2500 words - CASE STUDY ANALYSIS

Course name:

International Management

Required to write a case study analysis summarising and providing solutions to case questions for a case study.

Assessment 3
Briefing

MGMT3001 International Management: Individual Case Study Analysis

Report Format
Total word count: 2,500 words
Summary (500 words)
Question 1 (300 words) – indicate question number
Question 2 (300 words) – indicate question number
Question 3 (300 words) – indicate question number
Question 4 (300 words) – indicate question number
Question 5 (300 words) – indicate question number
Conclusion (500 words)
No executive summary needed.
No introduction needed.

Assignment 3: Word count is 2,500 (10%+/- rule: word limit is 2,250 – 2,750)
Do we need to cite and reference the case study?
Yes, please cite the case when you use the information from it.
You may also choose to cite the source in the topic sentence of a paragraph and mention the following information was sourcing from the same source as the first one.
Use up the information from the case study first before using information from outside sources. Make sure the outside sources are valid and reliable.
No Wikipedia, CourseHero, UK.Essay, etc. essay mill sites. I will fail you and report you for academic misconduct.

Instructions
The title page, table of contents, reference list and appendices do not comprise part of the prescribed word limit. Please also print the total word count on the cover page.
You are expected to use at least ten (10) different scholarly journal articles (please check the library guide if you are uncertain about the definition of a scholarly journal) published within the past ten years to support your arguments and discussion.
Unable to meet this mandatory requirement will result in a zero in your reference section (10%) of the marking rubric. Written assignments must use the Chicago 17th B Referencing style and assignments unsatisfactorily referenced will not be marked and the students notified.
Please don’t forget to cite the case as this is a case study analysis.

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Page 407

Brief Integrative Case 3

Google in China: Protecting Property and
Rights

Google in China
In early 2008 Guo Quan announced plans to sue Google in the United States for blocking his
entire name from search results in China. But why was his name blocked from search results?
Guo Quan had published an open letter in early January to his government leaders Hu Jintao
and Wu Bangguo, calling “for government reform [with] multi-party democratic elections”
that served the interests of the common people.1 In response to his letter, the government
labeled Guo as a dissident and a political danger. He was ultimately arrested on charges of
“subversion of state power.”2

Guo Quan’s name might have forever been lost in the shadow of the then-upcoming
2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, but formal and informal networks of information helped
publicize his case; his harsh sentence, which resulted in his imprisonment until 2018, and the
fact that he named Google in his suit have made him infamous. The story of Guo Quan
reflects the many challenges faced by Google over the course of the past decade as it has
attempted to expand globally. During this period, Google’s relationship with China has
undergone a series of advances and setbacks, each reflecting in some way China’s response to
the challenges of the Internet and social networking as well as Google’s difficulties of
translating a uniquely North American business model to countries and environments with
different regulatory regimes, legal environments, and fundamental values.

Rough Beginnings
At the break of the new millennium, Google began to offer its search services in a Chinese-
language format with the hope of furthering its mission “to organize the world’s information
and make it universally accessible and useful.”3 Disappointingly, the website was
consistently unavailable “about 10 percent of the time … [and] slow and unreliable” due to

Luthans, Fred, and Jonathan Doh. ISE EBook for International Management: Culture Strategy and Behavior : Culture Strategy and Behavior, McGraw-Hill US Higher Ed ISE, 20

20.

ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=621257

Created from curtin on 2022-09-04 08:24:

22.

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“extensive filtering performed by China’s licensed Internet service providers.”4 This sense of
distrust persisted for another two years until the autumn of 2002, when Google first became
completely unavailable in China because Google claimed to have “stood by its principles and
not subject[ed] itself to Chinese laws and regulations.”5 The dysfunctional use of Google
search services for mainlanders continued and in December 2003, Google.com was again
blocked in China.

Three years later, in 2006, Google.com was again blocked while Google.cn, Google’s
Chinese subsidiary, remained in operation. The following year, in 2007, CEO Eric Schmidt
gave an upbeat assessment of Google’s outlook in China amid challenges of censorship issues
and competition from Baidu.com.

More Than a BackRub: Google’s Rise to Power
But how did Google come to such international prominence? In 1996, Stanford graduate
students Larry Page and Sergey Brin began collaborating on a search engine called BackRub.
This search engine got its name because Page and Brin used backlinks to measure the
importance of a site.6 By using the innovation called PageRank, a new system of ranking a
website’s relevance using “an objective measure of its citation importance … according to an
idealized model of user behavior,”7 Page and Brin dramatically increased search relevance
compared to other search engines like Yahoo.

