1238 - Assignment Essays

Reading Responses Instructions and Rubric

Total possible points = 10

Instructions:

Because education happens in a large, interrelated world your assignment is to draw connections between the readings. There is not one “correct” answer that we’re looking for, whatever you find and support well will earn full credit. The purpose of the assignment is to demonstrate that you read and understood the readings. There are some specific instructions that must be followed to earn full credit:

1. Your Response must include references to the required number of readings (see “Response Requirements”) from the given portion of the semester. You can pull from any combination of weeks in this portion; you are not required to use at least one from each week.

a. No, there isn’t extra credit for including more readings. Sorry.

2. Any information pulled from the readings—direct quotes, summaries, rewording, etc—must be cited using

APA

citations.

3. You can use sources outside of the readings if you’d like to but you are not required to do so. Any information must be cited.

Examples of what you can do include, but are not limited to:

1. Identify a common theme running through the readings.

2. Apply the readings to a real-world event/case study.

3. Show how a problem, hazard, and/or solution from one reading applies to the others.

You will be submitting your papers to the Discussion Board and the following rant is because every semester we have a student who thinks they can get away with violating the Honor Code. The end result is usually a grade of zero for the assignment.

Plagiarism is a direct violation of the Florida State University and will not be tolerated. Any instances of plagiarism found may result in failure of the assignment as well as the full weight of a FSU Honor Code Violation. The Florida State University Academic Honor Policy outlines the University’s expectations for the integrity of students’ academic work, the procedures for resolving alleged violations of those expectations, and the rights and responsibilities of students and faculty members throughout the process. Students are responsible for reading the Academic Honor Policy and for living up to their pledge to “. . . be honest and truthful and . . . [to] strive for personal and institutional integrity at Florida State University.” (Florida State University Academic Honor Policy, found at http://dof.fsu.edu/honorpolicy.htm.)

Under no circumstances should you be using Wikipedia or similar web sites as a reference for your papers. This includes any website that allows for community editing of information (a wiki). However, you may visit Wikipedia, etc. to find other primary sources for information.

Response Requirements:

Undergraduate Responses must be between 300-400 words and must cite at least four readings. Graduate Responses must be between 400-500 words
and must cite at least five readings.

APA citations used throughout the Response. Citations are correct and present.

	EXEMPLARY	POOR	UNSATISFACTORY
Content (5 pts)	The response clearly identifies, articulates, and provides evidence for a connection identified by the student.	The response does a poor job to clearly identify, articulate, and/or provide evidence for a connection identified by the student.	The response fails to clearly identify, articulate, and/or provide evidence for a connection identified by the student.
APA (1 pt)			APA citations used throughout the Response. Citations are correct and present.
Readings Referenced (2 pt)	Student references the required number of readings.	Student references less than the required number of readings.	Student does not reference the readings.
Editing (1 pt)	Sentence structure, grammar, and diction excellent; correct use of punctuation; minimal to no spelling errors. Response is within the required word count.	Sentence structure, grammar, and diction are weak; punctuation often used correctly. Some (minor) spelling errors; may have one run-on sentence. Response is not within the required word count.	Big problems in sentence structure, grammar, and diction. Frequent major errors in punctuation, and spelling. May have many run-on sentences and comma splices. Needs editing. Response is far beyond the required word count.
Professors’ Reaction (1 pt)	Response is interesting and educational when read. Writing and research flows in a way that is easy to understand. Arguments presented are well supported by research.	Response is interesting and educational when read. Writing and research may take some effort to understand. Arguments presented are not well supported by research.	Response is difficult to follow and read. Writing and research does not flow in a way that is easy to understand. Arguments presented are not supported by research.

The Good Enough Doctrine

Byman, Daniel 1 1 Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University

ProQuest document link

ABSTRACT (ENGLISH)

In the 20 years since the 9/11 attack, U.S. counterterrorism policy has achieved some striking successes and

suffered some horrific failures. On the positive side, jihadi organizations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State

(also known as isis) are now shadows of their former selves, and the United States has avoided another

catastrophic, 9/11-scale attack. The worst fears, or even the more modest ones, of U.S. counterterrorism officials

have not been realized. With terrorism less of an immediate concern, U.S. President Joe Biden has turned

Washingtons focus toward China, climate change, and other issues-even withdrawing U.S. troops from

Afghanistan as part of an effort to end the so-called forever wars. At the same time, however, many of the United

States more ambitious foreign policy efforts done in the name of counterterrorism since 9/11, such as effecting

regime change in the Middle East and winning the goodwill of Muslims around the world, have failed and even

backfired. Although al Qaeda and isis are far weaker than they were at their peak, they have persisted in the face of

tremendous pressure, and their reach, albeit at times more ambitious than their grasp, has only grown since 2001.

Today, other countries face potent terrorist threats, and al Qaeda, isis, and their various affiliates and allies remain

active in civil wars around the world.

FULL TEXT
Headnote

Learning to Live With Terrorism

In the 20 years since the 9/11 attack, U.S. counterterrorism policy has achieved some striking successes and

suffered some horrific failures. On the positive side, jihadi organizations such as al Qaeda and the Islamic State

(also known as isis) are now shadows of their former selves, and the United States has avoided another

catastrophic, 9/11-scale attack. The worst fears, or even the more modest ones, of U.S. counterterrorism officials

have not been realized. With terrorism less of an immediate concern, U.S. President Joe Biden has turned

Washingtons focus toward China, climate change, and other issues-even withdrawing U.S. troops from

Afghanistan as part of an effort to end the so-called forever wars.

At the same time, however, many of the United States more ambitious foreign policy efforts done in the name of

counterterrorism since 9/11, such as effecting regime change in the Middle East and winning the goodwill of

Muslims around the world, have failed and even backfired. Although al Qaeda and isis are far weaker than they

were at their peak, they have persisted in the face of tremendous pressure, and their reach, albeit at times more

ambitious than their grasp, has only grown since 2001. Today, other countries face potent terrorist threats, and al

Qaeda, isis, and their various affiliates and allies remain active in civil wars around the world.

Instead of a decisive victory, the United States appears to have settled for something less ambitious: good

enough. It recognizes that although jihadi terrorism may be impossible to fully and permanently eradicate-or the

costs of trying to do so are simply too high-the threat can be reduced to the point where it kills relatively few

Americans and no longer shapes daily life in the United States. As Washington has grown more skeptical of large-

scale counterinsurgency operations designed to reshape whole societies, the most recent three administrations-

Barack Obamas, Donald Trumps, and now Bidens-have focused on keeping jihadi organizations weak and off

balance. Through a mix of intelligence gathering, military operations, and homeland security efforts, they have

mostly succeeded in keeping the fight over there. To a remarkable degree, the United States itself has been

https://www.proquest.com/magazines/good-enough-

doctrine/docview/2565214785/se-2?accountid=4840

https://www.proquest.com/magazines/good-enough-doctrine/docview/2565214785/se-2?accountid=4840

insulated from the threat. Jihadism remains alive and well abroad and is not going away anytime soon, but the

current U.S. doctrine is a politically feasible and comparatively effective way of managing the issue. Good enough,

it turns out, is good enough.

ON THE RUN

The severity of the threat posed by jihadi groups such as al Qaeda and isis depends on where you are. Data from

the think tank New America indicate that 107 Americans have died in jihadi terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since

9/11, almost half of whom were killed at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in 2016 by Omar Mateen, who

declared allegiance to isis during his rampage. Europe, by contrast, has suffered far more such violence. In one

gruesome 2015 evening in Paris alone, isis suicide bombers and shooters killed 130 people in a coordinated series

of attacks. Europe has also seen far more stabbings and other low-casualty attacks, in part because it has stricter

gun laws. As isis’s strength has waned, however, attacks on both sides of the Atlantic have subsided. As of mid-

July 2021, the United States had not endured a jihadi attack since December 2019, when a Saudi student linked to

al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula killed three sailors at a U.S. Navy base in Florida. Europe has suffered fewer

casualties than during the peak years of 2015 and 2016.

These numbers pale in comparison to those of Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, where jihadi groups are far

more active than they were before 9/11. Al Qaeda has a presence in, among other countries, Afghanistan, Algeria,

Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iran, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen. Isis

is present in most of those countries, plus Cameroon, Chad, Iraq, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Russia. Many of these

countries suffer from civil wars in which jihadi groups are among the active participants. Hundreds of thousands

have died in these conflicts.

One crucial factor keeping the United States safe is the American Muslim community. After 9/11, U.S. officials

feared that the country was home to an angry Muslim population riddled with al Qaeda sympathizers and sleeper

agents. In 2003, Robert Mueller, the director of the fbi, warned that the country’s “greatest threat is from al Qaeda

cells in the United States that we have not yet been able to identify.” This fear turned out to have no basis in fact.

Compared with European Muslims, American Muslims are well integrated into society. Indeed, their average

educational and income levels are equivalent to or higher than those of non-Muslims. Although some have

attempted to travel abroad to join isis, they have done so at far lower rates than European Muslims. Most

important, American Muslims have cooperated closely with law enforcement and the fbi, making it hard for cells

and radicalized individuals to organize and plan

operations.

The jihadi movement also suffers from numerous weaknesses that hamper its ability to carry out attacks. Even at

the height of al Qaeda’s power, for instance, the movement the group sought to lead had conflicting priorities:

Should it fight foreign invaders, topple supposedly apostate regimes in the Middle East, or take the war to the

United States? These divisions are more pronounced today. Different factions disagree on whether and when to

declare an Islamic state, how to handle nonbelievers and the insufficiently pious, which enemy to target first, and,

of course, who should be the overall leader of the movement. In Iraq, these disputes led some fellow jihadis to

condemn al Qaeda, and in Syria, they led to a rift that gave rise to isis and a jihadi civil war.

NOT-SO-SAFE HAVENS

The movement also lacks a sanctuary akin to what it enjoyed on the eve of 9/11. More than 10,000 volunteers

traveled to Afghanistan when it was under the Taliban’s rule to train in camps run by al Qaeda and other militant

organizations. This safe haven was a powerful unifying force that made al Qaeda more lethal. It allowed its leaders

to bring jihadi groups and individuals together from across the globe, train them to fight, indoctrinate them into a

common agenda, and give those with special language skills or particular promise additional training.

Today, the movement tries to make do with multiple smaller safe havens, but none has proved as effective a

launching pad as pre-9/11 Afghanistan did. Al Qaeda, isis, their affiliates, and other jihadi groups are present in war

zones around the Muslim world. In those wars, members of these organizations learn to use weapons and forge

intense bonds with one another. But they engage primarily in civil war, not international terrorism. As a result, they

do not receive the same training as previous generations of jihadis did-and local leaders often assign the most

promising local recruits and foreign volunteers to important roles in local conflicts rather than give them

international terrorist assignments. The vast majority of the over 40,000 foreign fighters who joined isis during the

Syrian civil war, for instance, fought to defend the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, not to project terror abroad.

The United States and its allies, moreover, exert constant pressure on most local affiliates-often to the point where

they reject their mother organizations. Consider al-Nusra Front, once al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, the most

important war zone for the jihadi movement in the last decade. In 2016, it publicly distanced itself from al Qaeda.

Al-Nusra’s leader, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, declared that he and his organization rejected attacks on the United

States and Europe. For al Qaeda, this was a major military setback and an even larger reputational blow,

threatening its status as the would-be leader of the broader jihadi movement.

Iran is another second-rate safe haven for al Qaeda. As the U.S. State Department noted in its 2020 annual report

on terrorism, since 9/11, Tehran had “continued to permit an [al Qaeda] facilitation network to operate in Iran,

sending money and fighters to conflict zones in Afghanistan and Syria, and it still allowed [al Qaeda] members to

reside in the country.” Because Iran has an effective air defense system and Washington wants to avoid a broader

conflict with Tehran, the United States does not carry out drone strikes or other direct attacks against al Qaeda

figures there, giving them a degree of protection. But the group still must worry about other counterterrorism

operations in the country. In 2020, Israeli assets-operating at the behest of the United States, according to

interviews of intelligence officials conducted by The New York Times-killed Abu Muhammad al-Masri, a top al

Qaeda official living in Iran.

The Iranian government itself also places numerous restrictions on al Qaeda figures in the country. Al Qaeda

documents captured by U.S. forces revealed that some members of the group moved to Iran after 9/11 only out of

desperation, and the organization’s relationship with the Iranian government has been marked by hostility and

suspicion. For much of the post-9/11 period, al Qaeda members in Iran have often been considered captives or at

least potential bargaining chips, not welcome guests. In addition, ties to Iran-a Shiite power that many religious

Sunnis loathe-are unpopular among jihadis and discredit al Qaeda when publicized. Isis, which is not based in Iran

and supports attacks on the Islamic Republic, has criticized al Qaeda for its links to the country.

The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could restore some of al Qaeda’s freedom of action in the country. As it did

before 9/11, the Taliban might once again support or tolerate a large al Qaeda leadership presence and give the

group free rein to train, plot, and recruit there. Alternatively, the Taliban may simply work with al Qaeda fighters

against their mutual enemies in Afghanistan but discourage broader international terrorist operations. For now, it

remains unclear which Afghan Taliban leaders support direct attacks against the United States. Even before 9/11,

several staunch Taliban supporters did not appear to approve of such operations, even if they did little to stop

them.

Moreover, the United States’ withdrawal from Afghanistan will not end its ability to affect the situation on the

ground. Washington will retain diplomatic options, such as sanctions and multilateral pressure, to influence the

Taliban’s behavior. The United States is also working on an array of basing and access arrangements that would

allow the U.S. military to strike targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the withdrawal of all U.S. troops. Such

arrangements will not fully replace a direct U.S. presence in Afghanistan, but they could make it difficult for al

Qaeda to plot freely or run large-scale training camps in the country. In short, although the United States’ departure

is unquestionably a victory for al Qaeda, it is not yet clear how big a win it will prove.

Beyond geographic safe havens, jihadis often use virtual sanctuaries. Even these, however, are less secure than

they once were. Al Qaeda exploited the Internet for many years after 9/11, using email, chatrooms, and websites to

communicate with followers, publicize the movement, and direct operations. Isis put that approach on steroids,

using platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to recruit widely and spread propaganda. When isis

reemerged during the Syrian civil war, electrifying jihadi extremists worldwide with its beheading videos, Twitter

hashtag hijackings, and other social media successes, it seemed that technology was on the terrorists’ side. Not

so today: although jihadi groups remain active on mainstream platforms, the companies that control them now

remove jihadi content and ban users who promote it. Many governments, for their part, now aggressively monitor

terrorist-linked accounts to identify followers and disrupt potential plots. For the would-be terrorist, social media

has become a risky place to reside.

WHAT’S WORKED?

After years of grand designs with ambitious goals, the United States has settled on a set of policies designed to

weaken foreign jihadis while protecting the U.S. homeland. Perhaps the most important but least appreciated of

these policies is the U.S.-led global intelligence campaign against terrorist groups. After 9/11, the United States

developed or expanded security partnerships with more than 100 countries. Local intelligence agencies have the

manpower, legal authority, language skills, and other vital resources to monitor, disrupt, and arrest suspected

terrorists. Jihadis now find themselves hunted when they try to establish cells, recruit new members, raise money,

or otherwise prepare for attacks. The discovery of a terrorist cell in one country, moreover, often leads to arrests in

another if the jihadis try to communicate, share funds, or otherwise work together across borders. U.S. intelligence

agencies, for their part, share relevant information, push partners to act on it, and, when these partners do, gain

new information that continues the cycle.

Some governments, however, are too weak for such intelligence cooperation to function effectively. In such cases,

the United States uses drone strikes and airstrikes, along with raids by special operations forces, to attack al

Qaeda, isis, and associated groups. Washington usually conducts these operations with the approval of local

governments, as it does in Pakistan, or by taking advantage of the lack of a functioning government, as it does in

Somalia and Yemen. In addition to the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, the United States and its allies have killed

the al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula leader Nasir alWuhayshi, the leading English-language jihadi propagandists

Anwar al-Awlaki and Adam Gadahn, and the South Asian al Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiri, as well as important

operational figures, such as Rashid Rauf and Saleh al-Somali, both of whom orchestrated attacks in the West.

Washington and its allies have also assassinated al Qaeda’s new leader in Yemen, Qasim al-Raymi; the leader of

the group’s North African branch, Abdelmalek Droukdel; and the leader of its unofficial affiliate in Syria, who was

known as Abu al-Qassam. The United States launched a similar campaign against isis, killing its selfproclaimed

caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2019, among many other leaders.

Such efforts, of course, do not end terrorism, and they often kill innocent people caught in the crossfire. They are,

however, effective at keeping jihadi groups weak. Decapitation strikes create constant churn within organizations,

and many terrorist groups do not have a deep bench of would-be leaders, making it difficult for them to replace

experienced commanders.

The constant fear of drone strikes and raids also undermines terrorist groups’ effectiveness-perhaps more than the

death of individual leaders. Members cannot gather in significant numbers for fear of detection, making it hard to

sustain large training camps. If groups communicate, they risk being tracked. Isolated and dispersed, terrorist

groups then risk splintering into disparate cells that are difficult to coordinate. Cells may go against the wishes of

senior leadership and even compete with one another. Without the ability to communicate, leaders also lose their

relevance. When the Arab Spring protests, the most important event in the Arab world in a generation, began in late

2010, al Qaeda waited weeks before commenting. In contrast, rival voices across the Arab world offered their views

constantly, particularly on social media. At the height of the Syrian civil war, Ayman al-Zawa- hiri, bin Laden’s

successor as the leader of al Qaeda, went incommunicado for long stretches of time-prompting the al-Nusra Front

leader Julani and other affiliated members to distance themselves from the core organization. For its part, isis has

managed to remain more active, both on the battlefield and in its propaganda efforts. But it, too, is diminished. U.S.

pressure has forced the group’s leaders into hiding, making it difficult for them to coordinate and direct global

operations.

A separate set of U.S. efforts to track terrorists’ travel activities, share databases of suspects, and tighten borders

has also made it harder for terrorists to penetrate the United States. After 9/11, the fbi undertook a far-reaching

campaign to identify, disrupt, and arrest potential terrorists on U.S. soil-a campaign that continues unabated to

this day. Many terrorist plots would have come to nothing regardless, but some might have reached fruition if not

for government intervention. Alert citizens and law enforcement officers have caught other potential terrorists. The

police foiled a plot to bomb military installations at Fort Dix in 2007, for example, when the jihadis went to a Circuit

City store to transfer from a vhs tape to a dvd videos of themselves shooting weapons and shouting “Allahu

akbar.” The employee making the transfer contacted law enforcement. Travel is also far harder for would-be jihadis

than it was in decades past. Unlike in the 1990s, potential terrorists cannot travel to a sanctuary such as

Afghanistan for training without a high risk of detection and arrest. As a result, many Western jihadis are untrained,

making them far less dangerous.

REIMAGINING 9/11

To understand the cumulative effect of these counterterrorism measures, it is helpful to consider the problems al

Qaeda or another jihadi group would face if it sought to carry out a spectacular terrorist attack similar to 9/11. Al

Qaeda began planning that strike in late 1998 or early 1999 from bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the

group had deep networks and the support of local governments. After receiving approval from bin Laden, Khalid

Sheikh Mohammed, an experienced senior jihadi and the overall architect of the attack, started recruiting members

in 1999. Mohammed initially tried to draw heavily on veteran fighters, but their inexperience in the West made them

poor candidates to lead the operation. Al Qaeda leaders instead identified Mohammed Atta, who had lived in

Germany for several years, as an ideal cell leader. Commanders noticed Atta’s English fluency, religious fervor, and

comfort operating in the West when he traveled to Afghanistan in 1999.

The hijackers prepared for the operation in Afghanistan, where some learned to hijack planes and disarm air

marshals. A group of the planners held a meeting in Malaysia in January 2000, where U.S. intelligence picked up

fragments of their trail, but not enough to detect the plot. The hijackers themselves began entering the United

States that same year, although some first traveled to Germany. In California, two members with weaker English-

language skills probably received some support from the local Muslim community via area mosques. Others

prepared by taking flight lessons and going on practice runs-traveling first class cross-country on the type of

aircraft they would later hijack. In the summer of 2001, Atta traveled to Spain to meet with Ramzi bin al-Shibh, one

of the attack’s coordinators. There, Atta received further instructions and finalized plans for the attack. Money for

expenses flowed through accounts in the United Arab Emirates. Throughout this planning process, al Qaeda

enjoyed a crucial advantage in Europe and the United States: official neglect. Intelligence and law enforcement

services in both places were focused on other priorities, allowing the jihadis considerable freedom of movement.

On September 11, 2001, the operation proceeded like clockwork-aided by an airport security system unaware that

such an attack was possible. The hijackers boarded four planes without arousing suspicion. Although authorities

selected some of the hijackers for extra scrutiny, that simply meant that their bags received a slightly more

thorough screening. They likely carried utility knives or pocketknives permissible under the guidelines of the time,

and several reports indicate that the hijackers also had Mace and box cutters, which the screeners may not have

detected. After takeoff, the attackers forced their way into the planes’ cockpits and successfully turned three of the

four airliners into massive suicide bombs, killing almost 3,000 people.

Every step of the way, a plot on the scale of 9/11 would be far harder to carry out today. With no sanctuary on a par

with pre-2001 Afghanistan, volunteers have few training opportunities-and even fewer chances to plot direct

attacks against the United States. Indeed, would-be terrorists risk arrest in their home countries and in transit. If

they eventually made it to a war zone or other haven, they would also find it far harder to gather safely or

communicate without being detected by local or foreign intelligence agencies. Authorities in the United States or

elsewhere could capture senior figures who might give up important operational details. And leaders such as

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed might be killed by a drone strike. Governments might detect meetings in other countries

or funding flows through foreign banks- revealing not just the plot but also the identities of many other group

members. If terrorists tried to recruit, raise money, or conduct operations via social media, the platforms’

moderators might ban them from the sites or report them to the FBI. Their social media followers might, in turn,

come under suspicion. The visa applications of would-be flight students from the Middle East now receive far more

scrutiny. If plotters managed to make it to the United States, a wary public and a cooperative Muslim community

would be more likely to report suspicious activity. Al Qaeda could not tell its operatives to seek support from locals

without the risk of detection. Even if terrorists managed to overcome all these obstacles, carrying out an actual

attack would still be far harder: civil aviation and other sensitive targets are much better guarded than they were

before 9/11.

No single measure by itself can make a repeat of a 9/11-scale plot impossible. But the cumulative effect of these

policies and changes has made a sophisticated and high-impact scheme much less likely to succeed. It is not an

accident that most attacks in the United States and even Europe in the last decade have been so-called lone-wolf

incidents-inspired, rather than directed, by groups such as al Qaeda and isis. These kinds of attacks are usually

less deadly, but they are harder to stop.

WHAT’S FAILED?

