20 years are nowhere comparable to the magnitude of those on 9/11, public fears
of terrorism since that day remain heightened (Haner, Sloan, and Cullen 2019). This is
partially attributable to our cognitive biases. People rarely apply expected utility calcula-
tions to everyday thinking and instead tend to overinflate the probability of big payoff or
epic disaster scenarios. Furthermore, individuals tend to put greater weight towards
potential losses rather than gains, resulting in a need to eliminate risk and protect the
status quo (Sunstein and Zeckhauser 2008). The catastrophic nature of the 9/11 attacks
imprinted into the minds of millions of Americans the necessity of preventing additional
loss, and the public’s singular focus on that event leads to an inflation of its likelihood of
repeat.

These feelings are reinvigorated each time a new attack happens, resulting in renewed
calls for security measures, due to our tendency to view unrelated and scattershot acts of
violence as part of an intentional, centralised agency (Jordan, Kosal, and Rubin 2016;
Bloom and Veres 1999; Jervis 1976). A recent example of this includes the bipartisan call
for the expansion of the HSGP in the wake of the anti-Semitic shooting in Jersey City and
the US assassination of Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani (Roberts 2020). These fears, when
coupled with a military-industrial complex that benefits from military spending, create
what Friedman (2011) calls “ . . . a permissive environment for overreaction to terrorism.
Security politics becomes a seller’s market where the public will overpay for counter-
terrorist policies.” Hence, the problem of spending could be less a matter of government
supply and more one of public demand, resulting in the next set of hypotheses:

H8: CT funding to a constituency should increase with the frequency of terrorist attacks it
suffers.

H9: CT funding to a constituency should increase with the severity of terrorist attacks it
suffers.

Furthermore, this fear varies with partisanship in the citizenry. The role of party
identification as a heuristic for interpreting political information is widely established
in American politics research (Campbell et al. 1960; Norpoth, Lewis-Beck and Jacoby
2008; Lodge and Hamill 1986). Overall, Republicans are seen as internationalists who
favour authoritative foreign policy tactics and strategies, while Democrats are seen as
accommodationists, a pattern that has intensified over time (Holsti and Rosenau 1988;
Holsti 2004). To this end, polls consistently show that a majority of Republicans favour

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 519

an increase in anti-terrorism defence spending within the US, while only roughly 1 in
3 Democrats favour an increase (Pew 2017). Examining counterterrorist threats more
generally, over two-thirds of Republicans think that government policies do not go far
enough in preventing terrorism in contrast to just 46% of Democrats (Pew 2016a). The
mitigating effects of partisanship can vary the intensity of public calls for government
action on a state-by-state basis, leading a legislator to react to that demand in the
interest of preserving their seat. This leads to the final hypothesis:

H10: Constituencies with a more conservative citizen ideology should receive more CT
funding.

Data and methodology

Dependent variables

Beginning with the dependent variables, three sources are used. The first two are
discretionary funding from the State Homeland Security Grant Program(SHSGP) and
the Emergency Management Performance Grant Program (EMPG) (Department of
Homeland Security 2020). These two sub grants of the Homeland Security Grant
Program were chosen because they afford the greatest time span of data. Other
subcategories either do not last as long or draw their funds off of the programmes
used here.3 These two grants will be combined to create a total funding variable,
formatted in millions of raw dollars. Prior to the DHS Appropriation Act of 2006
(2005), each state received a base of 0.75% of the total distribution for a respective
programme with the remaining funds distributed based on state population. Since
2006, the base funds are still allocated, but risk and the anticipated effectiveness of
proposed investments are used instead of population, which gives the DHS more
discretion over distribution. As a result, 0.75% of each state’s allocation is subtracted
from the total to ensure that only discretionary funds, subject to variable influence, are
used. The unit of analysis is a state-year.

The second dependent variable measures the eligibility of a metropolitan area to
receive funds from the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI), a programme that provides
funding to enhance security in high-threat, high-density areas (FEMA 2021). Eligibility is
determined by assessing the relative risk of a terrorist attack in the 100 most Metropolitan
Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the US (Homeland Security Act of 2002). The unit of analysis,
district-year, is constructed by decomposing each MSA into its respective congressional
district(s). The variable is coded as 1 if a city’s district is eligible for UASI funds in
a given year and 0 otherwise.

Taken as a whole, the majority of funding from the Homeland Security Grant Program
stems from these programmes.4 It is important to note that these three variables do not
represent the entire domain of security spending. Due to the opaque nature of the
subject, a number of sources are omitted,5 though these contributions satisfy a number
of conditions outlined in the literature that are being tested. Specifically, each outlay/
eligibility decision flows directly to a state/district, that allocation can ultimately be traced
back to specific congressional action, and that action is visible to the public. The timeline

520 K. T. KATTELMAN

of the data extend from 2003, which represents a seismic shift in counterterrorist spend-
ing the wake of the 9/11 attacks, until 2018, the latest report on outlays and jurisdictions
for the 115th Congress. A timeline of spending and city eligibility is presented in Figure 1.

Two main peaks are visible – the first in 2003 captures the quick acceleration of the
invasion of Iraq, and the second spike beginning roughly in 2008 reflects spending
increases when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were at their height. A second notable
feature is the prominence of UASI grants that roughly follow the contours of the outlays.
UASI grants are specifically allocated out of a risk calculation based on population density,
the presence of critical infrastructure, and the presence of a credible threat (Reese 2004).
However, as a block grant, a number of city officials began to lobby congressional
legislators who felt unfairly left out. As a result, the original pool of 7 cities grew to 30
at their peak, with the pool of money increasing from $100 million to $700 million (Ripley
2004). Efforts to revise the funding formula to a more valid measure of risk have been met
with pushback in Congress. For example, HR10 included language to reduce automatic
state grants from 0.75% to 0.25%. This was denounced by Senator Leahy (D-VT),
a member of the Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, as an effort to “short-
change rural states” (Ripley 2004, 5). Such findings present a vivid account of the dynamic
between pork and risk on CT spending and lend tacit support for the hypotheses outlined
above.

To get a preliminary view of the distribution of spending, Table 1 presents a simple per
capita outlays-by-state in descending dollar amount. A clear pattern that emerges is that
spending disproportionately favours the rural states. Indeed, the states that routinely fall

Figure 1. Federal homeland security outlays and UASI eligibility: 2003–2018.

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 521

in the bottom 10 of population are among the highest earners of Homeland Security
outlays. The reverse is true for the most populous states, as California, Florida, and Texas
are the lowest receivers. The pattern does not map perfectly, as New York sits in the
middle of the pack. It is important to stress that this study examines discretionary
spending only, as including the baseline each state automatically receives would dispro-
portionately favour the rural states. The distribution of these specific grants fit into the
broader patter of US defence spending that favours rural regions (Thorpe 2010, 2014).

Independent variables

To measure the effects of pork, risk, and reaction, three subsets of independent variables are
used. Beginning with the electoral and institutional features that are hypothesised to
influence pork, a dummy variable is constructed for a presidential election year. The theory
outlined here relies on the public visibility of presidential rather than congressional elections
as a primary driver of CT outlays. To capture the partisanship of individual legislators, DW-
NOMINATE scores are used (Lewis et al. 2021). Scores are averaged across legislators by state
within a specific year for each chamber, resulting in separate measures for House and
Senate. Individual legislator scores from the House are used at the district level. Since the
dependent variables are spending decisions, only the economic ideology dimension is used,
with a higher value indicating a more conservative economic ideology. Additional partisan
effects include a dummy variable indicating majority party status for the Republican Party
and a count variable indicating the number of party leaders within a state or district.

Table 1. Average per capita outlays by state, 2003–2018.
(1) Wyoming $7.20 26. New York $1.62
(1) Vermont $6.54 27. Kentucky $1.59
(1) North Dakota $5.95 28. South Carolina $1.52
(1) Alaska $5.76 29. Alabama $1.5

(1) South Dakota $5.10 30. Maryland $1.48
(1) Delaware $4.74 31. Colorado $1.48
(1) Montana $4.33 32. Minnesota $1.43
(1) Rhode Island $4.10 33. Washington $1.39
(1) New Hampshire $3.42 34. Missouri $1.39
(1) Maine $3.40 35. Massachusetts $1.39
(1) Hawaii $3.34 36. Wisconsin $1.39
(1) Idaho $3.03 37. Arizona $1.33
(1) Nebraska $2.72 38. Indiana $1.32
(1) West Virginia $2.68 39. Tennessee $1.32
(1) New Mexico $2.47 40. New Jersey $1.31
(1) Nevada $2.10 41. Virginia $1.30
(1) Utah $2.01 42. Illinois $1.24
(1) Kansas $2.00 43. Georgia $1.21
(1) Arkansas $1.94 44. Michigan $1.20
(1) Mississippi $1.92 45. North Carolina $1.16
(1) Iowa $1.89 46. Pennsylvania $1.16
(1) Connecticut $1.80 47. Ohio $1.15
(1) Oklahoma $1.69 48. California $1.14
(1) Oregon $1.66 49. Texas $1.05
(1) Louisiana $1.63 50. Florida $1.03

522 K. T. KATTELMAN

For institutional power, since committee membership can influence the direction of
funds, a count of a state’s legislator membership on the Subcommittee on the
Department of Homeland Security, seated within the Appropriations Committee, is
used. These measures are used as specific committee assignments and have been
shown to result in particular constituent benefits (Evans 1994; Lee 2003; Balla et al.
2002; Lazarus 2009, 2010). Finally, it has been shown that the chair position rather than
membership is the most influential position for pork distribution (Berry and Fowler 2016).
As such, a dummy variable is coded for whether a state has a legislator who is the cardinal
of the DHS Appropriations Subcommittee, from either chamber.

Measuring the degree of terrorism risk is inherently tricky, as assessments are often
sensitive in nature and not publicly available. Prior to 2006, the DHS-based discretionary
outlays on state population, switching to more comprehensive risk assessment mea-
sures afterwards. Therefore, it is important to employ a measure alongside state popu-
lation to check for evidence of this change (Prante and Bohara 2008). While the DHS’
exact risk assessment methodology remains unknown, a relatively objective approxima-
tion is captured in the Applied Insurance Research Terrorism Loss Estimation Model (AIR
Worldwide 2016), which utilises the Delphi method to condense input from terrorism
experts and former employees of the FBI, CIA, and Department of Defence. The measure
puts heavy emphasis on the presence of high-profile targets, tourist attractions, and
infrastructure rather than state population or per capita income (Boyle, Malinowski, and
Gannon 2002). The original measure consists of three ordinal values based on a state’s
level of risk (low, medium, and high), but for purposes of modelling it will be composed
into two dummy variables of medium and high, with the low risk serving as the base
category. Due to data limitations, the risk data are only available for 2004. It is assumed
here that there would be little temporal variation if more years were available, and as
such the data are applied to the entire timeframe of the dataset. Still, while it is likely
that a state such as Wyoming will remain low and New York high, variation in the
middle category is a concern.

The last subset, reaction, is measured according data on terrorist attacks taken from the
Global Terrorism Database (START 2021). The organisation defines terrorism as “ . . . the
threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain
a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”
(GTD Codebook 2017, 9).6 The data include geo-coordinates on the specific location of the
attack, allowing for attacks to be matched to the specific location in which they occurred.
To measure severity, a casualty count is also included. Both variables are expected to hold
positive relationships with both dependent variables.

Finally, to capture public demand for CT funding, Berry et al.’s (1998) measure of citizen
ideology is included. The measure consists of an index of the ideological positions of
incumbent and challenger weighted by the level of citizen support within each district,
with larger values indicating a more liberal citizen ideology.

Control variables include separate dummy variables indicating whether a state or
district borders Mexico, Canada or an ocean. The natural log of a state’s population is
included, since the DHS used population as a metric of grant allocation prior to 2005. To
capture the general dependence on federal funding, a state’s per capita GDP is included
(Pew 2016b). Finally, evidence suggests a racial dynamic to perceptions of terrorism.
Recent evidence finds that white anxiety over demographic shifts leads to demand for

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 523

harsher counterterrorism measures (Patel 2017; Piazza 2020). To control for this possibility,
the percentage of the state’s population categorised as white is included. All demo-
graphic data are taken from the US Census Bureau (2020). For application to UASI
eligibility, data on a given metropolitan area are used. Summary statistics for both units
of analyses are presented in Table 2. To account for temporal variation not specified by
the included variables, year dummies are used in all models.

Results

Funding

Table 3 presents OLS models for funding outlays to the states. A Fisher test indicates no
unit root presence, indicating that the underlying process is stationary. Model 1 in the first
column serves as a baseline that exclusively features the control variables. The results
largely hold to expectations, with population and a state’s GDP exerting positive influence
on funding outlays. Both measures are often used as an instrumental variable for risk, and
the DHS (2009) directly employs state population to determine the amount of funding
allocated. All models include a one-year lag of the dependent variable on the right side of
the equation, and the lagged DV behaves as predicted, with current funding a function of
the previous year’s outlays.

Moving to the second column, model 2 includes the set of variables testing hypotheses
1–6 (pork) and finds support for institutional and political variables, though none with
legislator partisanship. Interpretation of these OLS coefficients against low count and
dummy variables is relatively straightforward. Each number in the model represents the
change in raw dollars per each unit increase in the independent variable. For example, the
coefficient on DHS committee chair membership (i.e. Cardinal) is 0.31. To translate that
into a substantive interpretation, simply multiply that coefficient by the different values
that the cardinal variable could be. Since there are only two values to this variable (i.e. 1 if
a state contains a cardinal and 0 otherwise), there are only two predicted relationships.

Table 2. Summary statistics of state outlays (district values in parentheses).
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.

Total funds (in millions) 918 8.13 7.48 .05 54.16
UASI funding 2098 0.50 0.50 0 1
Election year 920(2098) 0.25(0.25) 0.43(0.43) 0(0) 1(1)
Cardinal dummy 920 – 0.04 – 0.19 – 0 – 1 –
GOP majority 920(2098) 0.62(0.63) 9.42(0.41) 0(0) 1(1)
DHS member 920(2098) 0.41(0.04) 0.58(0.18) 0(0) 3(1)
Party leader 920(2098) 0.16(0.07) 0.42(0.25) 0(0) 3(1)
House NOMINATE 796(2098) 0.05(−0.10) 0.23(0.44) −0.49(−0.70) 0.68(0.75)
Senate NOMINATE 800 – 0.06 – 0.35 – −0.64 – 0.67 –
High Risk 816(2098) 0.06(0.29) 0.24(.45) 0(0) 1(1)
Medium Risk 816(2098) 0.16(0.28) 0.36(0.45) 0(0) 1(1)
Attack count 920(2098) 0.48(1.50) 1.28(2.60) 0(0) 14(14)
Casualties 920(2098) 0.38(1.27) 2.94(5.10) 0(0) 59(59)
Citizen ideology 700 – 51.91 – 15.80 – 13.48 – 97.00 –
Log population 832(2098) 15.12(14.61) 1.02(1.11) 13.13(13.15) 17.49(16.77)
Canada 920(2098) 0.17(0.17) 0.38(0.37) 0(0) 1(1)
Mexico 920(2098) 0.07(0.23) 0.25(0.42) 0(0) 1(1)
Ocean 920(2098) 0.37(0.65) 0.48(0.48) 0(0) 1(1)
Percent white 896 – 66.32 – 25.09 – 0.70 – 96.5 –
GDP per capita 832(1951) 49813.89(10.82) 10100.16(0.27) 19820.21(9.84) 79894(11.76)

524 K. T. KATTELMAN

Table 3. Predictors of CT outlays to US states, 2003–2018.
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7

Test of Pork Hypotheses

H1:Election year t – 1 –

0.90***
(0.16)

0.80***
(0.20)

0.90***
(0.16)

0.08(0.05) 0.09(0.05)

H2aHouse ideology
t – 1

– 0.41(0.26) 0.37(0.26) 0.44(0.28) 0.39(0.25) 0.41(0.26) 0.38(0.28)

H2bSen. ideology t – 1 – 0.01(0.26) −0.004
(0.27)

−0.01
(0.27)

0.01(0.26) 0.01(0.26) −0.02
(0.28)

H3GOP majority. t – 1 –

−0.94***
(0.17)

−0.84***
(0.22)

−0.59*
(0.33)

−0.97***
(0.17)

−0.94***
(0.17)

−0.54*
(0.33)

H4:DHS mem. t – 1 – 0.07(0.10) 0.09(0.11) 0.35*
(0.18)

0.07(0.10) 0.07(0.10) 0.35**
(0.18)

H5:Cardinal
dummyt – 1

– 0.31*(0.16) 0.39*(0.21) 0.27**
(0.13)

0.07(0.17) 0.31*(0.16) 0.06(0.13)

H6:Party leader t – 1 – −0.08(0.16) 0.18(0.29) −0.06
(0.16)

−0.10(0.16) −0.08(0.16) 0.16(0.27)

Party leader*GOPmaj
t – 1

– – −0.59(0.44) – – – −0.54
(0.42)

DHS*GOPmaj t – 1 – – – −0.63*
(0.34)

– – −0.60*
(0.31)

Cardinal*GOPmaj t –

– – – – 0.52*(0.31) – 0.61(0.44)

Election
Year*GOPmaj

– – – – – 0.82***
(0.15)

0.72***
(0.21)

Test of Risk Hypotheses
H7a:High risk dummy – 2.16*(1.17) 2.13*(1.14) 2.24*

(1.30)
2.15*(1.16) 2.16*(1.17) 2.19*(1.25)

H7b:Med. risk dummy – 0.17(0.24) 0.16(0.24) 0.13(0.26) 0.16(0.24) 0.17(0.24) 0.11(0.26)

Test of Reaction Hypotheses
H8:Total attacks t – 1 – −0.004

(0.07)
0.001(0.06) 0.01(0.06) −0.004

(0.07)
−0.004

(0.068)
0.01(0.06)

H9:Casualties t – 1 – 0.04*(0.02) 0.03*(0.02) 0.04**
(0.02)

0.03*(0.02) 0.04*(0.02) 0.04**
(0.02)

H10:Citizen ideology
t – 1

– 0.001(0.01) 0.001(0.01) 0.001
(0.01)

0.001(0.007) 0.001(0.007) 0.001
(0.007)

Control Variables
DV t – 1 0.93***

(0.02)
0.85***

(0.04)
0.85***

(0.05)
0.85***

(0.04)
0.85***

(0.05)
(ln) Population t – 1 0.23**(0.10) 0.37***

(0.14)
0.38***

(0.14)
0.41**

(0.16)
0.38***

(0.14)
0.37***

(0.14)
0.42**

(0.17)
Canada dummy 0.32(0.20) 0.23*(0.14) 0.23(0.14) 0.25(0.16) 0.23(0.14) 0.23*(0.14) 0.24(0.16)
Mexico dummy 0.43(0.34) 0.78(0.48) 0.76(0.48) 0.81(0.50) 0.78(0.48) 0.78(0.48) 0.79(0.51)
Ocean dummy 0.07(0.06) 0.22(0.13) 0.20*(0.12) 0.23*

(0.14)
0.22*(0.13) 0.22(0.13) 0.22*(0.13)

Percent white t – 1 −0.004*
(0.002)

−0.0004
(0.004)

0.000
(0.004)

−0.00
(0.00)

−0.0004
(0.004)

0.0003
(0.004)

GDP per capita t – 1 0.56**(0.28) 0.41(0.29) 0.47(0.32) 0.37(0.30) 0.42(0.29) 0.41(0.29) 0.43(0.34)
Constant −10.26**

(4.17)
−9.29**

(4.46)
−9.97**

(4.97)
−9.38*

(4.83)
−9.52**

(4.58)
−9.29(4.46) −10.26

(5.42)
N 780 696 696 696 696 696 696
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97

All models OLS regression estimations with year dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by US state.
* p ≤ 0.1. ** p ≤ 0.05. *** p ≤ 0.01.