A little more than a year later, BackRub’s massive bandwidth usage, which had
downloaded over 30 million indexable HTML pages, made it inoperable on the Stanford
server.8 From then on, Larry and Sergey realized the potential of BackRub, changed its name
to Google, and moved their office to a colleague’s garage.9

Google’s first investor became interested in 1996 when Sun Microsystem founder Andy
Bechtolsheim provided a $100,000 check, allowing Google to incorporate and become
officially Google Inc. In 1999, more investors grew attracted to Page and Brin’s idea and,
with an increased budget of around $1 million, Google Inc. was able to relocate to a real
office in Palo Alto, where a staff of only eight answered about 500,000 queries per day.10

In mid-1999 Google received an additional $25 million in equity funding for its search
engine from two venture capital firms: Sequoia Capital and Kleiner Perkins Caufield &
Buyers. The confidence to invest such a large amount of capital came from the previous
experience these VCs had in funding high-tech companies, such as Amazon and Cisco
Systems. Google’s engineering genius and a monthly growth rate of 50 percent fueled only

Luthans, Fred, and Jonathan Doh. ISE EBook for International Management: Culture Strategy and Behavior : Culture Strategy and Behavior, McGraw-Hill US Higher Ed ISE, 2020.
ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/curtin/detail.action?docID=6212572.
Created from curtin on 2022-09-04 08:24:22.

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http://Google.com

http://Baidu.com

Page 408

by word of mouth easily proved its value to these seasoned investors.11

By the year 2000, Google became the world’s largest search engine, supporting 15
languages.12 Google’s service was nothing new considering the existing search engines at the
time, like Yahoo and AOL, but it was indisputable that Google offered the best search
services. The innovative PageRank algorithm was combined with a minimalist homepage
that focused on its search tool and reminded the user of its chief focus while helping to
reinforce confidence in its best feature. Having secured a solid foothold in America, Google
continued to seek more ways to expand. Visionaries from the very beginning, Page
and Brin created Google to have “simplicity in our user interface and the scalability
in our back-end systems [that] enables us to expand very quickly.”13

By anticipating the need to be flexible in order to expand, Google was set to go global.
And as Larry Page remarked: “Google’s search engine has always had strong global appeal.
We attribute this success to the site’s simplicity of design, ease of use, and highly relevant
results. By localizing our search services to new international communities, Google will open
up a host of new revenue, sales, and partnership channels.”14

Unfortunately, Asian countries in general had always been more difficult to penetrate
because of competition from well-established local search engines. As recently as 2015, local
search engine Naver had a market share of 49.8 percent in South Korea, while Google had
36.9 percent.15 Furthermore, China posed the greatest roadblock with censorship and
competition from Baidu. However, with a population of one billion people and Internet usage
on a steady climb, Google was determined to establish a stronger foothold in China (see
Figure 1).

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Figure 1 China’s Internet Users and Population

Google vs. Baidu
China’s policies have directly influenced the competitive landscape for search firms in China.
In the space of Internet search, Baidu is usually referred to as China’s Google. But in reality,
Baidu holds a strong market share lead over Google.16 Prior to the launch of Google.cn in
2006 in China, Google held 33.3 percent of the search engine market share between
Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou while Baidu held 47.9 percent.17 Google was optimistic
about the close margin in market share and considered the possibility of perhaps buying out
Baidu in competition. But instead, in mid-2006, Google made a fatal mistake, selling its 2.6
percent stake of more than $60 million in Baidu shares and introducing Google.cn to
China.18

Nevertheless, Google.cn was launched with the promise that it would agree to block
certain websites in return for the opportunity to run local Chinese services.19 Google
promised to notify Chinese users when their search results would be censored and also
promised not to maintain any services that involved personal or confidential data, like Gmail
or Blogger, on the mainland. Google.cn was a response to improve the poor service Google
believed it was providing in China. As senior policy counsel Andrew McLaughlin put it,
“Google users in China today struggle with a service that, to be blunt, isn’t very good … the
website is slow, and sometimes produces results that when clicked on, stall out the user’s
browser. Our Google News service is never available; Google Images is accessible only half
the time … the level of service we’ve been able to provide in China is not something we’re