With the risk of 9/11-scale violence significantly reduced, it is tempting to declare victory and return to the pre2001

level of vigilance. This would be a mistake. The United States has failed in many of its more ambitious attempts to

fight jihadi groups, suggesting that terrorism will remain a threat for years to come. Although the danger these

groups pose will remain manageable, preventing attacks will still require ongoing counterterrorism efforts.

The need for continued vigilance stems in part from Washington’s failure to win over the Muslim world. After 9/11,

U.S. leaders sought to cultivate goodwill among Muslims through advertising campaigns; new broadcasting

entities, such as the Arabic-language station Radio Sawa and the television channel Al Hurra; and, eventually,

social media initiatives. But polling data suggest that these efforts have had little impact. Public opinion of the

United States in the Arab world is still largely negative, although it has varied somewhat over the years. In 2015,

over 80 percent of poll respondents in Jordan- a close U.S. ally-had an unfavorable opinion of the United States.

This is damning, but it should not come as a surprise. Unpopular U.S. policies, such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq,

which many throughout the Muslim world opposed, and U.S. support for Israel, have overshadowed fine-tuned

messages about how wonderful life in the United States is for Muslims. As a result, anti-American groups continue

to find it easy to recruit followers, and the incentive for targeting the United States remains high.

Jihadi-linked insurgencies are also far more prevalent now than they were before 9/11. This is partly because of

the collapse of governments throughout Africa and the Middle East and partly because of the weakness of many

surviving regimes. It takes only a small band of fighters to establish an insurgency in a weak state such as

Mozambique and even fewer in a failed state such as Yemen. The jihadi cause, moreover, offers local fighters a

compelling brand, enabling them to sell their movements to the community as providers of law and order and

defenders of the faith. With jihadi bona fides, they can also tap into transnational networks, gain support from like-

minded fighters in neighboring states, and, at times, acquire resources such as money, weapons, and access to

propaganda.

In the past, the United States turned to counterinsurgency to combat these groups-deploying tens of thousands of

its own forces to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and various Sunni jihadi groups in Iraq. With public support for

such efforts declining, however, and jihadi groups spreading to more countries, the U.S. military and intelligence

agencies now often resort to training and equipping local forces that can act as the tip of the counterterrorism

spear. Such U.S. proxies have battled al Shabab in Somalia, an isis offshoot in Libya, and al Qaeda-linked Abu

Sayyaf in the Philippines, among other groups.

In a few places, the United States has managed to make headway against jihadis by partnering with local

government forces. In many others, however, the defeat of one jihadi group has simply made room for the

emergence of another. After 9/11, U.S. forces helped the government of the Philippines rout Abu Sayyaf; today, the

Philippines is fighting an isis-linked organization. Elsewhere, even that limited level of success is elusive. The

enormous amount of money, time, and equipment the United States poured into helping anti-isis fighters in Syria

and the governments of Afghanistan and Iraq appears to have achieved, at best, only modest results. Training

successes are limited to some small elite units such as Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service. Efforts to stand up large

armies have largely failed.

U.S. attempts to improve the quality of governance in states with jihadi terrorist problems have an equally mixed

legacy. Some countries, such as Yemen, have slipped into civil war, while corruption, poor economic growth, and

undemocratic political systems plague many others, such as Egypt and Pakistan. Where progress toward

democratization has occurred, such as in Indonesia and Tunisia, it was the work of indigenous movements and

leaders, not U.S.-led efforts.

Counterterrorism policies within the United States suffer from a different set of problems. Politicians should level

with the American people about the real risk of terrorism-which is low compared with many other dangers-as a way

of inoculating the public against the psychological effect of small attacks. Despite 20 years of limited terrorist

violence in the United States, however, polls show that the number of Americans “very” or “somewhat” concerned

about terrorism remains high and has even grown in recent years. Political leaders continue to use this fear as a

cudgel, criticizing one another when attacks occur and using these rare incidents to advance particular agendas

on issues such as immigration. When Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, an operative for al Qaeda in the Arabian

Peninsula, almost blew up a plane over Detroit in 2009, Republicans blasted Obama for this near failure. As a

candidate and in office, Trump used the asylum status of the 2013 Boston Marathon bombers to bolster his calls

for a border wall, among other antiimmigrant measures.

As a result, the U.S. legal system and public discourse often single out American Muslims as a potential threat.

Many Americans now associate Islam with violence, even though very few American Muslims have been involved

in terrorist activities, and even though the larger American Muslim community has proved willing to work with U.S.

law enforcement. In 2020, Muslims reported the highest level of discrimination of any religious group in the United

States. Many American Muslims worry that the police do not treat them equally. This state of affairs is both unjust

and counterproductive. If community members fear law enforcement, they may not seek out the authorities if a

problem arises.

LEARNING TO LIVE WITH SUCCESS

Twenty years after 9/11, U.S. policy is stuck-but not necessarily in a bad way. The mix of intelligence cooperation,

military pressure on groups in their havens, and better homeland security has largely insulated the United States

from terrorist violence. Still, Washington has failed to permanently solve the problem. Today, the United States is

still bombing and raiding the ideological descendants of the original 9/11 planners. There is no end in sight, and

groups such as al Qaeda remain committed to attacking the United States. Even so, constant pressure keeps

these organizations weak, and as a result, they will conduct fewer and less lethal attacks. Jihadi terrorism will not

go away, but its biggest impact is felt mainly in parts of the world where U.S. interests are limited. Washington

must therefore think hard about where to deploy its counterterrorism resources. Although violence in Chad or

Yemen is catastrophic for those countries, its impact on U.S. security is small. Efforts to promote democracy or

improve governance may be valuable for other reasons, but they are unnecessary for heading off potential terrorist

threats. In some cases, such efforts may actually make the situation worse.

The United States also needs to do more to manage the domestic politics of counterterrorism. Public fear keeps

support for robust defense programs strong, but it also makes it easier for terrorists to gain attention and sow

panic. Politicians must therefore tread cautiously in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and condemn extreme

reactions of all kinds. When (not if) the next attack occurs, it will be vital for the president and other leaders to

react responsibly. They must not only stress the need to help the victims and punish the killers but also explain

that such events are rare and that the American Muslim community is part of the solution, not the problem. Local

leaders, including police officials, should reach out to their Muslim communities to show support and guard

against any retaliatory violence. Unfortunately, the last 20 years have shown that politicians will reliably exploit

fear, even when the actual threat is limited. Such behavior only helps terrorist groups as they strive to stay

relevant.

Israeli officials have a useful phrase to describe their own good-enough counterterrorism strategy: “mowing the

grass.” The idea is that by conducting regular raids against terrorists and continually gathering intelligence, the

government can keep terrorist groups such as Hamas weak, even if those groups’ attacks will always continue.

The goal is to manage, rather than eliminate, the terrorist threat, and this frees the government to focus on other

concerns. Having found a similarly imperfect but largely effective solution to the problem of jihadi violence,

Washington should do just that, prioritizing China, Russia, climate change, and other pressing issues. With its post-

9/11 counterterrorism toolkit, the United States can keep terrorist groups in remote countries weaker and off

balance while accepting that at least some threat will always remain.

DETAILS

Subject: Suicide bombings; Terrorism; Threats; Muslims; Counterterrorism; Intelligence

gathering; War; September 11 terrorist attacks-2001; Civil war; Muslim Americans;

Islam; Presidents; Ambition; Foreign policy; State; Climate change; Affiliates

Business indexing term: Subject: Affiliates

Location: Middle East; United States–US; Iraq; Afghanistan; Iran; Florida; Syria; Europe

Company / organization: Name : Al Qaeda; NAICS: 813940

Publication title: Foreign Affairs; New York

Volume: 100

Issue: 5

Pages: 32-36,38-43

Publication year: 2021

Publication date: Sep/Oct 2021

Publisher: Council on Foreign Relations NY

Place of publication: New York

Country of publication: United Kingdo m, New York

Publication subject: Political Science–International Relations

ISSN: 00157120

e-ISSN: 2327-7793

Source type: Magazine

Language of publication: English

Document type: Commentary

ProQuest document ID: 2565214785

Document URL: https://www.proquest.com/magazines/good-enough-

doctrine/docview/2565214785/se-2?accountid=4840

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The Good Enough Doctrine

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ldA HOOVER INSTITUTION ESSAY FROM THE CARAVAN NOTEBOOK

How the Doha Agreement
Guaranteed US Failure in Afghanistan
LISA CURTIS

Introduction

The twenty-year US mission in Afghanistan ended in the worst imaginable way possible,

with a poorly planned and executed withdrawal that saw the Taliban immediately roar back

to power. Members of an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organization were placed in charge of

the country’s security, while the United States conducted a rushed and chaotic evacuation

that left behind thousands of Afghan allies and created a geopolitical vacuum that its rivals,

namely Russia and China, are poised to fill. There will be countless policy and academic

studies, books, college courses, and debates on how and why the United States failed so

catastrophically in Afghanistan. This essay examines how the poorly negotiated and weak

US-Taliban Doha agreement, concluded during the Trump administration, sealed the fate of

a US mission that cost America tremendous blood and treasure in a country that, contrary

to US president Joe Biden’s assertions, continues to pose a threat to America’s vital national

security interests.

Trump Starts Strong on Afghanistan

Despite his presidential campaign pledges to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan,

then president Donald J. Trump initially took the advice of his top national security and

defense advisors and in August 2017 adopted a new strategy toward Afghanistan aimed

at reversing the deteriorating security situation and ultimately setting the stage for a

peaceful settlement that would protect US interests and advance regional stability. The

strategy included shifting from a time-based to a conditions-based approach to US troop

deployments; expanding authorities for US troops on the ground to aggressively pursue

the enemy; getting tougher on Pakistan for its support to the Taliban; and increasing troop

numbers by around four thousand.1

In his 2017 speech unveiling the new Afghanistan strategy at the Fort Myer military base in

Arlington, Virginia, the former president rightly acknowledged that

the consequences of a rapid exit are both predictable and unacceptable. 9/11, the worst

terrorist attack in our history, was planned and directed from Afghanistan because that

country was ruled by a government that gave comfort and shelter to terrorists. A hasty

withdrawal would create a vacuum [that] terrorists, including ISIS and al-Qaeda, would

instantly fill, just as happened before September 11.2

Lisa Curtis • How the Doha Agreement Guaranteed US Failure in Afghanistan

Little did anyone know then that this scenario would play out four years later under the

Biden administration. However, the Trump administration’s missteps on peace talks with

the Taliban from 2018 to 2020 also contributed to the ease with which the Taliban retook

the country in August 2021.

Shifts to Troop Withdrawal and Peace Track

By the spring of 2018—less than a year after announcing the ambitious Afghanistan

strategy—President Trump began to lose confidence in his own strategy and signaled

his desire to start withdrawing US troops. Around the same time, US diplomats stepped

up peace efforts, and in June of that year, the first-ever ceasefire between the Afghan

government and the Taliban came into effect. It was short lived, however, lasting just a

few days over the Eid al-Fitr holiday, which marks the end of the Muslim holy month of

fasting. Although brief, the ceasefire demonstrated grassroots support for peace among

the Afghan population as well as the Taliban rank and file. Building on this positive

momentum, former senior US diplomat for South Asia Alice Wells held direct talks with

Taliban leaders in Doha, Qatar, in July 2018. Two months later, in September 2018,

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo named former US ambassador to Afghanistan and

Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad as the senior representative for Afghanistan reconciliation.

Ambassador Khalilzad brought impressive credentials to the job—regional expertise,

language skills, and deep policy experience working in conflict zones. However, he proved

too eager to close a deal with the Taliban, allowing his single-minded focus to cloud his

judgment on the negative impact of his concessions to the Taliban on the future of the country

and on US fundamental national security interests. It is true that Trump’s repeated statements

about wanting to withdraw US forces from the country undermined Khalilzad’s leverage with

the Taliban; however, instead of conceding almost everything the Taliban requested, the

US negotiator should have considered whether no deal was better than a bad deal.

Trump’s third national security advisor, John Bolton, recognized the dangers of signing a

bad deal with the Taliban and sought to convince the president to back away from what

was shaping up to be less of a “peace” agreement and more of a poorly masked surrender

agreement. A suicide attack in downtown Kabul that killed a US service member and

eleven others on September 5, 2019, led Trump to suspend peace talks with the Taliban

two days later. His tweet announcing the talks’ suspension revealed that he had intended to

invite the Taliban and then Afghan president Ashraf Ghani to Camp David for peace talks.

It is highly doubtful the Taliban would have agreed to meet with Ghani in the United States

in any case—a fact that should have been apparent to the US negotiator.

Sowing Seeds of Surrender under Guise of Peace

There has been repeated criticism of the US military for flawed strategies in Afghanistan,

but the record of US diplomacy in Afghanistan—particularly peace efforts led by

Hoover Institution • Stanford University

former US negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad over the last three years—have so far escaped scrutiny.

The so-called Afghanistan Papers—confidential documents published by the Washington Post

in December 2019—show how US military leaders often provided rosy assessments of the

military situation or told political leadership that the United States had “turned a corner” in

the fight against the Taliban, when facts showed otherwise. In my time as National Security

Council senior director for South and Central Asia, I also witnessed senior civilian officials and

advisors relying on wishful thinking, rather than data and evidence, to form policy.

The predilection to rely on mistaken beliefs, rather than facts on the ground, defined the peace

talks with the Taliban and the resulting Doha agreement. The first mistake was excluding the

Afghan government from peace talks. When the White House made the decision in July 2018

for the United States to pursue direct talks with the Taliban to jump-start a more comprehensive

peace effort, the intention was to quickly bring the Afghan government into that process.3

No US official at the time envisioned the United States signing a deal with the Taliban

without the involvement of the Afghan government, which is precisely what happened

nineteen months later.

By signing a deal with the Taliban that demanded few concessions, the US negotiator

signaled to the Afghan authorities that the United States was ready to cut and run from

the country and provide international legitimacy to the enemy while doing so. The deal

committed the United States to a full withdrawal of forces within fourteen months in

exchange for vague Taliban pledges to enter peace talks with Afghan authorities and prevent

terrorists from threatening the United States and its allies. This essentially reversed Trump’s

earlier commitment to a conditions-based approach to US troop deployments.

The second mistake was the failure of the US negotiator to calibrate the pace of the

talks to the violence carried out by the Taliban. Trump was right to suspend talks when a

US service member was killed in an attack in downtown Kabul in September 2019. However,

when peace talks resumed three months later, the Taliban conducted a car bombing at

Bagram Airfield on December 11, 2019, killing two Afghans and wounding eighty.4 While

no US service member was killed in the attack, it was a brazen assault on a US facility and

merited another suspension of the talks. Instead, the US negotiator forged ahead with

another round of talks with the Taliban two days later, this time with a request to the

Taliban to merely pause violence for six days before the Doha deal would be signed.

Everything about the way in which the United States negotiated with the Taliban signaled

US desperation for a deal that would cloak its troop withdrawal in the guise of a negotiated

peace settlement. The fact that the United States moved ahead with signing the Doha

deal one month after US citizen Mark Frerichs was taken hostage by militants in Kabul

is further evidence of US desperation. The United States should have never signed a deal

with a group holding an American hostage. It was the ultimate signal of US weakness and

fecklessness.

Lisa Curtis • How the Doha Agreement Guaranteed US Failure in Afghanistan

The third mistake was providing the Taliban with practically everything they wanted

without their having to concede much of anything. Consider the decision to force the

Afghan government to release five thousand Taliban prisoners before the Taliban started

talks with the Afghan government. It was clear the Taliban had no interest in a negotiated

settlement but simply wanted their fighters freed, to help them achieve a military path back

to power.

Among the Taliban prisoners released was an Afghan army sergeant named Hekmatullah,

who in 2012 had murdered three Australian soldiers in cold blood while they rested at

their base.56 Australian prime minister Scott Morrison had pleaded with President Trump

not to force President Ghani to release Hekmatullah.7 It was unnecessary to release this

hardened Taliban killer, especially when one of our most trusted allies was opposed to it.

The Trump administration’s hope that Hekmatullah’s release would facilitate peace talks

turned out to be wildly unfounded.

Flimsy Counterterrorism Commitments

Despite Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and US negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad’s repeated

claims throughout 2020 that the Taliban agreed to break ties with al-Qaeda, all evidence

points to the contrary. In a report released in early June 2021, the United Nations said that

large numbers of al-Qaeda fighters and other terrorist elements aligned with the Taliban

were located in various parts of Afghanistan and have celebrated the departure of US and

NATO forces from the country as a victory for global radicalism.8 While the Doha agreement

states that the Taliban will instruct its members not to cooperate with groups that pose a

threat to the United States and its allies, the UN coordinator for the Islamic State, al-Qaeda,

and Taliban Monitoring Team, Edmund Fitton-Brown, said last October that shortly before

the Doha agreement was signed, the Taliban promised al-Qaeda that the two groups would,

in fact, remain allies.

A careful reading of the Doha agreement shows that the Taliban never pledged to break

ties to al-Qaeda or expel terrorists from the country. After countless hours of negotiations,

the most the US negotiator could extract from the Taliban was a flimsy pledge to “not allow”

al-Qaeda to “use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its

allies.” The language is weak and meaningless. For instance, what happens when al-Qaeda

fails to ask the Taliban for permission to conduct a terrorist strike outside of Afghanistan? It

is likely the Taliban would feign ignorance, arguing they were unaware of the plotting and

training, as they did with the 9/11 attacks. Instead of locking the Taliban into breaking ties

with terrorist groups, the Doha agreement provides the Taliban with plausible deniability in

the event terrorists conduct a strike against the United States from their haven in Afghanistan.

To this day, the Taliban refuses to acknowledge that al-Qaeda carried out the attacks of 9/11.

Furthermore, the Doha agreement lacks clarity on the issue of foreign terrorist fighters and

their ability to reconverge on Afghanistan. The agreement says the Taliban will deal with

Hoover Institution • Stanford University

those “seeking asylum or residence in Afghanistan according to international migration

law . . . so that such persons do not pose a threat to the security of the United States and

its allies.” However, the next clause presents a major loophole, saying the Taliban will not

provide official documentation to those seeking to enter the country who pose a threat to the

United States. In other words, the Taliban can simply turn a blind eye to the arrival of foreign

terrorist fighters into Afghanistan and still be within the letter of the Doha agreement.

While it is too early to determine precisely how the Taliban victory in Afghanistan will

impact terrorism trends in the region, the initial indicators are worrisome. The Taliban have

appointed a hardline interim government headed by Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund,

who served as foreign minister and then deputy prime minister during Taliban rule

from 1996 to 2001. Akhund also played a critical role in the Quetta Shura and in driving

the Taliban’s military strategy from its safe haven in Pakistan. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the

subject of an FBI Rewards for Justice program that offers $5 million for information

leading to his arrest due to his role in terrorist attacks that killed US citizens, was named

interior minister. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who spent eight years in a Pakistani jail

before the US negotiator requested his release to participate in peace talks, is known to

be more moderate in his approach and was part of a group of insurgents who engaged

with Hamid Karzai when he was Afghan president back in 2009. Baradar’s relegation to

deputy prime minister appears to be a sign that harder-line factions of the Taliban

currently have the upper hand in decision making.

Weakening the Afghan State

Both the Trump and Biden administrations underestimated the degree to which the

Doha agreement had weakened the Afghan state and divided the Afghan political elite.

The way in which the United States handled peace talks in Doha directly contributed

to undermining President Ghani and the Afghan institutions under his charge. The US

undercut Ghani by simultaneously forcing him to make concessions to the Taliban while

the Taliban continued to press ahead with its military campaign to take the country

by force. The Taliban used peace talks to divide Afghan leaders, while at the same time

assassinating Afghan civilians and attacking the Afghan security forces to weaken their

will to keep fighting. It was a recipe for disaster.

In a recent interview, former CIA counterterrorism chief Douglas London explained

how the United States played into the Taliban strategy, which was to increase the level

of violence “while undercutting the Afghan government’s cohesion by negotiating with

and paying off regional opponents.” London concluded that under these circumstances,

it should have been obvious to US observers that the Afghan government could collapse

“within days to weeks.”

The United States would have been better off negotiating its withdrawal directly with

the Ghani government, something Ghani had proposed in early 2019. In this way, the

Lisa Curtis • How the Doha Agreement Guaranteed US Failure in Afghanistan

United States would have avoided demoralizing its Afghan partners even as it pulled

back its support to the Afghan security forces. Instead, the combination of withdrawing

US forces and military support at the same time we were making a political deal with the

enemy of the government meant we ended up handing the country to the Taliban like

a birthday cake. In the words of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, US actions in

Afghanistan “culminated in what amounts to unconditional American withdrawal by the

Biden administration.”

Afghan political leaders and regional power brokers do not get a pass, however. They allowed

themselves to be divided. The only possible way they could have fended off Taliban military

advances would have been to unify their ranks and fight together against the Taliban.

Several Afghans and Americans blame President Ghani and his leadership style that eschews

consensus building for this failure. However, former president Hamid Karzai and former

chief executive Abdullah also miscalculated badly by naively believing the Taliban would

make them part of an interim government.

Biden Administration Perpetuated Misguided Afghan Policy

The Biden administration had an opportunity to change course on peace talks with the

Taliban when it assumed power in January 2021. President Biden instead chose to stick

with the poorly negotiated Doha agreement and retain its architect, Ambassador Khalilzad.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s letter to President Ghani in March 2021 implicitly laid

blame on Ghani for the failure of peace talks, even as Taliban violence and assassinations

of Afghan civil society leaders continued apace.12 As former national security advisor

General H. R. McMaster explained in an op-ed in March, “Secretary of State [Antony]

Blinken’s leaked letter to President Ghani made clear the new administration has not

ended the grand self-delusion meant to justify an incompetent and unethical policy:

that the Taliban has become less murderous and is disconnected from other terrorist

organizations.”13

President Biden claims he had only two choices on Afghanistan: either stick with the terms

of the Doha agreement, which included US withdrawal by May 1, 2021, or deploy more

US forces to Afghanistan. This is simply not true. He could have retained the approximately

3,500 US troops, which would have been supplemented by around 7,500 NATO troops,

to maintain support for the Afghan security forces and to protect US counterterrorism

interests. This would have required resources and potential risks to US forces, but full

withdrawal also entails risks and requires continued resources for over-the-horizon

counterterrorism operations. Another option would have been to follow through on

troop withdrawal, not according to the Doha agreement but on Biden’s own terms. Such

a withdrawal could have involved pulling out contractor support at a more gradual pace,

coordinating more closely with NATO allies, and continuing robust air support for the

Afghan security forces over a longer period. This may have prevented Afghan morale from

plummeting so rapidly and allowed the Afghan security forces time to regroup.

Hoover Institution • Stanford University

Work with Friends, Not Foes

Another mistake of US Afghanistan policy over the last two years has been the diplomatic

focus on working with Russia and China at the expense of coordinating closely with our

UK and European allies. The US negotiator was heavily invested in coordinating the peace

effort with Russia and China over the last two years, despite their lack of interest in

promoting human rights and civil liberties and their ill will toward the United States.