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 525

Multiplying the coefficient by 1 yields 0.31. Since the dependent variable is measured in
millions of dollars, it means that, all else equal, a state will receive $310,000 more if its
legislator is a member of the DHS committee chair than if it is not (since the value is 0 if
a state does not feature a member). There is strong support for this relationship, as it
remains significant and positive across four of the six different models.

There is also some support for hypothesis 4, as models 4 and 7 indicate that DHS
committee members are able to independently secure $350,000 in CT funds for their
states.7 There is no support for hypothesis 6, as the party leadership variable is consis-
tently insignificant. Turning to partisanship effects, we see that member ideology has no
effect. Majority party status is significant, though it runs opposite to hypothesis 3. It was
anticipated that support for counterterrorist spending would increase with a GOP major-
ity. However, the opposite is true, which falls in line with the more conventional con-
servative stance on government spending (Jacoby 1994, 2000, 2008; Oldendick and
Hendren 2018).

Much of the research cited here notes a conditional relationship between political
dynamics and public spending. The next series of models test this by including interac-
tions between electoral year, majority party control, and institutional effects. Previous

Table 4. Logistic regression of UASI eligibility, 1 = received funds.
Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6

Test of Pork Hypotheses

H1:Election year t –

– −1.13(0.83) – – −1.16(0.87) 1.64*(0.89)

H2:House ideo. t – 1 – −0.93(1.02) – – −0.74(0.51) −0.91(0.63)
H3:GOP majority t –

– 4.72***(0.83) – – 9.39***(1.67) 9.28***
(1.78)

H4:DHS mem. t – 1 – −0.93(1.02) – – −0.88(1.01) −0.58(0.78)
H6:Party leader t – 1 – 1.39**(0.61) – – 1.28**(0.63) 1.90**

(0.94)

Test of Risk Hypotheses
H7a:High risk

dummy
– – −0.84(1.02) – −0.87(1.00) –

H7b:Med. risk
dummy

– – −1.38*(0.83) – −1.07(0.88) –

Test of Reaction Hypotheses
H8:Total attacks t –

– – – 0.02(0.11) 0.01(0.11) 0.05(0.09)

H9:Casualties t – 1 – – – 0.01(0.03) 0.01(0.03) −0.01(0.03)
Control Variables
DV t – 1 3.74***(0.62) 3.74***(0.60) 3.74***(0.62) 3.74***(0.61) 3.74***(0.60) 2.26***

(0.37)
(ln)Population t – 1 3.98***(0.94) 4.04***(0.93) 4.27***(0.96) 3.97***(0.94) 4.26***(0.95) 8.31*(4.77)
Canada dummy 0.92(0.67) 0.97(0.68) 1.08(0.89) 0.92(0.67) 1.21(0.89) –
Mexico dummy −0.55(0.80) −0.48(0.81) −0.42(0.82) −0.58(0.81) −0.32(0.83) –
Ocean dummy −0.01(0.52) −0.19(0.54) 0.56(0.74) −0.03(0.53) 0.29(0.78) –
(ln)GDPpc t – 1 1.68(1.68) 1.49(1.76) 1.10(1.49) 1.70(1.68) 1.09(1.55) 2.64(3.28)
Constant −76.27***

(21.61)
−79.67***

(21.61)
−73.96***

(20.63)
−76.44***

(21.28)
−78.52***

(21.31)
–

N 1947 1947 1947 1947 1947 705
Wald X2 384.63*** 403.57*** 411.13*** 389.51*** 501.56*** 333.18***
Log likelihood −301.88 −297.88 −300.34 −301.79 −297.00 −135.87

All logit regressions include year dummies.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by US state.
H5 not included because no DHS subcommittee chairs present in data.
* p ≤ 0.1. ** p ≤ 0.05. *** p ≤ 0.01.

526 K. T. KATTELMAN

works have noted that committee member power is contingent upon majority party
status (Cox and McCubbins 1993: Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). To test this, three
interaction variables are created between Republican majority status and membership
on the DHS subcommittee, chair position, and party leadership. Of these, there is robust
support of a conditional relationship between a DHS seat and Republican majority
control, in addition to independent DHS effects, as evidenced by models 4 and 7.
Hence, there is evidence that institutional effects work in conjunction with partisan
control, though it works in the opposite direction presented in H3. As model 4 shows,
a Republican controlled legislature reduces a DHS member’s ability to garner funds for
their state by $870,000.8 The effects of a cardinal seat appear more robust, with an
individual’s ability to collect on average $30,000 across models 2–4.9 Additionally, the
positive coefficient on the interaction term is in line with existing literature. The discre-
pancy in direction between these two variables may be a product of the partisanship of
the individual members. Of the DHS members, 40% are Democrats, a sizeable minority
compared to 29% of Democratic cardinals. Thus, cardinals may be more successful at
working with a Republican majority since the overwhelming majority of them are
Republicans themselves.

Overall, however, the results show robust support for the independent effects of DHS
and cardinal seats, irrespective of party control, supporting hypotheses 4 and 5. Finally,
the effects of majority party control are also interacted with an election year, as previous
studies have indicated that conservative members tend to lean hawkish on defence
spending in election years (Askoy 2018). Models 6 and 7 show robust support for
a Republican reversal of defence spending during election years, as indicated by the
interaction terms. Hence, it appears that Republican controlled legislatures adhere to the
fiscal conservative orthodoxy with regard to defence spending until election years.

The effects of risk are consistently significant across all models, supporting hypothesis
7. However, only states with a high risk receive additional funds, accepting on average an
additional $2.17 million. Thus, it appears that DHS allocations are truly allocated, in part,
by the degree of inherent risk. A robustness check includes two additional independent
measures of risk. The first is a population measure weighted by density. The second is an
aggregated Risk Management Solutions (RMS) model that calculates expected annual
consequences from a diverse range of terrorist threats (Willis et al. 2005). As noted earlier,
DHS outlays are a partial function of state population. However, these two measures
account for location or the degree of clustering of groups of people. Unfortunately, much
like the risk dummies, data are only available for 2004. Both variables show positive
significance and render the institutional variables insignificant while election year,
Republican majority control, and casualty count retain significance in the predicted
direction. The results with these additional measures are presented in the online
Appendix.

Finally, we see no support that either attacks or citizen ideology drive CT funding,
though casualty counts show robust effects. Each individual casualty within a state
generates an average increase of $36,000. This is no small effect and is in line with
existing research on the knee-jerk reactions in the US to terrorist events (Mueller and
Stewart 2012). Terrorism is a notoriously subjective label, and the theory outlined here
is contingent upon whether the public perceives a violent act as terrorism. In the US,
racial stereotypes influence the inherently subjective concept of terrorism (Whidden

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 527

2001; Aziz 2009; Elver 2012), with individuals more prone to label people perceived of
as “Arab” or “Muslim” as terrorists (Corbin 2017, 458). To test for the possibility that
the American public view certain acts as more salient than others, the data are
disaggregated into a separate count of attacks from Islamist organisations or indivi-
duals thought to be affiliated with Islamist organisations. Perpetrators groups were
coded as Islamist according to Carson and Suppenbach (2018), and incidents in which
there is tentative evidence of ties to Islamist groups were hand coded by checking the
motive, incident summary, and cited sources within the GTD database. Overall, there
were 43 separate Islamist attacks identified, yet they produce no significant effects.10

UASI eligibility

Table 4 presents logistic regression of whether a metropolitan district received UASI outlays.
Model 1 presents base controls, which behave as expected. UASI outlays are dependent
upon the population of the metro area and whether it received funding in the previous year.
This is consistent with DHS (2009) reports that model risk off of a metropolitan area’s
population. Model 2 lists pork findings, and it is here that two notable effects emerge.
The first is that institutional effects perform similarly with state outlays. However, instead of
cardinal and DHS seats it is a party leadership position that influences UASI eligibility.
The second finding is a departure from the outlay models. Election year has no effect on
eligibility, but a Republican controlled legislature has a negative effect. This finding lends
support to hypothesis 3 while at the same time pointing to separate underlying processes
that drive funding and the decision to fund. Whereas the effects of a Republican majority
were conditional on election year, here they exhibit consistent positive effects.

Further analysis of partisanship effects finds that more conservative district members
lead to a lower probability of receiving grants, which runs counter to Republican perfor-
mance as a whole. Indeed, one of the defining features of this model is that institutional
and partisan features play the lone role in the variation of metro area qualification, as model
three shows that risk is not taken into consideration, nor are the reactionary measures of
attacks or casualties. In fact, risk is significant in the opposite predicted direction. There is no
theoretical reason to suspect that officials target lower risk states, but the findings could be
an artefact of the pork process – the initial cities were the most at risk, but as more cities are
added to the list of UASI recipients they are inevitably going to add cities that are less at
risk. A cursory glance at the data supports this. A number of high-risk metropolitan areas
(e.g. New York City, San Francisco, Chicago) received funds across all years of observation,
while less risk states slowly accumulated, peaking in 2010, before dropping again.

The full model illustrates the robustness of partisan and institutional effects, though
individual membership ideology fails to reach significance. Taken together, once popula-
tion is controlled for, eligibility to receive UASI funds meant for counterterrorism defence
functions largely as an exercise in pork and partisan politics. These results also translate
over to within-observation effects, as the fixed-effects model 6 demonstrates.
Interpretation of logit coefficients is not as straightforward as OLS, as they are representa-
tions of log-odds. However, by running the coefficients through the logit model, pre-
dicted probabilities for specific variables of interest can be obtained, in this case party
leadership and Republican control of the legislature. Table 5 lists the predicted

528 K. T. KATTELMAN

probabilities from model 5, and the results are indeed substantive, with party leadership
contributing to an 8% increase in the probability of UASI eligibility and Republican
majority control contributing to a 7% bump.

As with the OLS models, several robustness checks are run. Islamist attacks do not have
any significant effects on the results, and the RMS and density-weighted population
measures also are negative and significant, which is consistent with the categorical risk
measure in model 3. Taken as a whole, the findings on UASI eligibility show robust
partisan influence at play, calling into question the purpose of counterterrorist funding
to metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the effects of majority party differ between the two
grant processes, suggesting a disconnect between the decision to fund and the amount
of funding that warrants a closer look. A condensed version of the hypotheses and the
support they receive is provided in Table 6.

Discussion

This exercise is considered a first-cut attempt at delineating the specific factors that
influence public CT spending since 9/11. The data cover the entire period of the phase
commonly known as the “Global War on Terror,” and include two measures meant to

Table 5. Predicted probabilities of receiving UASI funding
conditional on GOP control and party leadership.

H6: Party Leader

No Yes

H3: GOP Majority No 59% 68%
Yes 65% 74%

All predictions significant at *** p ≤ 0.01.
All other variables held at their mean values

Table 6. Summary of results.

Predicted finding
Support for

Increased funding?
Support for UASI

eligibility?

Pork

H1: CT funding to states should increase during a presidential election year.

Yes No

H2: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is

conservative.
No No

H3: CT funding to a constituency should increase if the legislature is
Republican controlled.

No Yes

H4: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is
a member of the DHS appropriations subcommittee.

Yes No

H5: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is
a chair of the DHS appropriations subcommittee.

Yes –

H6: CT funding to a constituency should increase if its congressperson is
a party leader.

Yes Yes

Risk
H7: CT funding to a constituency should increase with level of risk. Yes No
Reaction
H8: CT funding to a constituency should increase with the frequency of

terrorist attacks it suffers.
No No

H9: CT funding to a constituency should increase with the severity of terrorist
attacks it suffers.

Yes No

H10: Constituencies with a more conservative citizen ideology should receive
more CT funding.

No –

CRITICAL STUDIES ON TERRORISM 529

capture both the degree of CT spending as well as its scope. The collections of indicators
are meant to capture the three most commonly cited reasons behind CT variation and
expansion.

The results of this study have several implications for future research on the dynamics
of CT spending in the US. The first and most obvious is that, contrary to the few existing
studies, spending on the prevention of terrorism in the US is as much a product of politics
as any other spending decision. Committee chairs, election cycles, and party control all
work to alter the dynamics of funding flows to states as well as district eligibility. Perhaps
that should not been seen as a surprise, yet it justifies the anecdotal evidence of over-
spending and pushes back on the narrative that risk is the primary driver of national
security spending. Most notably in the case of UASI eligibility, risk plays a negative role in
the decision to grant funds to metropolitan areas.

Second, the results here suggest that risk plays a large role in grant allocation, with a small
handful of the most at-risk states receiving the largest shares of funding. The time variant
controls of population and GDP per capita are traditionally thought of as rough approxima-
tions of risk, and there were robust effects of population increases on both funds and
eligibility. This is to be expected, since the DHS explicitly relied on population as a metric
of distribution. However, the other common approximation of risk, GDP per capita, exerted
sporadic influence among state outlays and no influence in USAI eligibility. A benefit of
including the AIR risk measure in regression models is that it allows for direct comparison to
the common proxy measures of population and GDP, which provides us with more valid
evidence that the DHS does employ some degree of risk assessment in funding allocation.

Third, it is important to mention the effect that the human toll has on CT spending. The
analysis here makes clear that individual attacks do not matter as much as the actual
degree of destruction that they render. The US has a low tolerance of death at the hands
of terrorists, and a close interpretation of the data bears this out. This finding comple-
ments previous works that detail the vast degree of overspending and suggest that
casualty-induced spending measures intend to sooth a psychological gap rather than
correct a lapse in an already over secure nation.

As previously stated, the research presented here is a first cut at a very small subset of
federal CT spending. The theoretical logic rested primarily on a top-down approach. That
is, spending decisions were a function of actions at the federal level. State and local
demand were not captured in these models beyond simple demographic and partisan
measures. One promising method of measuring local dependence and demand on
defence spending involves examining subcontracts. As of now, however, data at this
level remain limited in scope, yet patterns of local economic dependence on defence
spending using this method exist (Thorpe 2010, 2014). Further research into the HSGP
should employ data at the subcontract level to expand on the findings here, as it remains
unclear how any of this grant money is actually used.

Lastly, it should be stressed that statistical models cannot provide definitive answers to the
specific processes that drive CT spending to the states. At best, they infer that key political
positions and party control play a role in HSGP distribution. While their advantage is that they
show these effects as part of a broader pattern, detail is lost on how these processes actually
play out. Future research should also focus on qualitative, deep-dives into the DHS sub-
committee, for example, to uncover specifically how this relationship drives spending.

530 K. T. KATTELMAN

Notes

1. Gimpel, Lee, and Thorpe (2009) find evidence of this with the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, which was passed in response to the exogenous shock of the
financial crisis of 2008.

2. In particular, Representative Harold “Hal” Rogers (R-KY) has brought over $200 million in DHS
grants back to his state in the three years since the panel was created, which is approximate
to the amount New York City received in 2005 (Kaplan 2006).

3. For example, the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Programme (LETPP) was a separate
line item until 2009, when it was determined that SHSGP and UASI will dedicate 25% of their
funds to its continuance (US Department of Homeland Security FY 2009 Overview). Other
programmes, such as the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) and the Citizen
Corps Program (CCP), discontinued in 2012.

4. Specifically, the SHSGP and UASI (US Government Accountability Office 2008).
5. For example, state and local investments in counterterrorism, dual-use programs and spend-

ing, private donations, classified spending, and economic losses and secondary effects
stemming from the long-term cost of homeland security.

6. There are also additional filtering criteria that allow for customisation of the definition – 1. Act
must be aimed at attaining a political economic, religious, or social goal. 2. There must be
evidence of intention to coerce or convey a message to a larger audience. 3. The action must
be outside of the context of legitimate warfare activities. All three criteria were selected to
obtain the data for this study.

7. This value is simply the result of multiplying the DHS committee membership coefficient of
0.35 on the value of a state having a member of the DHS committee, which is 1. Since the
dependent variable is in millions of dollars, the coefficient is multiplied by 1,000,000 to
generate the predicted dollar amount.

8. Interpreting interaction effects must take into account the separate coefficients as well as
their interactions. Hence, we add the coefficient for GOP majority (−0.59) with DHS member-
ship (0.35) with the interaction term between the two (−0.63).

9. This is compiled by averaging the three Cardinal coefficients (i.e. 0.31, 0.39, and 0.27).
10. Results presented in the online Appendix.

Data availability statement

Data available at https://kylekattelman.wixsite.com/kylekattelman

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Kyle Kattelman is associate professor of political science at Fairleigh Dickinson University.

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Domestic terrorism: A more urgent threat, but weaker laws

https://doi.org/10.2307/2150933

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887113000129

https://doi.org/10.2307/2600934

https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X09337107

https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial-census/data/datasets.html

https://www.dhs.gov/science-and-technology/national-federal-laboratories-research-centers

https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grant-program-overview-fy2009

https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-852

Abstract

Introduction

Motivators of counterterrorist spending in the US

Pork: domestic political motivators

Risk: statistical motivators

Reaction: psychological motivators

Data and methodology

Dependent variables

Independent variables

Results

Funding

UASI eligibility

Discussion

Notes

Data availability statement

Disclosure statement

Notes on contributor

References

https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480616684195

Theoretical Criminology
2018, Vol. 22(2) 206 –225

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DOI: 10.1177/1362480616684195

journals.sagepub.com/home/tcr

The European Union:
Sword or shield? Comparing
counterterrorism law in the
EU and the USA after 9/11

Claire Hamilton
Maynooth University, Ireland

Abstract
Drawing on the developing literature on a ‘European penology’ this article seeks to
use counterterrorism as a lens through which to re-examine arguments concerning
penal moderation in Europe. Counterterrorism measures adopted in the EU and the
USA in the post-9/11 period are therefore scrutinized for the lessons they hold about
the role of European values and institutions as a ‘shield’ against punitiveness or indeed
their ability to, swordlike, cut deep into citizens’ freedoms. The resulting analysis raises
questions about the need for a more refined approach to the question of ‘European’
penal values as well as pointing up the continued existence of a culture of rights in the
USA.