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Page 409

proud of.”20

Fundamentally, Google’s strategic move to create a local presence with Google.cn was
driven by its desire to follow its mission of creating the most organized and efficient search
engine. However, while Google thought it had the flexibility to set up a better search engine
in China, Baidu CEO Robin Li was already ahead of the curve. While PageRank was being
developed by Page and Brin, Robin Li was simultaneously working on a similar strategy for
siteranking called RankDex. As a result, this similar search concept was brought to Baidu. In
the end, Google had erroneously presumed that it could overtake Baidu by maximizing its
core competencies within China.21

Not only did Baidu have a strong competing search engine against Google, but it also
provided several innovative search features customized for more local tastes. It introduced
community-oriented services, including information-exchanging bulletin boards and instant
messaging. These extra services appealed strongly to Chinese Internet users and put Baidu
ahead of a foreign Google that did not seem to understand the Chinese market as well.

In addition, Baidu also took an extra step that Google missed by setting up “a national
network of advertising resellers in 200 Chinese cities to educate businesses about the power
of online advertising.”22 By specifically targeting the business market segment, Baidu aimed
to secure the Shanghai business sector. To secure the more general student population in
Beijing, Baidu also offered a search engine that provided easy access to pirated film and
music downloads.23

While Baidu strategically offered services that targeted specific market segments,
Google was at a loss because of its slow comprehension of the Chinese market. Among one
of the failures Google made was its attempt to rebrand Google.cn to Guge, which was
Chinese for Harvest Song. Six months after the launch of Guge, “72.6 percent (62.8 percent
of the users whose first choice was Google) of the interviewed users still weren’t able to
[recall] the Chinese name of Google.”24 The lack of brand loyalty was reflected in the
insignificant number of Google users who were willing to convert from using the Chinese
version of Google.com to Guge. Most users still preferred to use the original
Google.com that was only censored by the People’s Republic of China.25

Google seemed to be fighting a losing battle, while Baidu continued to receive positive
press coverage during its 2005 IPO on NASDAQ. Consequently, in just one year, Baidu
gained 14 percent of the search engine market share while Google lost 8 percent.26

In the following year, 2007, Google fought hard to hold onto its piece of the China

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http://Google.com

market, increasing its total market share from 19.2 percent to 22.8 percent while Baidu fell
from 63.7 percent to 58.1 percent. Google increased its efforts by “hiring Chinese employees
and … partnering with Chinese technology firms … [and establishing] two research centers,
one in Beijing and one in Shanghai.”27

The small victory was short-lived as Google was soon met with conflict from both
China’s and the U.S.’s governments.

The Challenge of Censorship: Google under Fire
Shortly after Google.cn received its license from the Chinese government in 2007, Google
proceeded to sign a set of guidelines, designed to reduce the risk that their actions would lead
to human rights abuses in China and other countries.28 By promising to comply with
censorship when the government filed a formal request, this effectively removed Google’s
presence from the majority of human rights activities.

From this point forward, Google was fiercely criticized for running advertisements from
nonlicensed medical websites in 2008, launching free music services, scanning books
without proper copyright laws, and making pornographic content easily available multiple
times in 2009.29 What has unfolded in the most recent years has been the climax of this
drama between country and company.

On January 13, 2010, in response to an attack on the Gmail accounts of human rights
activists by the Chinese government, Google released an initial statement saying that it was
ready to end censorship of its search service.30 The announcement caused a stir, with
speculations that Google would pull out of China completely.

Soon afterwards, however, CEO Eric Schmidt released a counterstatement stating that
Google was planning to stay in China, even if it was forced to close down its local search
services and just carry through with its other range of services.31 In the same month, Hillary
Clinton, the U.S. Secretary of State, called upon Beijing to carry out a thorough and
transparent investigation regarding the cyber hacks of human rights activists’ e-mail accounts.
Ultimately, she threw her weight behind Google’s threat to pull out of China unless Beijing
permitted an “unfiltered search engine.”32

Following the conflict in January, Google formally announced in March that all
Google.cn users would be directed to the uncensored Google.com.hk website instead.
According to Google, the decision reflected a legal move that still allowed mainland users
access to their search engine.33 The move to stop offering a local search engine and battling

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http://Google.com

with China over censorship reflected a shift in Google’s attitude, giving up competing with
Baidu for Internet usage. In April, Google’s share of Chinese Internet searches dropped from
35.6 percent to 30.9 percent and Baidu’s rose from 58.4 percent to 64 percent.34 Despite no
longer providing Google.cn to China, Google still cannot escape the censorship battles and
attacks on its server. In 2014, China restricted access to nearly all of Google’s auxiliary
services.35 Almost instantly, Google’s market share in China dropped to less than 2 percent.