Russian and Chinese officials have recently excoriated the United States for the current

chaos in Afghanistan. European leaders, for their part, are quietly seething about the

United States’ failure to consult them over the last two years on both the peace process

and the troop withdrawal.14

The United States must shift its diplomatic attention to working closely with like-minded

democratic partners, such as the United Kingdom, Europe, and India, which share similar

objectives regarding regional security and counterterrorism, and recognize the importance

of advancing civil liberties and women’s rights to counter the rise of Islamist extremist

ideologies. The US bungling of the situation in Afghanistan has contributed to a significant

decline in goodwill among these nations toward the United States and a loss of faith in

US competence as a global leader. It will take a wholesale shift in US diplomacy from

desperately negotiating and catering to terrorist supporters toward focusing on policies

based on principles of human rights and counterterrorism and implemented from a position

of strength and conviction.

The US negotiator’s decision to work hand in glove with Pakistan must also be questioned.

As the Taliban entered Kabul on August 15, 2021 (India’s Independence Day anniversary

and perhaps not by coincidence), Pakistani prime minister Imran Khan said the Taliban

“had broken the shackles of slavery,” while his special assistant tweeted that “the contraption

that the US had pieced together for Afghanistan has crumbled like the proverbial house

of cards.”15

No US administration in the last twenty years has been able to convince Pakistan to

crack down on the Taliban located inside its territory. So long as the Taliban could rely

on Pakistan for refuge and could fall back there to regroup and get medical attention

and move unhindered back and forth across the border, the Taliban were never going to

lose their stamina to fight. Trump, for his part, had suspended US military assistance to

Pakistan in January 2018, with his national security advisor, H. R. McMaster, explaining,

“The relationship can no longer bear the weight of the contradictions in Pakistan’s terrorism

policies.” The aid suspension impacted nearly $2 billion of previously obligated security

assistance for Pakistan. Before the aid suspension, the US had given Pakistan six months

to take decisive action against Taliban and Haqqani Network leaders who had refused to

participate in peace talks. The US had also asked Pakistan to disrupt the operational activity of

these groups, including the plotting of attacks, financial transactions, and cross-border flows

of weapons and fighters—none of which Islamabad did. Even though the aid suspension

Lisa Curtis • How the Doha Agreement Guaranteed US Failure in Afghanistan

failed to substantively change Pakistani behavior toward the Taliban, it ensured that

US taxpayer money would no longer fund a foreign military supporting a group linked to

those responsible for 9/11 and continuing to kill US soldiers in Afghanistan.

It’s too late to penalize Pakistan for its support of the Taliban, but US officials should

also learn from their experience of twenty years of Pakistani obstinance and lack of

support for US objectives in Afghanistan. US officials must maintain low expectations of

Pakistan on the counterterrorism front moving forward. It is possible that the United States

could cooperate with Pakistan in targeting the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, a group that is

responsible for killing tens of thousands of Pakistanis in terrorist attacks over the last

twelve years. Washington and Islamabad may also find it mutually beneficial to cooperate

against ISIS-K (Islamic State Khorasan), which poses a threat to both countries. However,

Pakistan’s intelligence service views the Haqqani Network as an asset in Afghanistan and

will never turn on the group. Neither should the US expect Pakistan to help in targeting

al-Qaeda leaders. While Islamabad helped the United States arrest al-Qaeda leaders in the

early years following the 9/11 attacks, that assistance has long since dried up.

While the Taliban are not puppets of Pakistan, the Pakistanis have become adept at gaining

indirect control over them through manipulation. As a member of the US delegation in

peace talks with the Taliban in 2019 and 2020, I witnessed instances of Taliban leaders’

frustration with Pakistan. Now that the Taliban have taken control of Afghanistan and are

no longer dependent on their Pakistani sanctuary, the Pakistanis may lose some of their

influence over the group.

Our policy toward India has, likewise, been wrongheaded. In deference to Pakistan, the

United States has avoided working closely with India, and in the end this achieved nothing

for America’s regional objectives. It is long past time to turn that policy around and

recognize that the United States has far more to gain by coordinating with like-minded

democracies that fight terrorists than by focusing its attention on regimes that rely on

terrorist proxies to undermine their neighbors. India shepherded a strong resolution on

Afghanistan when it held the United Nations Security Council presidency in August 2021.

It is currently serving a two-year term as a nonpermanent member of the Security Council,

which rotates the presidency among its fifteen members every month.16 In the 1990s, India

worked closely with Russia and Iran in support of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Now

that Russia and Iran have forged closer ties with the Taliban, primarily to counter the rise of

ISIS-K, India finds itself more isolated in the region.

Judge Taliban’s Actions, Not Words

Moving forward, President Biden should entrust his Afghanistan policy to those who will

report the facts and not project them through rose-colored glasses. During the Trump years,

diplomats tended to see the Taliban they wanted to see, rather than taking the measure

Hoover Institution • Stanford University

of their actions. For instance, there was little attention given to the UN reports previously

mentioned on continued Taliban–al-Qaeda linkages, even though the US negotiator told

Congress the United States was monitoring and verifying the Taliban’s actions toward

terrorist groups.17

Instead of assuming the Taliban’s desire for international assistance and legitimacy will help

moderate its behavior in the future, the Biden team should wait to see whether the Taliban

take concrete actions to prove they have changed. Such actions would include refraining

from revenge killings, opening schools for girls, allowing women to work outside the home,

and taking steps to curb terrorist activities.

During their first week back in power, Taliban leaders went to great lengths to try to show

the world their movement had evolved on issues of governance, terrorism, and women’s rights

since they ruled the country twenty years ago. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid

gave a press conference in Kabul in which he offered amnesty to those who worked for the

government of President Ashraf Ghani, vowing there would be no reprisal killings. He said

women would be allowed to work and study and could participate in society “within the

bounds of Islamic law.”18

Contrary to Mujahid’s early statements, women were later told to stay in their homes until

the Taliban rank and file were instructed how to treat women properly. The United Nations

also reported that the Taliban apparently had lists of people it sought to question and

punish, mostly former police and military officials, and there are numerous accounts of the

Taliban knocking on doors and threatening people.19 There have been other reports of

the Taliban banning girls from attending school beyond the primary level and threatening

female police officers.

There’s good reason to be suspicious of the Taliban claims of amnesty. One week before the

Taliban took over Kabul, they assassinated the state media chief of the Afghan government

as part of a systematic campaign to assassinate government officials, civil society leaders,

human rights activists, and journalists. Furthermore, the Taliban leadership’s claims of

amnesty mean little unless the Taliban rank and file are held to account and punished if

they carry out such killings.

Conclusion

The United States cannot simply wash its hands of Afghanistan or wish away the terrorist

threat that still exists and is likely to grow with the Taliban’s ascendance to power. The

critical issue moving forward is the way in which America engages with a Taliban-controlled

Afghanistan. Such engagement should be based on a commitment to the principles of

freedom and human dignity and with eyes wide open to the continuing terrorist threats

in the region. The United States must continue to provide humanitarian assistance for the

Lisa Curtis • How the Doha Agreement Guaranteed US Failure in Afghanistan

basic needs of the Afghan people while avoiding rewarding the Taliban with diplomatic

recognition and economic development assistance before they have earned it.

While the Biden administration’s poor handling of the withdrawal has temporarily strained

relations with allies and partners who also invested heavily in the Afghanistan mission,

these nations are unlikely to make sweeping conclusions about the overall reliability

of the United States over the longer term. Since taking office nine months ago, the

Biden administration has invested a great deal in repairing and rejuvenating partnerships

and alliances in Europe and Asia. The mishandling of the situation in Afghanistan also

spans several US administrations—Republican and Democrat alike—and reflects how

Americans across the political spectrum had grown weary of the war. The most effective

way to redeem the botched Afghanistan withdrawal and rebuild trust with US partners is

for the Biden administration to deal with the Taliban from a position of strength and seek

to shape its behavior in close coordination with other like-minded nations.

NOTES

1 White House, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia,” August 21, 2017,
https:// trumpwhitehouse . archives . gov / briefings – statements / remarks – president – trump – strategy – afghanistan
– south – asia; David Nakamura and Abby Phillip, “Trump Announces New Strategy for Afghanistan That Calls for a
Troop Increase,” Washington Post, August 21, 2017, https:// www . washingtonpost . com / politics / trump – expected
– to – announce – small – troop – increase – in – afghanistan – in – prime – time – address / 2017 / 08 / 21 / eb3a513e – 868a – 11e7 – a94f
– 3139abce39f5 _ story . html.

2 “Full Transcript and Video: Trump’s Speech on Afghanistan,” New York Times, August 21, 2017, https:// www
. nytimes . com / 2017 / 08 / 21 / world / asia / trump – speech – afghanistan . html.

3 Mujib Mashal and Eric Schmitt, “White House Orders Direct Taliban Talks to Jump-Start Afghan Negotiations,”
New York Times, July 15, 2018, https:// www . nytimes . com / 2018 / 07 / 15 / world / asia / afghanistan – taliban – direct
– negotiations . html.

4 Fahim Abed and Mujib Mashal, “Taliban Attack US Base in Afghanistan as Negotiators Talk Peace,” New York Times,
December 11, 2019, https:// www . nytimes . com / 2019 / 12 / 11 / world / asia / Afghanistan – bagram – airfield – attack . html.

5 Jade Gailberger, “Morrison Lobbies Trump to Keep Killer Afghan Sergeant behind Bars,” News . com . au,
August 10, 2020, https:// www . news . com . au / national / politics / australia – lobbies – for – afghan – sergeant – to – be – kept
– behind – bars / news – story / 29e3509f36ab4675c9275014ab98c422.

6 Hugh Poate, “My Fight to Have My Son’s Killer Executed,” Weekend Australian Magazine, March 26, 2021, https://
www . theaustralian . com . au / weekend – australian – magazine / my – fight – to – have – my – sons – killer – executed – in
– afghanistan / news – story / d58f2c9481e51cdf25de5ddee0315ce8.

7 Andrew Greene, “Afghan Soldier Hekmatullah, Who Killed Three Australians, Flown to Qatar ahead of Peace
Talks with Taliban,” ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation), September 10, 2020, https:// www . abc . net . au
/ news / 2020 – 09 – 11 / hekmatullah – transferred – to – qatar – taliban – peace – talks – australia / 12653524.

8 United Nations Security Council, “Twelfth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team
Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2557 (2020) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and
Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability and Security of Afghanistan,” June 1, 2021, 3, https:// www
. undocs . org / en / S / 2021 / 486.

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-strategy-afghanistan-south-asia

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-expected-to-announce-small-troop-increase-in-afghanistan-in-prime-time-address/2017/08/21/eb3a513e-868a-11e7-a94f-3139abce39f5_story.html

http://News.com.au

https://www.news.com.au/national/politics/australia-lobbies-for-afghan-sergeant-to-be-kept-behind-bars/news-story/29e3509f36ab4675c9275014ab98c422

https://www.theaustralian.com.au/weekend-australian-magazine/my-fight-to-have-my-sons-killer-executed-in-afghanistan/news-story/d58f2c9481e51cdf25de5ddee0315ce8

https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-09-11/hekmatullah-transferred-to-qatar-taliban-peace-talks-australia/12653524

https://www.undocs.org/en/S/2021/486

Hoover Institution • Stanford University

The publisher has made this work available under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 4.0 International license.
To view a copy of this license, visit https:// creativecommons . org / licenses / by – nd / 4 . 0.

The views expressed in this essay are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the staff,
officers, or Board of Overseers of the Hoover Institution.

hoover . org

27 26 25 24 23 22 21 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

9 Secunder Kermani, “Al-Qaeda Still Heavily Embedded with Taliban in Afghanistan, UN Official Warns,”
BBC News, October 29, 2020, https:// www . bbc . com / news / world – asia – 54711452.

10 Rezaul H. Laskar, “India Has Good Reason to Worry over Taliban’s Rise: Ex-CIA Official,” Hindustan Times,
September 6, 2021, https:// www . hindustantimes . com / world – news / taliban – rise – a – concern – for – india – ex – cia – hand
– 101630869550332 . html.

11 Henry Kissinger, “The Future of American Power: Henry Kissinger on Why America Failed in Afghanistan,”
The Economist, August 25, 2021, https:// www . economist . com / by – invitation / 2021 / 08 / 25 / henry – kissinger – on – why
– america – failed – in – afghanistan.

12 Blinken to Ghani, February 28, 2021, https:// tolonews . com / pdf / 02 . pdf.

13 H. R. McMaster, “Afghanistan Is America’s Longest War—It’s Time for the Delusion about It to End,” Fox News,
March 22, 2021, https:// www . foxnews . com / opinion / afghanistan – america – longest – war – h – r – mcmaster.

14 Mark Lowen, “Afghanistan Crisis: How Europe’s Relationship with Joe Biden Turned Sour,” BBC News,
September 3, 2021, https:// www . bbc . com / news / world – europe – 58416848.

15 Ishaan Tharoor, “Pakistan’s Hand in the Taliban’s Victory,” Washington Post, August 18, 2021, https:// www
. washingtonpost . com / world / 2021 / 08 / 18 / pakistan – hand – taliban – victory.

16 “India’s Presidency of UNSC Ends with ‘Substantive’ Outcomes on Key Global Issues,” The Hindu, September 1,
2021, https:// www . thehindu . com / news / national / indias – presidency – of – unsc – ends – with – substantive – outcomes – on
– key – global – issues / article36219690 . ece.

17 United Nations Security Council, “Twelfth Report.”

18 Zeerak Khurram, Saphora Smith, Yuliya Talmazan, and Gabe Joselow, “Taliban Spokesman Says US Will
Not Be Harmed from Afghan Soil,” NBC News, August 17, 2021, https:// www . nbcnews . com / news / world / taliban
– announces – amnesty – urges – women – join – government – n1276945.

19 “Protests Spread to Kabul as Taliban Struggle to Govern,” New York Times, updated August 30, 2021, https://
www . nytimes . com / live / 2021 / 08 / 19 / world / taliban – afghanistan – news#the – taliban – intensify – a – search – for – people
– who – worked – with – us – and – british – forces – a – un – document – says.

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0

https://www.hoover.org/

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54711452

https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/taliban-rise-a-concern-for-india-ex-cia-hand-101630869550332.html

https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2021/08/25/henry-kissinger-on-why-america-failed-in-afghanistan

https://tolonews.com/pdf/02

https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/afghanistan-america-longest-war-h-r-mcmaster

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-58416848

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/08/18/pakistan-hand-taliban-victory

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indias-presidency-of-unsc-ends-with-substantive-outcomes-on-key-global-issues/article36219690.ece

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/taliban-announces-amnesty-urges-women-join-government-n1276945

https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/08/19/world/taliban-afghanistan-news#the-taliban-intensify-a-search-for-people-who-worked-with-us-and-british-forces-a-un-document-says

Author Name • Essay Title

Hoover Institution, Stanford University
434 Galvez Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6003
650-723-1754

Hoover Institution in Washington
1399 New York Avenue NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005
202-760-3200

About The Caravan Notebook

The Caravan Notebook is a platform for essays and podcasts
that offer commentary on a variety of subjects, ranging
from current events to cultural trends, and including topics
that are too local or too specific from the larger questions
addressed quarterly in The Caravan.

We draw on the membership of Hoover’s Herbert and Jane
Dwight Working Group on the Middle East and the Islamic
World, and on colleagues elsewhere who work that same
political and cultural landscape. Russell Berman chairs the
project from which this effort originates.

The Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group
on the Middle East and the Islamic World

The Herbert and Jane Dwight Working Group on the Middle
East and the Islamic World studies a range of political,
social, and cultural problems in the region with the goal
of informing American foreign policy choices and the
wider public discussion. The working group draws on the
intellectual resources of an array of scholars and practitioners
from within the United States and abroad to foster the
pursuit of modernity, to combat Islamist radicalism, to
promote human flourishing, and to spread the rule of
law, human rights, and democratic governance in Islamic
lands—developments that are critical to the very order of
the international system. The working group is chaired by
Hoover fellow Russell Berman.

For more information about this Hoover Institution Working
Group, visit us online at www . hoover . org / research – teams / middle
– east – and – islamic – world – working – group.

About the Author

LISA CURTIS
Lisa Curtis is senior fellow and

director of the Indo-Pacific Security

Program at the Center for a New

American Security. She is a foreign

policy and national security expert

with over twenty years of service

in the US government, including

most recently (2017–21) as deputy

assistant to the president and

National Security Council senior

director for South and Central Asia.

Ce
nt

er
fo

r a
N

ew
A

m
er

ic
an

S
ec

ur
ity

https://www.hoover.org/

http://www.hoover.org/research-teams/middle-east-and-islamic-world-working-group

Title Page

Introduction

Trump Starts Strong on Afghanistan

Shifts to Troop Withdrawal and Peace Track

Sowing Seeds of Surrender under Guise of Peace

Flimsy Counterterrorism Commitments

Weakening the Afghan State

Biden Administration Perpetuated Misguided Afghan Policy

Work with Friends, Not Foes

Judge Taliban’s Actions, Not Words

Conclusion

NOTES

About the Author

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol

42(3

)

Sep/Dec 2020 539

Contexto Internacional
vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020

http://doi.org/10.1590/S0102-8529.2019420300002

Castro

The Securitization of the Tri-Border
Area between Argentina, Brazil and
Paragua

Isabelle Christine Somma de Castro*

Abstract: The purpose of this study is to identify the main features of the US discourse regarding the
Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay through the analysis of 16 editions of the
Patterns of Global Terrorism and of the Country Reports on Terrorism published from 2001-2016.
Securitization theory is applied to explain the use of speech acts as movements to securitize the
region. After employing NVivo to measure the frequency of words, a strong link between the rise of
the financial semantic field and clashes in the Middle East were observed. The fact that the reports
had a special emphasis regarding legislation on terrorism in the three countries was also detected.

Keywords: Tri-Border Area; securitization; content analysis; terrorism; George W. Bush; Barack
Obama.

Introductio

In the last decades, the border region between Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, interna-
tionally known as the Tri-Border Area, has been acknowledged as a hub for terrorist activ-
ities and financing. Claims of illegal activities were published in governmental and think
tank reports as well as in several academic studies and press articles. However, the existing
accounts frequently fail to indicate the contradiction between the accusations and the
evidence. Assuming that the construction of the demand for security is made through dis-
course, an analysis of the sources which sustain that demand is imperative to understand
how the region has been represented to the public, and the impacts thereof.

One of the most notorious and influential reports that addresses terrorist acts and
groups is published annually by the US Department of State. The reports Patterns of
Global Terrorism (published between 2001-2004) and Country Reports on Terrorism (pub-
lished between 2005-2016) are valuable portraits of the George W. Bush and Barack H.
Obama administration’s views concerning terrorism and counterterrorism. Both series
of documents reveal an emphasis on specific issues and episodes, which may or may not

* University of São Paulo (USP), São Paulo-SP, Brazil; isasomma@hotmail.com. ORCID iD 0000-0002-3572-
4565.

540 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

be related to the Tri-Border Area. Understanding how the region is portrayed in official
records may help disclose the concerns of US administrations regarding Argentina, Brazil,
and Paraguay, as well as their specific demands related to security.

This study is based on the idea that security frequently takes politics beyond rules and
that it may also be framed above politics. The concept of securitization, which is seen as
a more extreme version of politization, is helpful to understand how this works (Buzan,
Waever and de Wilde 1998: 23). The theory offers effective means to understand how the
idea of threat originates, how enemies are constructed in discourse, and how specific ac-
tors use it in their favour and against other actors. The securitization approach may also
be useful in disclosing flaws in political discussions about the need of security and to chal-
lenge the use or misuse of this concept. As a result, this approach can improve the search
for possible explanations of the securitizing actors’ actions.

Securitization involves three dimensions, as claimed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde.
The first dimension is the ‘speech act,’ in which the understanding of a given threat is con-
structed. The securitizing actor, that accounts for the second dimension of the theory, can
demand exceptional measures to deal with the specific threat. These measures are urged
by the speech act elaborated by the securitizing actor to persuade an audience to accept
the measures, constituting the third dimension. The effort to have the audience agreement
is a ‘securitization movement’ that can only be successful if the audience is convinced that
there is an existential threat and that this threat needs to be tackled with ‘special measures
and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ (Buzan, Waever
and de Wilde 1998: 24).

Reports such as Patterns of Global Terrorism and Country Reports on Terrorism are
powerful tools that can drive securitization movements because they are public docu-
ments made exactly to disclose views, requests, and claims made by the US Department of
State, an important agency of the securitizing actor. Although the reports are influential to
public opinion, it is difficult to measure their impact on audiences. As argued by Stritzer
(2007: 363), it is not clear which audience the authors are referring to, what are the im-
plications of the existence of so many audiences and when exactly the audience should or
would be persuaded. This case study does not measure the impact of the documents on
the public opinion, but assumes that there is a tension between the main securitization ac-
tor, the US administration, and the local governments, especially the Brazilian one, which
has been denying the existence of terrorist activities in the region for the past two decades
(Castro 2020).

According to Stritzer, another limitation of the securitization approach is its sugges-
tion that there are two centres of gravity which are still ‘theoretically underdeveloped’ and
that probably reflect two different views of the subject. The first view, that he defines as
‘internalist,’ considers the performativity of the speech acts. The second is the ‘externalist’
one, which comprehends the social process of securitization involving actors and audienc-
es. Stritzer argues that just one of these centres of gravity should be employed and chooses
the externalist perspective to be the focus. In his opinion, security articulations have to
relate to broader discursive contexts, since the actors gain their power from them (Stritzer

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 541

2007: 362, 367). This study encompasses the two, based on the belief that both the broad
context as well as the discursive practice may be disclosed as they are interconnected.

On the internalist view, Amaral (2010) offers probably the most comprehensive em-
pirical analysis of the securitization of the Tri-Border Area. His aim is to investigate how
the area entered in the US security agenda, with special focus on the Bush administration.
Even though it takes on an unsystematic approach, his research analysed documents from
many US government departments. Amaral suggests that the target of the security dis-
course encompassed two audiences. The first one included the governments of Argentina,
Brazil and Paraguay, that did not accept the assumption that there was a nexus between
crime and terror in the area. The second, formed by the US Congress and by US gov-
ernment agencies, thoroughly endorsed the existence of such nexus. Although the three
South American countries had restrictions to the claims, they nevertheless accepted un-
usual measures such as including the USA in the ‘3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security.’
The research concluded that the securitization movement was partially successful to the
first audience and successful to the second one (Amaral 2010: 256-258).

This study aims to identify the main US discourse features about this important fron-
tier through 16 editions of the Patterns of Global Terrorism and the Country Reports on
Terrorism. It addresses the possible motivations behind the movements of securitization
observed in the Department of State reports. At first, it suggests a special focus on the
relationship between the local Tri-Border Arab community as well as Lebanon and Iran,
causing the US view on the area to be more related to the conflicts between this country
and state and non-state actors from the Middle East. This perception places the local dy-
namics, such as the increase or the decrease of crime statistics in the region, in a lower
level of importance.