Keywords
Counterterrorism, European penology, human rights, punitiveness

Introduction

Perhaps one of the richest seams of literature to emerge in response to Garland’s (2001)
seminal Culture of Control is that which draws attention to the spatial or ‘cultural’ limits
of his thesis (Garland, 2011). While many of these accounts focus on national
idiosyncrasies, a more recent line of argument extends the criminological gaze outwards

Corresponding author:
Claire Hamilton, Senior Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, Maynooth University, Maynooth, Co Kildare,
Ireland.
Email: claire.hamilton@nuim.ie

684195 TCR0010.1177/1362480616684195Theoretical CriminologyHamilton
research-article2017

Article

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Hamilton 207

towards Europe and the role that European human rights standards and cultural norms
may play in insulating member countries from repressive penal policies (Body-Gendrot
et al., 2013; Daems et al., 2013; Snacken, 2006; Snacken and Dumortier, 2012; Van Zyl
Smit and Snacken, 2009; Vaughan and Kilcommins, 2007). Building on the work of
Whitman (2003) and others (e.g. Salas, 2005), this literature seeks to interrogate the
significance of European values and human rights standards for penality, particularly the
opportunities they provide for ‘resistance’ to US-style punitive policies (Snacken and
Dumortier, 2012). Writing in this journal, Snacken (2010), for example, has pointed to
policies such as the rejection of the death penalty, the steady evolution of the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law on prison conditions; and the limits placed by
the Court on states’ ability to criminalize certain behaviours in support of her argument
that ‘penal moderation is in accordance with some of those fundamental values cherished
by many Europeans’ (2010: 287). Taking up the mantle, Daems (2013) makes the case
for a ‘European penology’, while emphasizing the common values that unite Europeans
such as a liberal and cosmopolitan tradition. In the same volume Snacken and Van Zyl
Smit (2013) argue that an understanding of European penology is better reached by
focusing on the specific European institutional context, namely, the Council of Europe
but also the European Union, an actor which since the creation of the Area of Freedom,
Security and Justice (AFSJ) in 1999 has become increasingly active in the penal field.
Here too we are witnessing a deepening commitment to human rights in its activities,
with the role of human rights now formally reflected in the form of the European Charter
on Fundamental Rights, now in force and legally binding on Member States when imple-
menting EU law.

One area which has remained relatively under-examined in the context of this
debate—and which this article seeks to address—is the field of counterterrorism, with
only cursory discussions in the literature on the role of security matters in ratcheting up
the punitive climate in Europe (Dumortier et al., 2012: 109–110; Snacken and Van Zyl
Smit, 2013: 22). While this may be unsurprising in light of what Zedner (2007: 264) has
described as the tendency of counterterrorism to remain ‘outside the normal boundaries
of criminological knowledge’ it is nevertheless an omission in terms of the significant
influence it has wielded over European crime control policy. Conceived precisely at the
moment when the EU was beginning to assert itself in the criminal justice field, EU
counterterrorism law and policy (such as the European Arrest Warrant, asset freezing
measures, data retention and surveillance legislation, etc.) has become the ‘central driver’
(Murphy, 2013: 169) of European criminal justice cooperation in the past decade. This
has been accompanied by a literature expressing concern about the securitized nature of
European criminal law and justice, particularly the impact which counterterrorism policy
has had on the evolution of ‘ordinary’ crime control policy in the Union since the area of
‘freedom, justice and security’ first emerged in 1999 (Baker, 2010; Baker and Roberts,
2005; Loader, 2002; Mitsilegas et al., 2003). In a report commissioned by Privacy
International, for example, Hosein (2005) argues that European counterterrorism poli-
cies such as the interception of communications and data retention/profiling go much
further than those adopted in the USA and furthermore (unlike US policies) lack trans-
parency or a robust process of policy deliberation in order to keep such powers in check.
In the most comprehensive study of this issue to date, Baker (2010) characterizes the

208 Theoretical Criminology 22(2)

Union’s existing role as a penal actor as ‘governing through security’ rather than ‘gov-
erning through crime’ (the latter being of course a reference to Simon’s (2007) argument
concerning the use of crime as a mode of governance in the USA). Applying this frame-
work to the European Union, Baker observes some evidence of victim focused/crime
control thinking in terms of security policies that have been adopted so far with many of
these, such as the European Arrest Warrant, having been somewhat hastily adopted in the
face of the ‘terrorist threat’ (Caneppele, 2013). Indeed, the influence of counterterrorism
on criminal justice policy in the Union has been such that Dumortier et al. (2012) describe
it as a ‘turbo’ to the penalization engine which has resulted in a significant escalation in
penal measures and the punitive climate in Europe. Discussion such as this casts Europe
in a very different light, one much more aligned with the US position where security
demands, particularly since 9/11, have pushed it to ‘the brink’ (Baker, 2010: 206) of a
more punitive approach.

Given the different approaches taken by these two literature streams, this article seeks
to use counterterrorism as a lens through which to re-examine arguments concerning
penal moderation in Europe. Adopting the metaphor employed by Dumortier et al.
(2012), the counterterrorism example is scrutinized for the lessons it holds about the role
of European values and institutions as a ‘shield’ against punitiveness or indeed their abil-
ity to, swordlike, cut deep into citizens’ freedoms. To this end, a comparative approach—
contrasting developments in the EU with those in the USA—is adopted given the insights
it affords into the question of Europe’s position in relation to the rest of the world (Pakes,
2015: 5). Through cross-Atlantic comparison of counterterrorism law and policy we gain
a better perspective on European initiatives, particularly given the frequent use of the
‘punitive turn’ in the USA as a foil for arguments concerning a European penology (see,
for example, Daems, 2013: 27–28). As the EU is a supranational body and not a sover-
eign state like the USA it goes without saying that the nature of the comparison is not
strictly ‘like-for-like’; inter-state measures such as the European Arrest Warrant do not
have a meaningful equivalent in the USA, for example. As comparative scholars such as
Dannemann (2006) have remarked, however, we should beware of a rigid focus on simi-
larity/difference and instead seek to strike a proper balance between these qualities in
accordance with the purpose of the comparative inquiry.

In line with the approach taken by members of the ‘European penology’ school of
thought, ‘punitiveness’ for this purpose will be defined broadly incorporating: ‘a wide
variety of actors’ ranging from ‘primary criminalization by legislators, to decisions taken
by practitioners within the criminal justice system (police, prosecution, sentencing, etc.),
or to attitudes of revenge or forgiveness of victims of crime’ (Snacken and Dumortier,
2012: 2). The article thus proceeds in the next part to provide an overview of European
Union and US law and policy in this area in the period since 2001, examining some of
the key measures taken by the USA and the European Union in response to the events of
9/11. This is followed by a more detailed look at some of the most significant criminal
law measures adopted with the Framework Decisions on Combating Terrorism (hereafter
‘FDCT’) and the European Arrest Warrant (hereafter ‘EAW’) providing the main focus
as the flagship measures in the EU response (Hassan, 2010).1 Extra-legal measures are
subsequently examined in line with suggestions in the literature that many of the coer-
cive practices associated with the ‘war on terror’ have been deployed outside of the

Hamilton 209

criminal process (Lazarus et al., 2013). The final part discusses the implications for the
literature arising from a survey of law and policy in this area. The resulting analysis, it is
argued, reveals a more nuanced situation than is often assumed to be the case: while the
highly punitive measures taken by the USA in the period immediately following the 9/11
attacks cannot be gainsaid, some of these have been subsequently watered down or aban-
doned. They have also, to a significant degree, been ‘contained’ within the exceptional
realm. In contrast, the significant body of EU counterterrorism legislation which has
accrued since 9/11 has driven radical and permanent change in at least some areas of
mainstream criminal law and procedure in EU Member States.

EU and US responses to 9/11

Background

In order to fully appreciate EU activism in this area it is necessary to briefly trace the
‘genealogy’ of the European approach to counterterrorism (Hassan, 2010). Beginning
with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht which first conferred competence on the Union in the
field of justice and home affairs, justice policy at the time of the Twin Towers attack had
evolved to the point where agreement had been secured to the construction of an ‘Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) and to the principle of mutual recognition. The
9/11 terrorism emergency thus occurred precisely at the moment when the EU was
beginning to assert itself in the criminal justice field resulting in counterterrorism becom-
ing the focal point for the development of the EU’s role in this area (Murphy, 2011). The
sheer volume of counterterrorism measures adopted by the EU bears testament to this
with a recent report by SECILE (2013) identifying 239 such measures for the period
2001–2013. While implementation of some of these measures has been patchy (Den
Boer, 2006; European Commission, 2007), many of the most significant (and controver-
sial) instruments in terms of their impact on domestic criminal justice, for example, the
European Arrest Warrant, have now been successfully transposed and implemented by
Member States (Coolaset, 2016; European Commission, 2014).

Following the attacks the European Council hastily arranged an extraordinary (emer-
gency) meeting of the chefs de cabinet in Brussels on 20–21 September. The meeting
sought to address the deficiencies in EU action in this area, namely, the lack of a common
legal definition of terrorism, the absence of a harmonized system of penalties and a basis
for accelerated extradition, and set itself the deadline of December 2011 to reach agree-
ment on several legal acts (Monar, 2005). Most prominent among these was the adoption
of a framework decision on the EAW and a decision harmonizing Member States’ penal
laws on the definition and sentencing of terrorism (FDCT). While the European
Commission had been working on proposals in these areas for many months it is difficult
to overstate the transformative effect of the 9/11 attacks in this area. As Den Boer (2006:
90) has written, ‘all of a sudden decisions were possible on dormant dossiers’. By 27
December 2001, the EU had constructed a common definition of terrorism and issued a
common list of terrorist organizations, the first such definition by an international body,
although final adoption of the FDCT was delayed until 13 June 2002 because of parlia-
mentary scrutiny. The EU Framework Decision on the Arrest Warrant and the Surrender

210 Theoretical Criminology 22(2)

Procedures between Member States (Council of the European Union, 2002a), which
overhauled the law on extradition between Member States, was similarly delayed due to
parliamentary scrutiny until 13 June 2002.

The period after the Madrid bombings saw fresh impetus brought to this area. The
European Council adopted a new declaration on combating terrorism on 25 March con-
taining 57 specific measures, many of which as Statewatch (2004) has commented were
only vaguely related to terrorism stricto sensu. In 2005, after the 7/7 London bombings,
the Counterterrorism Strategy sought to simplify the wide range of counterterrorism
measures for Member States under four headings (prevent, protect, disrupt and respond).
The commitment to ‘prevention’ in the 2005 Strategy marks another point of distinction
with the US strategy which has been less concerned with the ‘root causes’ of terrorism.
As Coolaset (2011: 238) has pointed out, however, the degree of consensus on this point
should not be overestimated: ‘among the EU member states, most were adamant that the
emphasis should be on repressive measures’.

Compared with the scale of the European response, the body of US legislation over the
same period appears rather more modest. The US Patriot Act 2001 hastily adopted by
Congress in the aftermath of the attacks was followed by two large pieces of reforming
legislation, namely, the Department of Homeland Security Act 2002 and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 2004. The former effected probably the largest over-
haul of government structure in the period since the Second World War in establishing the
Department of Homeland Security and the latter inter alia created a new director of national
intelligence in an effort to centralize the intelligence function. Subsequent legislation, how-
ever, appears more reactive than proactive, responding to the decisions of the courts on the
rights of military detainees and controversy surrounding the National Security Agency
(NSA) warrantless spying programme.2 The impact of the legislation also appears less
significant than in other countries: Roach (2011: 161) describes the Patriot Act as ‘mild
compared to the responses of other democracies’ and Banks (2005) similarly wonders how
the Patriot Act became a ‘lightning rod’ for critics of the Bush administration. In fact, many
of the most infamous responses to the attacks were measures taken unilaterally by the
executive in the years immediately following the attacks such as: the detention of more
than 5000 foreign nationals; the indeterminate detention of suspected terrorists or ‘enemy
combatants’ in Guantanamo Bay; the ‘disappearance’ of persons into so-called CIA ‘black
sites’ or secret prisons; and ‘extraordinary rendition’ of suspects to countries where they are
at risk of torture. Some of these actions such as the detention of ‘enemy combatants’ have
been justified with reference to the Authorization of Military Force (AUMF) passed by
Congress in a direct response to the events of 9/11. This resolution authorizing the President
to ‘use all necessary and appropriate force’ against the perpetrators of 9/11 was sweeping
in its breadth and represented a clear endorsement of the ‘war model’ by Congress (Oliverio,
2008). Gradually, however, through litigation and public opposition, many of these policies
have begun to be reversed (see later).

Criminal law measures

As noted earlier two of the signal reforms introduced by the EU in the period immedi-
ately following 9/11 concerned a common definition of terrorism (FDCT) and a new

Hamilton 211

procedure for extradition between Member States (EAW). Each of these measures will
be considered separately below.

FDCT: Terrorism offences

As the trigger for a wide range of coercive powers (Amnesty International, 2005;
Murphy, 2012a) the definition of terrorism is obviously critical, however, in an EU con-
text this issue assumed particular importance as so few Member States had any specific
legislation criminalizing terrorism prior to the adoption of the Framework Decision in
2002 (Amnesty International, 2005; Argomaniz, 2009). Indeed, the number of Member
States with legislation which criminalized terrorist acts autonomously went from six
prior to 9/11 to 22 by 2007 (Chaves, 2015). Roach (2013: 29) describes this as ‘an explo-
sive growth’ or ‘viral propagation of anti-terrorism laws in Europe’ whose impact should
not be underestimated.

In terms of reforms at Member State level, the definition of terrorist offences inevita-
bly led to the adoption of new criminal offences in those states without anti-terrorism
legislation (Chaves, 2015). Legislation was also required in those states which already
had counterterrorism legislation in place given that they all had definitions of terrorism
that were narrower than the EU’s (Chaves, 2015). In the 2002 FDCT these new offences
took the form of directing, creating, supporting or participating in a terrorist group and
this was extended in 2008 to include offences of public provocation to commit a terrorist
offence, recruitment and training for terrorism (including via the internet). These offences
have been criticized for the threat they pose to fundamental legal principles as well as the
preventative or pre-emptive direction in which they take the criminal law (Murphy,
2012a). Indeed, such was the concern of the European Parliament about the 2008 amend-
ments that it sought to introduce human rights safeguards into the legislation, amend-
ments which were rejected by the Council, save for a declaratory (and arguably
superfluous) statement regarding the general requirement to respect fundamental rights
(European Parliament, 2008). It is worth noting that all of these offences are subject to
enhanced sentencing as the Decision also provided for minimum maximum sentences
(15 years for directing and eight for participatory or preparatory acts). This is the case
even if group offences are not applicable to an individual given the requirement for
Member States to enact ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’3 criminal penalties for
all offences linked to terrorism (Murphy, 2012a). Unlike the EU, the USA, constrained
by First Amendment principles of freedom of association, did not enact multiple new
terrorist crimes such as membership or incitement to terrorism. The only new offences
created by the Patriot Act were those relating to attacks on mass transportation4 and har-
bouring or concealing terrorists5 as well as some minor changes to the offence of provid-
ing ‘material support’ for terrorism.6

In Europe, moreover, the problems associated with these associative and preparatory
offences are compounded by the EU definition of terrorism itself. This definition is also
expansive, defining terrorist acts as those committed with the aim of:

seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international
organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or

212 Theoretical Criminology 22(2)

destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country
or an international organisation.

(Article 1(1))

The list of offences goes beyond violence to include serious property damage ‘likely to
result in major economic loss’ (Article 1(1)(d)), a move which has been criticized, par-
ticularly when interpreted in the context of the broadly drafted reference to ‘unduly com-
pelling’ a government (Douglas-Scott, 2004). While drafted more tightly than the UK
provisions, it does appear broader than the definitions adopted by most of the UN con-
ventions on terrorism and the Patriot Act itself (Roach, 2011, 2013; Zedner, 2013).
Indeed, Roach (2011: 181) describes the latter’s approach as ‘comparatively restrained’
in terms of its narrow focus on ‘violent acts or acts dangerous to a human life’ and the
absence of reference to religious or political motives.

European Arrest Warrant

The European Arrest Warrant (EAW)—‘the jewel in the crown of the EU’s response to
the terrorist attacks’ (Douglas-Scott, 2004: 223)—probably represents one of the most
prominent yet possibly also the most controversial of the EU counterterrorism measures
(Van Sliedregt, 2010). While proposals for the EAW predated the events of 9/11, negotia-
tions between Member States on this sensitive area were so protracted that it really only
became ‘politically palatable’ (Murphy, 2012b: np) in the period after the attacks. Indeed,
while the proposal had already been under preparation by officials for a period of two
years, national views on the most basic features of the instrument were ‘very, very far
apart’ (Kaunert, 2007: 396) until the events of 9/11.7 The measure, adopted in a
Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 (Council of the European Union, 2002b), revolu-
tionized laws relating to extradition in the EU, effectively transforming what was once a
detailed judicial procedure with strict legal requirements such as the dual criminality
rule8 into an administrative ‘box ticking exercise’ (MacGuill, 2012). The procedure is
now a summary one whereby the merits of the request are taken on trust and the receiv-
ing Member State is obliged to execute an EAW unless one of the very limited grounds
of objection is applicable. The considerable efficiencies gained by the measure (particu-
larly the reduction in delays) have been noted by the European Commission (2011),
something which, given that justice delayed is often justice denied, may well work in
ease of requested persons. Yet the benefits in terms of expeditious hearings must also be
considered against strong concerns voiced about disproportionality, violations of proce-
dural rights, poor detention conditions and the imprisonment of innocent persons
(European Parliament, 2014; Hammarberg, 2011). While space constraints do not permit
a full examination of the concerns voiced, two observations relevant to the current argu-
ment can be made. First, as with the FDCT discussed earlier, it is surprising given the
ostensible respect for human rights principles proclaimed in various EU legal instru-
ments that the prospect of serious breaches of human rights was not expressly stated as a
ground on which extradition could be refused, an omission which has led to highly vari-
able protection of rights across Member States (Anagnostopoulos, 2014; Magyar, 2012).

Hamilton 213

Another significant concern is with net-widening or ‘function creep’ (Argomaniz et al.,
2015) which was evident from the legislation’s inception: while it was presented to
Member States and to the public as a key counterterrorist measure it included within its
scope a long list of (32) offences, many of which, such as road traffic offences, are not
even offences of specific intent.9 Unsurprisingly, this has resulted in the majority of
requests being issued for ordinary rather than terrorist offences as well as the systematic
use of the EAW procedure for minor offences (European Parliament, 2014). This is
unfortunate given the severely damaging effect which the disproportionate use of the
EAW can have on individuals sought by requesting states; not only may they be taken
away from their homes, families and employment for a lengthy period, perhaps for years,
but they will in all likelihood be denied bail by virtue of the very fact of being a resident
of another country (Fennelly, 2007).

This picture of radical change in the form of a radical new binding system of surren-
der stands in marked contrast to the dearth of fundamental criminal justice change to the
domestic system in the USA (Roach, 2011). While inter-state measures relating to extra-
dition have no functional equivalent in the USA, as a sovereign power rather than a
supranational body it could also have introduced legislation to facilitate preventative
arrests, to curtail Miranda rights10 or to erode the accused’s right to disclosure yet it did
not (Roach, 2011). Hybrid new civil/criminal measures such as control orders (UK) or
special trial procedures as introduced in the UK and the Netherlands might also reason-
ably have been expected following the greatest ever attack on US soil, yet these too were
notable by their absence (Van Sliedregt, 2010). Indeed, as discussed in more detail below,
far from a ‘levelling down’ of procedural protections in the domestic criminal justice
system, there has in fact been a ‘levelling up’ of core procedural guarantees to military
detainees.