But criticisms of Google have not always been from China. On March 22, 2011, New
York Judge Denny Chin rejected a settlement between Google and both the Authors Guild
and the Association of American Publishers (AAP). The original settlement had included an
annual payment of $125 million in royalties to the copyright owners in order for Google to
continue its project of scanning and selling online access to 150 million books.36 But
copyright concerns persisted because no one could establish ownership of the digitized and
scanned pages. It was concluded that Google’s current pact would simply give the company
an unfair advantage over its competitors while rewarding it for engaging in wholesale
copying of copyrighted works without permission.

In October 2012, the AAP announced a new, yet controversial, settlement deal with
Google. For each book already scanned by Google, publishers could choose to contact
Google for removal. Moving forward, every digitized book catalog would first require an
express opt-in from publishers. None of the financial terms of the deal were released. The
Authors Guild, on the other hand, remained in litigation, leading a class-action lawsuit
criticizing Google for its opt-out approach.37 In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the
case, stating that Google’s actions were within the realm of “fair use.”38

Some of the hardest-hitting criticisms have come from Google employees themselves.
In August 2018, online magazine The Intercept released details of a leaked internal Google
memo, highlighting a new attempt by the company to create a search engine, code named
“Project Dragonfly,” for the Chinese market. The memo seemed to suggest that, rather than
holding firm to its commitment to providing an open and uncensored search engine, Google
was exploring the possibility of creating a product that met the demands of the Chinese
government. In specific, the Project Dragonfly search engine would censor items that dealt
with human rights, democracy, protesting peacefully, and religion. Additionally, users’ search
histories would be shared with a Chinese JV partner, giving the Chinese government the
ability to spy on its citizens. Upon learning of the project, Google employees, fearing that
Project Dragonfly would compromise the business ethics of the company, penned open letters

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Page 410

discussing their disapproval of the plan. The privacy and security teams at Google also noted
that they were excluded from Project Dragonfly, leading to increased outrage from
employees. Some Google employees threatened to strike, and others enlisted the
backing of Amnesty International. By October 2018, U.S. Vice President Mike
Pence had even weighed in on the issue, stating his opposition to Project Dragonfly due to
the potential persecution of Chinese citizens. Within a few months, Project Dragonfly had
been scrapped.39,40

Google’s Future: Innovation and Alphabet Inc.
The challenges of censorship in China have forced Google to look beyond the appeal of
China’s gargantuan search market. Instead, Google has shifted its focus to the operating
systems of smartphones. By March 2019, Google’s Android operating system enjoyed a
market share of nearly 73 percent.41 Android is closely held by Google; so closely, in fact,
that Google had been unwilling to share the most recent versions of code with Chinese
smartphone developers. [An] example of this is when Google forced the delayed release of a
smartphone manufactured by Acer Inc., which ran an operating system called Aliyun. This
operating system was allegedly created by taking Android’s software and making unapproved
changes that were headed by the Chinese ecommerce organization Alibaba.42

Relationships are extremely hostile between Google and China, and the options for
China are quickly disappearing. The only course of action left for China is to build its own
Chinese mobile-OS for Chinese mobile devices.43 Mobile continues to dominate a large
portion of Google’s strategy. When Google purchased Motorola Mobility in May 2012, it had
hoped that the accompanying treasure trove of over 17,000 patents would yield innumerable
benefits. But this has not been the case. As discussed previously, the US$12.4 billion
purchase did not yield any decisive legal victories with big payoffs.44

Regardless of the challenges, Google still has accumulated a powerful tool by acquiring
Motorola Mobility’s patents. Google now possesses among the best IPR for designing
devices, and Google has the software to supplement those devices and integrate them
vertically into its online systems.45 Despite selling most Motorola Mobility’s hardware
business to Lenovo, this purchase was ultimately consistent with Google’s hope to reposition
itself as a bigger player in the space of mobile technology.