Studies have shown that the transnational organized crimes have become more com-
plex in the border and that the militarization response deployed by local governments has
been ineffective (Devia-Garzon and Ortega-Avellaneda 2019: 11). Crimes such as smug-
gling, embezzlement, drugs and arms trafficking, tax evasion, and counterfeiting are com-
mon in the area. On the other hand, the tension levels between Washington and groups
like Hamas and Hizballah, as well as Tehran, rather than what is actually taking place on
the ground, seems to be the focal point of the accusations related to terrorist practices in
the Tri-Border Area observed in the documents released by the US Department of State.

This study does not dismiss other catalysts for the discursive pressure exercised by the
US Department of State’s upon local governments to apply repressive measures on money
laundering. It is not possible to ignore other factors, which may have influenced a possible
increase in the awareness of the region, such as the Brazilian nuclear program (Wikileaks
2009), the rise of progressive governments in the region – such as the former Paraguayan
president Fernando Lugo, who was elected in 2008 and impeached in 2012 as a result
of an uncommon brief process in Congress, the lack of regional support for the war on
terrorism (Halliday 2002: 237), and the rapprochement between Brazil and Iran through
the 2010 tentative Nuclear Agreement negotiated between the two countries and Turkey.
Moreover, it is also worth mentioning longstanding known US interests in the region, for

542 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

instance, regarding the Guarani Aquifer, the second-biggest underground waters supplier
in the world, and the project to install a US military base in Paraguay (Jorge 2009: 86).
Although several issues have been responsible for the rising attention devoted to the Tri-
Border Area, this paper argues that the Middle East dynamics are the main catalyst for
establishing a nexus between the region’s illegal activities and terrorism.

The goal of this investigation is to increase the knowledge of these documents by add-
ing empirical data to support a more qualified examination of the US counterterrorism
tactics regarding South America. The approach taken by the research is a hybrid method-
ology through the use of the software NVivo. Adopting this tool of analysis enabled the
measurement of the frequency of words related to the Tri-Border Area and to the borders
of its neighbouring countries – namely Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay – in a corpus of 16
reports. Four of these are editions of the report Patterns of Global Terrorism, which relate
to the years 2000-2003, and 12 are editions of the Country Reports on Terrorism that refer
to 2004-2015. The dates of the documents reflect the year of reference and not that of the
publication, which is the following year1. These editions were released during George W.
Bush’s administration, throughout the period from January 2001 to January 2009, and
during Barack H. Obama’s presidency, from January 2009 to January 2017. Both presi-
dents were re-elected for a second term.

This article is divided into three sections. In the first section, the historical background
of the supposed link between the Tri-Border Area Muslim community and international
terrorism is briefly described. This includes a discussion of the security implications of
the unproven relation of the Buenos Aires bombings in the 1990s to the area, as well as
renewed claims of the existence of terrorist groups in the frontier following the September
11th terrorist attacks. In the second section, the methodology is explained, namely how
the corpus was classified, why the NVivo software was chosen and in what ways observing
the frequency of words is useful to identify patterns. The results are also presented and
discussed. In the last section, the main conclusions of the study are addressed.

The Tri-Border Area and terrorism

The literature on the Tri-Border Area has highlighted that the assumption of a supposed
presence of terrorists in the region originated after the Buenos Aires bombings in 1992
and 1994 (Rabossi 2004; Pinto 2016; Nasser 2018: 136). Since then, governmental reports
and media outlets have speculated about how criminal and financial offenses such as drug
trafficking, money laundering and smuggling in the region might be financing the activi-
ties of terrorist groups like Hamas and Hizballah2.

The cities of Foz do Iguaçu, in Brazil, Ciudad del Este, in Paraguay, and Puerto Iguazu,
in Argentina, are divided by two rivers, Paraná and Iguaçu. These political and geographic
limits did not have any specific denomination before March 1996. Only from then on,
the governments of the three countries began to refer to that specific area as a ‘Tríplice
Fronteira’ or ‘Triple Frontera’ (Rabossi 2004: 24). The newly attributed designation would
be used not only in official documents but also in academic studies and by the press. The

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 543

1996 edition of the Patterns of Global Terrorism, translated into English in quotes, lower-
case and no hyphen, inserted under the Argentina title: ‘“triborder” area,’ was also intro-
duced by the US Department of State at the time. In this particular document, the term
was linked to new security measures that were being implemented by the governments of
the three countries ‘to help address the growing security concerns’ (Department of State
[USA] 1997). Brazil was not placed under a specific entry in this edition.

From a geographic landmark, this frontier became ‘a category built by diplomatic
agreements, by the actions of national and international security agencies’ and also by
international media outlets (Pinto and Montenegro 2008: 5). The new designation for
the region was created to answer demands for security, and more specifically, regarding
intra-national and transnational dynamics (Amaral 2010: 33). Although Brazil has nine
tri-borders, only this one can be found in as a title case in official documents and press
articles without any other clarification. The term was created and is still being used as a
constructed securitized form of the region, leaving its other known characteristics, such
as the fact that it is an ecological paradise and a tourist attraction, aside. The presence of a
large Arab and Muslim community mainly from the Bekaa Valley and South Lebanon, but
also of Palestinians, Syrians, Jordanians, and Egyptians, probably made the region a place
of greater awareness to securitizing actors.

The region has been referred to as a security threat since two deadly terrorist attacks
hit Buenos Aires in the 1990s. The first one targeted the Israeli embassy in 1992 and the
second, the most lethal one, destroyed the Asociación Mutuales Israelitas Argentinas
(AMIA), a Jewish community centre, in 1994. Both bombings killed 115 people, injured
hundreds of people who lived and worked in the neighbourhood and destroyed many
buildings nearby. A Buenos Aires criminal court charged 12 Iranian nationals and one
Lebanese citizen believed to be a Hizballah operative (Department of State [USA] 2004)
for the latter attack. High ranking Argentine authorities, such as the former president
Carlos Menem, were accused of forgery and covering up.

The link between the AMIA bombing and the Tri-Border Area was made public by
the Interior Minister of Argentina Carlos Corach two years after the last bombing, per-
haps as a way to dismiss the accusations that the government was not doing enough to
solve the case (Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Brazil] 2001). Corach argued that the explo-
sives used in at least one of the attacks were smuggled through Argentina by the Brazilian
border between Foz do Iguaçu and Puerto Iguazu. The charge was renewed more recently,
in 2015, with a new allegation. The Argentinian chief prosecutor, Alberto Nisman, filed a
complaint in January 2015,3 accusing the government of President Cristina de Kirchner
of conceiving a criminal plan to grant immunity to Iranian officials accused of participat-
ing in the Buenos Aires blasts.4 The report also reveals details of the investigation con-
cerning both attacks. The Tri-Border Area is mentioned in terms of telephone calls made
by a Colombian national, Samuel Salman El Reda – one of the supposed protagonists in
the AMIA bombing – to a cell phone in Foz do Iguaçu registered in the name of André
Marques. These calls are the only connection made in the report between the attack and
the border area.

544 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

The fact that both the first and the last call recorded were made from
the two respective airports leads us to conclude that he [El Reda] had
informed the active Hezbollah member working as André Marques
about both the arrival and departure of members of the task force
that carried out the final stage of the mission (Nisman 2015: 156).

One year after the prosecutor’s complaint was made public, the Colombian govern-
ment revealed that El Reda’s passport was fraudulent (Kollmann 2016). Since then, the
identity of the real key agent of the plot remains unknown. Although El Reda’s identity is
uncertain, Interpol (2009) issued in 2009 an international arrest warrant against him on
its website, after a request made by Nisman in 2006. The identity of Andre Marques was
not established; neither was it even confirmed if he existed. Not a single person who lives
or lived in the Tri-Border Area has been indicted or identified as a suspect in either of the
deadly attacks for more than two decades following it.

The culprits of the crimes, as before mentioned, are suspected to be agents designat-
ed under the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and a member of Hizballah,
a Shia militant group from Lebanon that is also financed by the Iranian regime. These
Lebanese and Iranian nationals, with no connections with the Tri-Border Area, were in-
dicted by the Argentinian Courts and included in the Interpol list of most wanted persons
for terrorism. One of these suspects is Mohsen Rabbani, who worked as an official at the
Iranian Embassy in Buenos Aires and now lives in Qom, Iran. Rabbani was interviewed by
a Brazilian journalist and denied all the accusations regarding having helped to organize
the plot that killed almost 100 people in the AMIA attack of 1994 (Adghirni 2012).

Although many suspects were indicted in Argentina, the case is far from being
closed. The ‘local connection’ – as a group of Argentinian citizens involved with the plot is
known – is still under investigation and awaiting criminal proceedings. The involvement
of Argentinian police members and of the Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado (SIDE)5,
the country’s secret service, in the AMIA attacks has not been fully dismissed (Davies
2015; Caballero 2005; Salinas 1997; Sanz e Paolella 2007). In a recent trial, an Argentinian
federal judge, Juan José Galeano, and a former chief of SIDE, Hugo Anzorreguy, were con-
victed of organizing a cover-up operation and sentenced to six and four and a half years in
prison, respectively. Conversely, former Argentinian president Carlos Menem was found
not guilty in this plot. Another famous character of the ‘local connection,’ Carlos Telleldín,
who faced trial and was found not guilty (Nisman 2015: 157), was sent back to court in
2019, convicted of obstruction of justice and sentenced to three years in prison. He will be
tried again for his involvement in the AMIA bombing (Tomás 2019).

A similar case in 1970 had the same characteristics but a different outcome. Two gun-
men invaded the Israeli Embassy in the Paraguayan capital, Asuncion, killing one per-
son and injuring another. Soon thereafter, the Brazilian newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo
published an article relating the Arab residents of Foz do Iguaçu with the action. After
arresting the two offenders, both Palestinians who had come from the United Kingdom,
the Paraguayan Justice found no evidence of the involvement of the Tri-Border Arab com-
munity with the raid (Karam 2013: 60). New evidence has shown that the two assailants

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 545

did not plan the attack and were trying to receive a stipend promised by the Israeli govern-
ment to Palestinians who accepted to settle in Paraguay (Rivarola 2020).

The fluidity of the frontier, where thousands of people and products cross over the
two bridges between Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este and between Foz do Iguaçu and
Puerto Iguazu in a daily basis, is a security concern for the three countries. As with other
borders, crimes such as drugs and arms trafficking, smuggling, and other illicit activities
are a common issue. What is uncommon, however, is to associate these activities to terror-
ism financing in South America. For the past decades, there has been a discourse not only
linking such activities in the region with international terrorism but also connecting both
the Shia and Sunni Muslim communities from the Tri-Border Area to terrorism financing
around the globe.

After the September 11th attacks, a link between the Tri-Border Area and terrorist
activities remerged. The connection was made by the US Department of State, which
suggested that the area hosted training camps and financed international groups accused
of terrorist acts, identifying it as a ‘safe haven’ for terrorists (Amaral 2010; Folch 2012;
Ferreira 2016). The visit of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to Foz do Iguaçu in 1995, one of the
most well-known members of Al Qaeda who had involvement in the World Trade Center
attack in 1993, supported the allegation that the group had links with the community in
the region (CNN 2003). On the other hand, the information published in the Brazilian
magazine Veja about a supposed Osama bin Laden’s trip to the area has been found untrue
(Policarpo Junior 2003; Benson 2003).

The suspicions of an association between the local Arab community and Al Qaeda
were dropped after the release, on July 2004, of the final report provided by an indepen-
dent and bipartisan commission created by the U.S. Congress to investigate the circum-
stances of the September 11th attacks. The 9/11 Commission Report recognizes that ‘No
clear evidence connects him [Sheikh Mohamed] to terrorist activities in those locations’6
(National Commission 2004: 148). It is fair to say that following the publication of this
investigation in 2004, the Arab community in the Tri-Border was acquitted of having any
relationship to terrorists and to the perpetrators of 9/11 and the 1993 World Trade Centre
attacks.

Much of the literature produced by local experts since the mid-2000’s also empha-
sizes the inconsistent and contradictory claims regarding the Tri-Border Area. Costa and
Schulmeister (2007: 34) describe the lack of evidence of the nexus crime-terrorism and
argue that the remittances sent abroad by the Middle Eastern immigrants do not validate
the claim that they fund terrorists. Ferreira (2016: 213) has shown how contradictory the
US Department of State view is. While claiming the presence of terrorism financers in
the region, the reports of this agency also stressed the lack of evidence to prove it. What
is not yet clear is the impact of these allegations and why they are still being made to this
day. The analysis of 16 editions of the US Department of State reports may improve our
understanding of the reasons why the Tri-Border Area has been continuously linked to
the terrorist threat.

546 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

Content analysi

This section will explain why the sample was chosen, how it was categorized, how the
method was used and the main findings of the analysis. As described earlier, this article
aims to examine the US Government discourse on terrorism in Brazil, Argentina and
Paraguay after September 11th during the George W. Bush administration until the end of
Barack Obama’s in 2016. In order to achieve this goal, a selection of documents that had at
least the same patterns was required. Most importantly, these documents had to be similar
in purpose and size during both administrations to make the comparison reliable.

The US Secretary of State is requested by law to provide to the Congress a ‘full and
complete annual report on terrorism for these countries and groups meeting the criteria
of the act,’ as established by the US Code in compliance to (A), (B) and (C) of the section
2656f(a) of Title 22 (Department of State [USA] 2004: 1). The report should include the
activities of individuals, terrorist organizations or umbrella groups in the previous year,
as well as detailed assessments of terrorist acts that occurred in other countries. However,
the documents are more detailed than required by law (Department of State [USA] 2001).

The most well-known of these reports are both Patterns of Global Terrorism, published
until 2005, and Country Reports on Terrorism, the renewed version of the previous publi-
cation with a few variations. They are a reliable option to analyse how the US Department
of State summarizes information about terrorism and what main suggestions are made to
tackle the problem. The first report that dealt with this demand was the Patterns of Global
Terrorism, released for the first time in 1997 during President Bill Clinton administration
(1993-2001). Four editions of this series of reports were included in this study, referring
to the years 20007, 2001, 2002 and 2003, published during Bush’s administration. All four
contain specific chapters about Latin America and just one has a subsection dedicated to
the region, entitled ‘Tri-Border’8. The information about the three countries that share the
border (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay) could only be found in this section.

The 2004 report, released in April 2005 during the second term of President Bush, had
its name and format changed. The configuration of the Patterns of Global Terrorism content
and methodological approach was criticized. Since then, the most important document
about international terrorism and counterterrorism published by the US Government be-
came the Country Reports on Terrorism. Its first edition was more concise than the pre-
vious one. The new report had only 132 pages, while the average number of pages of the
Patterns of Global Terrorism editions was 200.

The 2005 edition, released on April 2006, has a new chapter, the third, entitled
‘Terrorist Safe Havens,’ that includes a subsection about the Tri-Border Area. The fifth
chapter, ‘Country Reports: Western Hemisphere,’ created sections for each country, in-
cluding Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay. Since the release of this edition, the Tri-Border
Area is officially considered a safe retreat/sanctuary/shelter for terrorism by the US
Department of State, which constitutes a way to label the region as a threat to the world.
The following passage makes a very clear association of the local Muslim community with
groups considered by the US Department of State as terrorists:

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 547

The Triborder Ar

Suspected supporters of Islamic terrorist groups, including Hizballah
and HAMAS, take advantage of loosely regulated territory and prox-
imity to Muslim communities in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay, and Foz
do Iguacu [sic], Brazil, to engage in illegal activity and illicit fund-
raising (Department of State [USA] 2006: 23).

In another edition, the relationship between the area and terrorism is more extensive-
ly portrayed. In the 2008 Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT), released in April 2009, the
Tri-Border Area is also described in a new section of the ‘Terrorist Safe Havens’ chapter, ti-
tled ‘Strategies, tactics, tools for disrupting or eliminating ‘safe havens.’ It is informed that
the US ‘remained concerned’ that both Hizballah and Hamas ‘were raising funds in the
TBA by participating in illicit activities and soliciting donations from sympathizers within
the sizable Muslim communities in the region’. However, the report admits that there was
no ‘corroborating information’ about the presence of operatives of any ‘Islamist extremist
groups’ in the Tri-Border Area, which itself is a contradiction to the statement that the re-
gion is a safe haven to terrorism (Department of State [USA] 2009: 214). Previous research
on this issue had shown that the lack of empirical research in the region and the prejudice
against the Muslim and Arab community spread this misconceived belief (Ferreira 2009:
183).

The Tri-Border Area remained in the safe havens list published in the CRT editions
of 2009, 2010 and 2011. The list also included countries like Somalia and Afghanistan,
where armed militias and gangs operate freely, something that was not seen in and around
the Tri-Border Area. Another major inconsistency is not mentioning as a safe haven the
area where the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) used to rule until
the signature of the 2017 peace agreements (Castro, 2015: 16-17). The Tri-Border Area
disappeared from the ‘Terrorist Safe Havens’ chapter list of the 2012 Country Reports
on Terrorism (CRT), released in May 2013. In this edition, the only countries of South
America mentioned are Colombia and Venezuela – in addition to the FARC – in chapter
2, ‘Western Hemisphere Overview’ (Department of State [USA] 2013: 210). The report
does not explain the reasons for excluding the Tri-Border Area from the list, where it had
been placed since 2005.

Considering the representative nature of the documents, 16 were chosen, referring
to the years between 2000 and 2015 and published in the following years, 2001 and 2016.
To isolate only what was written about the three focal countries, that is, only the excerpts
of the reports that had as titles the words Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Tri-Border
Area, accounting for the border between them, were added to the corpus. All the ex-
cerpts collected in each report were aggregated in one single segment and identified by
the year of publication. As a result, the final corpus consisted of a total of 16 segments,
each representing one year, between the years of 2000 and 2007, published during Bush’s
administration (2001-2008), and 2008 and 2015, during Obama’s (2009-2016). Therefore,

548 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

the corpus consists of Patterns of Global Terrorism (PGT) reports from 2000 to 2005 and
of CRT reports that refer to the period between 2006 and 2015.

Hybrid methods that encompass qualitative and quantitative tools can offer an ef-
fective approach to analyse this corpus. Observing a list of most frequently used words is
helpful not only to identify patterns and differences between each segment, but also be-
tween the two administrations. NVivo, the chosen software, is one of the most well-known
and widely adopted tools for this purpose. The selection of this software is due to its reli-
ability and validity. Besides, the aim of this study is also to investigate which subjects are
associated with all three countries and the border, which can also be achieved by counting
the frequency of words used in the reports.

Before running the software, words with three or fewer letters were excluded from
the analysis. Later, function words like ‘again,’ and ‘this’ were also ignored, as they would
not add useful information about the subject. Each year’s excerpts were analysed inde-
pendently by the software; the results from the most frequently used words to the least
used words were inserted in a column. The next step was to divide these words into two
different tables, referring to one of the two administrations, namely the results from the
years 2000 to 2007, corresponding to Bush’s years in office (2001-2007), and from 2008 to
2015, relating to the Obama’s administration (2008-2016).

Some of the findings were already expected. The words ‘Paraguay,’ ‘Brazil’ and
‘Argentina’ were among the five most frequent words of the whole corpus. These three
words are the names of the countries selected for this study and were also used by the
authors of the documents to name the sections of the excerpts. Consequently, these words
are not considered in the analysis. That is why the most common word detected in the
reports of both administrations is ‘terrorist.’ This word was used 92 times during the eight
years of Bush administration excerpts and 190 times in the same number of excerpts of
the Obama administration. The latter used the word ‘terrorist’ more than twice in com-
parison with the previous one, which can be considered an unexpected finding, as the
Democrat president promised to leave the War on Terror rhetoric behind. However, this
finding is aligned with other works that indicate that Obama had, in fact, restored the
previous rhetoric concerning terrorism (McCrisken 2011). The other five most frequently
employed words by Bush’s reports were ‘terrorism’ (73 times), ‘government’ (62), ‘money’
(61), ‘laundering’ and ‘united’ (56 each), as can be seen in Figure 1 (below) and Table 2
(see Appendix). During Obama’s administration, the following top words were: ‘border’
(142 times), ‘financial’ and ‘security’ (126 each), ‘money’ (121) and ‘enforcement’ (119), as
illustrated in Figure 2 (below) and Table 4 (see Appendix).

From a broader perspective, it was possible to identify the most common semantic
field in all excerpts, notably during the Obama administration: the financial one. This field
deals more specifically with terrorism financing. It may indicate that both administrations
were focusing their attention on crimes in the region related to this field. Besides, it seems
that there is an effort to make a connection between financial crimes and terrorism as the
primary focus of these documents is reporting about the latter subject. The most used
words in this category during the entire Bush administration were: ‘money’ (61 times),

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 549

Figure 1 – 100 top words during George W. Bush’s administration
found in the Patterns of Global Terrorism and

in the Country Reports on Terrorism 2000-2007 (years of reference

)

Source: Created by the author

Figure 2 – 100 top words during Barack Obama’s administration
found in the Country Reports on Terrorism 2008-2015 (years of reference)

Source: Created by the author.

550 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

which was the sixth most frequent word, ‘laundering’ (56), the seventh, ‘financial’ (45),
the tenth, and ‘financing’ (19), 26th, as shown in Table 2 (see Appendix). During Obama’s
presidency, the top financial category words were: ‘financial’ (126), ranked fifth, ‘money’
(121), sixth, ‘laundering’ (114) eighth, ‘financing’ (95), thirteenth, and ‘FATF’ (48), 23th,
which are the initials of the Financial Action Task Force. These are also presented in Table
4 (see Appendix).

As the most frequent word of the financial semantic field by both administrations was
‘money,’ the deployment of this word was closely checked. The recurrence peaked in the
2006 (17 times), 2007 (22) and 2008 (29) reports. In general, the use of ‘money’ relates to
‘laundering’ or ‘launderer.’ ‘Laundering’ is the ninth and eighth most frequent word in the
two sets of excerpts, during Bush’s (56 times) as well as in Obama’s presidency (121 times).
The first time both words are used together is in the 2001 edition of Patterns of Global
Terrorism, deployed only three times. Then, ‘laundering’ appears again six times in the
2004 report. The frequency peak of this word also occurs in the documents between 2006
and 2008, exactly as with the word ‘money.’ After that, the recurrence begins to decrease
gradually in the ranking. In 2009, ‘laundering’ was the fourth most used word (found 16
times); the seventh in 2010 (13) and in 2011 (15); the eighth in 2012 (10) and in 2013
(14); the eleventh in 2014 (9) and twelfth in 2015 (9) – as shown in Tables 1, 2, 3 e 4 (see
Appendix).

Both ‘money’ and ‘laundering’ were more used in connection with Hizballah in the
2005 and 2007 reports, editions published in April 2006 and April 2008, during the Bush
administration. This trend may have reflected a pressure against local governments in
the months of tensions and of the preparations to the attacks of Israel to Lebanon in July/
August 2006 and in Gaza in December 2008/January 2009. After these three reports, di-
rect relations between the two words and the group could not be detected in the subse-
quent documents. During Bush’s administration, the word Hizballah was the eleventh
most used, but its frequency fell during the next presidency, not reaching the top 100. As
Israel is an important US ally in the Middle East, the two conflicts may have influenced
the public demands of the US Department of State against supposed financing sources of
both Hizballah and Hamas in South America.