Extra-legal measures

It is probably the range of illegal conduct engaged in by the US executive in the period
post-9/11—namely, torture, extra-legal detention/rendition and the use of military tribu-
nals rather than civilian courts—that has both elevated the United States to international
notoriety and provided the most vivid illustration of ‘difference’ between the US and
European approaches to punishment. Snacken and Van Zyl Smit (2013) make the (very
valid) point that while torture, rendition and detention centres outside of judicial control
have gained increasing acceptance in the USA (in the period prior to 2009 at least), in
Europe bodies such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) have increased supervision of places of
detention and expanded the definition of torture. While some of these measures have
been defended in the USA based on Congress’s AUMF and convoluted legal opinion
(see, for example, the infamous ‘torture memos’: Greenberg and Dratel, 2005), it is clear
that by international standards they constitute serious breaches of human rights which
test the limits of the appropriate exercise of executive power.

These measures have not gone uncontested, however. A fact which is perhaps less
appreciated outside of the USA is that in recent years legal and political opposition has
gradually brought an end to some of the worst abuses: most of the detainees have been

214 Theoretical Criminology 22(2)

released from Guantanamo Bay (although it remains open); torture and inhumane treat-
ment are no longer official US policy; the CIA’s black sites are closed; there have been
no reports of rendition in years; and the widespread detention of Muslims which occurred
in the immediate post-9/11 period has not been repeated (Cole, 2011; Murphy, 2012b).
After some years in operation, a more considered view may also be taken on the quality
of justice administered in US military tribunals. Following the long line of litigation in
the US Supreme Court on the rights of Guantanamo detainees, some of the most impor-
tant procedural protections such as the right to disclosure have been extended to military
detainees under the Military Commission Act 2009. While the Miranda rule and speedy
trial arguments cannot be made by suspects tried before military commissions, state-
ments admitted as evidence are subject to the voluntariness test as in civilian trials and
disclosure rules are closely modelled on the Classified Information Procedure Act 1980
(CIPA) principles that govern civilian criminal trials (Cole, 2013). Thus, in an interesting
subversion of Whitman’s (2003) arguments about the USA’s tendency to ‘level down’ or
reduce all offenders to a low status, procedural protections have in fact been ‘levelled up’
to these detainees, rather than ‘levelled down’ for all citizens (as occurred in Europe).
These developments should also be considered against a conviction rate of 80 per cent
for military tribunals (White, 2004 in Jacobson, 2006) which, compared with a convic-
tion rate of 89 per cent for terrorist prosecutions in the Federal Courts (Center on Law
and Security, 2010) casts doubt on widespread perceptions of such courts as a ‘kangaroo
court’ (Cole, 2013). All of the above allows a much more optimistic verdict than would
have been returned some years ago. Indeed, Cole (2011) argues that the rule of law has
been more resilient in the USA than many commentators would have predicted in the
immediate post-9/11 period.

While the EU has no equivalent to the detention of ‘enemy combatants’ in Guantanamo
Bay, even in this area we should not be too quick to draw conclusions based on funda-
mental cultural differences. We do not have to probe very far into the history of European
jurisdictions and their experience with terrorism to witness similar strategies: France’s
use of torture, military/state security courts and the paradigm of ‘preventive justice’ in
the fight against Islamic terrorism provides a good illustration in this regard (Garapon,
2006). Likewise, the EU’s position on such illegalities is somewhat more ambiguous
than is commonly understood. While known for its strong commitment to the rule of law
(Baker, 2013), it has also been criticized for its failure to take a more assertive role on
human rights standards in the ‘war on terror’, with Human Rights Watch (2007) describ-
ing it as ‘punching well below its weight’. Indeed, it is clear that with regard to some of
the abuses associated with the war on terror, including the provision of logistical support
to US air carriers engaging in illegal renditions, several of the European states do not
come with clean hands. A Council of Europe report (Marty, 2006) on the matter found 14
European countries colluded in a system of illegal US detentions and transfers with sub-
sequent reports (Marty, 2007, 2009) naming Poland, Romania and Lithuania as the sites
of secret CIA prisons. This was further supported by an investigation by the European
Parliament (2007) which found that at least 1245 flights operated by the CIA flew into
European airspace or stopped over at European airports between 2001 and 2005 (plus an
unspecified number of military flights for the same purpose). Most recently, Poland has
become the first EU Member State to be found complicit in the CIA’s secret detention

Hamilton 215

programme and responsible for multiple violations or rights in breach of the ECHR.11
This finding—by the European Court of Human Rights (Council of Europe) rather than
the European Court of Justice (EU)—begs the additional question as to why the European
Commission failed to bring a rule of law challenge under Article 7 of the Treaty against
those states who allowed rendition on their territory to show its seriousness about human
rights (Douglas-Scott, 2008–2009).

Implications for the literature

At the beginning of this article we noted the emerging literature on the distinctive fea-
tures of a European criminal law and the role of human rights as a bulwark against
US-style punitiveness. While the authors are careful to place question marks after both
book titles (viz. Daems et al., 2013 European Penology?; Snacken and Dumortier, 2012
Resisting Punitiveness in Europe?), it is clear, as Tham (2013: 566, emphases added)
observes, that ‘the sympathetic idea of common liberal values grounding European
states, [is] put forward both as description and prescription’. The above discussion does
little to trouble these arguments concerning the protective influence of the human rights
standards promulgated by the Council of Europe and the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) which, to be fair, form the authors’ main focus (see Daems et al.,
2013: v). It does, however, raise some questions about the coherence of a ‘European’
penology, particularly as applied to the policies of the European Union. This is for three
reasons, based on the above discussion. First, while the Union may strongly endorse
human rights values in the Charter and elsewhere, these are less in evidence in the coun-
terterrorism, and by extension, ordinary criminal justice sphere. The failure of the
Council to include formal safeguards protecting fundamental rights in the 2008 amend-
ments to the FDCT, even in the face of objections from the European Parliament (2008),
is a case in point. Even more significant is the omission of human rights grounds as a
formal bar to extradition in the Framework Document on the EAW, resulting in the prop-
agation of ‘an approach to extradition which places mutual recognition above the human
rights of the requested person’ (Magyar, 2012: 4). There is also the second important
question of the expanding parameters of the penal state as achieved through the second
Framework Decision (FDCT). As we have seen, ‘an explosive growth’ in anti-terrorism
law in this field has meant that even the six Member States which already criminalized
terrorist acts were required to enlarge the number and type of behaviours included in
legislation. Proscription of a wide variety of participatory and preparatory acts related to
terrorism together with enhanced penalties for these offences may not lead to an immedi-
ate increase in punishment, but may result in increased punitiveness over time, as the
police and prosecutorial authorities become more familiar with the new laws (Chaves,
2015). This is all the more likely in the new legal and institutional environment where the
Commission and the European Court of Justice have full enforcement powers over coun-
terterrorism measures, and where counterterrorism now exists as an established policy
domain, thus marking an important difference with the counterterrorism measures of the
past (Argomaniz, 2011). Rather than a ‘shield’ against the expansion of the penal state,
therefore, this legislation better fits with the concept of Europe as a ‘sword’ (Dumortier
et al., 2012) advancing the reach of the criminal law, particularly for those protestors and

216 Theoretical Criminology 22(2)

opposition groups who may be caught up in the ambiguities of the broad definition of
terrorism. As we have seen, similar measures criminalizing what may be termed ‘abstract
danger’ were not adopted in the USA, probably on account of the strong First Amendment
protections (Roach, 2011).

The final, and critical issue, concerns the spillover effect of counterterrorist legisla-
tion into the ‘ordinary’ criminal justice sphere, a tendency which is by now well docu-
mented (Hillyard, 1994). Unlike the USA (and to a lesser degree the UK) the EU has
chosen to confine its counterterrorism measures to the criminal justice realm. While
commendable, as Zedner (2014) observes, this carries its own hazards in terms of the risk
of over-criminalization and incorporation of ‘exceptional’ procedures into normal crimi-
nal justice practice. In this regard at the EU level we may observe a pattern of EU
Member States approving a policy to counter terror but including within its ambit a range
of other crimes (Hosein, 2005; SECILE, 2013; Statewatch, 2004). The European Arrest
Warrant probably provides the best example of this as a policy which was presented to
Member States as a counterterrorism measure but applied to a significantly larger num-
ber of ordinary offences. Its systematic application to ordinary and indeed minor offences
such as road traffic infractions has had punitive consequences for many thousands of
Europeans with nearly 55,000 warrants issued in the period between 2005 and 2009
alone (European Parliament, 2014). A similar logic can be seen at work with the pro-
posed European Investigation Order (EIO), another ambitious legal instrument which is
listed as a counterterrorism measure in the EU’s current counterterrorism strategy, but
which will have significant implications for evidence gathering and fundamental rights
principles in respect of all criminal offences (Anagnostopoulos, 2014; Murphy, 2012a).
In the USA, on the other hand, this process of contamination has been less pronounced;
while there have been reports of Patriot Act powers being used by law enforcement in the
prosecution of other serious offences (Dworkin, 2003), one of the paradoxical effects of
the violent nature of the ‘war on terror’ abroad is the protective effect it has had on the
internal criminal justice system (Roach, 2011).

Which ‘Europe’?

In light of the above is there a need for a more refined approach to the question of
‘European’ penal values, one which perhaps distinguishes to a greater degree between
different branches of the European institutional family? As Douglas-Scott (2008–2009:
85) has written in her survey of EU action in the security and justice field, the European
Union has so far done less towards the goal of a Europe ‘that can represent itself to the
world as a continent of human values’, than the ‘other Europe’ of Strasbourg and the
ECHR. This is of course a reference to the Council of Europe, an international organiza-
tion focused on promoting human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe and
promulgator of the ECHR. While there is certainly a degree of overlap between the
Council of Europe and the EU in terms of their commitment to human rights standards,
it is also clear from the above discussion that the Realpolitik of EU criminal justice has
often subordinated human rights to the perceived imperative of security.

A further interesting point is the extent to which this argument can be applied and
extended to the institutions of the EU itself. Viewed through the lens of counterterrorism

Hamilton 217

law and policy, it is probably the European Parliament, of the three institutions of the EU
(Council, Commission and Parliament), that has demonstrated the greatest commitment
to human rights principles—witness its investigations into the CIA extraordinary rendi-
tion programme (European Parliament, 2007); its criticisms (cited earlier) of legislative
overreaching in the 2008 Framework Decision; and its recent report calling for EAW
reform (European Parliament, 2014). Servent (2010: 192) agrees, through her observa-
tion that ‘the EP [European Parliament] has developed a reputation for engaging in a
strategy of contestation that questions the given balance between security and liberty’
(see also Murphy, 2013). All of this raises significant questions about the extent to which
‘Europe’ and even the European Union itself speaks with one voice, beyond what one
may perhaps consider ‘baseline’ values such as the prohibition of the death penalty.

It is likely that these institutional dynamics will assume a new relevance given the
entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the now increased capacity of the Parliament in
decision making in sensitive areas such as counterterrorism. In this new context there
may well be greater opportunities for the European Parliament to ‘de-securitize’ (Servent,
2010). Liberalizing measures may also follow what Murphy (2013) describes as a ‘push
back’ in this area and a new emphasis on procedural rights and enhancing mutual trust in
line with the Stockholm Programme and its successor.12 All of these developments cau-
tion against drawing too sharp a contrast between mutual recognition and human rights
as well as the complementarity which may exist in Europe between crime control and
due process measures (the latter being necessary to build the mutual trust for the former)
(Vaughan and Kilcommins, 2010). Lest this should suggest a brave new dawn in EU
criminal justice, however, it is worth noting that while enhanced procedural protections
may balance out the so far unduly repressive tone of European criminal justice, it is
highly unlikely that we will see any of the existing counterterrorism measures reversed
(Chaves, 2015; Murphy, 2013). Indeed, the permanent nature of much of the European
legislation since 9/11 forms another important point of distinction with US counterterror-
ism measures taken over the period (Hassan, 2010; Murphy, 2012b). The exceptional
measures unilaterally taken by the US executive in the period immediately following
9/11, though egregious and (probably) illegal, have at least permitted a certain retrench-
ment in the face of political and legal opposition.

The culture of rights in the USA

It may be that in many ways the US case benefits from a longer-term view or less epi-
sodic analysis. While not gainsaying in any way the highly punitive measures taken by
the USA in the period immediately following the Twin Tower attacks, it is undeniable
that a longer-term view of US counterterrorism policy reveals the cracks in an executive
approach which endorsed torture, indefinite detention and rendition. This should also be
considered against a considerable degree of legislative restraint with regard to domestic
criminal procedure. As has been discussed, the significant changes which counterterror-
ism law and policy have effected in the ‘ordinary’ EU criminal justice sphere contrast
sharply with the more conservative approach to law reform adopted by the US state in
the post-9/11 period. Though rarely acknowledged in the literature, or indeed wider dis-
course (though see Liptak, 2011),

218 Theoretical Criminology 22(2)

the fact remains that a decade after 9/11 and the prosecution of many home-grown terrorist
plots, there has been little serious discussion or contemplation of new legislation that would
limit the rights of American citizens in attempt to prevent terrorism.

(Roach, 2011: 477)

Indeed, the lack of fundamental reform has led Jacobson (2006: 133) to criticize what he
sees as the ‘sacrosanct’ nature of the US criminal justice system and Garapon (2006)
similarly to chastise the USA for its ‘inflexibility’ (in comparison with France). It is
important to stress again, however, that this is not in any way to gainsay or minimize the
abuses that occurred in the years immediately following the attacks. While there has
been a desire to keep domestic protections intact for US citizens, there has also been
much infamous conduct directed at non-US citizens both inside (e.g. the 9/11 detainees)
and outside of the USA. Arguments concerning the relative stability of the US criminal
justice system in the period post-9/11 must therefore acknowledge the important trade-
offs which have occurred between citizen and non-citizen rights, particularly in the years
immediately following the atrocity (Cole, 2003).

All of these developments serve to complicate the human rights ‘story’ advanced in
respect of the two continents. Snacken and Van Zyl Smit (2013: 6), for example, write of
the relative importance of crime control and due process values in the USA/EU: ‘[t]he
American balance is now clearly in favour of crime control values, while the European
emphasis on due process and human rights has increased greatly under the influence of
the ECHR’. As applied to domestic criminal justice protections in the post-2001 period
in the USA, however, one may question the degree to which this holds true; unlike the
EU it has been conservatism rather than change which has formed the watchword of the
political reaction. While some may dismiss this as a function of the constraints imposed
by the US Constitution (Jacobson, 2006), the point remains that the absence of reform,
grounded in constitutional values, serves as an important reminder of a US rights culture
which has continued to exist even in the midst of the punitive turn that has occurred in
that jurisdiction since the mid-1970s. It is this strong adherence to due process that
Garland (2010) refers to in his research on the US death penalty, viz. the desire to render
the ultimate penalty lawful through a complex machinery of appeals and so on, and
which has also been described as a key source of legitimacy in the USA (Garapon, 2006;
Lewis, 2005).

Conclusion

To recall the arguments made by Snacken, Daems and others at the start of this article,
we may wonder whether a more fine-grained approach to the question of European penal
values is to be preferred to the straightforward association of certain penal values with
‘brand Europe’ tout court (Baker, 2013). Space might also be found within the debate to
account for the continued existence of a rights culture on the other side of the Atlantic as
evidenced by a sustained commitment to constitutionalism in the domestic US criminal
justice system in the period following the largest attack on US domestic soil (Hosein,
2005). This is, of course, not to suggest a convergence of rights cultures. The US rights

Hamilton 219

tradition is more inward-looking and self-sufficient than the European human rights
framework and is not afraid to diverge from international human rights norms (Ignatieff,
2009). For Americans, human rights are ‘American values, writ large’ (Ignatieff, 2009:
14) while for Europeans these denote more universal values. Moreover, both cultures, as
we have seen, are mediated strongly by the demands of security. Whatever their relative
merits, however, we should be wary of ‘blind spots’ (Hosein, 2005: 2) in analysing coun-
terterrorism policy and criminal justice policy more generally, lest the ‘distracting sway
of the American case’ (Sparks, 2001: 165) causes us to neglect similar and perhaps more
expansive initiatives within Europe itself.

Read across to the broader literature on security, the above observations raise sev-
eral questions around the security–rights binary and the ‘politics of rights scepticism’
(Lazarus and Goold, 2007: 6) more generally. While the human rights credentials of
the European Union are little in doubt, their failure to act as a bulwark against exces-
sive securitization recalls earlier arguments made by Zedner (2007) and others
(Krasmann, 2012) regarding the limits of the human rights idiom as a means of resist-
ing the siren call of ‘security’ and the emerging paradigm of preventive justice. In
seeking only compliance or, at best, the establishment of a political and juridical
‘culture of justification’ (Dynzenhaus, 2007), the discourse on human rights assumes
a common concern about rights in this field. As Krasmann (2012: 381–382) argues,
the fatal flaw in the argument is that ‘it presupposes what has yet to arise, namely a
common concern about governmental encroachment in the name of security and a
willingness of all parties to join in that discourse’. When combined with the sheer
instrumentality and hegemonic force of executive and legislative action (Weber et al.,
2014: 99) one may find human-rights abusing measures rapidly outpacing judicial
proceedings (witness the findings by the ECtHR on CIA black sites some 12 years
after the event). With the most recent attacks in Paris, Brussels and Nice exerting
considerable political pressure for an integrated EU response, and subsequent legisla-
tion such as the foreign terrorist fighter provisions proving contentious in terms of
their legality (Human Rights Watch, 2015), these factors remain highly salient. This
remains so even in an EU without the UK which, though perhaps more open to argu-
ments by Germany and other countries on the importance of privacy and other human
rights, could potentially see more rapid and deeper integration in areas where the UK
has hitherto been a barrier to progress (Bond et al., 2016).

Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Fulbright-Schuman Program which provided me
with the opportunity to carry out this research while on sabbatical in New York. Sincere thanks
also go to Barry Vaughan, Shane Kilcommins, Giulia Berlusconi and the anonymous reviewers for
their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/
or publication of this article: This research was funded by the Fulbright-Schuman Program which
is jointly financed by the U.S. State Department and the Directorate-General for Education and
Culture of the European Commission.