The rate at which technology is becoming even more integrated into our lives is
astounding, and Google is on the forefront of that mission. With its app for Android users,

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called “Google Keep,” it hopes to target early software adopters looking for another way to
manage all of their sticky notes, photos, and lists. But yet again, a central component to this
new advancement is trust. While some users are easily giving up more private ground in the
routine of their daily lives, others are questioning whether or not the free services are worth
it, especially because similar projects like Google Reader or iGoogle have been terminated.46

For Google, these privacy issues and other antitrust criticisms have taken off
internationally, resulting in various fines and penalties across the globe. Such fees are usually
already factored into the business expenses of large data-mining corporations like Google.
But these fines are not uncommon. Rather, it is the opposite and often considered regular
behavior. The EU has been particularly aggressive with Google. Between 2017 and 2019, a
series of three large fines relating to alleged antitrust issues were levied by the EU against the
company. The first, totaling US$2.7 billion, related to Google’s manipulation of search results
by directing retail customers to its own shopping comparison website. The second, issued in
2018 and totaling US$5 billion, was levied against Google due to claims that the company
required Android-operated cellphone users to download additional Google applications. In
2019, a further US$1.7 billion fine was issued against Google due to claims that it
manipulated the placement of its own advertisements to the detriment of its competitors.47

Google’s extensive reach in data is only growing in size. At around the same time that
Germany was bringing its charges against Google, Google cemented its Global Human
Trafficking Hotline Network, committing $3 million to bring together three NGOs: Polaris
Project, Liberty Asia, and La Strada International. But one question still remains, even in the
face of Google’s good intentions: Can this company be trusted with sensitive information
now regarding potentially trafficked victims? Have we gone too far by giving Google so
much credit and by painting Google with a philanthropic stroke? In response to these
questions, head of philanthropy at Palantir Technologies Jason Payne points out, “Just
because someone’s human rights have been eviscerated, doesn’t mean that their civil liberties
and electronic rights can be eviscerated.”48 Regardless of Google’s legal efforts and privacy
challenges, it is still pressing on with several innovative projects.

Google has developed several other projects including Google Home, Google’s attempt
at home automation, connecting light bulbs, coffee pots, and alarm clocks.49 Another project
is Google Fiber, which focuses on delivering Internet speeds “100 times faster than the
average Internet connection in the United States.”50 Driverless cars are also another
ambitious goal for the company, which would go nicely with its current database of road

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Page 411

maps. Google’s strategy is clear: With billions of dollars spent on research and development,
Google knows that it has a responsibility to push out products that no other company would
dare to dream about, all the while pursuing high-tech inventions that integrate with our daily
lives.

To better structure the company for future innovation and diversification, Google
reorganized itself under a newly formed umbrella company, called Alphabet Inc., in 201

Alphabet Inc. consists of multiple subsidiaries, each with a distinct focus. Under this new
corporate structure, the Google Inc. brand continues to operate Google.com, Google Maps,
and YouTube, but the tasks associated with other company goals are spread to newly created
Alphabet Inc. subsidiaries. Calico, incorporated in 2013, is centered around biotech research
and development, with a specific focus on disease and aging. Google Capital and GV
(formerly Google Ventures) function as the venture capital arms of Alphabet Inc., targeting
both tech startups and growth-stage companies. Perhaps the most interesting
subsidiary is Google X (known simply as “X”), which functions as the heart of
innovation at Alphabet Inc. As a secret research and development lab, Google X is
responsible for developing the driverless car and Google Glass. Another exciting project,
called “Project Loon,” involves the deployment of atmospheric balloons to increase Internet
access worldwide.

As Google expands, and its presence permeates developing markets, its opportunities
are abundant. This is especially true because most of the newly connected Internet users are
living in areas of conflict and could potentially experience drastic changes to their social
structures as a result of interacting with Google. A company such as Google could extend its
influence beyond that of a nation-state by empowering desperate citizens with the ideas or
information they need to incite a revolution. New innovative Google projects, like “Project
Loon,” will connect the developing world with access to information and communication in
ways that were previously impossible.

Ultimately, Google’s international strategy will continue to align itself with its
information strategy, continually leveraging the opportunities of both computational science
and human ingenuity. At the same time, Google will continue to face political threats of
censorship and information restriction and challenges to its privacy policies and practices.
But the reverberations from its new technology will continue to generate commotion in the
markets and challenges to governments and their information policies.

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http://Google.com

10.

Questions for Review
How would you characterize China’s market for online search and related services?