There are two main hypotheses to explain the US Department of State focus on finan-
cial crimes in the Tri-Border Area. The first one suggests that it is an approach to constrain
the local community from transferring money, especially to Lebanon. The US pressure to
prevent local businessmen to send money abroad to buy products or send remittances
to their families in Lebanon is expected to result in the withdraw of ideological support
to Hizballah and Hamas (Nasser 2016). The second explanation is that the US strategy
to focus on the financial sources of these groups in Latin America is closely directed by
the lack of evidence concerning the existence of terrorist cells in the region (Villa 2020).
Thus, the narrative of the Tri-Border Area as a strong source of terrorist financing would
make the region susceptible for the securitization move by making the acceptance of the
threat easier to local audiences. It seems that both explanations make sense, as they help us

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 551

understand the main advantages for the USA regarding pressuring the local communities
and governments.

After the 2004 edition, the reports related the word ‘money’ most notably to another
subject: the legislative process of bills referring to terrorism financing in the three coun-
tries’ national Congresses. It also included the enforcement of recommendations made by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and other international organizations to combat
financial crimes, especially money laundering. This finding could contradict the initial
hypothesis of an acute connection between the discourse on terrorism in the Tri-Border
Area and the Middle Eastern actors. Nevertheless, it seems that the credibility of this link
is key to secure the success of a securitization move. The need for this legislation was not
an internal urgency, but rather a probable outcome from external pressure.

The 2007, 2008 and 2009 reports, for instance, mention the lack of effort of the
Brazilian legislative to vote the anti-terrorism and anti-money laundering bills, that were
pending since 2005 (Department of State [USA] 2007: 151). In 2007 and 2008, the US
Congress discussed granting funds to the Southern Command (Ferreira 2009: 189), which
may have increased the need to justify it. On the other hand, the reports from 2010 to
2014 are more subtle regarding this subject. In 2010, the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies
passed an updated money laundering bill establishing stricter penalties, which probably
relieved the anxiety revolving around the issue. However, the 2011 document stressed
that ‘a specific terrorist financing provision was not included’ (Department of State [USA]
2011: 153).

The law that would deal with crimes related to terrorism would eventually be approved
five years later, after the World Soccer Cup of 2014 yet before the 2016 Rio Olympics.
President Dilma Rousseff signed the Law 13.260/2016 months before being impeached by
the Brazilian National Congress. The law provides procedures for freezing assets relating
to groups considered terrorists by the United Nations, such as Al Qaeda, Taliban, and
Daesh (Department of State [USA] 2016: 274). The 2014 report described it as the end
of a ‘longstanding gap in Brazil’s ability to confront terrorism financing’ (Department of
State [USA] 2015: 260). Rousseff was under the pressure of international organizations
and security experts before the Olympic Games (Rötzsch 2011), an international compe-
tition that took place in Rio de Janeiro and would attract thousands of tourists and inter-
national attention. The law introduced new investigation and procedural measures and
defined what a terrorist organization consists of (Aita 2017), but faced criticism by social
and human rights movements, as well as by the local office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (Benites 2016; Terenzi 2016). However, new arguments
were also important to overthrow old barriers against the approval of such law. The need
for protection against preparatory acts to commit a crime, for the recruiting of foreign
terrorists and incitement to terrorism, especially in social media, would receive more at-
tention than the previous arguments (France 2018: 310-311).

The reports also mention the cooperation efforts between the US authorities and local
ones. The most common partnership are special courses ‘ranging from interview and in-
terrogation techniques, terrorist financing, and money laundering investigations’ offered

552 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

by the Americans (Department of State [USA] 2014: 259). The training courses attended
by Brazilian officials are mentioned in the 2007, 2008, 2009, 2013 and 2014 reports; the
Paraguayan ones, in the 2007 and 2009 reports. There is no mention of courses taught to
Argentinian authorities. Interviews made in Foz do Iguaçu in 2018 have shown that most
of the Polícia Federal and Receita Federal top officials had taken such courses in the USA
(Castro 2020).

Not only the training courses to local police officials were important tools to imple-
ment the desired measures, but also to pressure politicians to change the legislation. The
unsteady connection between ‘money’ – one of the most used words – and Hizballah, the
term is found more attached to events concerning legislative and executive procedures
of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina, indicating a different perspective concerning the in-
terests of the US governments. It seems that the reports have a special focus on exerting
pressure for change in the three countries’ legislation concerning financial crimes relat-
ed to terrorism, as well as for requesting the adoption of the FATF recommendations.
In addition to Brazil, the two other Tri-Border countries approved new laws concerning
terrorism in the analysed period. Argentina, the only of the three countries that suffered
two terrorist attacks, had an antiterrorist law since 2000 (Aita 2017). New and reshaped
laws were added in 2007 and 2011. The most important change was the replacement of
the idea of ‘terrorist illicit association’ for ‘terrorist act’ to define the crime (Durrieu 2015;
Aita 2017). Paraguay also approved anti-terrorism laws before Brazil. The country imple-
mented new legislation in 2010 and 2011. The last one improved the capacity of the local
courts to freeze assets to meet new demands of international organizations concerning the
financial funding for terrorist groups.

Contrary to expectations, this study did not find significant use of words related to the
semantic field of unlawful activities, a subject commonly linked to the Tri-Border Area.
Words such as ‘smuggling’ and ‘illicit’ were not among the top 50 most detected words and
the word ‘drug’ was not even in the top 100 list. This consists of additional evidence that
seems to indicate that the focus of the reports was to highlight the financial activities in
the region and urge scrutiny on this particular issue by the local authorities. The overall
emphasis in the financial semantic field, as well as in the legislation concerning money
laundering, linked the region with the US interests in the Middle East in many ways.

Conclusions

The Patterns of Global Terrorism and the Country Reports on Terrorism are public docu-
ments published not only to fulfil the requirement to periodically inform the US Congress
but also to pressure other countries to adopt measures to combat the actions of terrorists
and terrorism financing even in regions such as the Tri-Border Area, where no evidences
of terrorist actions were provided. The main objective of this study has been to identify
which connections were built between terrorism and the region during the administra-
tions of Presidents Bush and Obama by analysing these documents. The main hypothe-
sis is that the dynamics of the US relations with the Middle East – especially with Iran,

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 553

Hizballah, and Hamas – direct the narratives and criticism of the reports. The findings of
this study suggest that there is a special focus on these issues, despite the lack of evidence
proving that both a link between them and the Tri-Border Area – and the need to address
other security problems in the region – exist.

The hypothesis was confirmed as we could identify some parallels between an in-
ternalist and externalist view of the securitization concept. Events that occurred in the
Middle East could be associated to the frequency rise of some words and demands. The
most striking link between the Tri-Border reports and the Middle East events was the
increased usage of the words ‘money’ and ‘laundering’ in the 2006, 2007 and 2008 reports,
released in the years 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. These documents were published
during and after the wars between Israel and Lebanon (2006) and the Gaza War (2008-
2009). The connection between the words ‘Hizballah’ and ‘money laundering’ were mostly
found in the 2005, 2006 and 2007 reports, respectively released in 2006, 2007 and 2008.

The emphasis placed on the financial semantic field by both administrations, espe-
cially on money laundering during these specific periods, may reveal a strong connection
between the interests of the US in the Middle East and the discourse about the Tri-Border
Area. Therefore, these findings indicate that there is a direct impact between what hap-
pens in the Middle East and what the US Department of State writes about this South
American frontier. However, the most striking feature of this rhetoric is the missing link
that would prove that illegal money from the Tri-Border Area is financing terrorist acts.
The focus on the repetition of the accusations against the three countries may be a way
to hide the lack of this important piece of evidence that should be displayed by the US
Department of State. It may be used to promote the view that Hizballah is an international
terrorist group that operates in other parts of the world rather than a local defence militia
against Israeli offensives in Lebanon.

Likewise, the frequent mentions of legislative procedures concerning antiterrorism
bills show that there is a consistent interest of the securitizing actor in making this con-
nection to securitize the Tri-Border Area. Countries such as Brazil and Paraguay, which
had no recent problems with terrorism, approved anti-terrorist laws that were not raised
by popular demand, but rather, by an external pressure. The Brazilian law was voted and
approved months before the arrival of foreign tourists to the Rio Olympic Games to com-
ply with the security concerns from countries such as USA and Israel. The Brazilian and
Paraguayan national Congresses can be seen as audiences that accepted the need for spe-
cial measures to combat the terrorist threat, but both took actions inside the normative
framework. It is not possible to determine that the direct pressure of the securitizing ac-
tors resulted in this movement. Rather, this was probably one of the dynamics that pro-
moted the approval of the new measures.

On the other hand, it can be argued that Argentina had enough reasons to implement
new laws tackling terrorist acts, as the country was the target of two bombings in the
1990s. However, most of these laws were approved more than a decade after the Buenos
Aires attacks and years following September 11th, that is, only in 2007 and 2011. This
fact may also imply that other kinds of pressures or contexts were more decisive to the

554 vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 Castro

implementation of the new legislation. Other actors such as FATF and internal forces may
have helped to increase the tension and to approve such laws in the three countries. That is
why we may assume that there was also a security movement, but it is likewise not possible
to trace connections only and directly to a specific US demand.

What the study clarifies is that there were continuous securitizing movements during
most of these 16 years of documents. These were not completely successful in Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay, as the measures were taken inside the normal bounds of political
procedure, despite the fact that most of these laws took more than a decade to be ap-
proved. A further study could reveal the impacts of anti-terrorism laws, like the ones ap-
proved in the three countries. It would also help us to understand why these were so
important to the US Department of State discourse. If the debate is to be moved forward,
a better understanding of the use of these new laws is also suggested, especially to verify
if they made requests to facilitate the acceptance of the extradition of foreign residents by
local courts. New outcomes in the securitization of the Tri-Border Area may also develop
soon, as both Argentina and Paraguay recently declared Hizballah a terrorist group, and
as the Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro announced in August 2019 his intention to follow
suit. The benefits or the inconveniences of these decisions are also yet to be disclosed.

Not

1 For example, the September 11th attacks are in the 2001 edition of the Patterns of Global Terrorism,
published in 2002. The edition of the Country Report on Terrorism that refers to the last year of Obama’s
administration, namely 2016, was published in 2017, during the first year of Donald Trump’s presidency.
Therefore, this one is not included in this corpus.

2 In this article, we spell Hizballah in the same format the PGT and CRT reports do. Yet, when we quote other
authors who use a different spelling like Hezbollah e Hizbullah, their choice is respected.

3 Four days after filing the complaint, Nisman was found dead with a gunshot wound to the head, in
suspicious circumstances.

4 Nisman’s complaint was not accepted by the tribunal, even after an appeal made by a new prosecutor.
5 In 2001, SIDE changed its name to Secretaría de Inteligencia (SI), but it was still viewed as too attached

to the old military regime. In 2015, President Cristina de Kirchner dismissed SI and created the Agencia
Federal de Inteligencia following the death of Nisman. She claimed that the act was a ‘debt to democracy’
(Iñurrieta 2015).

6 It refers to Brazil, Sudan, Yemen and Malaysia – countries to which he travelled before the attacks.
7 The report referred to the year 2000, the last year of the Clinton administration which was also included

because it was published on 30 April 2001, during Bush’s first year as a president. The same measure was
taken concerning the next president: the report referred to the year 2008, period in which Bush was still
president; it was included in the analysis as belonging to the Obama administration, as it was published in
2009, after he took office.

8 The designation Tri-Border Area is found in the Patterns of Global Terrorism reports as Tri-Border or
Triborder. In this paper, it is reproduced as it is written in these documents.

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 555

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Acknowledgemen

I would like to thank Rafael Duarte Villa, Janina Onuki, Thiago Babo, Ignacio Cardone, Micael
Alvino da Silva, Marcelino Teixeira Lisboa, Mamadou Alpha Diallo and Heloisa Marques Gimenez
for the comments and suggestions regarding a previous version of this paper and the two peer re-
viewers. This study was funded by FAPESP. Grants numbers: 2016/12824-6 and 2018/06825-5.

About the author

Isabelle Christine Somma de Castro is a FAPESP Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department
of Political Science at the University of São Paulo (USP). She is a member of the Center
for Research of International Relations (Nupri-USP), the National Institute of Science and
Technology for Studies of the USA (INCT-Ineu) and the Triple Frontier and International
Relations Research Center (GTF/Unila). She holds an M.A. and a Ph.D. from the University
of São Paulo (USP). She was a visiting student at the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern
Studies at the University of Cambridge with a Capes fellowship and a visiting Scholar in
the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, with
a FAPESP fellowship.

http://www.trans-move.com/Books/Files/ltifhy4voinlgfxjawdjgsqw_132857216

https://www.perfil.com/noticias/politica/amia-el-segundo-juicio-contra-telleldin-avanza-a-paso-lento.phtml

http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title50/chapter56&edition=prelim

The Securitization of the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay vol. 42(3) Sep/Dec 2020 559

A Securitização da Tríplice Fronteira entre
Argentina, Brasil e Paraguai

Resumo: O objetivo deste estudo é identificar as principais características do dis-
curso dos EUA em relação à Tríplice Fronteira entre Argentina, Brasil e Paraguai
através da análise de 16 edições dos relatórios Patterns Global Terrorism e Country
Reports on Terrorism, publicados entre 2001 e 2016. A teoria da Securitização é apli-
cada para explicar o uso dos atos de fala como movimentos para securitizar a região.
Depois de utilizar o NVivo para medir a frequência das palavras, pôde ser observada
uma forte ligação entre a ascensão do campo semântico financeiro e os confrontos
no Oriente Médio. Também pôde ser observado que os relatórios revelam uma ên-
fase especial em relação à legislação sobre terrorismo nos três países mencionados.

Palavras-chave: Tríplice Fronteira; securitização; análise de conteúdo; terrorismo;
George W. Bush; Barack Obama.

Received on 14 October 2019 and approved for publication on 13 July 2020.

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

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17
Br

az
ili

an
(

30
)

in
te

rn
at

io
na

l
11

ac
ti

vi
ti

es
(

5)
le

ga
l

18
ag

ai
ns

t
(2

Is
la

m
ic

ad
dr

es
s

se
cu

ri
ty

su
pp

or
t

(2
9)

CR
T

20
05

CR
T

20
06

CR
T

20
07

To
ta

l
Bu

la
un

de
ri

ng
ef

fo
rt

s
st

at
es

19
bo

rd
er

(
28

)

Pa
ra

gu
ay

an
ex

tr
ad

it
io

n
10

an
ti

(
6)

se
cu

ri
ty

(
28

)

po
lit

ic
al

gr
ou

ps
ar

ea
su

sp
ec

te
d

(2
8)

se
cu

ri
ty

in
te

rn
at

io
na

l
Br

az
ili

an
20

co
nt

in
ue

d
(2

su
sp

ec
te

d
re

gi
on

fo
rc

e
po

lic
e

(2
6)

10
ac

ti
vi

ty
(

3)
12

ba
nk

(
4)

11
ac

ti
on

(
5)

Tr
i-

bo
rd

er
(

26
)

ag
re

ed
ce

nt
ra

l
cu

st
om

s
21

en
fo

rc
em

en
t

(2
5)

au
th

or
it

ie
s

co
nc

er
ne

d
Hi

zb
al

la
h

in
te

lli
ge

nc
e

(2
5)

Ba
ra

ka
t

en
fo

rc
em

en
t

le
gi

sl
at

io
n

22
ex

tr
ad

it
io

n
(2

bo
m

bi
ng

fin
an

ci
ng

tr
ai

ni
ng

23
ill

ic
it

(
22

)

Br
az

ili
an

go
ve

rn
m

en
ts

re
m

ai
ne

d
(2

ca
pa

bi
lit

ie
s

gr
ou

p
24

Ba
ra

ka
t

(2
1)

ef
fo

rt
s

in
cl

ud
in

g
of

fic
ia

ls
(

21
)

en
fo

rc
em

en
t

in
di

vi
du

al
s

25
ef

fo
rt

s
(2

FA
RC

in
st

it
ut

io
ns

Pa
ra

gu
ay

an
(

20
)

fo
rc

es
in

te
lli

ge
nc

e
26

fin
an

ci
ng

(
19

)

im
pl

em
en

t
No

ve
m

be
r

in
cl

ud
in

g
(1

in
te

lli
ge

nc
e

re
fo

rm
le

ga
l (

19
)

m
ee

ti
ng

su
sp

ec
te

d
27

ar
re

st
ed

(
18

)

op
er

at
io

na
l

un
de

r
au

th
or

it
ie

s
(1

te
rr

or
is

m
un

it
co

un
tr

ie
s

(1
8)

un
de

r
gr

ou
p

(1
8)

un
it

So
ur

ce
: C

re
at

ed
b

y
th

e
au

th
or

Ta
bl

e
3

–
Co

un
tr

y
Re

po
rt

s
on

T
er

ro
ri

sm
2

00
8-

20
12

: M
os

t
fr

eq
ue

nt
w

or
ds

b
y

ye
ar

o
f

re
fe

re
nc

CR
T

20
08

CR
T

20
09

CR
T

20
10

CR
T

20
11

CR
T

20
12

1
m

on
ey

(
29

)
1

t
er

ro
ri

st
(

23
)

1
te

rr
or

is
t

(3
0)

1
te

rr
or

is
t

(2
8)

1
Br

az
il

(2
4)

2
la

un
de

ri
ng

(
28

)
2

Br
az

il
(1

8)
2

Br
az

il
(2

3)
2

Br
az

il
(2

5)
2

te
rr

or
is

t
(2

3
Br

az
il

(2
6)

3
Ar

ge
nt

in
a

(1
7)

3
bo

rd
er

(
21

)
3

Ar
ge

nt
in

a
(2

3
Pa

ra
gu

ay
(

18
)

4
Pa

ra
gu

ay
(

25
)

4
bo

rd
er

(
16

)
4

Ar
ge

nt
in

a
(1

)
po

lic
e

(2
0)

4
fin

an
ci

al
(

16
)

5
bo

rd
er

(
24

)

un
de

ri
ng

(
16

)
5

Pa
ra

gu
ay

(
16

)
4

Pa
ra

gu
ay

(
18

)
5

Ar
ge

nt
in

a
(1

6
te

rr
or

is
t

(2
3)

m
on

ey
(

16
)

6
en

fo
rc

em
en

t
(1

4)
5

fin
an

ci
al

(
17

)
en

fo
rc

em
en

t
(1

7
st

at
es

(
18

)
5

Pa
ra

gu
ay

(
15

)
7

go
ve

rn
m

en
t

(1
3)

6
Ar

ge
nt

in
e

(1
6)

se
cu

ri
ty

(
15

)

un
it

ed
(

18
)

6
Br

az
ili

an
(

14
)

la
un

de
ri

ng
(

13
)

m
on

ey
(

16
)

6
bo

rd
er

(
13

)

8
Ar

ge
nt

in
a

(1
4)

go
ve

rn
m

en
t

(1
4)

m
on

ey
(

13
)

7
la

un
de

ri
ng

(
15

)
7

go
ve

rn
m

en
t

(1
1)

fin
an

ci
al

(
14

)
7

fin
an

ci
al

(
12

)
8

te
rr

or
is

m
(

12
)

8
bo

rd
er

(
14

)
re

gi
on

al
(

11
)

9
fin

an
ci

ng
(

13
)

fin
an

ci
ng

(
12

)
9

FA
TF

(
11

)
go

ve
rn

m
en

t
(1

4)
8

Ar
ge

nt
in

e
(1

go
ve

rn
m

en
t

(1
3)

8
po

lic
e

(1
1)

fin
an

ci
al

(
11

)
9

fin
an

ci
ng

(
13

)
Co

un
te

rt
er

ro
ri

sm
(

10
)

10
ar

ea
(

12
)

9
gr

ou
p

(1
0)

fin
an

ci
ng

(
11

)
10

Br
az

ili
an

(
12

)
la

un
de

ri
ng

(
10

)

Br
az

ili
an

(
12

)
10

ar
ea

(
9)

gr
ou

p
(1

)
11

en
fo

rc
em

en
t

(1
1)

m
on

ey
(

10
)

co
un

te
rt

er
ro

ri
sm

(
12

)
Ar

ge
nt

in
e

(9
)

10
Br

az
ili

an
(

10
)

se
cu

ri
ty

(
11

)
po

lic
e

(1
0)

11
ac

ti
vi

ti
es

(
11

)
en

fo
rc

em
en

t
(9

)
11

Ar
ge

nt
in

e
(9

)
12

FA
TF

(
9)

9
in

te
rn

at
io

na
l (

po
lic

e
(1

1)
11

in
te

lli
ge

nc
e

(8
)

po
lic

e
(9

)
in

te
rn

at
io

na
l (

9)
10

Br
az

ili
an

(
8)

2
en

fo
rc

em
en

t
(1

0)
te

rr
or

is
m

(
8)

12
Ar

ea
(

8)
re

gi
on

al
(

9)
co

nt
in

ue
d

(8
)

gr
ou

p
(1

0)
tr

ai
ni

ng
(

8)
In

te
rn

at
io

na
l (

8)
tr

ai
ni

ng
(

9)
fin

an
ci

ng
(

ill
ic

it
(

10
)

un
it

ed
(

8)
12

ac
ti

vi
ti

es
(

)
13

Am
er

ic
an

(
8)

te
rr

or
is

m
(

re
gi

on
(

10
)

12
ac

ti
vi

ti
es

(
7)

as
se

ts
(

7)
co

nt
in

ue
d

(8
)

11
co

op
er

at
io

n
(7

)

te
rr

or
is

m
(

10
)

gr
ou

ps
(

7)
gr

ou
ps

(
7)

cr
im

es
(

)
cr

im
es

(
7)

CR
T

20
08

CR
T

20
09

CR
T

20
10

CR
T

20
11

CR
T

20
12

13
co

nt
in

ue
d

(9
)

ill
ic

it
(

7)
re

la
te

d
(7

)
Oc

to
be

r
(8

)
FA

TF
(

14
dr

ug
s

(8
)

re
gi

on
(

7)
tr

ai
ni

ng
(

7)
14

ar
ea

(
7)

gr
ou

p
(7

)

fe
de

ra
l (

8)
st

at
es

(
7)

13
Co

af
(

6)
co

nt
ro

l (
7)

12
de

pa
rt

m
en

t
(6

)

gr
ou

ps
(

8)
13

an
ti

(
6)

co
op

er
at

io
n

(6
)

gr
ou

p
(7

)
m

em
be

r
(6

)