220 Theoretical Criminology 22(2)

Notes

1. While it may be argued that the EAW is exclusively a counterterrorism measure given that it
applies to all serious offences, it must be firmly located within the post-9/11 EU ‘policy drive’
given that: (1) it was announced as a central plank of EU counterterrorism strategy; (2) it spent
years in limbo prior to the 9/11 attacks and in all likelihood would not have been adopted in
its current form (including most of the key provisions) ‘but for’ the Twin Tower attacks (Den
Boer, 2006; Kaunert, 2007; Murphy, 2012b); and (3) surrender forms an important part of the
EU counterterrorist action plan. Indeed, Argomaniz (2011: 21) notes that ‘it is now widely
regarded as the most important operational instrument in the European fight against terrorism
for its impact in the reduction of the length of time of the extradition procedures and its exten-
sive utilisation by national authorities (European Commission, 2005a, 2006)’. This article
adopts the approach espoused by many previous studies of EU counterterrorism which treats
the EAW as a lynchpin of the EU counterterrorist response (see, for example, Argomaniz,
2009, 2011; Argomaniz et al., 2015; Bures, 2011; Murphy, 2012a; SECILE, 2013).

2. See, for example, Detainee Treatment Act 2005 (in response to Rasul v. Bush (2004) 542
US 466) and Military Commissions Act 2006 (in response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006)
548 US 557).

3. Article 5.
4. Section 801.
5. Section 803.
6. Section 805.
7. For a detailed discussion on the extent to which the EAW was politically constructed as an

instrument on the ‘war on terror’, see Kaunert (2007).
8. That is, that the act in respect of which extradition is sought is recognized as criminal in both

the requesting and extraditing State.
9. That is, offences requiring intention or recklessness rather than mere negligence. See further

the highly critical judgment of Hardiman J in Tobin v. Minister for Defence (No. 2) [2012]
IESC 37.

10. Under the 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona confessions obtained as a result of a custodial
interrogation without protective safeguards, namely, warnings and a waiver of rights, will be
excluded.

11. Al-Nashiri v. Poland; Abu-Zubaydah v. Poland Application no. 28761/11, 24 July 2014.
12. The Stockholm Programme is a multi-annual working programme setting out the priorities

for the area of freedom, security and justice for the period 2010–2104.

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Author biography

Claire Hamilton is a Senior Lecturer in Law in Maynooth University, Ireland. Her recent publica-
tions include the Routledge Handbook of Irish Criminology (co-edited with Deirdre Healy, Yvonne
Daly and Michelle Butler, Routledge, 2016) and Reconceptualising Penality (Ashgate, 2014).

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The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Change:
Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism
Intelligence

Adam D.M. Svendsen

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The Federal Bureau of Investigation
and Change: Addressing US Domestic

Counter-terrorism Intelligence

ADAM D.M. SVENDSEN*

ABSTRACT In this article, shortcomings with US domestic counter-terrorism
intelligence and associated efforts since 2000 are analysed. Potential suggestions for
the extended development of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) are then
discussed. Some of these propositions touch on developments involving the domestic
intelligence and security services of other countries, and explore their use concerning
the future optimization of the FBI in the area of domestic counter-terrorism
intelligence. Within the overall culture and operational approach of the FBI, today
greater sustained emphasis still needs to be accorded to the ‘intelligence methodology’
of ‘wait and watch’. Simultaneously, the FBI needs to keep moving more from mainly a
post facto emphasis to more of an a priori one in its investigations. Thereby, the FBI
can continue to move towards improved delivery and better meet its role as a guarantor
of US national security in a timely manner as the twenty-first century progresses.

We in the FBI have undergone unprecedented transformation in recent
years, from developing the intelligence capabilities necessary to address
emerging terrorist and criminal threats, to creating the administrative
and technological structure necessary to meet our mission as a national
security service.1

– R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI

Introduction

The early twenty-first century has inaugurated a period of much change for US
domestic intelligence. This has particularly been the case for its traditional
manager, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The long-term drivers
for these trends stem predominantly from attempting to cope with the
detritus of unprecedented rapid globalization experienced during the post-
Cold War era. This has included significantly elevated counter-crime

*Email: adam@asgonline.co.uk
1‘Statement of R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI’, Oversight of the FBI, Hearing before the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate (25 March 2009) p.5

Intelligence and National Security
Vol. 27, No. 3, 371–397, June 2012

ISSN 0268-4527 Print/ISSN 1743-9019 Online/12/030371-27 ª 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2012.668080

requirements.2 After the 9/11 attacks, expanded domestic and international
counter-terrorism needs were also firmly asserted. A complex matrix of
enhanced tasks has formed.

In this article, focus is concentrated on the post-9/11 FBI. Unsurprisingly,
given the contemporary challenges confronted by the FBI, strategy and policy
implications loom large. Equally, neither exempt from consideration are
important tactical and operational concerns. Both structural and cultural
factors likewise figure. All of these implications still need their timely
engagement and addressing by the FBI and its partners beyond. This action is
required in order to maintain an appropriate and proportional level of
vigilance in the United States and abroad as the twenty-first century
progresses. This consideration emerges prominently as, into 2010, the diverse
terrorism threat the US confronts continues to evolve in several different
challenging directions. Sustained close scrutiny and monitoring of all the
dimensions involved is necessary.3

To keep both identifying, and – more crucially – learning, complex
lessons, the considerations presented above make the subject of this article
worthy of some further examination. This is especially as the FBI has to
constantly maintain treading a fine ‘balancing act’ in its operations
concerning many sensitive issues. Extending a continuously evolving
approach to learning and adaptation is clearly essential.4 During the FBI’s
process of change, increasingly creative and knowledgeable counter-
terrorism practitioners need their enhanced fostering.

‘Reforming’ the FBI

Recent history has dealt some tough hands for the FBI. Over the last decade,
analysts have tabled numerous suggestions for FBI reform. Frequently, they
adopt a comparative approach. Attention is drawn to other instructive
models for domestic intelligence and security sector reform in the United
States that are available throughout the world. This extensive literature
provides a valuable foundation upon which the connective and explorative
propositions advanced in this article are built.5

2For a mid-1990s evaluation of ‘globalization’, M. Waters, Globalization (London:
Routledge/Key Ideas series 1995). For the ‘dark side’ of globalization, S. Weber, Naazneen
Barma, Matthew Kroenig and Ely Ratner, ‘How Globalization Went Bad’, Foreign Policy
(January/February 2007); see also J.A. Scholte, ‘Globalization and (In)Security’ in
Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave 2005) pp.279–315.
3See, for example, C. Dickey, ‘Inside the Zazi Takedown’, Newsweek, 26 September 2009;
‘Pakistan Confirms US Men Arrested’, BBC News Online, 10 December 2009; ‘Unconnected
Dots, Yet Again, on a Terror Attempt’, The Washington Post, 28 December 2009; M.
Mazzetti and S. Shane, ‘Evidence Mounts for Taliban Role in Car Bomb Plot’, The New York
Times, 5 May 2010.
4See, for example, C. Johnson, ‘FBI Director Appoints Judge to Review lead up to Fort
Hood’, The Washington Post, 8 December 2009; J. Markon, ‘FBI Walks Tightrope in
Outreach to Muslims, Fighting Terrorism’, The Washington Post, 20 December 2009.
5See, for instance, the texts cited throughout this article.

372 Intelligence and National Security

Offering a ‘critical’ perspective, this article aims to provide a suitably
detached reflective overview evaluation of the ongoing changes vis-à-vis the
FBI. Aiming to communicate a range of operational-to-strategy/policy-
orientated lessons, contemporary historical developments since 2000 are
examined. Particular concentration is placed on the FBI’s counter-terrorism
intelligence work in the early twenty-first century. Some suggestions are then
offered for how changes might be shaped and extended over the next few
years. These are provided to help ensure that the FBI adequately reflects an
evolving ‘work-in-progress’ within the important realms of intelligence and
counter-terrorism.

The FBI and Intelligence

Intelligence forms the main concern. As former CIA Inspector General
(1990–98), Frederick P. Hitz, has argued: ‘It is not fair to say, as some of its
critics do, that the bureau has no experience in this domestic intelligence
responsibility’.6 Indeed, several longer-ranging histories of the FBI, and
associated subject texts, provide valuable insights into the extent of that
competency during earlier time periods.7 However, as a plethora of twenty-
first-century events have shown and continue to demand, an enhanced
intelligence methodology is still increasingly imperative for the FBI.8

Reflecting greater use of ‘wait and watch’ tactics, this last methodology
requires effective implementation alongside the security methodology –
characterized in turn as being more reflective of ‘see and strike’ actions. An
extended ‘intelligence methodology’ is especially important vis-à-vis the
issue of terrorism. This is while it is simultaneously useful against other
contemporary pressing FBI concerns, such as organized and cyber crime.9

Forward movements can be summarized. Sustained attention towards
effectively pursuing the route of enhanced intelligence is required by the FBI
in its overall law enforcement approach as time progresses. A useful place to
begin is by examining the context of recent US domestic counter-terrorism
intelligence shortfalls. Especially shown is how, over the past decade,
particularly emblematic examples have been tackled and where they need
their further addressing.

6F.P. Hitz, Why Spy? Espionage in an Age of Uncertainty (New York: St. Martin’s Press
2008) p.193.
7See, for example, texts such as R. Jeffreys-Jones, The FBI: A History (London: Yale
University Press 2007); see also A.D.M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on
Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11 (London: Routledge/Studies in
Intelligence Series 2010) pp.42, 47–8.
8See also J.N. Shapiro and R. Darken, ‘Homeland Security: A New Strategic Paradigm?’ in J.
Baylis, J.J. Wirtz and C.S. Gray (eds.) Strategy in the Contemporary World, 3rd ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press 2010) from p.288.
9See also R.S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary’, FBI website, 20 January 2010.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 373

US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence Shortcomings

In the wake of 9/11, the FBI was widely criticized regarding its competence.
Domestic counter-terrorism intelligence emerged as the main focus of
concern.10 Arguably, especially after the 1998 US embassy bombings in
Africa, the FBI’s attention span concerning terrorism had been increasingly
focused beyond the shores of the United States. The international terrorism
threat dominated.11 Only very shortly before the 9/11 attacks was a more
concerted domestic counter-terrorism focus and broader homeland security
threat awareness beginning to develop.12 Ultimately, with hindsight, this
was rather belated.

After 9/11, numerous reviews were conducted and a multitude of reforms
to US domestic counter-terrorism intelligence were tabled. Many of the post-
9/11 reviews were vociferous in calling for the radical reform of the FBI.
Notably, these demands emphasized improving information sharing. This
was to be accomplished both internally within the FBI and externally on an
interagency basis.13

Certainly, some of the shortcomings identified during the post-9/11
‘season of inquiry’ have now been addressed.14 However, some limitations

10See also Jeffreys-Jones, ‘9/11 and the Quest for National Unity’, chapter 14 in his The FBI,
pp.230–52.
11A. Khan, ‘Analysis: FBI Goes Global’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 April 2000; see also
‘George Tenet’s al-Qaida Testimony – Part 1’, The Guardian, 18 October 2002; M. Smith,
The Spying Game (London: Politico’s 2003) p.444.
12‘Defending the Homeland becomes a Priority for Bush’, Jane’s Terrorism & Security
Monitor, 1 August 2001.
13Many sources can be cited here: ‘3.2. Adaptation – and nonadaptation – in the law
enforcement community’ in the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States of America, 9/11 Commission Report (22 July 2004), pp.73–80; M. German,
‘An FBI Insider’s Guide to the 9/11 Commission Report’, GlobalSecurity.org (2005); P.
Shenon and E. Lichtblau, ‘F.B.I. is Assailed for its Handling of Terror Risks’, The New York
Times, 14 April 2004; A. Cumming and T. Masse, ‘RL32336: FBI Intelligence Reform Since
September 11, 2001: Issues and Options for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress, 6 April
2004; Office of the Inspector General, ‘A Review of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Counterterrorism Program: Threat Assessment, Strategic Planning, and Resource Manage-
ment’, Report No. 02-38, September 2002; ‘Terrorist Attacks Prompt FBI Reform’, Jane’s
Intelligence Review, 1 February 2002; A. Brownfeld, ‘US Intelligence Failures and the
Moussaoui Case’, Jane’s Terrorism & Security Monitor, 17 June 2002; U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence
Information Related to the September 11 Attacks (November 2004/declassified June 2006);
see also ‘Confronting the ‘‘Enemy Within’’: What Can the United States Learn About
Counterterrorism and Intelligence from Other Democracies?’, RAND Research Brief, 2004;
see also P. Chalk and W. Rosenau, Confronting the ‘Enemy Within’: Security Intelligence, the
Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2004).
14See, for example, ‘Sharing & Accessing of Information Beyond the FBI’ in ‘Responses of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Based Upon the May 2, 2006 Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary Regarding FBI Oversight’, pp.117–18; see also R.S. Mueller,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘From 9/11 to 7/7: Global Terrorism Today and the

374 Intelligence and National Security

remain. More than eight years after 9/11, domestic counter-terrorism efforts
and intelligence gathering generally within the United States still have
ample scope for being further optimized.15 Both qualitative and quanti-
tative problems have been confronted. While challenging to disaggregate
because of their close overlap, some of these pressing problems are now
evaluated in turn.

Confronting Qualitative Problems

In May 2006, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, US Senator Pat Leahy,
highlighted some of the major obstacles that confronted the FBI. He asserted
that: ‘The FBI simply cannot continue to foster a culture that places a lower
value on intelligence functions than investigative efforts.’16 During early 2008,
in his testimony to a congressional subcommittee, FBI Agent Bassem Youssef
went further. He observed critically that: ‘The FBI counter-terrorism division is
ill-equipped to handle the terrorist threat we are facing’.17 Furthermore, he
asserted that ‘counter-terrorism agents and managers at FBI headquarters often
lack basic knowledge about Middle Eastern culture, language and terrorists’
ideology’. Allegedly, high-level counter-terrorism inexperience figured
strongly, ‘compounding matters’.18 More widely, these problems are often
intimately connected with prominent questions regarding ‘proportionality’
during the conduct of operations. They also extend to include pressing civil
liberties and domestic, constitutional and civil rights considerations.19

Challenges of Tomorrow’, Chatham House Transcript, 7 April 2008; see also, for example,
‘Interview: Art Cummings’, PBS Frontline, 5 June 2006; see also D. Priest, ‘FBI Pushes to
Expand Domain into CIA’s Intelligence Gathering: Common Ground Not Yet Reached on
Agency Roles in U.S.’, The Washington Post, 6 February 2005; see also R.A. Best Jr., ‘Sharing
Law Enforcement and Intelligence Information: The Congressional Role’, CRS Report for
Congress, 13 February 2007; ‘TSC Recognized for Information Sharing Initiatives’, FBI Press
Release, 6 March 2009; see also ‘Intelligence at Home . . . and Abroad?’ heading in ‘The
Agenda Ahead’, chapter 5 in G.F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 2009) pp.120–33.
15See also S. Shane, ‘Lapses Allowed Suspect to Board Plane’, The New York Times, 5 May
2010.
16‘Statement by Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary Hearing
on FBI Oversight’, Office of Senator Leahy, 2 May 2006; see also R.A. Posner, Uncertain
Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in the Throes of Reform (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2006); for a review of Posner’s book, see S. Moskowitz,
‘Intelligence in Recent Public Literature: Uncertain Shield: The U.S. Intelligence System in
the Throes of Reform. . .’, CIA Studies in Intelligence 50/3 (2006); see also R.A. Posner,
‘Conclusion’ in his Remaking Domestic Intelligence (Washington, DC: Hoover Institution
Press, 2005) pp.81–2.
17Quoted in R.B. Schmitt, ‘Agent Says the FBI is Not Prepared’, Los Angeles Times, 22 May
2008.
18Ibid.
19D. Cole and J.X. Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution, 3rd ed. (New York: The New
Press 2006).

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 375

A persistent but frequently overlooked problem for the FBI is balancing
multiple roles. Most immediately after the multitude of post-9/11 reforms
around 2002 and closely following several high-profile spy cases, other
security anxieties re-emerged, such as regarding counter-espionage.20 Fears
were evident that too many resources, including staff, were being redeployed
to combat solely the issue of terrorism. Others expressed concerns that
organized crime investigations were simultaneously atrophying. Although,
according to some – such as David Major, a former senior FBI Counter-
intelligence agent – these fears could soon be somewhat placated by 2002–3.21

Yet, divided attention remains problematic. Focusing on three highly
demanding roles, that all compete for the same ultimately finite resources,
means that several complications are encountered.22 Continuing into 2009–
10, the diverse competing calls on the FBI’s intelligence capabilities and
capacity necessitates ever-greater resourcefulness in making allocations.23

Here, an enhanced ‘intelligence methodology’ can again assist. For example,
this is in the form of introducing some more reflective planning.

These have not been the only prevailing concerns. During the FBI’s
attempts to modernize, as well as to reform after 9/11, not all of its
initiatives have gone to plan. The FBI has encountered a plethora of major
and costly information computing technology (ICT) project problems.
Worse, simultaneously some of these projects have failed to deliver or
produce as quickly as required.24 In part, these struggles appropriately
reflect the FBI’s attempts to strive to meet what criminologist James
Sheptycki has observed as an overall trend towards a ‘rise to prominence of
intelligence-led policing (ILP), which is the technological effort to manage

20G. Corera, ‘US Reforms Overlook Threat from Foreign Intelligence’, Jane’s Intelligence
Review, 1 June 2003.
21See, for instance, where he is quoted in ibid.; for a later US espionage case, ‘US Scientist
Charged with Spying’, BBC, 19 October 2009; D.Q. Wilber, ‘Md. Scientist Tried to Spy,
Indictment Says’, The Washington Post, 23 October 2009.
22See also ‘The FBI and Foreign Intelligence Penetration’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 30
January 2009.
23B. Krebs, ‘Organized Crime Behind a Majority of Data Breaches’, The Washington Post, 15
April 2009; see also B. Krebs, ‘Security Fix: Is Cyber Crime Really the FBI’s No. 3 Priority?’,
The Washington Post Blog, 24 September 2007; see also R.S. Mueller, III, Director FBI,
‘Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’, FBI website,
30 September 2009; R.S. Mueller, III, Director FBI, ‘Statement Before the Senate Judiciary
Committee’, FBI website, 16 September 2009; P. Slevin, ‘Rampage Kills 12, Wounds 31’, The
Washington Post, 6 November 2009; G. Jaffe, A. Gerhart and W. Booth, ‘Officials Cast Wide
Net in Search for Answers’, The Washington Post, 8 November 2009; E. Nakashima and J.
Pomfret, ‘China Proves to be an Aggressive Foe in Cyberspace’, The Washington Post, 11
November 2009; M. Glod, ‘Former FBI Employee Sentenced for Leaking Classified Papers’,
The Washington Post, 25 May 2010; A. Entous, ‘Obama Starts Deploying Interrogation
Teams’, Reuters, 19 May 2010.
24E. Lichtblau, ‘F.B.I. Faces New Setback in Computer Overhaul’, The New York Times, 18
March 2010.