Why was Google initially attracted to China? What changed its perspective?

Should companies like Google conform to the Chinese government’s expectation
regarding privacy, censorship, and distribution of information?

What advantages does Baidu have over Google in the Chinese marketplace? How
might Google overcome those advantages?

What recommendations would you make for Google in China going forward?
Prepared by Karl Li and Pin-Pin Liao of Villanova University under Professor Jonathan

Doh as the basis for class discussion.

ENDNOTES

“Wife & Son of Well-Known Political Prisoner & Christian, Guo Quan Arrive in
US,” ChinaAid.org, January 24, 2012, https://www.chinaaid.org/2012/01/wife-son-of-
well-known-political.html.

Ibid.

“About,” Google, https://about.google.

Justine Lau, “A History of Google in China,” Financial Times, July 9, 2010, http://ig-
legacy.ft.com/content/faf86fbc-0009-11df-8626-00144feabdc0#axzz5uUFaHm55.

Ibid.

John Battelle, “The Birth of Google,” Wired, August 1, 2005,
https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/battelle.html?tw=wn_tophead_4.

Lawrence Page, Sergey Brin, Rajeev Motwani, and Terry Winograd, “The PageRank
Citation Ranking: Bringing Order to the Web,” Stanford Digital Library Project,
September 16, 1997, http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/422/1/1999-66 .

“BackRub,” Google Web Archives, December 4, 1997,
http://web.archive.org/web/19971210065425/backrub.stanford.edu/backrub.html.

“From the Garage to the Googleplex,” Google, https://about.google/intl/en/our-story.

“If the Check Says ‘Google Inc.,’ We’re ‘Google Inc.,’” Wired, September 7, 2007,

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http://ChinaAid.org

https://www.chinaaid.org/2012/01/wife-son-of-well-known-political.html

https://about.google

http://ig-legacy.ft.com/content/faf86fbc-0009-11df-8626-00144feabdc0#axzz5uUFaHm55

https://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/battelle.html?tw=wn_tophead_4

http://ilpubs.stanford.edu:8090/422/1/1999-66

http://web.archive.org/web/19971210065425/backrub.stanford.edu/backrub.html

https://about.google/intl/en/our-story

nikpt
Highlight

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

Page 412

https://www.wired.com/2007/09/dayintech-0907.

“Google Receives $25 million in Equity Funding,” Google Web Archives, June 7,
1997,
http://web.archive.org/web/20000309205910/http://www.google.com/pressrel/pressrelease1.html

“Google Goes Global with Addition of 10 Languages,” Google, May 9, 2000,
http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/05/google-goes-global-with-addition-of-
10.html.

“Internet and Search Engine Usage by Country,” Internet World Stats,
http://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780789747884/supplements/9780789747884_appC

Larry Page, “Google Goes Global with Addition of 10 Languages,” Google, May 9,
2000, http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/05/google-goes-global-with-addition-of-
10.html.

Maureen Gleeson, “Why Google Can’t Dominate Search in South Korea,” Oban
Digital, January 30, 2015, https://obaninternational.com/blog/why-google-cant-
dominate-search-in-south-korea.

Ginny Marvin, “Google Still Dominant, but Baidu Benefitting from Google Ban in
China Says eMarketer,” March 31, 2015, http://searchengineland.com/google-still-
dominant-but-baidu-benefitting-from-google-ban-in-china-says-emarketer-2177

45.

“Google Losing Market Share in China,” Search Engine Journal, September 21,
2006, https://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-losing-market-share-in-
china/3816.

Rebecca Fannin, “Why Google Is Quitting China,” Forbes, January 15,
2010, https://www.forbes.com/2010/01/15/baidu-china-search-intelligent-technology-
google.html.

“From the Garage to the Googleplex.”

Andrew McLaughlin, “Google in China,” Google, January 27, 2006.
https://web.archive.org/web/20190403060504/https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/01/google-
in-china.html.

Fannin, “Why Google Is Quitting China.”

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https://www.wired.com/2007/09/dayintech-0907

http://web.archive.org/web/20000309205910/http://www.google.com/pressrel/pressrelease1.html

http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/05/google-goes-global-with-addition-of-10.html

http://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780789747884/supplements/9780789747884_appC

http://googlepress.blogspot.com/2000/05/google-goes-global-with-addition-of-10.html

South Korean search engines: Google or Naver?