Hi
zb

al
la

h
(8

)
co

nc
er

ne
d

(6
)

co
un

te
rt

er
ro

ri
sm

(
6)

le
gi

sl
at

io
n

(7
)

m
em

be
rs

(
6)

in
te

lli
ge

nc
e

(8
)

co
un

te
rt

er
ro

ri
sm

(
6)

fin
an

ce
(

6)
re

la
te

d
(7

)
13

ac
ti

on
(

se
cu

ri
ty

(
8)

cu
st

om
s

(6
)

fu
nd

s
(6

)
st

at
e

(7
)

al
le

ge
d

(5
)

15
Ar

ge
nt

in
e

(7
)

13
do

cu
m

en
t

(6
)

le
gi

sl
at

io
n

(6
)

14
te

rr
or

is
m

(
7)

13
bi

la
te

ra
l (

co
nc

er
ne

d
(7

)
fe

de
ra

l (
6)

Pa
ra

gu
ay

an
(

6)
15

ac
ti

on
(

6)
bo

rd
er

s
(5

)

tr
ai

ni
ng

(
7)

se
cu

ri
ty

(
6)

re
gi

on
al

(
6)

au
th

or
it

ie
s

(6
)

co
af

(
5)

16
an

ti
(

6)
14

ag
ai

ns
t

(5
)

Se
pt

em
be

r
(6

)
co

op
er

at
io

n
(6

)
cr

ea
te

d
(5

)

bi
ll

(6
)

Co
ng

re
ss

(
5)

sm
ug

gl
in

g
(6

)
ef

fo
rt

s
(6

)
ef

fo
rt

s
(5

)

co
ng

re
ss

(
6)

co
nt

ra
ba

nd
(

5)
st

at
es

(
6)

fo
rc

e
(6

)
ex

pl
os

iv
e

(5
)

cr
im

e
(6

)
dr

ug
s

(5
)

un
it

ed
(

6)
pr

og
ra

m
(

6)
fin

an
ce

(
5)

ef
fo

rt
s

(6
)

ef
fo

rt
s

(5
)

ta
sk

(
6)

fo
rc

e
(5

)

es
ta

bl
is

he
d

(6
)

fr
au

d
(5

)
in

fo
rm

at
io

n
(5

)

go
od

s
(6

)
go

od
s

(5
)

le
gi

sl
at

io
n

(5
)

in
cl

ud
in

g
(6

)
in

cl
ud

in
g

(5
)

m
in

is
tr

y
(5

)

in
te

rn
at

io
na

l (
6)

in
te

rn
at

io
na

l (
5)

si
nc

e
(5

)

Ju
ly

(
5)

st
at

e
(5

)

op
er

at
io

ns
(

5)
sy

st
em

(
5)

Pa
ra

gu
ay

an
(

5)
ta

sk
(

th
re

e
(5

)

So
ur

ce
: C

re
at

ed
b

y
th

e
au

th
or

Ta
bl

e
4

–
Co

un
tr

y
Re

po
rt

s
on

T
er

ro
ri

sm
2

01
3-

20
15

: M
os

t
fr

eq
ue

nt
w

or
ds

b
y

ye
ar

o
f

re
fe

re
nc

e
an

d
to

p
w

or
ds

d
ur

in
g

Ob
am

a’
s

ad
m

in
is

tr
at

io
n

CR
T

20
13

CR
T

20
14

CR
T

20
15

To
ta

l
O

ba
m

1
se

cu
ri

ty
(

24
)

1
Br

az
il

(2
9)

1
Br

az
il

(3
3)

1
Br

az
il

(1
99

)

2
en

fo
rc

em
en

t
(2

2)
2

se
cu

ri
ty

(
28

)
se

cu
ri

ty
(

29
)

2
te

rr
or

is
t

(1
90

)

3
Br

az
il

(2
1)

3
te

rr
or

is
t

(2
3)

2
te

rr
or

is
m

(
26

)
3

Pa
ra

gu
ay

(
15

4
Ar

ge
nt

in
a

(2
0)

t
er

ro
ri

sm
4

Pa
ra

gu
ay

(
21

)
3

Pa
ra

gu
ay

(
22

);
te

rr
or

is
t

4
Ar

ge
nt

in
a

(1
42

)

;
bo

rd
er

5
te

rr
or

is
t

(1
9)

5
fin

an
ci

al
(

20
);

bo
rd

er
4

bo
rd

er
(

20
);

en
fo

rc
em

en
t

5
fin

an
ci

al
(

12
6)

; s
ec

ur
it

6
fin

an
ci

al
(

17
)

6
Ar

ge
nt

in
a

(1
9)

5
Br

az
ili

an
(

19
);

fin
an

ci
al

6
m

on
ey

(
12

7
m

on
ey

(
16

)
Pa

ra
gu

te
rr

or
is

m
(

18
);

en
fo

rc
em

en
t

6
Ar

ge
nt

in
a

(1
8)

; c
ou

nt
er

te
rr

or
is

m
7

en
fo

rc
em

en
t

(1
19

)

8
bo

rd
er

(
14

);
go

ve
rn

m
en

t;
la

un
de

ri
ng

Br
az

ili
an

(
16

)
7

fin
an

ci
ng

(
16

)

;
in

te
rn

at
io

na
l;

po
lic

e
8

la
un

de
ri

ng
(

11
4)

9
in

te
rn

at
io

na
l (

12
)

8
in

te
rn

at
io

na
l (

12
);

go
ve

rn
m

en
t;

co
un

te
rt

er
ro

ri
sm

;

g
ro

up
8

go
ve

rn
m

en
t

(1
5)

9
te

rr
or

is
m

(
10

10
cr

im
es

(
11

);
fin

an
ci

ng
; p

ol
ic

e
9

fin
an

ci
ng

(
11

);
m

on
ey

; p
ol

ic
e

9
co

nt
in

ue
d

(1
3)

; g
ro

up
; s

ta
te

10
go

ve
rn

m
en

t
(1

06
)

11
Ar

ge
nt

in
e

(1
0)

; B
ra

zi
lia

co
nt

in
ue

d;
r

eg
io

na
l

10
co

nt
in

ue
d

(1
0)

; s
ta

te
10

de
pa

rt
m

en
t

(1
2)

11
Br

az
ili

an
(

10
1)

12
al

le
ge

d
(9

);
co

un
te

rt
er

ro
ri

sm
;

st
at

e
11

cr
im

es
(

9)
; l

au
nd

er
in

g;
le

gi
sl

at
io

pr
og

ra
m

; r
eg

io
na

l
11

co
op

er
at

io
n

(1
0)

; m
on

ey
;

Pa
ra

gu
ay

an
12

po
lic

e
(9

13
ag

en
ci

es
(

8)
;

FA
TF

; k
ill

ed
;

le
gi

sl
at

io
n;

m
em

be
rs

12
FA

TF
(

8)
12

ag
ai

ns
t

(9
);

in
fo

m
at

io
n;

un
de

ri
ng

; r
eg

io
na

l
13

fin
an

ci
ng

(
95

)

14
m

ili
ta

ry
(

7)
13

ac
ti

on
(

7)
; f

or
ce

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a_1_A_iii

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on

Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa
By Mahmut Cengiz, PhD and Huseyin Cinoglu, PhD

Abstract

Africa has become a haven for jihadist terrorist organizations that
run the gamut from local groups fighting to avenge political and
economic grievances to splinter groups affiliated with the Islam-
ic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or al-Qaeda. Jihadist groups that
left Syria and moved into the Sahel region of Africa after ISIS was
defeated have only increased the threat of terrorism in the region.
The organizational structure of these groups has made efforts to
counter their operational capacity extremely difficult. While some
of these groups, such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, are organi-
zationally independent, others, such as ISIS and Qaeda affiliates,
are organizationally dependent and rely on either a hub-spoke or
an all-channel group structure. The leaders of these dependent
groups seek the endorsement of or assignments from the group to
which they are affiliated. The results of this study show that orga-
nizationally dependent groups target military and state institutions
exclusively and perpetrate fewer terrorist incidents than other ji-
hadist organizations in the region.

Keywords: al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Africa, organization struc-
ture, organizational models, al Qaeda, ISIS franchises, JNIM

Los impactos de la estructura organizativa en los
grupos terroristas salafistas yihadistas en África

Resumen

África se ha convertido en un refugio para las organizaciones
terroristas yihadistas que van desde grupos locales que luchan para
vengar agravios políticos y económicos hasta grupos disidentes
afiliados al Estado Islámico en Irak y Siria (ISIS) o al-Qaeda. Los
grupos yihadistas que abandonaron Siria y se mudaron a la región
africana del Sahel después de que ISIS fuera derrotado solo han
aumentado la amenaza del terrorismo en la región. La estructura

doi: 10.18278/ijc.9.1.5

International Journal on Criminology • Volume 9, Number 1 • Winter 2022

International Journal on Criminology

organizativa de estos grupos ha hecho extremadamente difíciles
los esfuerzos para contrarrestar su capacidad operativa. Si bien
algunos de estos grupos, como Boko Haram y Al-Shabaab, son in-
dependientes desde el punto de vista organizativo, otros, como los
afiliados de ISIS y Qaeda, son dependientes desde el punto de vista
organizativo y se basan en una estructura de grupo central o de
todos los canales. Los líderes de estos grupos dependientes buscan
el respaldo o las asignaciones del grupo al que están afiliados. Los
resultados de este estudio muestran que los grupos organizativa-
mente dependientes se dirigen exclusivamente a las instituciones
militares y estatales y perpetran menos incidentes terroristas que
otras organizaciones yihadistas de la región.

Palabras clave: al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, África, estructura orga-
nizativa, modelos organizativos, al Qaeda, franquicias ISIS, JNIM

组织架构对非洲萨拉菲-圣战主义恐怖集团产生的影响

摘要

非洲已成为圣战主义恐怖组织的避风港，这些组织的规模范
围包括从“为报复政治不满和经济不满而战”的地方集团，
到与伊斯兰国（ISIS）或基地组织有关联的小集团。离开叙
利亚，并在伊斯兰国被击败后进入非洲撒哈拉区域的圣战分
子集团仅仅增加了该地区的恐怖主义威胁。这些集团的组织
架构让那些对抗其操作能力的举措变得极为困难。尽管例如
博科圣地和索马里青年党等集团在组织上是独立的，然而，
伊斯兰国和基地组织分支等却在组织上具有依赖性并且需要
轴辐式或全方位的集团架构。这些非独立集团的领导试图获
取其所属集团的支持或任务。本研究得出的结果表明，依靠
组织的集团专门以军事组织和国家组织为目标，并且比该区
域其他圣战组织参与更少的恐怖主义事件。

关键词：索马里青年党，博科圣地，非洲，组织架构，组织
模型，基地组织，伊斯兰国分支，“支持伊斯兰与穆斯林”
组织（JNIM）

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

Introduction

Counterterrorism efforts in the world have failed to stem the tide of bomb-
ings and killings that contribute to the roughly 8,000 terrorist incidents
each year that various databases have documented.1 Efforts to transform

terrorist breeding grounds by crushing and containing the groups’ operatives and
leaders, destroying their defenses, delegitimizing their standing among members
and sympathizers, and implementing diversion tactics2 have been to no avail, as
many terrorist groups bounce back from disruptive events, survive intact, and in-
crease their attacks. Recent discussions on terrorist organizations have focused
on the longevity and resilience of these groups and what is contributing to their
increasing capacity to cause devastative harm and destruction.

Africa is one of the major hot spots for terrorist organizations. National and
multinational military efforts have been no match for the resilience of Al-Qae-
da and ISIS-affiliated groups on the continent. In 2019, for example, countries in
Africa endured roughly 3,500 terrorist attacks—double the number of militant ji-
hadist-group attacks—in 2013.3 The attacks were perpetrated by dozens of groups
operating in 14 countries4 and resulted in the death of 10,000 people. Terrorism
trends in Africa indicate that salafi-jihadist5 groups that left Syria have sought ref-
uge in African countries, mostly in the Sahel region.

Al-Qaeda’s focus on localization and ISIS’s focus on expansion through loose
ties with clusters of like-minded individuals gave birth to multiple affiliated groups
whose members made their way to and reconstituted their intergroup structure
in Africa. Some of these groups—such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab—have
declared loyalty to and are ideologically affiliated with either al-Qaeda or ISIS,
but have not forsaken their independence. Other groups pledge their allegiance
to and are organizationally dependent on and under the command of either ISIS
(e.g., ISIS-West Africa Province and ISIS-Greater Sahara Province) or Al-Qaeda
(e.g., Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin). This study
compares two groups of dependent terrorist organizations (i.e., one ISIS and one
al-Qaeda-affiliate groups) and one group of independent terrorist organizations

1 According to the Global Terrorism Trends and Analysis Center (GTTAC) database, the number of
terrorist incidents was 8,093 in 2018 (Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terror-
ism 2018, p. 5); Global Terrorism Database (GTD, 2019) reported it as 7,553.

2 Gaines and Kremling, Homeland Security and Terrorism, 136.
3 African Center for Strategic Studies, “Threat from African Militant Islamist Groups Expanding, Di-

versifying.”
4 Ibid.
5 Salafi jihadism reflects the strict interpretation of the Qur’an and the Hadiths and seeks to advocate

for Islamic ideological goals by violent means. According to Maher, “there are five essential and
irreducible features of the Salafi Jihadi movement: tawhid [the unity of God], hakimiyya [sover-
eignty], al-wala’ wa-l-bara’ [loyalty and disavowal], jihad and takfir [excommunication, declaring
someone an unbeliever].” Maher, A History of Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea, 13-14.

International Journal on Criminology

(i.e., Boko Haram and al-Shabaab) in terms of number of attacks, fatality rate,
target type, group-leader ascension, and intergroup structures.

Organizational Structure in Terrorist Groups

Terrorist groups simultaneously operate under two basic organizational
structures: intragroup and intergroup. The intragroup structure represents
how group members are connected to each other inside the group, while

the intergroup structure reflects how different groups are networked to each other.
The models used within those structures vary from one terrorist group to anoth-
er. For example, some terrorist groups refine the basic structure with what one
researchers calls chain networks; all-channel networks; and star, hub, or wheel net-
works.6 Williams and Godson describes the refinement in terms of five models:
market, enterprise, cultural, ethnic network, and social network,7 whereas Taylor
and Swanson identify six organizational models: lone wolf, cell, network, hierar-
chical, umbrella, virtual model.8

Other researchers prefer the terms bureaucracy, hub-spoke, all-channel, and
market to describe the organizational structure of terrorist groups. Groups with a
bureaucratic structure have “clear departmental boundaries, clear lines of authori-
ty, and detailed reporting mechanisms.” 9 Hezbollah is an example of a bureaucratic
structure because each department in the group has its own specialization.10

Groups with a hub-spoke structure have a central actor to whom members
must go before communicating with others in the group.11 This type of group
structure includes franchises.12 Groups affiliated with ISIS are examples of the
hub-spoke group structure. According to the U.S. State Department’s 2018 Annex
of Statistical Information, ISIS has affiliates13 in 26 countries, including groups
such as ISIS-Khorasan in Afghanistan, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah in Indonesia, and
ISIS-West Africa in Nigeria, Niger, and Chad.14 The group leader in these and oth-
er hub-spoke terrorist organizations do not have central command and control.

6 Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, 264.
7 Williams and Godson, Anticipating Organized and Transnational Crime, 2002.
8 Taylor and Swanson, Terrorism, Intelligence & Homeland Security, 143.
9 Joshua, “A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure.”
10 Ranstorp, “Hizbollah’s Command Leadership: Its Structure, Decision‐Making and Relationship

with Iranian Clergy and Institution.”
11 Arquilla and Ronfeldt Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy.
12 Joshua, “A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure,” 813.
13 The U.S. State Department’s Annex of Statistical Information defines affiliated group as “pledging

allegiance, declaring loyalty, breaking away from the group but still linked by finance, communi-
cations, technical, HR, or being a splinter/offshoot organization” (Annex of Statistical Information
Country Reports on Terrorism, 2018, 5).

14 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, 5 & 6.

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

Groups with an all-channel structure are loosely organized around a lead-
er with no central control and no functional differentiation among the group’s
members. Tupamaros15 and Irish Republican Army are examples of the all-chan-
nel group structure because members of the group operate as cells of an umbrella
organization. The all-channel model also is applicable to umbrella terrorist groups,
where several terrorist groups convene and form a big incorporating group. Ter-
rorist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda16 also operate under an all-channel struc-
ture. These groups are aligned with the larger Al-Qaeda organization.

Groups that use a market structure have no distinct leadership or function-
al differentiation.17 They are decentralized and symbolize classic leaderless resis-
tance.18 American militia groups, such as Sovereign Citizens, and violent Amer-
ican domestic groups, such as the Ku Klux Klan, are examples of market group
structure.

At least one study has found that the organizational structure a terrorist
organization chooses to adopt depends on both external variables (e.g., per-capita
gross domestic product, freedom house, and polity durability) and internal vari-
ables (e.g., hard-target selection, group goals, and type of terrorist group).19 The
study finds that, while wealthy and democratic states host terrorist groups with
a decentralized structure, poor and autocratic states host terrorist groups with a
centralized structure.20 The study also finds that religious groups are more likely
to be decentralized and have an all-channel or hub-spoke group structure.21 Reli-
gious groups that adopt instead a bureaucratic structure have one or more of the
following features: a nationalist element, participation in state politics, and opera-
tions in a weak or failed state.22

Jihadist groups primarily adopt bureaucratic structures for their intragroup
administration, a preference that arises from their Islamic ideology. It is an ideol-
ogy that requires subordinates to obey their leader. The result is a leader-oriented
and top-down hierarchical group structure. The leaders of such groups, therefore,
frequently stress the importance of obeying the caliph and caliphate in their public
and private rhetoric.

15 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 231.
16 According to the U.S. State Department’s Annex of Statistical Information (p. 5), Al-Qaeda had

affiliated groups in 15 countries. These groups include, for example, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Syria
and Laskhar-e Tayyiba in India and Pakistan.

17 Powel, “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization,” Research in Organization-
al Behavior, 297.

18 Beam, “Leaderless Resistance.”
19 Joshua, K., “A Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure,” 814-817.
20 Ibid., 823.
21 Ibid., 824.
22 Ibid., 824.

International Journal on Criminology

When it comes to intergroup relations, jihadist groups’ loyalty is less uni-
form. Some jihadist groups pledge allegiance to groups that are more powerful
and more popular their own, while some are linked ideologically only to popular
groups. In either case, the jihadist groups do not change their group structure, and
the leader of each group operates independently. Other jihadist groups, however,
not only pledge allegiance ideologically but also link themselves organizationally
to the more popular group. The result is a dependent intergroup structure where
the leader of smaller group is under the command of the larger group to which the
smaller group chose to affiliate.

Independent Organizational Models:
Al-Shabaab and

Boko Haram

The groups in this category are not organizationally under the command of
any other large group, although they may declare loyalty to the larger. For
example, Al-Shabaab has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, while Boko Ha-

ram has pledged allegiance to ISIS.

al-Shahaab

Terrorist groups flourish in areas where the state lacks the means to oust the groups,
and counterterrorism efforts have been ineffective.23 Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mu-
jahideen or, simply Al-Shabaab (i.e., “The Youth”), is a salafi-jihadist group that
arose from the remnants of a failed state and now operates in the Horn of Africa.24
With aspirations of becoming a regional and global leader, the organization’s head,
Ahmed Abdi Godane, opened the doors to international jihadists in 2009, causing
internal strife within the group. To quell the uproar, Godane declared loyalty to
al-Qaeda and killed his rivals.25

al-Shabaab has an independent intergroup structure and a bureaucratic and
hierarchical intragroup structure comprised of several units under a central lead-
er. A 10-member cabinet provides guidance and council to the leader. A shura
majlis, or consultative council, comprised of junior amirs, serves under the group’s
leader. Al-Shabaab also has regional political and military representatives (such
as those for Bay and Bokool and for South-Central Somalia and Mogadishu) who
are free to engage in independent actions without the approval of the shura. Three
sub-amir from the shura majlis oversee the Politics Division, the Media Division,
and Military Operations. 26

23 Piazza, “Do Democracy and Free Markets Protect Us from Terrorism?”
24 White, Terrorism and Homeland Security, 168 & 169.
25 Ibid., 170.
26 Shuriye, “Al-Shabaab’s Leadership Hierarchy and Its Ideology.”

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

In Somalia, al-Shabaab has pioneered a subject network model that uses
ethnic, historical, and religious dynamics to create an elastic network. Thanks to
this model, the organization benefits from the weaknesses of the failed Somalian
government and the elusive against counterterrorism efforts of United States and
the Western world.27

al-Shabaab is the most active terrorist group in Africa, being the perpetra-
tor of 535 attacks and killing 3,585 people in 2018.28 The group mostly targets So-
mali military, police, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (a regional peace-
keeping mission operated by the African Union with the approval of the United
Nations) as well as government buildings, government officials, and civilians. It
operates in south and central Somalia. A small group of al-Shabaab members op-
erates in the Bari region of Puntland state. In 2018, al-Shabaab used weapons that
ranged from firearms and explosives to melees and incendiary devices.29 Armed
assault is the primary mode of the attack and includes bombings, assassinations,
and suicide attacks. For example, al-Shabaab was involved in 51 assassinations and
conducted 33 terrorist attacks in 2018.30 That same year, the group also targeted
foreigners in the country, killing a U.S. service member and wounding others in
an attack in Lower Jubba.31 In another attack, al-Shabaab fired mortars at a Turkish
military base in the Somali capital, Mogadishu.32

al-Shabaab has numerous leaders who are tasked by the organization to at-
tack Western targets.33 The group also has targeted Kenya after the Kenyan gov-
ernment joined international forces seeking to counter al-Shabaab. Until then,
al-Shabaab had maintained a close relationship with Kenyan Muslims who had
provided logistical support to the organization.34 The al-Shabaab group based in
Kenya increased its attacks there in late 2019, killing three Americans at an air-
base, striking schools, and killing civilians.35

The organization’s independent bureaucratic structure has made al-Sha-
haab the most effective terrorist organization in the region—especially when the
effectiveness of a terrorist organization is measured in terms of media and political
attention, impact on the media audience, the ability to force concessions, the dis-
ruption of normal routines, and the ability to provoke the host state to overreact.36

27 Allen, “Al-Shabaab and the Exploitation of the Subject Network Model.”
28 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism, 2018, 9.
29 Ibid., 15
30 Ibid., 12.
31 UPI, “U.S. Service Member Killed in Al-Shabaab Attack in Somalia.”
32 Grada World, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab Fires Mortars at Turkish Military Base in Mohadishu.”
33 Allen, “Al-Shabaab and the Exploitation of the Subject Network Model.”
34 White, J., Terrorism and Homeland Security, 170.
35 National Public Radio, “In Kenya, A Rise in Attacks by Islamist Al-Shabaab Insurgents.”
36 Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, 281 & 282.