376 Intelligence and National Security

information about threats and risks in order to strategically manage the
policing mission’.25

Significant well-documented obstacles have beset the FBI on this front.26

In August 2006, reports bemoaned that, ‘five years after the Sept. 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks and more than $600 million later, agents still rely largely on
the paper reports and file cabinets used since federal agents began chasing
gangsters in the 1920s’. This lack of technological interconnectivity was a
considerable shortcoming. Not least, this paucity was occurring as the FBI
tried to operate in a domain where making ‘connections’ during the course
of increasingly wide-ranging investigations is crucial. This is particularly
when operations are trying to be undertaken during an era of exponential
globalization. Amid the fallout from these stymying ICT project failures,
officials commented that in terms of technology the FBI is trapped in the
1980s, ‘if not earlier’.27 Senator Leahy lamented: ‘We might be in the
22nd century before we get the 21st-century technology’.28 FBI intelligence
activities confronted being technologically stunted.

A third area of difficulty has been evident. This has been seen most clearly
regarding FBI internal handling processes and procedures. Pointing to a
suggested lack of micro-domain change at the daily work level, post-9/11
FBI agent training has frequently been criticized. This has particularly been
in relation to the more specific domain of counter-terrorism skills.29 Business
was impacted negatively. Poor handling, such as of records and so-called
‘National Security Letters’ (NSLs)30 during the course of investigations, has
experienced considerable criticism. In 2007, the flaws were exposed most
starkly in an official report during a review of FBI data collection.31

However, what was possibly more damning for the FBI were its subsequent

25J. Sheptycki, ‘Transnational Policing’, The Canadian Review of Policing Research, 1
(2005); see also T. Connors, ‘Putting the ‘‘L’’ into Intelligence-Led Policing: How Police
Leaders Can Leverage Intelligence Capability’, International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence 22/2 (2009) pp.237–45.
26D. Eggen and G. Witte, ‘The FBI’s Upgrade That Wasn’t: $170 Million Bought an Unusable
Computer System’, The Washington Post, 18 August 2006.
27Ibid.
28Quoted in ibid.
29See, for example, S. Horwitz, ‘Old-School Academy in Post-9/11 World: New Focus is on
Terrorism, but Training is Struggling to Keep Up’, The Washington Post, 17 August 2006.
30NSLs are defined by the FBI as ‘a letter request for information from a third party that is
issued by the FBI or by other government agencies with authority to conduct national security
investigations’.
31Many sources can be cited here: R.J. Smith, ‘Report Details Missteps in Data Collection’,
The Washington Post, 10 March 2007; see also D. Johnston and E. Lipton, ‘U.S. Report to
Fault F.B.I. on Subpoenas’, The New York Times, 9 March 2007; J. Solomon and B. Gellman,
‘Frequent Errors in FBI’s Secret Records Requests: Audit Finds Possible Rule Violations’, The
Washington Post, 9 March 2007; D. Stout, ‘F.B.I. Head Admits Mistakes in Use of Security
Act’, The New York Times, 10 March 2007; D. Eggen and J. Solomon, ‘FBI Audit Prompts
Calls for Reform: Some Lawmakers Suggest Limits on Patriot Act’, The Washington Post, 10
March 2007; R.J. Smith and J. Solomon, ‘Amid Concerns, FBI Lapses Went On: Records

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 377

sluggish attempts to then deal with the issue once identified. This was while
the scope of the errors, at least at first, was not fully appreciated.32 Worse,
these problems were not isolated. Instead, they were more linked to issues
of a muddled methodology riddled with faults.33 Already besieged exter-
nally, intelligence work suffered further from facing these substantial
internal challenges.

The faults could be exposed. According to Justice Department and FBI
officials, FBI agents repeatedly provided inaccurate information to win secret
court approval of surveillance warrants in terrorism and espionage cases.
This prompted officials to tighten controls. Notably, this was on the way the
FBI uses its powerful anti-terrorism tools, as sanctioned by legislation such
as the post-9/11 Patriot Act of October 2001.34

The spectre of some further operational constraints being raised was soon
forthcoming. This was through the stricter application of the law as a greater
controlling mechanism on FBI intelligence activities. The chief judge of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, ‘raised the
possibility of requiring counterterrorism agents to swear in her courtroom
that the information they were providing was accurate’. This was judged to
be ‘a procedure that could have slowed such investigations drastically’.35 A
sharp legal warning was issued to the FBI. These developments could impact
strongly on its permissible intelligence activities and on the definition of their
legitimate operational parameters. Many concerns for future intelligence
activities and which ‘leads’ could be exploited were apparent.

Operational flaws were proving difficult to resolve. Although ‘risk
thresholds’ had been lowered post-9/11, better balances with other pressing
and frequently competing considerations were sought in the FBI’s opera-
tions. This was especially so that the end goals of ‘public safety’ and
‘homeland security’ could be better met in a less compromising manner to
widely held higher values. In his later testimony of March 2009, the Director
of the FBI, Robert S. Mueller highlighted that: ‘We have strengthened
our training at the FBI’s Quantico Training Academy for both agents and
[intelligence] analysts’.36 The improvement of practices was to be the
way forward.

Arguably, however, the operational problems confronted also reflected
institutional overstretch. Intelligence efforts were similarly frustrated. This was

Collection Brought Internal Questions but Little Scrutiny’, The Washington Post, 18 March
2007.
32Ibid.
33See also C.E. Lindblom, ‘The Science of ‘‘Muddling Through’’‘, Public Administration
Review 19 (Spring 1959) pp.79–88; C.E. Lindblom, ‘Still Muddling, Not Yet Through’,
Public Administration Review 39 (1979) pp.517–26; J. Solomon and C. Johnson, ‘FBI Broke
Law for Years in Phone Record Searches’, The Washington Post, 19 January 2010.
34See also P.A. Buxbaum, ‘Patriot Act Redux’, ISN Security Watch, 11 November 2009.
35J. Solomon, ‘FBI Provided Inaccurate Data for Surveillance Warrants’, The Washington
Post, 27 March 2007.
36‘Statement of R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI’, p.7.

378 Intelligence and National Security

witnessed vividly in mid-2007, extending into 2009, with the concerns over the
backlog exposed in the FBI’s immigration-checking responsibilities.37 Other
intelligence and terrorism experts were not impressed. With an eye on FBI
developments around 2006–7, Michael Scheuer, the former head of the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’s Bin Laden unit, claimed: ‘The FBI
continues to be a broken, anachronistic organization’.38 The presence of more
quantitative problems, concerning the high volume of work that had to be
undertaken by the FBI, was also suggested. These problems are examined next.

Experiencing Quantitative Problems

During March 2009, Mueller effectively demonstrated to Congress the sheer
multiplicity of tasks with which the contemporary FBI has to deal.39 This
heavy workload has had ramifications of a quantitative nature on daily
business activities, including the FBI’s intelligence activities. Indeed, some of
these highly demanding quantitative factors continue to be experienced –
especially as a plethora of high-profile US terrorism cases have unfolded
during the latter half of 2009 and into mid-2010, including an attempted
airline attack on Christmas Day 2009 and a car bomb attempt in Times
Square, New York, during May 2010.40 These issues take time to be
addressed, requiring the constant strict prioritization of tasks and the
judicious allocation of resources, as well as their continuous monitoring. As
difficult trade-offs attempt to be fashioned by the FBI (together at times in
concert with other domestic and international agencies), inevitably not all
activities have gone smoothly.41 These continue to have far-reaching
implications for intelligence work in the FBI context and beyond.

Over time, the terrorist watchlist system in the United States has shown
some noteworthy inconsistencies.42 According to a Department of Justice
(DoJ) audit on the FBI released in March 2008:

We found that the FBI was not always providing updated nominations
when new information became known about a nominated individual
. . . We also found that the FBI was not always removing records from
the watchlist when it was appropriate to do so . . . Moreover, FBI

37See, for example, S.S. Hsu and N.C. Aizenman, ‘FBI Name Check Cited in Naturalization
Delays: Official Calls Backlog ‘‘Unacceptable’’’, The Washington Post, 17 June 2007; see also
S. Fidler, ‘Fears Over Covert DNA Database’, The Financial Times, 17 November 2008; see
also N.C. Aizenman, ‘U.S. Antiterrorism Laws Causing Immigration Delays for Refugees’,
The Washington Post, 12 November 2009.
38Quoted in ‘INTERVIEW: With Michael Scheuer’, PBS Frontline, 30 January 2007.
39‘Statement of R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI’, p.5.
40See, for example, the several cases cited in the sources dated September–December 2009,
provided throughout this article.
41See also C. Johnson and S.S. Hsu, ‘Possible Agency Missteps Debated’, The Washington
Post, 11 November 2009; ‘In Plain Sight?’, The Washington Post, 12 November 2009.
42See also C.K. Ervin, ‘OP-ED Contributor: After Eight Years, Terrorists Still Fly’, The New
York Times, 29 December 2009.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 379

headquarters officials reported that watchlist nomination submissions
from field offices were often incomplete or contained inaccuracies,
which caused delays in the processing of nominations.43

With further implications for intelligence work and procedures, more
worryingly these problems had reportedly been ongoing ‘for nearly three
years despite steps taken to prevent errors’. Furthermore, an FBI spokesman
responded that ‘gaps identified in the system should be fixed within six
months’. Factors akin to bureaucratic inertia were proving hard to erode. In
the audit’s entirety, the FBI was given ‘a mixed review’. More positively, the
audit did conclude ‘that the FBI has proper training and other internal
controls in place to help make sure names of suspected terrorists were
accurately added to the list’.44

Distinct deficiencies, however, have continued to be evident. Subsequent
adjustments, or indeed even their lack thereof, were the complicating
factors. For instance, once ‘blacklisted’ it was considerably challenging to
get a name cleared. With ramifications for refined intelligence filtering and
targeting activities, a degree of chaos and inconsistency was reflected. This
was as well as, more widely, the impact of multiple overlapping agencies
focused on the domestic counter-terrorism intelligence task continuing to be
vividly apparent.45

The higher coordination of domestic intelligence tasks still appeared to be
more lacking. Or, it was more haphazard in its nature. This was at least con-
cerning the management of some of these more specific issue areas, including
counter-terrorism work.46 Moreover, extending into 2010, the challenge of a
high volume of names needing to be processed speedily in a timely manner
continued to be confronted in the FBI context. Tough issue management ‘trade-
offs’ similarly continued to be navigated. Disappointingly, some persistent and
familiar difficulties appeared to be encountered on occasion.47

Arguably, the FBI’s overburdened condition is one of the main
impediments to internal reform and renewal.48 As a ripple knock-on effect,
intelligence efforts are similarly constrained. This factor was apparent as

43Quoted in L.J. Jordan, ‘Audit: FBI Watchlist Data Error-Riddled’, The Huffington Post, 17
March 2008.
44Ibid.
45See also B. Debusmann, ‘The Trouble with US Terrorist Watchlists’, Reuters, 8 May 2010;
Timothy J. Healy, Director, Terrorist Screening Center, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
‘Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee’, FBI website, 24 March 2010.
46E. Nakashima, ‘FBI’s Lapses on Terrorist Watch List put Nation at Risk, Report Warns’,
The Washington Post, 7 May 2009; see also, for later concerns, ‘US Vows to Pursue Plane
Plotters’, BBC News Online, 28 December 2009.
47W. Pincus, ‘1,600 are Suggested Daily for FBI’s List’, The Washington Post, 1 November
2009; see also K. DeYoung and M. Leahy, ‘Uninvestigated Terrorism Warning about Detroit
Suspect called Not Unusual’, The Washington Post, 28 December 2009.
48See also E. Lichtblau, D. Johnston and R. Nixon, ‘F.B.I. Struggles to Handle Wave of
Financial Fraud Cases’, The New York Times, 19 October 2008; J. Carmella, ‘FBI Director
says Financial Fraud Cases are Limiting Ability to Fight Other Crime’, Jurist, 25 March 2009;

380 Intelligence and National Security

recently as late 2008, as the FBI kept demanding new tools. Reportedly,
these were needed to better aid it ‘to assess national security and foreign
intelligence threats’.49 According to an authoritative article in The
Washington Post:

The overhaul [‘to FBI ground rules’, proposed by the US Department of
Justice during September 2008, would be] the most substantial revision
to FBI operating instructions in years, also [they] would ease some
reporting requirements between agents, their supervisors and federal
prosecutors in what authorities call a critical effort to improve
information gathering and detect terrorist threats.50

More of an ‘intelligence methodology’ appeared to be trying to get greater
expression. This elevated status for intelligence was trying to be fashioned
amid the overall persisting mix of methodologies used contemporaneously
by the FBI.51 Indeed, in his response to some recent public criticism of the
FBI’s performance in the intelligence area, John Miller, assistant director of
the FBI, argued:

the FBI’s Strategic Execution Team has employed best practices from
the private and public sectors to identify what was working well in
our intelligence efforts and how we could strengthen those efforts.
We have standardized the intelligence work roles and processes
across all field offices. We have added several weeks of updated
hands-on training for field-office personnel, developed new policies
and handbooks for field intelligence, and tasked the field offices to
use these tools in new assessments of the potential threats in their
areas.

Providing further insights into the FBI’s internal processes, he continued:

see also ‘FBI to Play Larger Role in US Counter-terror Ops: Report’, AFP Newswire, 28 May
2009.
49L. Margasak, ‘FBI Wants New Tools in Terrorism Assessments’, Associated Press –
Newswire, 13 September 2008; S. Gorman and E. Perez, ‘FBI Wrestling with Remake as
Intelligence Agency: Critics say Bureau Needs Culture Shift; Director to Testify’, The Wall
Street Journal, 16 September 2008.
50C. Johnson, ‘Rule Changes Would Give FBI Agents Extensive New Powers’, The
Washington Post, 12 September 2008; see also ‘Joint Statement of Attorney General Michael
B. Mukasey and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller on the Issuance of the Attorney General
Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations’, MarketWatch, 3 October 2008.
51See also under sub-heading ‘Intelligence’ in Robert S. Mueller, III, Director Federal Bureau
of Investigation, ‘Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee’, FBI Press Release, 16–17
September 2008; Valerie Caproni, General Counsel, FBI, and Elisebeth Collins Cook,
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy, DOJ, ‘Statement Before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence’, FBI Press Release, 23 September 2008; ‘Fact Sheet: Justice
Department Counter-Terrorism Efforts Since 9/11’, FBI Press Release, 11 September 2008.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 381

To improve the number and quality of our human sources, we created
special squads in every field office that will focus entirely on developing
human sources and intelligence collection. In addition, we launched an
effort to recruit, train and enhance the roles of intelligence analysts. All
of this progress in the field is vetted personally by Director Robert
Mueller on a regular basis over a classified video link. These sessions
reinforce the need for leadership in the field and accountability.52

Clearly much introspection regarding the intelligence dimension was
underway within the FBI. Also, according to the FBI, positively some of
the computer ‘problems’ they had experienced earlier were now resolved by
September 2008.53 Providing updates, the recurring theme of ‘improvements
in FBI technology’ similarly figured in Mueller’s later testimony to Congress
during both March and May 2009. As he remarked, this development ‘will
allow us to communicate and share information with our law enforcement
and intelligence partners’.54

More intelligence-led policing activities would now be better furnished
technologically. However, how these most recent changes actually work in
practice over the long term – for instance, regularly at the daily operational
level and in qualitative terms – are yet to be seen more fully and clearly.55 The
new ‘guidelines’ have already been criticized as ‘expansive, not delimiting’
from a civil liberties perspective.56 These concerns highlight others that exist,
extending beyond merely those regarding the FBI.57

Many fixes in several different areas of activity were clearly required.
Those most relevant to the FBI will be considered next. Capturing core
concerns, as UK scholars Jon Moran and Mark Phythian note, those who
follow counter-terror and policing policy in the United States should now be

52J. Miller, Assistant Director, FBI, ‘The FBI is on Track with Its Intelligence Mission’, FBI
Press Release, 29 September 2008, written in response to Gorman and Perez, ‘FBI Wrestling
with Remake as Intelligence Agency’; see also ‘FBI Transformation’ in Robert S. Mueller, III,
Director, FBI, ‘Statement Before the Senate Judiciary Committee’, FBI Press Release, 25
March 2009.
53J. Stein, ‘FBI Touts New Online Intelligence Systems’, SpyTalk – CQ Politics Blog, 24
September 2008.
54‘Statement of R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI’, pp.7–8; see also R.S. Mueller, III, Director
FBI, ‘Statement Before the House Judiciary Committee’, FBI website, 20 May 2009.
55See also C. Johnson, ‘FBI Threat Tracking Improves, Report Says: System, However, Still
Needs Work’, The Washington Post, 8 November 2008; Lichtblau, ‘F.B.I. Faces New Setback
in Computer Overhaul’.
56A. D’Amato, ‘The FBI’s New Guidelines’, Jurist Forum, 7 October 2008; C. Johnson,
‘Guidelines Expand FBI’s Surveillance Powers’, The Washington Post, 4 October 2008; see
also C. Savage, ‘Loosening of F.B.I. Rules Stirs Privacy Concerns’, The New York Times, 29
October 2009. For FBI guidelines, see ‘Essential Documents: FBI Domestic Investigations and
Operations Guide, December 2008’, US Council on Foreign Relations website (2009).
57See also C. Johnson, ‘Director of FBI Urges Renewal of Patriot Act: Portions of Law to
Expire This Year’, The Washington Post, 26 March 2009; D. Kravets, ‘Lawmakers Cave to
FBI in Patriot Act Debate’, Wired.com Blog, 1 October 2009.

382 Intelligence and National Security

‘familiar with the controversial relationship between intelligence investiga-
tion and criminal investigation with regard to the activities of the FBI’.58

Indeed, arguably the role of intelligence is central to all of those
investigative efforts in the overall law enforcement approach espoused by
the FBI. This is rather than intelligence being merely juxtaposed. Some
further changes were needed in order to realize a better balance. This was as
well as to adequately maintain that optimum balance into the future.