Google Still Dominant, But Baidu Benefitting From Google Ban In China Says eMarketer

https://www.searchenginejournal.com/google-losing-market-share-in-china/3816

https://www.forbes.com/2010/01/15/baidu-china-search-intelligent-technology-google.html

https://web.archive.org/web/20190403060504/https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/01/google-in-china.html

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

Ibid.

“Google Losing Market Share in China.”

Ibid.

“Web History of China,” Time Toast, https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/web-
history-of-china.

Lau, “A History of Google in China.”

Ibid.

“Google Aims to Stay in China Despite Censorship Clash,” Financial Times, January
22, 2010, https://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/f9ff5bcc-06ce-11df-b058-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RynyO1Rd.

Chris McGreal and Bobbie Johnson, “Hillary Clinton Criticises Beijing over Internet
Censorship,” The Guardian, January 21, 2010,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/21/hillary-clinton-china-internet-
censorship.

“A New Approach to China: An Update,” Google’s Official Blog, March 22, 2010,
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html.

Loretta Chao, “Google Loses Chinese Market Share,” Wall Street Journal, April 27,
2010,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703465204575207833281993688.

Charles Riley, “The Great Firewall of China Is Nearly Complete,” CNN Money,
December 30, 2014, https://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/china-internet-
firewall-google.

Dominic Rushe, “US Judge Writes Unhappy Ending for Google’s Online Library
Plans,” The Guardian, March 22, 2011,
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/mar/23/google-online-library-plans-

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https://www.timetoast.com/timelines/web-history-of-china

https://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/f9ff5bcc-06ce-11df-b058-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2RynyO1Rd

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jan/21/hillary-clinton-china-internet-censorship

http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703465204575207833281993688

https://money.cnn.com/2014/12/30/technology/china-internet-firewall-google

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/mar/23/google-online-library-plans-thwarted

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

thwarted.

Julianne Pepitone, “Google Strikes Deal with Publishers over Universal Library,”
CNNMoney.com, October 4, 2012,
http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/technology/google-books-settlement/index.html.

Adam Liptak and Alexandra Alter, “Challenge to Google Books Is Declined by
Supreme Court,” New York Times, April 19, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/technology/google-books-case.html.

“Pence Says Google Should Halt Dragonfly App Development,” Reuters, October 4,
2018,https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-pence-technology/pence-says-
google-should-halt-dragonfly-app-development-idUSKCN1ME20H.

Ryan Gallagher, “Hundreds of Google Employees Tell Bosses to Cancel Censored
Search Amid Worldwide Protests,” The Intercept, November 27, 2018,
https://theintercept.com/2018/11/27/hundreds-of-google-employees-tell-bosses-to-
cancel-censored-search-amid-worldwide-protests.

“Mobile Operating System Market Share China,” StatCounter, March 2019,
http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/china.

Paul Mozur, “China Criticizes Android’s Dominance,” Wall Street Journal, March 5,
2013,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324539404578342132324098420.

J. O’Dell, “China: Google’s Too Controlling. We Should Create Our Own Damn
Smartphone OS,” Venturebeat, March 5, 2013,
http://venturebeat.com/2013/03/05/china-google-android-drama.

Susan Decker and Brian Womack, “Motorola Buyout Fails to Yield Patent Jackpot for
Google,” Business Report, April 30, 2013,
https://www.iol.co.za/business/international/motorola-buyout-fails-to-yield-patent-
jackpot-for-google-1.1508190#.UYQPdrXqnoI.

“Facts about Google’s Acquisition of Motorola,” Google press release, 2013,
https://www.google.com/press/motorola.

Ezra Klein, “Google’s Trust Problem,” Washington Post, March 21, 2013,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/21/googles-trust-

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http://CNNMoney.com

http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/04/technology/google-books-settlement/index.html

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-pence-technology/pence-says-google-should-halt-dragonfly-app-development-idUSKCN1ME20H

Hundreds of Google Employees Tell Bosses to Cancel Censored Search Amid Worldwide Protests

http://gs.statcounter.com/os-market-share/mobile/china

https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324539404578342132324098420

http://venturebeat.com/2013/03/05/china-google-android-drama

https://www.iol.co.za/business/international/motorola-buyout-fails-to-yield-patent-jackpot-for-google-1.1508190#.UYQPdrXqnoI

https://www.google.com/press/motorola

https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/21/googles-trust-problem

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