International Journal on Criminology

Indeed, al-Shabaab was the terrorist group that the U.S. media covered the most
in 2018.37

Boko Haram

The group Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, also known as Boko
Haram, is a salafi-jihadist group that operates in northern Nigeria. The organi-
zation believes that politics have been seized by corrupt Muslims and therefore
it must create a pure Islamic state ruled by sharia law.38 Among terrorist groups
worldwide in 2018, Boko Haram ranked fourth for the number of terrorist in-
cidents committed that year. It also was the second most violent group in 2018
with a worldwide fatality rate of 5.9639 and, at 17% was ranked first in terms of
the percentage of attacks that involved bombers.40 The group was the perpetrator
of many notable attacks. In March 2012, for example, Boko Haram burnt down
12 schools in one night and forced 10,000 pupils out of education.41 In 2014,
the group kidnapped more than 250 schoolgirls42 and, in 2018, kidnapped 104
schoolgirls.43 Unlike Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (in northwestern part of
Africa and in West Africa) and Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram is not bent on targeting
Western interests.44 Its victims in 2018, for example, were predominantly civilians
and military personnel.45

In its early years, Boko Haram maintained a decentralized and fluid lead-
ership structure under its founder and leader, Salafist-trained Muhammad Yusuf.
Intermediaries in the group, however, shared a common ideology and a transna-
tional agenda.46 After Yusuf was executed, Abubakar Shekau took the leadership
reins and radicalized the organization. The group had two other significant and
authoritative leaders: Maman Nur (ideological leader) and Khalid al-Barnawi (op-
erational leader).47 Nur, a Cameroonian, introduced Shekau to Yusuf and was third
in command under Yusuf ’s leadership. Nur led Boko Haram temporarily in 2009
when Yusuf was killed and Sheaku was imprisoned.48 The inhumane killing of
Muslims by some members of Boko Haram incensed Nur and others in the group.

37 Timmons and O’shea, “What Makes a Terrorist Attack Notable? Determinants of U.S. Media Cov-
erage”

38 Walker, “What Is Boko Haram.”
39 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, 9.
40 Ibid., 13.
41 Walker, “What Is Boko Haram,” 6.
42 Zenn, “Boko Haram and Kidnapping of Chibok Schoolgirls.”
43 Abubakar, “Boko Haram 104 of 110 Kidnapped Schoolgirls.”
44 Walker, “What Is Boko Haram,” 9.
45 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, 18.
46 Zenn, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria.”
47 Zenn, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria.”
48 Counterextremism Project, “Mamman Nur.”

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

Some of the opponents defected and formed Ansaru, which operated mostly in
Chad and Cameroon.49

Boko Haram relies on a bureaucratic and hierarchical organizational
structure.50 The leader, at the top of the organizational pyramid, sets goals and
has final authority over all decisions and actions. Under the leader are well-or-
ganized layers and cells that support the organizational structure: two deputies;
a 30-member Shura council (which supervises state and local operational com-
manders and strategists and variety of operational cells). Other responsibilities of
the council include overseeing the group’s internal support and external publicity,
terrorist missions, and financial acquisitions. All of the operational command-
ers and strategists operate independently to maintain the confidentiality of the
group’s activities. Courier messengers are used for direct and confidential com-
munication.51

Boko Haram also has a permeable group structure akin to that of two other
jihadist groups: Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Ansaru (in
Nigeria). Boko Haram and Ansaru eschewed rivalries between their two groups
because they wanted to avoid unnecessary strife and because some militants have
undertaken operations for both groups.52 Likewise, Boko Haram and ISWAP do
not target each other.

Dependent Group Models

Unlike jihadist groups that pledge ideological allegiance but retain their or-
ganizational structure, some terrorist groups change their organizational
structure after declaring loyalty to a larger group. These smaller groups

then become dependent on the larger group and lose the ability to choose their
leader. Instead, the leader of the larger group assigns a leader to the affiliated
groups. Jihadist groups in this category adopt either a hub-spoke or an all-channel
organizational structure.

Hub-Spoke Groups in Africa: ISIS and Its Franchises

Western leaders say that ISIS has been defeated in Iraq and Syria because the ter-
rorist group has lost its territories; however, it is too early to speak about victory
over ISIS. According to the United States 2018 Annex of Statistical Information
report, ISIS is second only to the Taliban in terms of the number of terrorist inci-
dents committed.53 The ISIS franchise in Afghanistan, ISIS-Khorasan, is the 10th

49 White, 166 & 167.
50 Stratfor Global Intelligence “Nigeria: Examining Boko Haram.”
51 Ibid.
52 Zenn, “Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria.”
53 ISIS perpetrated 647 terrorist incidents, resulting in the death of 3,585 people and the wounding

1,791 others (Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, 9).

International Journal on Criminology

most active terrorist group and the most lethal group with a fatality rate of 12.65.54
The report also emphasizes that ISIS is the most prevalent terrorist group in the
world with franchises in 26 countries.55 These franchises operate on provincial
basis and they are loyal to the organization’s “core,” and its Caliph.56

ISIS had become a popular organizational model for other jihadist groups
for three main reasons: First, the group was able to control territory in Iraq and
Syria. Second, the group had the capacity to direct terrorist attacks in the Mid-
dle East and inspire self-radicalized individuals to carry out attacks in their home
countries. Third, ISIS won groups in many regions of the world through being
pledged allegiance or declared loyalty to itself, which ISIS treated them as the
group’s provinces.57 These franchises have presented credibility and created per-
ception on how ISIS is a globalized organization, after the organization lost its
power in the territories in Iraq and Syria. 58

Groups that want to join ISIS or become an ISIS franchise must have terri-
torial authority in a specific country or region and be willing to alter their internal
organizational structure and strategic decision-making processes to meet the de-
mands of ISIS. 59 In return, ISIS provides tactical support to its provincial affiliates.
For example, ISWAP received media equipment and tactical support for up-ar-
mored suicide vehicles used to transport improvised explosives devices.60

ISIS has an impact on the organizational structure on its provincial fran-
chises in a number of ways. For example, the group assigns leaders to its affiliates,
orders the foot soldiers of those affiliates to join the organization (as it did with
ISWAP), and requires its provincial leaders to support a more moderate theolog-
ical leadership approach.61 ISIS also uses its influence and authority to give orders
to its provincial leaders. For example, ISIS ordered the execution of two female
workers for a Muslim nongovernmental organization in 2018.62 As of March 2020,
ISIS recognized eight provinces in Africa, taking advantage of ongoing conflicts
and exploiting economic and political grievances of the people in those areas, as
shown in Figure 1.

54 ISIS-Khorasan killed 1,278 people in 101 incidents (Annex of Statistical Information Country Re-
ports on Terrorism 2018, 9).

55 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, 9.
56 Zenn, “The Islamic State’s Provinces on the Peripheries Juxtaposing the Pledges from Boko Haram

in Nigeria and Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group in the Philippines.”
57 Ibid., 87.
58 Ibid., 87.
59 Ibid., 88.
60 Ibid., 92.
61 Ibid., 93.
62 Ibid., 93.

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

Figure 1: ISIS and Its Franchises in Africa

ISIS Provinces in Sahel

Extremist groups are gaining strength in the Sahel region of Africa, an area in
Africa between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian Savanna to the south, de-
spite U.S.-led military operations, drone strikes, and efforts by the governments in
the region. Since 2015, the extremist groups have doubled and perpetrated more
than 700 violent episodes in 2019 alone.63 ISIS-West Africa and ISIS-Greater Saha-
ra are two ISIS provinces operating in the Sahel region of Africa.

ISIS West Africa was formed in 2016 by defectors of Boko Haram and oper-
ates primarily in Nigeria and the Lake Chad region with 5,000 fighters.64 Boko Ha-
ram leader Sheaku pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2015, but Sheaku’s indiscriminate
violence targeting Muslims (and anyone outside of the group65) prompted the ISIS
leadership to replace Sheakau with Mus’ab al Barnawi in 2016.66 Like ISIS-core,
Barnawi favored a more “hearts and minds” approach that called for targeting
collaborators and military forces.67 ISIS-West Africa perpetrated 22 terrorist inci-
dents in 2018, resulting in the death of 160 individuals.68 Boko Haram, meanwhile,

63 Gramer, “U.S. to Ramp Up Counterterrorism Efforts in Sahel Region.”
64 State of New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness, “ISIS West Africa Posturing for

Prolonged Insurgency.”
65 Reuters, “Islamic State Ally Stakes Out Territory around Lake Chad.”
66 Iaccino, “ISIS Replaces Abubakar Shekau with New Boko Haram Leader Abu Musab al-Barna-

wi.”
67 Sundiatapost, “Al-Barnawi Faction and Nigeria’s Timeless Boko Haram War.”
68 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, 5.

International Journal on Criminology

continued to target civilians indiscriminately. Those attacks helped to make Boko
Haram one of top five terrorist groups in terms of the number of civilian victims
in 2018.69 ISIS-West Africa, on the other hand, was more discriminating, targeting
Christian civilians and bypassing Muslim civilians.

ISIS-Greater Sahara came to prominence in 2015 when al-Mourabitoun,
a group affiliated with al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to ISIS.70 The group operates
primarily in Mali and has claimed responsibility for attacks such as the killing of
four U.S. soldiers and five Nigerian soldiers in Tongo region. The U.S. State De-
partment subsequently designated al-Mourabitoun as a terrorist organization.71
The size of the group fluctuates between 200 and 300 militants.72

ISIS Provinces in the Northern Theater

ISIS’s provincial franchises in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt perpetrated 347 terrorist
incidents in 2019, up slightly from 345 incidents in 2018.73 Libya is a failed state
where conflicts are occurring at the local, regional, and national levels.74 The coun-
try has teetered on the brink of collapse amid deteriorating security and increased
lawlessness since Muammar Qadhafi was ousted in October 2011.75 Qaddafi’s
strongholds were transformed into bases for ISIS and, of the foreign jihadists Lib-
ya hosted, most of them joined ISIS groups that had come into the country from
Tunisia in Libya.76 ISIS-Libya emerged in Derna, a port city in eastern Libya, in
2014 when a group of 300 former Libyan members of the Battar Brigade returned
to their country after fighting in Syria and allied with the Ansar al-Sharia terrorist
group. Immediately after Ansar al-Sharia pledged its allegiance to ISIS leader Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, ISIS recognized and announced the formation of three branch-
es of the Islamic State in Libya.77 While the number of ISIS attacks in Libya has de-
creased since 2014, the terrorist organization still holds a presence in the country,
targeting checkpoints and urban police stations and kidnapping local notables for
potential prisoner exchanges or ransom.78

Unlike Libya, Tunisia successfully transitioned to democracy after the Arab
Spring in the early 2010s. Tunisia, however, has the largest contingent of foreign

69 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018, 18.
70 Warner, “The Islamic State’s Three New African Affiliates.”
71 Department of State, “State Department Terrorist Designations of ISIS in the Greater Sahara.”
72 Warner and Hulme, “The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the

Continent.”
73 African Center for Strategic Studies, “Threat from African Militant Islamist Groups Expanding,

Diversifying.”
74 Engel, “The Islamic State’s Expansion in Libya.”
75 Engel, “Libya as a Failed State: Causes, Consequences, and Options.”
76 Kahlaoui, “What Is Behind the Rise of ISIS in Libya?”
77 Engel, “The Islamic State’s Expansion in Libya.”
78 Inga, “Islamic State in Libya: From Force to Farce,” 25.

https://ctc.usma.edu/sub-saharan-africas-three-new-islamic-state-affiliates/

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

fighters in Iraq and Syria.79 According to the Tunisian government, around 3,000
Tunisians80 have fought in Iraq and Syria for ideological and economic reasons
and to support the expansion of the Salafist movement in both countries.81 The
ISIS-Tunisia branch emerged in 2015 when the group was involved in attacks in
Sousse, Tunisia, including the targeting of the Bardo Museum.82 ISIS-Tunisia has
maintained its capacity to carry out attacks in the country, where the group exe-
cuted two suicide attacks in 2019.83

In Egypt, which also hosts many jihadist terrorist groups, most of the attacks
by these groups have occurred in the northern Sinai area. ISIS-Sinai was to blame
for 320 terrorist attacks between 2013 and 2017.84 This ISIS franchise originated
from the Sunni Salafist Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) terrorist group that declared
war against the Egyptian government immediately after the ouster of President
Mohamed Morsi in a July 2013 military coup.85 ABM emerged in 2011 when the
government collapse created power vacuums in northern regions of the country.
ABM had a loose affiliation with al-Qaeda in its early years and was designated as a
terrorist group by United States in 2014.86 In 2014, ABM pledged allegiance to ISIS
and began using the name of ISIS-Sinai. Since then, ISIS-Sinai has grown into the
most coordinated and most operationally effective terrorist group in Egypt.87 Many
of the group’s attacks in Egypt have been quite notable. For example, ISIS-Sinai has
claimed responsibility for the bombing of a Russian Metrojet flying out of Sharm
El-Sheikh, an Egyptian resort town between the desert of the Sinai Peninsula and
the Red Sea.88 ISIS-Sinai has been referred to as one of the most resilient ISIS fran-
chises because the group has survived intact despite many years heavy fighting with
the Egyptian military. 89 That resiliency can be attributed at least in part to its weap-
onry, which the group receives through illegal weapons transfers from Libya.90

ISIS-Somalia

The origin of the ISIS’s Somalian franchise dates to 2012 when Al-Shabaab assigned

79 Lounnas, “The Tunisian Jihad: Between Al-Qaeda and ISIS.”
80 Raghavan, “No Nationality Heeded the Call to Come Fight for ISIS Like Tunisians Did. Now

They’re Stuck.”
81 Counter Extremism Project, “Tunisia: Extremism & Counterextremism.”
82 Jane’s Defense Weekly, “Islamic State Attack on Ben Guerdane Indicates Shift in Group’s Tuni-

sia Strategy, to Trigger Insurgency.”
83 Counter Extremism Project, “Tunisia: Extremism & Counterextremism.”
84 World Data, “Terrorism in Egypt.”
85 AIPAC, “ISIS in the Sinai Peninsula.”
86 Gomez, “Islamic State-Sinai Province: What Is the ISIS-Linked Terrorist Group?”
87 Gomez, A., “Islamic State-Sinai Province: What Is the ISIS-Linked Terrorist Group?”
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Mazel, “ISIS in Sinai: The Libyan Connection.”

International Journal on Criminology

Abdul Qadir Mumin to operate in its remote outpost in Puntland in northeastern
Somalia. Mumin took control of the Puntland group in 2014 immediately after
the Al-Shabaab regional group leader defected to the government. Mumin left al-
Shabaab and began to consider himself an independent terrorist. He pledged alle-
giance to ISIS in 2015. 91 ISIS-Somalia has around 150 members.92 Similar to other
ISIS franchises, ISIS-Somalia primarily targets military troops and Al-Shabaab
fighters. In 2018 and 2019, Several clashes between Al-Shabaab and ISIS-Somalia
occurred in 2018 and 2019.93

ISIS-Central Africa

ISIS-Central Africa emerged in 2017 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
when militants from a new brand of the rebel group Allied Democratic Forces
(ADF) known as the City of Monotheism and Monotheists leaned towards ISIS.
The ADF is an Islamist group that has fought against the governments of the DRC
and Uganda for several years.94 The group recently adopted symbols similar to
those of global jihadists groups.95 Given the poorly equipped and formless struc-
ture of ADF, some scholars believe that it is not realistic to believe that an ISIS
province exists in the Central African region.96 Other scholars point out that the
leader of ISIS announced in 2018 that it did have a provincial group in the region97
and that ISIS claimed responsibility for several attacks in the DRC in 2019. In one
of those attacks, eight soldiers were killed.98

ISIS-Mozambique

Mozambique’s experience with violence by Islamic extremists began when Al Sun-
na wa Jama’ah (ASWJ)99 popped up in the eastern part of the country in 2017.
Referred to by locals as al-Shabaab, the group’s grievances included dissatisfaction
with widespread poverty and inequality, frustration over the government’s inef-
fective policies for addressing those issues, and the expansion of Salafist ideology
with support from the Gulf States in the form of funding for mosques, social pro-
grams, and young students who wanted to study abroad and propagate Wahhabi
Islam. The rising influence of Wahhabism led to conflict with Sufi Muslims in the
country, resulting in the death of 300 people and the displacement of thousands

91 Warner, “Sub-Saharan Africa’s Three ‘New’ Islamic State Affiliates.”
92 Browne, “U.S. Airstrikes Kills ISIS-Somalia’s Second in Command.”
93 Weiss, “Islamic State Claims Clashes with Shabab in Somalia.”
94 West, “Has Islamic State Really Entered the Congo and Is an IS Province There a Gamble?”
95 Congo Research Group, “Inside the ADF Group.”
96 West, “Has Islamic State Really Entered the Congo and Is an IS Province There a Gamble?” 9.
97 Weiss, “Islamic State-Loyal Group Calls for People to Join the Jihad in the Congo.”
98 Wembi and Goldstein, “ISIS Claims First Attack in the Democratic Republic of Congo.”
99 Postings, “Islamic State in Mozambique Further Complicates Cabo Delgado Violence.”

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

of others. By 2019, the terrorist group Al Sunna emerged and was acknowledged
by ISIS as one of its affiliates. Similar to other ISIS provincial franchises, Al Sunna
selectively targeted military troops.100

All-Channel: Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM)

Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) is an example of an all-chan-
nel network operating in the Maghreb (in the northwestern part of Africa)
and West Africa. JNIM was formed by the merger of four Al-Qaeda organiza-

tions: Ansar Dine, the Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun, and the Saharan
branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), as shown in Figure 2.101 The
group has between 1,000 and 2,000 members and is active in Mali, Burkina Faso,
and Nijer.102

Figure 2: The Formation of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

JNIM became an official branch of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb and West Af-
rica after four of the group’s leaders declared loyalty to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman
al Zawahiri in 2017.103 Zawahiri welcomed the affiliation as it helped to fulfill his
organization’s localization policies. Inspired by the formation of Hay’at tahrir al
Sham, which was created from the merger of Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Syria,
Zawahiri sought to expand Al-Qaeda’s influence with a network of allied terror-
ist groups. Unlike ISIS, which continued to create loose ties with its franchises,

100 Chua, “Challenges within Mozambique.”
101 Buchanan, “Mali: Terror Threat Spreads after Sahel Groups Join Forces.”
102 Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin.”
103 Gaffey, “African Jihadi Groups Unite and Pledge Allegiance to Al-Qaeda.”

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ansar_Dine

International Journal on Criminology

Al-Qaeda focused on shoring up its roots in the locations where the group histor-
ically has been active.104

Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine, became the leader of the merged
terrorist organization. Ghaly believed that group unity serves multiple purposes,
such as strengthening the jihadist cause, expanding the influence of Al-Qaeda,
making the group insurmountable by Western forces, and preventing ISIS’s at-
tempts to attract potential defectors.105 The structural reorganization of JNIM was
influenced by three Al-Qaeda’s policies in Sahel. First, Al-Qaeda policy prohib-
its members of merger groups from leaving the Al-Qaeda network to join a rival
group. The policy was necessary because when members left, they tended to join
ISIS. Second, Al-Qaeda policy requires that all members maintain the organiza-
tion’s ethno-political dynamics espoused by Ghaly, who had become the symbol
for the nomadic Tuareg people. The Tuareg people make their home across the Sa-
hara Desert, including in the North African countries of Mali, Niger, Libya, Alge-
ria, and Chad. Third, Al-Qaeda policy calls for seizing opportunities to invigorate
insurgency in the region.106

Similar to ISIS franchises in Africa, JNIM acts like a state and primarily
targets national and multinational posts and soldiers.107 In a video released by
JNIM in 2018, al-Qaeda leader Zawahiri gave a speech about how he targeted
multinational forces in Mali. Zawahiri explained that JNIM targeted the airport in
Timbuktu, Mali, wounding United Nations peacekeepers and French soldiers.108
The group, however, tries to avoid the targeting of civilians. When a landmine
accidentally killed civilians in central Mali in September 2019, JNIM expressed its
condolences and apologies and promised to compensate the victims’ families.109

Discussion

Table 1 shows how affiliation with either ISIS or Al-Qaeda affects the or-
ganizational structure of terrorist groups in Africa. Al-Shabaab and Boko
Haram are examples of groups that are organizationally independent. Their

leaders are not assigned by the groups to which they declare their loyalty. All of the
other groups listed in the table are examples of groups that are organizationally de-
pendent. For its organizationally dependent structure, Al-Qaeda uses an all-chan-
nel arrangement because its policies focus on the localization operations. ISIS, on

104 Perkins, “Local vs. Global – Al-Qaeda’s Strategy for Survival.”
105 Joscelyn, “Analysis: Al-Qaeda Groups Reorganize in West Africa.”
106 Zelin, “Jihadist Groups in the Sahel Region Formalize Merger.” Jihadology.
107 Wikipedia listed the incidents that were perpetrated by JNIM between 2017 and 2019. Wikipedia

Database, “Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin.”
108 The Defense Post, “Mali Militants Disguised as Peacekeepers Attack French and U.N. Bases Killing

One, Injuring Dozens.”
109 Long War Journal, “JNIM Apologizes for Killing Civilians in Central Mali.”

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

the other hand, prefers a hub-spoke organizational structure because it allows for
the creation of provincial groups that remain connected to the larger organization.
The hub-spoke and the all-channel organizational structures have been beneficial
to not only the larger organizations but also their affiliates. For example, the lead-
ers of some of the affiliates are endorsed by and allowed to continue in that role
(i.e., beneficial to the affiliate), while the leaders of other affiliates are appointed
by the larger organization (i.e., beneficial to the larger organization). More impor-
tantly, though, affiliate groups that are part of a hub-spoke or an all-channel net-
work work to implement the strategies of the larger organization (i.e., beneficial to
the larger organization).

Table 1: Description of the Organizational Structure of Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist
Groups in Africa

Group

Organization
to Which
the Group Is
Affiliated Country of Operation

Organizationally
Inter-Group
Structure

Leader
Assigned by
the Group
Affiliated to?

Al-Shabaab Al-Qaeda Somalia Independent No
Boko Haram ISIS Nigeria Independent No
JNIM Al-Qaeda Mali and Burkina

Faso
Dependent-All-
Channel

Yes

ISIS-Sinai ISIS Egypt

Dependent-Hub-
spoke

Yes

ISIS-Greater Sahara ISIS Mali and Burkina
Faso

Dependent-Hub-
spoke

Yes

ISIS-West Africa ISIS Sahel Dependent-Hub-
spoke

Yes

ISIS-Somalia ISIS Somalia Dependent-Hub-
spoke

Yes

Table 2 uses data from the U.S. State Department’s 2019 Annex of Statistical
Information110 to show how an affiliated terrorist group’s organizational depen-
dence on Al-Qaeda or ISIS affects the operational capacity of the affiliated group.
The number of terrorist attacks made by organizationally independent groups are
incomparably higher than the number of attacks made by organizationally depen-
dent groups. The large gap stems from who and what the groups target. Organiza-
tionally independent groups (e.g., Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram) are indiscriminate in
their choice of targets, while organizationally dependent groups (e.g., ISIS-Sinai,
ISIS-Greater Sahara) are discriminate (i.e., selective) in their choice of targets. For
example, organizationally dependent groups may choose to target only national or
multinational military forces, collaborators, or Christian civilians, while organiza-

110 Annex of Statistical Information Country Reports on Terrorism 2018.

International Journal on Criminology

tionally independent groups will target anything or anyone. Because dependent af-
filiates such as ISIS-Greater Sahara and ISIS-West Africa, are under the command
of ISIS (with its dependent structure), they act if they are part of a state and adhere
to a “hearts and minds” policy that prohibits the targeting of Muslim civilians. Ex-
amples include the ISIS-Greater Sahara and JNIM, which targets only national and
French military forces in Mali. Discriminate targeting results in fewer attacks. In
2018, for example, JNIM made only a handful of terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups
that operate under a hub-spoke or all-channel organizational structure, therefore,
typically perpetrate fewer terrorist attacks than terrorist groups operate under an
independent organizational structure.