Changing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence

How can the FBI more effectively confront what FBI scholar Rhodri Jeffreys-
Jones has appropriately termed ‘the post-9/11 challenge’?59 The suggestions
tabled below encompass both structural and cultural approaches. In their close
overlap, they intend to address the overstretched and overburdened condition of
the FBI in the early twenty-first century. This occurs as the FBI tries to fulfil the
twin roles of being both a domestic intelligence and a security/law enforcement
agency. Simultaneously, this is as the FBI tries to operate both domestically and
abroad – emphasizing the wider US counter-terrorism ‘Fortress America’
approach. Frequently, this FBI work is conducted alongside the CIA, with the
deployment of the FBI’s forward-posted legal attachés (‘legats’).60

The pressures of globalization have multiplied further the demands that all
these tasks have made on the FBI. The developments associated with
globalization have also required the FBI to further join up overseas with
other domestic intelligence and security agencies in foreign countries, such as
the British Security Service (MI5).61 Substantially increased foreign liaison

58J. Moran and M. Phythian, ‘Introduction: In the Shadow of 9/11’, Crime, Law & Social
Change 44/4–5 (2005), p.330.
59R. Jeffreys-Jones, ‘The Historiography of the FBI’ in L.K. Johnson (ed.) Handbook of
Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge 2007) p.47; see also ‘ The FBI’s New Approach’ in R.
Kessler, ‘A Journalist’s View: The New Spies’, SAIS Review XXVIII/1 (2008) pp.149–51; see
also ‘A Call for an American MI5’ in ibid., pp.153–5.
60For background insights into FBI foreign liaison activities, ‘The Legat Program and
Interpol’ in A.G. Theoharis, ‘FBI Oversight and Liaison Relationships’, chapter 4 in A.G.
Theoharis, T.G. Poveda, S. Rosenfeld and R.G. Powers (eds.) The FBI: A Comprehensive
Reference Guide (Phoenix, AZ: The Oryx Press 1999) p.165; see also ‘Legal Attachés
(Legats)’ in the chapter titled ‘Organization and Day-to-Day Activities’ in ibid., pp.218–19;
see also ‘Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program’ (March 2004), 5http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0418/index.htm4 (accessed 19 January 2006); see also FBI,
Budget Document (2008), pp.6-123–6-131 – where references are made to: ‘Expansion of CT
Presence Overseas’, ‘Legal Attaché Expansion’ and (on the domestic intelligence front)
‘Fusion Centers’, 5http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/2009just 4 (accessed 11 March
2008); J.S. Landay, ‘FBI Questions American Held Without Charges in Gulf State’,
McClatchy Newspapers, 17 November 2008.
61A. Svendsen, ‘The Globalization of Intelligence since 9/11: Frameworks and Operational
Parameters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21/1 (2008) pp.129–44; A.D.M.
Svendsen, ‘The Globalization of Intelligence since 9/11: The Optimization of Intelligence
Liaison Arrangements’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21/4

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 383

http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0418/index.htm

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/2009just

between these agencies is now a huge and complex additional task. This
work requires ever-greater expeditious management. Even the New York
Police Department (NYPD) enjoys numerous foreign liaison officers
stationed abroad. They are similarly tasked with primarily addressing
terrorism through extended intelligence activities.62

1. Structural Changes and Increasing the ‘Intelligence Methodology’

Several valuable ‘structural change’ suggestions can be tabled. Firstly, into
the future, the FBI will undoubtedly continue to benefit by placing more
emphasis on (i) the development, and then (ii) the sustaining, of a
comprehensive and sophisticated intelligence methodology in its overall
approach to domestic counter-terrorism. More importance can be devoted
to the ‘wait and watch’ and longer-term surveillance tactics in its
investigations. For instance, this can be best articulated in terms of increased
staff and other resource allocations being devoted to those ends.

Undertaking greater contextualization efforts similarly offer tangible
benefits when applied. More closely tied to prevailing details and specifics
acquired through improved intelligence collection activities, these move-
ments allow for the establishment of some more robust ‘connection’
possibilities during investigations.63 Through implementing some structural
changes, an enhanced contribution can be made towards better fostering a
changed culture of intelligence. This is particularly towards one that ceases
to prioritize merely ‘see and strike’ police-style and security dominated
investigations. Offering the potential for greater clarity to be brought into
answers arising from overall intelligence analysis (‘what is it?’) and
assessment (‘what does it mean?’) activities, by adopting this approach,
further-reaching improvements have increased possibilities to be realized.
Simultaneously, both the qualitative and quantitative problems experienced
by the FBI are more effectively addressed. In short, engaging in greater
intelligence efforts can offer much to practitioners.

Evidently movement in this direction has already begun. For instance, the
FBI has created the Directorate of Intelligence within the National Security
Branch, and it has ‘established Field Intelligence Groups in all 56 field offi-
ces’. This is as well as having ‘established Intelligence sections in each

(2008) pp.661–78; P. Finn, ‘U.S. Citizen Sues over Treatment in ‘‘Rendition’’’, The
Washington Post, 11 November 2009; J. Markon and S. Hussain, ‘N.Va. Men Allegedly
Tried to Join Jihadists’, The Washington Post, 11 December 2009.
62Many sources can be cited: E. Kaplan, ‘Hometown Security’, Council on Foreign Relations,
2 January 2007; E. Kaplan, ‘Backgrounder: New York Spurs Counterterrorism Efforts’,
Council on Foreign Relations, 28 December 2006; B. Hope, ‘Police Counterterror Official
Touts Importance of Local Role’, The New York Sun, 18 August 2006; B. Nussbaum,
‘Protecting Global Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal
Policing for Counter Terrorism’, Global Crime 8/3 (2007) pp.213–32; see also J. Dwyer, ‘City
Police Spied Broadly Before G.O.P. Convention’, The New York Times, 25 March 2007;
‘Christopher Dickey: Intelligence The NYPD Way’, NPR, 15 February 2009.
63Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror, p.233.

384 Intelligence and National Security

operational division at FBIHQ’.64 However, despite these positive develop-
ments, many critics have suggested that this is more of a peripheral
enhancement. It is claimed little is done to change activities at the centre.
Indeed, the ‘centre of gravity’ around which the FBI – as an organization –
and its investigations pivot, continues to be subject to close scrutiny.65

Questions have also been asked about the effectiveness of coordination,
especially in relation to intelligence. The FBI tradition of local investigation
by scattered field offices across the United States persists, including its
extension across the globe, with several FBI ‘legat’ offices abroad. Further
ameliorative adjustments can be suggested through some greater centraliza-
tion. However, these centralization movements must be carefully undertaken
hand-in-glove with the local developments. Here, the technological impro-
vements, together with their further advancement, can come in most
usefully. Positively, these technological improvements can be seen to be
underway by 2009–10, as cited above by both Mueller and Miller. This
approach must include ensuring that there is the effective recognition of and
capitalization on contemporary ‘glocalization’66 trends. Namely, this is
tackling areas where ‘local’ extending through to ‘global’ factors fuse.
Simultaneously, ‘human factors’ should not be neglected during the strong
emphasis on what technology can deliver.67 Implemented in balance with
each other, both human and technology factors must be carefully addressed
by the FBI.

Moreover, developments must not be undertaken too much in isolation.
This includes avoiding an overly individualistic emphasis and over-reliance
on certain key members of staff or particular managers. This is a trait that
impacts negatively on future business continuity. Leadership is undoubt-
edly important, as Miller has already highlighted, but it must not be
implemented alone. This is without adequate support from, or the
leadership failing to be taken up by, other members of staff within and
throughout the entire organization. Otherwise, sustaining stronger intelli-
gence initiatives and prolonging their underpinning rationale and
momentum is not fostered.

Together with occurring at a quicker rate, arguably cultural change within
the FBI must reach further down. This is into the micro levels of operation
and activity, witnessed at the daily work level. Enhanced and collective
training programmes, such as those referred to above by Mueller, are a
commendable way forward. However, these, too, always have ample scope
to be extended. This is accomplished through their further optimization, in
several different directions, as time progresses. Equally, they require their
continuous evolution through being constantly kept up-to-date. Moreover,

64‘Intelligence’, FBI fact sheet.
65See, for instance, the testimony of FBI Agent Bassem Youssef in 2008, cited above.
66A. Mooney and B. Evans (eds.), Globalization: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge/Key
Guides 2007) pp.117–8.
67See also the comments of John Miller, FBI assistant director, cited above.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 385

pro-active intelligence gathering must be kept well reflected in the FBI’s
operational culture. These movements are particularly essential vis-à-vis
individual FBI agents as they daily go about their work. Regularization is
key, addressing more haphazard, ad hoc tendencies.

Observations can be extended further. As ‘Americans spying on
Americans’ is such a strong anathema, a separate European-style domestic
security service would sit very uncomfortably with the American political
constituency.68 However, worthy of pursuit is some greater separation of (i)
the intelligence (‘wait and watch’) and (ii) the security (‘see and strike’)
functions and methodologies – or, at least, aspects of them. Although more
intelligence input is required in overarching strategic and policy terms
organizationally by the FBI, adopting more of this ‘firewall’ approach
elsewhere would help the FBI towards better resolving the tensions
encountered between these two methodologies. This is particularly at the
‘lower’ and more ‘micro’ tactical and operational levels, especially within the
investigations domain of the FBI’s activities. Notably, this is accomplished
through some enhanced reconciling disaggregation of these differing areas –
or, at least, their increased harmonization. This includes that process
occurring embedded within the pursuit of the FBI’s overall law enforcement
approach. Several complexities must be better resolved through at least a
degree of further methodological refinement.

Some further explanation is helpful. During the above process, an
improved way forward is offered. Instead of competing and clashing (in a
versus mode), the different methodologies are turned into more comple-
mentary force multipliers (in a vis-à-vis mode). Greater synergy between the
two is also generated, offering some ‘added value’ to investigations. As again
referred to above by Mueller, having both ‘analysts’ and ‘agents’ respectively
adopting those roles and specializing more in those methodologies does offer
a viable pragmatic and practical way forward. However, the importance of
the intelligence dimension in the training of FBI ‘agents’, while it might be
configured differently, must not be weaker than that provided to ‘analysts’.
Intelligence constructs must be maintained and communicated across the
whole organization. All of the FBI’s employees need enhanced intelligence
awareness being consistently encouraged. This is best accomplished through
their greater education in those terms.

Some qualifications apply to the above discussion. The tensions observed
between the intelligence and security methodologies in the overall approach
towards domestic counter-terrorism in the FBI context will never be
completely resolved. As frequently seen played out in institutional form,
tensions always remain. Some contradictions also always remain inherent.
These can be witnessed in the so-called ‘turf battles’ between dedicated
intelligence and security/law enforcement agencies, notably, in the United

68M.M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press
2006) p.1; see also J. Risen and E. Lichtblau, ‘Early Test for Obama on Domestic Spying
Views’, The New York Times, 18 November 2008.

386 Intelligence and National Security

States, the CIA and FBI, and when they are operating abroad.69 These
tensions include concerning at what point in time are ‘purer’ intelligence
operations stopped and is ‘security’ applied? They include clustering around
when the law should be enforced, typically achieved through the interdicting
of suspects.

A way forward can be readily suggested. While still allowing the FBI to
build and contribute towards legal cases, other security and stronger law
enforcement characteristics instead should be effectively toned down. For
instance, this is through those attributes being devolved more to the local
police authorities. This would involve removing the need for FBI agents to
possess the powers of arrest and removing their requirement to be (overly)
absorbed in actually physically implementing the law – i.e. needing to
undertake the ‘striking’ actions characterized above. This proposed re-
fashioning can be envisaged as being conducted along similar lines to how
MI5 and the UK police interact in concert during their joint counter-
terrorism investigations.70 As William Rosenau of RAND argued during
2006: ‘‘‘The British trump us in their use of police in counterterrorism,’’
while in the U.S., police are viewed largely as first-responders . . . The police
are integrated into the intelligence community in Britain in ways they aren’t
in the U.S., except perhaps in New York, L.A., and Chicago’.71

More recently, some commendable changes are afoot. Through the further
building up of their capacity and capabilities, local police authorities can
effectively take on greater security and law enforcement task burden sharing
with the FBI. This includes the police undertaking more of the local physical
and mechanical activities, such as actually carrying out raids and arresting
the targets. These movements also include the police doing more of the in-
the-field ‘legwork’ and ‘operation space’ (stakeout) preparation, as well as
dealing with the local community. Such a division of tasks is intended so that
FBI agents, in their ‘grander’ role as protectors of national security, do not
have to expend their time and effort on instead undertaking those lower and
micro level modes of tasks. Not least this is helpful as those tasks are already

69For CIA and FBI tensions, Priest, ‘FBI Pushes to Expand Domain into CIA’s Intelligence
Gathering’; see also R. Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of
its Enemies Since 9/11 (London: Simon & Schuster 2006) pp.92–4; ‘US Intelligence Wars’,
Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 4 November 2005; J. Warrick and W. Pincus, ‘CIA Finds Holes in
Pre-9/11 Work’, The Washington Post, 22 August 2007; D. Linzer, ‘In New York, a Turf War
in the Battle Against Terrorism’, The Washington Post, 22 March 2008; D. Johnston and
W.K. Rashbaum, ‘New York Police Fight with U.S. on Surveillance’, The New York Times,
20 November 2008; C. Johnson and S.S. Hsu, ‘Justice Dept., NYPD Tussle Over FISA
Warrants’, The Washington Post, 20 November 2008.
70See also K. Weston, ‘The Changing Nature of Counter-Terrorism Policing, RUSI Monitor
8/1 (2009) pp.19–20.
71E. Stables, ‘Alleged Plot in U.K. Highlights Improved Intelligence-Sharing with U.S.’,
Congressional Quarterly – CQ.com, 10 August 2006; see also Michael Downing, LAPD
Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, ‘Counterterrorism and Crime Fighting in Los
Angeles’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 22 October 2009.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 387

equally familiar to those operating in the general crime-fighting world.72

Effective lines of communication and flows of information between the
different levels and entities need to be strenuously managed, however,
allowing for best intelligence fusion possibilities. Also a degree of the
observable ‘nationalization of intelligence’ process is reflected.

Regarding the tackling of organized crime overseas, in 2009 the UK
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) has been going down a similar
road. Significantly, so-called ‘vetted units’ consisting of approved local law
enforcement personnel have been fostered in strategically important
countries across the globe.73 Adopting and extending these sorts of
approaches, both domestically (nationally) in the United States and out in
operational contexts abroad (on international, even globalized, bases),
would then allow ample room for the FBI to better: (i) address its
overburdened status; (ii) concentrate more on its investigations at a higher
and macro level of investigative and operational activity; as well as (iii) focus
on the enhancement of the intelligence methodology as more of an integral
and increased part of those investigations. Strategic impact would likewise
be better realized.

The extended use of various configurations of intelligence ‘fusion centers’
(and related concepts) similarly must be better encouraged.74 Tactically
through to strategically, the value of adopting this approach has already been
effectively demonstrated. For instance, this was seen during 2008–9 with the
FBI’s development of the El Paso Intelligence Center.75 Greater room for
manoeuvre to develop these highly supportive intelligence dimensions further
into the future would also be permitted in a suitably opportunistic manner.

However, acute vigilance must be maintained. Movements in this
direction must not be applied in a mutually exclusive and all-encompassing
blanket manner. As David Thacher has cautioned, the devolving of only
some security and law enforcement responsibilities from the macro and
higher-sited FBI to more micro and lower-situated local police forces must
be undertaken carefully.76 This is to ensure that already present higher-level
‘qualities’ are not lost or diminished during any change-processes. This
includes regarding more specialist counter-terrorism expertise – e.g.

72See also J. Weaver, ‘Sept. 11 Attacks Helped Forge Bond between FBI and Local Police’,
Miami Herald, 11 September 2009; S. Saulny, ‘Prayers and Criticism in Wake of Detroit
Imam’s Killing by F.B.I.’, The New York Times, 31 October 2009.
73Based on information from a non-attributable source. For more on SOCA, see Svendsen,
Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror, pp.20–1.
74‘Transformation through Integration and Innovation’, US Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI), The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America,
October 2005; J. Rollins, ‘Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress’, Congressional
Research Service Report for Congress, 18 January 2008; ‘Fusion Centers: Unifying
Intelligence to Protect Americans’, FBI Press Release, 12 March 2009.
75‘Statement of R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI’, p.29.
76D. Thacher, ‘The Local Role in Homeland Security’, Law & Society Review 39/3 (2005)
p.637; see also S. Pickering, D. Wright-Neville, J. McCulloch and P. Lentini, Counter-
Terrorism Policing (New York: Springer 2007) p.106.

388 Intelligence and National Security

concerning chemical, biological, nuclear and explosive (CBRNE) compo-
nents and forensic skills. The change-processes should not be too sweeping.
Important ‘top-down’ (central/national), and equally ‘bottom-up’ (periph-
eral/local), filtering and informing investigation information and skill-set
flows do not want to become detrimentally impeded as a byproduct or side-
effect. Equally, the valuable qualities do not want to become jettisoned.
Careful balances must be fashioned and then constantly maintained in future
activities.

Of course, clearly no single approach is entirely perfect. The intelligence
methodology itself is also not without flaws. Developments occurring in real-
time can be missed. ‘Time lags’ belonging to processes can have an impact,
such as during the translation and interpretation of the information gathered.
Naturally, it is also impossible for investigators to always be everywhere at
once. However, constant monitoring activities undertaken more system-
atically, and in a more consolidated form, can help to minimize those risks.
The cleavage has to be fashioned along lines that effectively navigate the
difficulties highlighted by Sheptycki, where, on the one hand, ‘Governments
at every level advocate putting more police on patrol but, at the same time, re-
organise and centralise policing systems around the intelligence-led policing
paradigm that puts more and more officers behind desks analysing criminal
intelligence’.77 Adopting a plurality of approaches therefore emerges as the
most effective route to pursue. The FBI can learn much.

Indeed, a proven method for enhanced directing is proposed. Increasingly
adopting the ‘medical triage’ process appears to be a commendable prudent
way forward in contemporary circumstances.78 This helps to better ascertain
FBI prioritizations, together with better allocating its case burden-sharing
and division of labour requirements with other collaborative partners – such
as local law enforcement (police) agencies. The potential for introducing
more reflective planning can be facilitated. In the 2008–9 global economic
downturn, a successful implementation of this approach has already been
witnessed amid the FBI and police based in New York City.79 This allows
the FBI to remain sufficiently focused on the contemporaneous ‘big’ or
‘headline’ issues, without simultaneously becoming (too) overwhelmed by
other seemingly more amorphous or ‘micro’ considerations. This is
particularly relevant in light of the contested domestic terrorism ‘threat’
the United States has appeared to confront over time.80

77Sheptycki, ‘Transnational Policing’; see also J. Sheptycki, ‘Organizational Pathologies in
Police Intelligence Systems’, European Journal of Criminology 1/3 (2004) pp.307–32.
78On ‘triage’ systems, see D. Alexander, Principles of Emergency Planning and Management
(Harpenden: Terra 2002) pp.200–11.
79P. Hurtado, ‘FBI Uses Triage to Shift from Terror to Madoff, Subprime Probes’,
Bloomberg, 22 December 2008.
80J. Mueller, ‘Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2006).
However, see also A. Elliott, ‘A Call to Jihad, Answered in America’, The New York Times,
12 July 2009; for recent cases, see P. Bergen, ‘The Terrorists Among Us’, Foreign Policy, 19
November 2009; B. Ghosh, ‘Domestic-Terrorism Incidents Hit a Peak in 2009’, TIME, 23

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 389

Furthermore, the ‘pure’ intelligence elements within the FBI must not
become encumbered by more ‘pedestrian’ producing-for-court requirements.
Sensibly, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) explicitly notes that:
‘The Service collects information relating to Canada’s security, not evidence for
a court of law’.81 Unfortunately, in its own contemporary overstretched and
overburdened condition, the UK’s MI5 appears to be going more down the
producing-for-court route.82 Indeed, from a ‘purer’ intelligence perspective,
this appears to be a counter-productive development for that agency. This
suggests its greater enmeshment in a web of highly set law court
requirements.83 Much can therefore be learned from these developments.
Before introducing the Arar Commission recommendations in Canada during
2006, the Canadian intelligence and security system similarly had its own
portfolio of shortcomings from which valuable lessons were drawn.84

Generally, intelligence targeting must be kept carefully refined. An
advisable move is for all agencies to engage in a greater degree of reflection
about their methods and processes. A better recall of their functional ‘roots’
and ‘heritage’ is helpful. This is not least through adequately remembering
the historical dimensions of their functional rationale. This is a movement
that is especially useful in our contemporary era, which has been
appropriately characterized as being substantially ‘back to the future’.85

December 2009; S. Shane, ‘News Analysis: A Year of Terror Plots, Through a Second Prism’,
The New York Times, 13 January 2010.
81Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communicating with Canadians (Ottawa:
Government of Canada 2006) p.6.
82See, for example, G. Corera, ‘The Reality of MI5’s Work’, BBC News Online, 10
November 2006.
83‘MI5’s ‘‘Torture’’ Evidence Revealed’, BBC News Online, 21 October 2005; ‘Lords Reject
Torture Evidence Use’, BBC News Online, 8 December 2005; ‘Judge Critical of MI5
Testimony’, BBC News Online, 12 October 2006.
84W. Wark, ‘Learning Lessons (and how) in the War on Terror: The Canadian Experience’,
International Journal 60/1 (2004–2005) pp.71–90.
85For the ‘dangers of a debased collective mentality, tenuous grasp of history’ and related
issues, see W.K. Wark, ‘Introduction: ‘‘Learning to Live with Intelligence’’’, Intelligence and
National Security 18/4 (2003); see also C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence Analysis Needs to Look
Backwards Before Looking Forward,’ History & Policy (June 2004); R. Popplewell,
‘‘‘Lacking Intelligence’’: Some Reflections on Recent Approaches to British Counter-
Insurgency, 1900–1960’, Intelligence and National Security 10/4 (1995) pp.336–52. For
other ‘historical resonances/parallels’, e.g. G. Stewart, ‘Al-Qaeda, Victorian Style’, The
Times, 5 August 2005; B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press
2006) p.7; R.B. Jensen, ‘Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth
Century Europe’, Terrorism and Political Violence 16/1 (2004) pp.116–53; E. Aydinli,
‘Before Jihadists There Were Anarchists: A Failed Case of Transnational Violence’, Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism 31/10 (2008) pp.903–23; R.B. Jensen, ‘The International Campaign
Against Anarchist Terrorism, 1880–1930s’, Terrorism and Political Violence 21/1 (2009)
pp.89–109; W. Kassel, ‘Terrorism and the International Anarchist Movement of the Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 32/3 (2009); J.
Lyon (ed.), ‘Introduction’ to J. Conrad, The Secret Agent (Oxford: Oxford University Press
2004 [1907]) p.xi.

390 Intelligence and National Security

Intelligence degradation must be strenuously avoided. Increasingly, the
shortcomings of pursuing a route that concertinas specialist, higher, and
macro level ranging intelligence capabilities appear to be exposed publicly.
Instead of becoming overly focused on fast moving day-to-day operational
minutiae, an appropriate long-view strategic focus simultaneously needs to
be carefully maintained.86 Once the more structural changes have been
implemented, some more cultural changes can be pursued. These can be
wider and deeper-reaching in their impact.87 They are examined next.

2. Cultural Change and Investigations Becoming More A Priori

As already introduced above, the FBI continues to require an extended
cultural transformation. In its domestic counter-terrorism investigations, the
FBI can effectively realize a yet greater capacity for agility and flexibility.
This involves a movement from investigations being so mainly post facto in
their nature to being more a priori.88 Or, to use a constructive distinction
borrowed from US Judge Richard Posner, culturally the FBI must be less like
‘dogs’ and more like ‘cats’ in terms of its outlook and behaviour.89 Such a
shift in the FBI’s domestic counter-terrorism investigations brings an added
benefit: arguably, the requirement to better pre-empt domestic terrorist
attacks is more advantageously reformed. The FBI would undergo a shift to
being more proactive and ‘ahead of the curve’ of events.90

Further emergency preparedness offers a helpful way forward. By
successfully adopting these constructs, the FBI is better placed to implement
a greater forward-looking risk management and opportunity-generation
approach. This offers improved ‘risk pre-emption’ possibilities. This is rather
than instead emphasizing more after-the-event crisis management or first-
responder approaches. Adopting this proposed ‘forward’ approach is highly
advisable, helping the FBI to better foresee and prevent potential terrorist
attacks.

Simultaneously, the process of ‘reflecting back’ and ‘learning lessons’
during, or from, investigations should not atrophy. However, while being
‘bottom-up’ informing, these activities must be marginally rolled back from
the real-time frontline ‘current affairs’-focused dimensions of the FBI’s

86M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006)
p.206; H. Strachan, ‘Strategy as a Balancing Act: The UK’s Dilemma’, RUSI Journal 153/3
(2008) pp.6–10.
87See also C.S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, Comparative
Strategy 26/1 (2007) pp.1–20; J.D. McCausland, Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st
Century (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College 2008).
88See also R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI, ‘Speech – Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.’, FBI Press Release, 3 February 2009.
89Judge Richard A. Posner, ‘Why the United States Needs a Counterpart to CSIS or MI–5’,
talk delivered at the Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (CASIS) 2006
Annual International Conference, Ottawa, Canada, 26 October 2006.
90See, for example, A.K. Cronin, ‘Behind the Curve: Globalization and International
Terrorism’, International Security 27/3 (2002–3) pp.30–58.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 391

police-work. Thereby, more appropriate supportive ‘top-down’ intelligence-
associated informing and warning qualities can be offered.91 The ‘seeing the
wood for the trees’ analogy resonates, also allowing for some extended
directing and thinking ‘outside of the box’.92

The improved intelligence penetration of terrorist activities also assists.
An extended intelligence methodology, involving the employment of
extended surveillance activities, allows authorities much. This includes
the confidence to permit a terrorist operation to mature to a sufficiently
convincing extent before arrests are made. Two important advantages of
adopting this approach can be highlighted: firstly, the terrorists readily
produce valuable future investigative leads. Secondly, arrests made at a
later stage in the development of a plot can offer distinct ‘added value’.
Arrests at this later stage tend to uncover considerably less disputable
(physical) evidence. Broadly ranging consensus can be built by demonstrat-
ing convincingly, e.g. communicating to the public via the media, that the
threat is sufficiently genuine. Facts can have greater potential to ‘speak for
themselves’. Thereby, more of a self-generating and sustaining ‘unique
selling point’ (USP), and hence legitimacy, for the case is offered publicly.
Enhanced potential for successful subsequent prosecution similarly is better
realized.

Ultimately, there is the increased potential for the application of a more
refined mode of pre-emption. As Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz has
observed, pre-emption is a risky approach to adopt, as it is a ‘knife that
cuts both ways’.93 Therefore, by applying a greater intelligence methodol-
ogy, the scenario that eventually emerges is increasingly engineered. This
ensures that there are better possibilities engendered for the course of
action adopted to ‘cut’ (work) more the way as desired. Borrowing from
Sir David Omand, the former Intelligence and Security Coordinator in the
UK Cabinet Office, overall this approach allows for the better application
of the ‘rapier’, rather than the ‘bludgeon’, in intelligence and security
operations.94 This scenario can be contrasted with the Padilla case from
2002, which posited a ‘dirty bomb’ plot directed at Chicago. Here, overly
zealous early action was counter-productive and left the authorities with

91‘Second Sight – Michael Heimbach, Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counter-terrorism
Division’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 19 February 2009.
92For the value of ‘scenario’ and ‘horizon-scanning’ work, B. Ralston and I. Wilson, The
Scenario Planning Handbook: Developing Strategies in Uncertain Times (Mason, OH:
Thomson South-Western 2006); G. Ringland, Scenario Planning, 2nd ed. (London: Wiley
2006).
93For more on ‘pre-emption’, A.M. Dershowitz, Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways
(London: W.W. Norton & Co. 2006); see also the cautions in B.E. Harcourt, Against
Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press 2007).
94D. Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, Gresham College Transcript, 20 October
2005.

392 Intelligence and National Security

embarrassingly little material with which to later make a compelling
prosecution case.95

Whatever the mixed eventual outcome of contemporary change develop-
ments currently underway vis-à-vis the FBI, some clear conclusions emerge.
Implementing a shift in investigative approach demonstrably would be of
long-term value to the FBI. This is particularly where the intelligence
methodology of ‘wait and watch’ continues to burgeon and figures through
(i) its rigorous application in a substantially extended and enhanced systemic
and systematic form, and where (ii) it is then constantly maintained into the
future in a consistent manner. A brief examination of how the domestic
intelligence services of other countries can be drawn on as viable models for
the FBI is now undertaken. Both in organizational (structural) and cultural
(even philosophical) terms, the value of adopting an enhanced intelligence
methodology is demonstrated.

The Domestic Intelligence and Security Services Model

Usefully applied intelligence methodologies exist elsewhere. In recent years,
there has been a sizeable amount of discussion about whether the British
Security Service (MI5) would be a commendable model on which to base
reform for the FBI.96 However, eventually Washington decided against
pursuing this option.97 Understandably in the United States, where ‘internal
liaison’ is a sizeable challenge between the multiple agencies that already
exist, there was opposition towards the creation of yet another separate
agency to handle domestic counter-terrorism intelligence. Such a proposal
was viewed as unhelpful from several vantage points. This included from a
US domestic intelligence-sharing perspective.98 Partly as a consequence of
these arguments, the United States decided that the FBI would keep its
domestic counter-terrorism intelligence role. This was despite the perceived
shortcomings around 9/11.

The FBI’s remit has since continued to proliferate exponentially. This has
been along with the tensions between the differing intelligence and security
methodologies trying to be reconciled within the one agency. By 2006, as

95M. Davis, ‘Padilla Case Highlights Terror Debate’, BBC News Online, 22 November 2005.
96See, for instance, T. Harnden, ‘US May Set Up MI5-style Spy Agency in Security Shake-up’,
The Daily Telegraph, 31 October 2002; see also T. Masse, ‘Domestic Intelligence in the
United Kingdom: Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States’, Congressional
Research Service, 19 May 2003; J. Burns and M. Huband, ‘US Considers Security Reforms
Along UK Lines’, The Financial Times, 5 May 2003; G. Corera, ‘USA Studies UK Security
Service’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 23 January 2003; see also US National Commission, 9/11
Report, 22 July 2004, p.423; RAND, ‘Confronting the ‘‘Enemy Within’’’; S.J. Paltrow, ‘MI5
Could Be Model for Revamped U.S. Intelligence Agency’, The Wall Street Journal, 10
October 2004.
97‘Bush Sets Up Domestic Spy Service’, BBC News Online, 30 June 2005.
98‘Statement of William P. Barr to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States’, Sixth public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, 8 December 2003.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 393

Senator Leahy observed, this had been accomplished to an extent. Yet,
simultaneously, much work remained to be done. The debates over whether
the United States needs a separate domestic intelligence agency also continue
to be aired, demonstrating the distinct lack of consensus on this issue.99

Further insights have been forthcoming. As explored in-depth by RAND,
other domestic intelligence and security services, or at least aspects of their
functioning, can be used as viable referential models for the basis of
domestic counter-terrorism intelligence reform to the FBI. This remains the
case even if a separate domestic intelligence agency or bureaucracy, adding
to the 17 (including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence –
ODNI) that already exist in the United States, is not created. The services
drawn upon for illustrative purposes notably include MI5 and the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service.100 Their instructive utility to the FBI continues
to be upheld into 2010. Most significantly, this is because those services
represent ‘purer’ intelligence organizations and are (generally) exponents of
a stronger intelligence methodology. Despite some renewed US Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and Congressional interest being emergent
during late October 2008, the creation of another US intelligence bureau-
cracy is still unlikely to be easily introduced or to be forthcoming anytime
soon.101 The FBI therefore has no choice but to continue to raise its own
intelligence game.

Other conclusions crystallize. Some separation, particularly of certain
powers – such as that of arrest, allocated to the police in the other countries
cited here (the UK and Canada) – continues to be highly advisable. Again,
this is so that the ‘ends’ of those types of domestic counter-terrorism
intelligence operations do not conflict, or at least do not clash so strongly,
with the ‘means’ deployed. The balance between methodologies being
pursued can move increasingly from figuring in more of a versus
(oppositional) and divided form, to a vis-à-vis (complementary) and unified
mode of operating. Further empowering shifts, allowing for improved
methodological fusion, can still be undertaken in a viable manner.

Ultimately, whatever is decided, any lessons learnt from these models
should not be assimilated uncritically. This is not least as those agencies
(MI5 and CSIS) similarly have their own portfolio of shortcomings, as they
likewise continue to undergo their own changes in such dynamic operating

99See Discussants: Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, Senior Lecturer, University of Chicago Law School and Juliette Kayyem, ‘Online
Debate: Does the United States Need a Domestic Intelligence Agency?’, Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR), 17 November 2006; Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on
Terror, p.55; see also as cited below.
100See, for example, the in-depth RAND report on this issue, Chalk and Rosenau,
Confronting the ‘Enemy Within’.
101See, for instance, ‘U.S. Policymakers Mull Creation of Domestic Intelligence Agency’,
CNN.com, 20 October 2008; see also ‘Should the United States Establish a Dedicated
Domestic Intelligence Agency for Counterterrorism?’ RAND Research Brief, October 2008;
G.F. Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND 2008).

394 Intelligence and National Security

environments. However, a conclusion that emerges clearly from examining
these models is that by overall adopting a greater ‘intelligence methodology’
significant benefits can be brought to the FBI. Notably, this is throughout its
whole organization and in relation to all of its operational processes. This is
especially when those movements are implemented comprehensively,
including in cultural terms. This observation now opens the way for some
wider conclusions.

Conclusions

Valuably, Hitz observed in 2008 that: ‘I believe it is too early to conclude, as
some important observers apparently have, that the FBI cannot perform its
domestic intelligence role competently’. He continued:

Congress and the executive branch will have to monitor carefully the
FBI’s success in creating a domestic intelligence career service to gauge
whether or not the bureau’s law-enforcement culture can be modified
to adopt an MI–5 competence. I believe that it will, as . . . cross-cutting
responsibilities like the [(US Intelligence Community-spanning) Na-
tional Counterterrorism Center] NCTC gather importance and effec-
tiveness, but the jury is still out.102

Whichever developments are particularly highlighted for examination, the
ongoing requirement to engage more with an intelligence methodology in
the FBI context continues to need to be energized and extended further.
Moreover, this must be accomplished in a long-term sustainable manner.103

Otherwise, any viable post–9/11 reforms of the FBI in the area of domestic
counter-terrorism intelligence, and the driving momentum behind them, will
instead increasingly stagnate. This last development would be counter-
productive for both the United States itself, as well as for its key counter-
terrorism partners, such as, internationally, the UK and Canada.

Alternatively, concerns abound that we will have to wait for the least
desirable ‘spark’ in the ‘tinderbox’ to act as a stimulus for more substantial
change. Namely, this is some future attack on American soil that would
surely provoke a further wave of reform. Indeed, a claim has surfaced that it
is likely that the ‘MI5-model’ would be adopted by the United States in the
aftermath of another ‘mass casualty’ attack similar to 9/11.104

Whatever transpires, to paraphrase the observation of an anonymous
commentator: ‘Americans are more interested in results; Europeans are more
interested in process’.105 Today, however, the FBI and all of its personnel
throughout the whole organization must become more interested in its

102Hitz, Why Spy?, p.193.
103For some FBI recognition of this factor, FBI Director Mueller, ‘Director to Police Chiefs:
Intelligence is Our Future’, FBI Press Release, 10 November 2008.
104Information from a non-attributable source.
105Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 395

process(es). Otherwise, the results that the American people most desire –
notably long-term sustainable public safety and security – are going to be
increasingly elusive. Without getting too constrained by bureaucratic factors
and machinations, ‘culture-change’ stands out as the best area on which to
concentrate. This is also the best area to continue investing and driving
transformative efforts vis-à-vis the twenty-first-century FBI.

A commendable way forward is pursuing more of an intelligence-
dominated approach. Rightly, as the FBI has recognized in 2009, this can
be characterized as consisting of the effective distribution and balance of the
elements of ‘assess, evaluate, monitor, and – if required – disrupt’.106

Regardless of the perceived scale of the domestic terrorist threat confronted
over time, as recent terrorism-related cases towards the end of 2009 and into
2010 have served to highlight, a more considered form of vigilance should
not be neglected by the United States.

Moving along the proposed lines of extended ‘waiting and watching’
activities is key. This offers (i) an approach that strives to reach wider and
deeper than current efforts, also (ii) allowing for the setting of more suitably
refined (and higher) risk management thresholds, while (iii) simultaneously
taking ‘proportionality’ considerations adequately into account during ope-
rations.107 Clearly adopting an enhanced comprehensive intelligence metho-
dology can offer an appropriate panacea to all of those concerns.
Qualitatively, as well as quantitatively, the FBI would do well to continue
rigorously pursuing this route in a sustained manner into the future. This
includes in both structural and cultural terms.

Finally, as FBI Director Robert Mueller argued in his Congressional
testimony of March 2009:

Today, the Bureau is a stronger organization, combining better
intelligence capabilities with a longstanding commitment to protecting
the American people from criminal threats. And we are also mindful
that our mission is . . . also to safeguard American liberties.108

Broadly, when reflecting over the long term of the years 2000–10, although
there have been significant problems and paucities encountered along the
way, the contemporary FBI has made some progress. In its condition of
ongoing transformation, so far the FBI appears to be heading in a more

106Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch, FBI,
‘Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs’,
FBI Press Release, 11 March 2009; see also E. Schmitt, ‘F.B.I. Agents’ Role is Transformed by
Terror Fight’, The New York Times, 19 August 2009.
107On ‘proportionality’ considerations, A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Strategy and Disproportionality in
Contemporary Conflict’, Journal of Strategic Studies 33/3 (June 2010) pp.367–99.
108‘Statement of R.S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI’, p.5; for later insights, R.S. Mueller, III,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘Statement Before the House Committee on
Appropriations, Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies’, FBI
Website, 17 March 2010.

396 Intelligence and National Security

positive than negative direction. Its increased adoption of intelligence
elements is commendable.

Complacency, however, should not ensue. Further time is now required to
see where the most recently implemented developments take us in the
future.109 While notes of caution should still be sounded on a regular basis,
whichever road is taken, and whatever various ‘moments’ of weakness are
encountered, the intelligence dimension remains central and essential for the
FBI. This is especially for its counter-terrorism work, with added use beyond
for the tackling of other concerning crimes. By comprehensively implement-
ing an enhanced intelligence approach in an effectively inter-connected way,
the contemporary FBI can continue to transform in a most expeditious
manner as the twenty-first century progresses.

Acknowledgements

This article is based in part on papers delivered at the British Association for
American Studies (BAAS) Conference, held at the University of Edinburgh in
March 2008, and the annual conference of the American Politics Group
(APG), held at the Rothermere American Institute and St. Anne’s College,
University of Oxford, in January 2009.

109See also S.S. Hsu, ‘FBI Names Veteran Officer to Oversee Intelligence Divisions’, The
Washington Post, 21 April 2010.

Addressing US Domestic Counter-terrorism Intelligence 397

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