Table 2: The impacts of organizational structure on the operational capacity of
jihadist groups

Group

Organization
to Which
the Group Is
Affiliated

Number of
Incidents
Perpetrated Target Type

Total
Number
of Deaths Fatality Rate

Al-Shabaab Al-Qaeda 535 Indiscriminate 2,062 3.85
Boko Haram Al-Qaeda 220 Indiscriminate 1,311 5.

JNIM Al-Qaeda 26 Discriminate 121 4.65
ISIS-Sinai ISIS 56 Discriminate 485 8.66
ISIS-Greater Sahara ISIS 18 Discriminate 79 4.39
ISIS-West Africa ISIS 22 Discriminate 160 7.27
ISIS-Somalia ISIS 17 Discriminate 27 1.70

When it comes to the number of casualties at the hands of dependent and
independent groups, no distinctive pattern emerges. Given that it may be riskier
and more difficult to target national and multinational military forces, the high
fatality rates from attacks by ISIS and Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups indicate that
members of both terrorist organizations are well-trained and capable of inflicting
heavy losses among their targets. ISIS-affiliated groups, however, have higher fa-
tality rates than Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups.

Conclusion

Salafi-jihadist groups continue to pose a grave threat to countries in all parts of
the world either from the formation of new jihadist groups or the evolution
of local Muslim groups into jihadist groups. Africa has been exposed to these

trends more than any other region. A number of groups affiliated with al-Qaeda
or ISIS have operated in Africa today. The debate continues over what has created
a favorable environment for these jihadist groups to flourish in Africa and how
these groups have been able to increase their resilience, longevity, and operational

The Impacts of Organizational Structure on Salafi-Jihadist Terrorist Groups in Africa

capacity. Organizational structure plays a key role in the groups’ rise and impene-
trability to government efforts to defeat them; therefore, it is essential that govern-
ment officials understand how terrorist groups structure their organizations and
how those structures can inform effective counterterrorism strategies.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS have changed their strategies since they first appeared
on the world stage. Al-Qaeda, for example, switched to an all-channel structure
that involves the use of affiliated terrorist groups in keeping with its policy of lo-
calization. These affiliated groups, however, are allowed to remain organizationally
dependent. ISIS, on the other hand, switched to a hub-spoke structure to expand
its reach through loose ties with affiliate terrorist groups that become organiza-
tionally dependent on the terrorist organization to which they have pledged their
allegiance. This study concludes that terrorist organizations that use a hub-spoke
or an all-channel structure commit fewer terrorist attacks compared with terror-
ist organizations who remain organizationally independent (al-Shaabab and Boko
Haram). This conclusion also is based on the observation that ISIS adheres to a
“hearts and minds policy” that requires the organization to target only nation-
al and multinational military forces—unlike al-Shaabab and Boko Haram, which
chooses its targets indiscriminately. Further research is needed to analyze the ef-
fects of group structure in a global context.

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What drives terrorism and why? The psychology and behavior of those committing violent acts is a key focus of counterterrorism initiatives. It is important to recognize that there is no single global definition for terrorism, nor are terrorists confined to a single group or ideology. To terrorism researchers who study the salience of terrorism and its importance to citizens, terrorism equates to sending messages beyond the direct victims, and causing low-probability, high-impact threats (de Roy van Zuidewijn & Sciarone, 2019). The content and framing of terrorism through media coverage has transnational impacts. Social media has been described as a battlefield and a global stage where terrorists communicate and spread their propaganda, reach potential recruits, and maintain a level of online anonymity (Schneider, 2021). At times, terrorists successfully commit acts of enormous shock and surprise. A focusing event, like a terrorist attack of the magnitude of the September 11 attacks, is defined to be sudden, relatively rare, and inclusive of violence that is aimed to inflict harm or suggest future harms (de Roy van Zuidewijn & Sciarone, 2019). The excessive costs of terrorism that result from public fears and actions of policy makers who implement countermeasures helps to drive the goal of reducing the “glory of terrorism” and treating terrorists like criminals (Mueller & Stewart). The Institute for Economics and Peace (2021) publishes the annual Global Terrorism Index showing trends and country ratings with respect to terrorism activity. The European Union (EU) through its Radicalisation Awareness Network focuses on local levels for upstream pre-emptive interventions and counters radicalisation by a strategy to prevent terrorism before an attack occurs, protect, pursue, and respond (Melhuish & Heath-Kelly, 2022). Facing similar challenges, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization use complementary yet different resources to combat hybrid threats and utilize military, political, and economic measures aimed at creating an effective global defense (Olech, 2021). De-radicalization or efforts to change radical ideologies to non-radical ones require governments to be accountable so that implemented measures do not violate such human rights as freedom from fear, or loss of life and property (Praba, 2020). Although the EU has drafted and proposed Terrorist Content Regulation to censure social media platforms, U.S. government regulation of terrorist online propaganda contends with First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of the press (Schneider, 2021). The most frequent targets of US domestic terrorism are the government, military, and police regardless of the perpetrator’s ideology and association to a particular social movement, whereas other targets include businesses, and individuals who have specific racial, ethnic, religious, or political affiliations (Jones, 2022).

References

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Institute for Economics and Peace (2021, June 8). Global terrorism index 2020: Measuring the impact of terrorism. Retrieved January 31, 2023, from https://www.reliefweb. int/report/world/global-terrorism-index-2020-measuring-impact-terrorism

Jones, S. (2022, February 17). The evolution of domestic terrorism. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep39859

Mueller, J., & Stewart, M. (2021), Terrorism and bathtubs: Comparing and assessing the risks. Terrorism and Political Violence, 33(1), 138-163. https:/doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1530662

Melhuish, F., & Heath-Kelly, C. (2022). Fighting terrorism at the local level: The European Union, radicalisation prevention and the negotiation of subsidiarity. European Security, 31(2), 313–333. https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2021.2009458

Olech, A. (2021, March 17). Cooperation between NATO and the European Union against hybrid threats with a particular emphasis on terrorism. Institute of New Europe. Retrieved January 31, 2023, from https://www.ine.org.pl/en/cooperation-between-nato-and-the- Links to an external site.european-union-against-hybrid-threats-with-a-particular-emphasis-on-terrorism/

Praba, D. (2020). De-radicalization and guidance for criminal acts of terrorism in India. Ganesha Law Review 2(1), 37-43. https://doi.org/10.23887/glr.v2i1.118

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43. The legal response of the Organization of
American States in combating terrorism
Mirko Sossai

1 INTRODUCTION

The initiatives taken by the Organization of the American States (OAS), presently comprised
of 35 member states, to counter the manifestations of terrorist violence in the Americas can
be divided into three main periods. The first historical phase culminated with the adoption
by a Conference of foreign ministers in 1971 of the Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts
of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion that are of
International Significance (1971 OAS Convention),1 in response to the multiple episodes of
kidnapping of diplomats by revolutionary groups to obtain political concessions from govern-
ments.2 The paradigmatic example was the kidnapping and murder of Count Karl Von Spreti,
the West German Ambassador to Guatemala, in 1970. In line with the crime-specific approach
taken by the universal counter-terrorism treaties of that time, the 1971 OAS Convention
accordingly sought to safeguard certain protected persons.

The adoption of that international legal instrument was characterized by polarized positions
among the OAS member states. While some delegations favoured a more comprehensive
treaty instead of one covering a specific issue, others feared that its provisions would infringe
excessively on state sovereignty. As a result, only a narrow majority of states voted in favour
of the Convention and signed it.3 Although the agreement was deemed to be ineffective due
to both the ambiguities of its provisions and its lack of support, one should not underestimate
its influence, as it served as the model for the subsequent 1973 United Nations Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons (1973 UN
Convention).4 The criticism levelled against the 1971 Convention also reflected the complexi-
ties of the political scenario in South America at that time and the delicate problem of the legal
classification of violence committed by irregular armed groups opposing the military regimes
in power in various countries.5

1 OAS Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against
Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, adopted 2 February 1971, 194
UNTS 1438 (entered into force 16 October 1973) (1971 OAS Convention’).

2 See C Baumann, The Diplomatic Kidnappings: A Revolutionary Tactic of Urban Terrorism
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

3 R Brach, ‘The Inter-American Convention on the kidnapping of diplomats’ (1971) 10 Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 392.

4 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, adopted 14 December 1973, 167 UNTS 1035 (entered into force 20 February 1977)
(‘Internationally Protected Persons Convention’).

5 See M Baker, ‘The South American legal response to terrorism’ (1985) 3 Boston University
International Law Journal 67.

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The end of the Cold War inaugurated a fresh perspective, at both the universal and regional
levels, on terrorist activities now condemned as criminal acts ‘in any circumstance unjusti-
fiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them’.6 The Summit of the Americas
in 1994 is the starting point of the second phase of the OAS response to terrorism. The heads
of state and government stressed that acts of terrorism constituted ‘a systematic and deliberate
violation of the rights of individuals and an assault on democracy itself’.7 Two specialized
conferences on terrorism were convened in 1996 in Peru and two years later in Argentina. In
particular, the Commitment of Mar del Plata recommended the creation of the Inter-American
Committee on Terrorism (CICTE) ‘for the development of cooperation to prevent, combat,
and eliminate terrorist acts and activities’.8

On the same day of the attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, an
extraordinary meeting of the OAS General Assembly was taking place in Lima for the adop-
tion of the Inter-American Democratic Charter. The OAS General Assembly issued a state-
ment condemning the terrorist acts, which emphasized ‘the need to strengthen hemispheric
cooperation to combat this scourge that has thrown the world and the hemispheric community
into mourning’.9 A crucial step was accomplished ten days later on 21 September 2001. The
OAS Foreign Affairs Ministers, acting as an organ of consultation under the Inter-American
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the ‘Rio Treaty’),10 classified the terrorist attacks against the
US as ‘attacks against all American states’,11 in accordance with Article 3 of the Rio Treaty,
which refers to the right to collective self-defence pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter.
A further resolution on ‘strengthening hemispheric cooperation to prevent, combat and elimi-
nate terrorism’ was approved, which paved the way for the negotiation of a new anti-terrorism
convention and for the revitalization of the CICTE.12 As a result of intense negotiations, the
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism was adopted and opened for signature by the
OAS General Assembly in June 2002 and has been ratified by 24 of 35 member states.13

The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the contribution of the OAS to the development
of the international legal framework against terrorism, particularly as regards the content of
the obligations to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, including in their criminal aspects. The

6 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, UN General Assembly Res 51/210 (17 December
1996), art I(2).

7 OAS, First Summit of the Americas: Plan of Action (9–11 December 1994); see M Scalabrino,
‘Fighting against international terrorism: The Latin American response’, in Andrea Bianchi (ed.),
Enforcing International Law Norms Against Terrorism (Hart, 2004) 163.

8 OAS, Commitment of Mar del Plata, Second Inter-American Specialized Conference on Terrorism
(24 November 1998).

9 General Assembly of the OAS, ‘Statement from the OAS General Assembly’ (Press Release,
E-005/01, 11 September 2001).

10 The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, adopted 9 February 1947, 21 UNTS 77
(entered into force 12 March 1948).

11 OAS Meeting of Consultation of Ministers Foreign Affairs, ‘Terrorist Threat to the Americas’
OEA/Ser.F/II.24, RC.24/RES.1/01 (21 September 2001).

12 OAS Meeting of Consultation of Ministers Foreign Affairs, ‘Strengthening Hemispheric
Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism’ OEA/ Ser.F/II.23, RC.23/RES.1/01 (21
September 2001).

13 Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, opened for signature 6 March 2002, OAS Treaty
A-66 (entered into force 10 July 2003) (‘2002 Inter-American Convention’).

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legal response of the OAS to terrorism also needs to be situated within the framework of the
Inter-American system for the promotion and the protection of human rights, itself a creation
of the OAS, including the role played by the Inter-American Commission (IACHR) and Court
(IACtHR).

2 THE OBLIGATIONS TO PREVENT ACTS OF TERRORISM

One of the most important achievements of the 1971 OAS Convention was its imposition
on states of an explicit obligation to prevent the use of their territories for the preparation of
terrorist acts to be carried out in the territory of another state. The content of this obligation,
found in Articles 8(a) and (b) of the Convention, was substantially reproduced by the 1973 UN
Convention and constituted the model for the subsequent anti-terrorism conventions.

As recognized by the International Law Commission, the obligation to prevent the specific
offences defined in the 1973 Convention codified ‘the well-established principle of inter-
national law that every State must ensure that its territory is not used for the preparation of
crimes to be committed in other States’.14 Interestingly, the obligations of prevention under the
1971 OAS Convention were twofold: not only to take measures to suppress the preparation
of the crimes in their territories, but also to exchange information and to take administrative
measures for the purpose of protecting the relevant persons. By providing that contracting
states must ‘take all measures within their powers, and in conformity with their own laws’,
the OAS Convention seems to imply that a due diligence standard of conduct is required and
is therefore equivalent to the requirement under the later universal anti-terrorism conventions
to take ‘all practicable measures’ to prevent terrorism.15 Such formulations leave states free to
determine the most appropriate measures to adopt on the basis of ‘their particular experience
and requirements’.16

More emphasis on prevention and much more specific obligations characterize the 2002
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism, adopted in the wake of 9/11. Articles 4, 5 and
6 are devoted to the fight against the financing of terrorism, while Article 7 provides that states
parties shall cooperate ‘in order to improve border and customs control’ as well as establish
‘controls on the issuance of travel and identity documents’. It is noteworthy that such provi-
sions build upon the obligations under both UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001),17
and pre-existing treaties such as the Terrorism Financing Convention18 and the Convention

14 ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-fourth session’ (2 May
1972–7 July 1972) (1972) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 219, 317.

15 See Internationally Protected Persons Convention, art 4(a); International Convention against the
Taking of Hostages, adopted 17 December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (entered into force 3 June 1983),
art 4(a); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
adopted 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 March 1992), art 13.

16 K Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism (OUP, 2011) 64–5.
17 UN Security Council Res 1373 (28 September 2001) [2(g)] (reflected in article 7 of the 2002

Inter-American Convention).
18 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted 10 January

2000, 2178 UNTS 197 (entered into force 10 April 2002), art 18 (‘Terrorism Financing Convention’)
(reflected in the 2002 Inter-American Convention’s financing provisions).

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against Organized Crime,19 which both reflect the 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering
adopted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).20 The regulatory regime to prevent,
combat and eradicate the financing of terrorism under the 2002 Inter-American Convention
includes: domestic regulation and supervision over banks and other financial institutions;
measures to detect and monitor the movement across the borders of currency and bearer
negotiable instruments; cooperation and information exchange through the creation of a finan-
cial intelligence unit and provisions for the freezing and confiscation of any assets in use or
intended to be used to finance terrorist acts.

From a legal perspective, one of the most important issues is the relationship between the
obligations under the 2002 Inter-American Convention and the FATF Recommendations.21
Under Article 4(2) of the Convention, the recommendations are referred to as ‘guidelines’
for the implementation of its financial control measures.22 The choice of the term ‘guidelines’
suggests not only that the recommendations can change over time, but that the provision does
not intend to render the soft law instrument legally binding. Political acts adopted within the
framework of the OAS, including General Assembly resolutions23 and the CICTE Declaration
of San Carlos of 2006, nonetheless underline ‘[t]he need for member states to implement the
40 plus nine recommendations of the FATF on money laundering and financing of terrorism’.24

The OAS, through the CICTE and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission
(CICAD), has observer status in the Financial Action Task Force of Latin America
(GAFILAT), a regional organization gathering 17 members, with the mandate of promot-
ing capacity-building and cooperation in the implementation of the FATF standards.25
Interestingly, the ‘mutual evaluations’ – a peer-review process to assess the overall level of
effectiveness and technical compliance in each country – show a mixed picture: whereas some
members possess a ‘mature regime’,26 the legal framework in force in other countries continue
to suffer from ‘deficiencies that limit the general system effectiveness’.27

The CICTE has also played an essential role in clarifying how to improve custom and
border controls measures, by emphasizing, inter alia, the complementary function of the 1997

19 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted 15 November,
2225 UNTS 209 (entered into force 29 September 2003), art 7 (‘Convention against Organized Crime’)
(reflected in the 2002 Convention’s financing provisions).

20 See Enrique Lagos and Timothy D Rudy, ‘Preventing, punishing, and eliminating terrorism in the
western hemisphere: A post-9/11 Inter-American Treaty’ (2002–2003) 26 Fordham International Law
Journal 401, 423.

21 For the latest version, see FATF, International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation, ‘FATF Recommendations’ (16 February 2012) www .fatf -gafi
.org/ recommendations. The 2012 revision has thus incorporated the nine Special Recommendations on
terrorist financing, initially adopted by the FATF on October 2001, within the Forty Recommendations
on money laundering.

22 2002 Inter-American Convention, above n 13, art 4(2).
23 See, e.g., ‘Support for the Work of the Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism’ OAS

General Assembly Res AG/RES. 2459 (XXXIX-O/09), (4 June 2009).
24 See, e.g., OAS CICTE, Declaration of San Carlos, ‘Hemispheric Cooperation for Comprehensive

Action to Fight Terrorism’ (24 March 2006).
25 See ‘Memorando de Entendimiento sobre la fundación del GAFILAT’.
26 See e.g. FATF and GAFILAT, ‘Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing

Measures – Mexico, Fourth Round Mutual Evaluation Report’, January 2018, 3.
27 See e.g. GAFILAT, ‘Mutual Evaluation Report of the Republic of Nicaragua’, October 2017, 6.

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Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials,28 as well as the need,

to strengthen security and controls in ports, airports, border crossing points and, where appropriate,
in the transportation, storage and containers of dangerous goods, in accordance with standards
established by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime
Organization (IMO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO).29

At the time of the adoption of the Inter-American Convention, the UN Security Council had
not yet issued Resolution 1540 (2004), which imposes on states binding obligations to prevent
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors, including terrorist
organizations. Domestic implementation of the measures contained therein in Latin America
had been initially challenged by a lack of states’ capacity and the perceived legitimacy deficit
of such quasi-legislative decision.30 For example, Brazil, at that time a member of the UN
Security Council, while voting in favour of Resolution 1540, stated that ‘there was no need to
put the whole resolution under the enforcement provisions of the [UN] Charter’.31 Since 2007,
the OAS General Assembly has promoted a more proactive involvement of the OAS in sup-
porting the full implementation of Resolution 1540 at the hemispheric level.32 The UN’s 1540
Committee too noted the OAS contribution through country-specific activities, in particular
with Colombia and Mexico.33

The most recent practice of both the General Assembly34 and the CICTE reflects the shift
in focus of the UN to the topic of violent extremism: the OAS member States have expressed
their commitment to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014) and 2396
(2017), by developing inter alia systems to collect biometric data, as well as ‘watchlists or
databases of known and suspected terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters’.35

The above overview of the legal initiatives taken by the OAS for the prevention of terrorism
confirms the trend since 9/11 at both the universal and regional levels towards a decrease in
the margin of discretion accorded to states in determining the most appropriate measures.36

28 Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, adopted 14 November 1997, 2029 UNTS 55
(entered into force 1 July 1998).

29 OAS CICTE, ‘Declaration on Strengthening Border Controls and International Cooperation in the
Fight Against Terrorism’ CICTE/ DEC. 1/09 (6 March 2009) [7].

30 M Herz, ‘Resolution 1540 in Latin America and the role of the Organization of American States’,
in Lawrence Scheinman (ed.), Implementing Resolution 1540: The Role of Regional Organizations
(UNIDIR, 2008) 9, 18.

31 UN Security Council, Verbatim Record of the 4956th Meeting, UN Doc S/PV.4956 (28 April
2004).

32 OAS General Assembly Res AG/RES. 2333 (XXXVII-O/07) (5 June 2007).
33 1540 Committee, 2011 review of the implementation ofresolution1540 (2004), Annex to UN Doc

S/2012/79 (6 February 2012) [26]; Id., Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1540 (2004), Annex to UN Doc S/2016/1038 (9 December 2016).

34 See ‘Advancing Hemispheric Security: A Multidimensional Approach’ OAS General Assembly
Res AG/RES. 2925 (XLVIII-O/18) (5 June 2018).

35 OAS CICTE, ‘Declaration: Strengthening Hemispheric Efforts to Address and Counter Violent
Extremism that is Conducive to Terrorism’, CICTE/DEC.1/18 (4 May 2018).

36 Cf Trapp, above n 16, 78.

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3 THE OBLIGATIONS TO SUPPRESS TERRORIST OFFENCES

A International Cooperation in Criminal Matters

One of the most contentious issues in the negotiation of the 1971 OAS Convention was the
determination of the criminal offences to be covered. The majority of delegations rejected the
original proposal of the Inter-American Juridical Committee to include a general definition
of terrorism. Rather, the OAS member states favoured a more restrictive approach, which
limited the scope of the Convention to the specific acts of ‘kidnaping, murder, and other
assaults against the life or personal integrity of those persons to whom the state has the duty
to give special protection according to international law, as well as extortion in connection
with those crimes’.37 Thirty years later, the same debate on the desirability of a comprehen-
sive definition of terrorism as a legal concept affected the initial stages of the drafting of
the 2002 Inter-American Convention.38 But, once again, a pragmatic approach was taken
to defining its scope of application. Such an approach was strongly supported by the US,
which observed that ‘[e]fforts in the UN and elsewhere have indicated clearly that efforts to
define the term are likely to result in deadlock’.39 Following the model of Article 2(1)(a) of
the Terrorist Financing Convention, the definition of the offences under Article 2 of the 2002
Inter-American Convention is based on a list of the existing UN anti-terrorism treaties. It is
open to a state which is not a party to a particular UN sector-specific treaty to declare that the
obligations contained in the 2002 Inter-American Convention do not apply to the offences in
that UN treaty. However, in line with the recommendations under Resolution 1373 (2001),
states should ‘endeavour to become a party’ to existing UN anti-terrorism conventions and to
ensure adequate national implementation, ‘including establishing, in [their] domestic legisla-
tion, penalties for the offenses described therein’.

As for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, the 1971 OAS Convention incorporates the
classical principle of aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute), which has been included
in all universal anti-terrorism treaties since the 1970 Hague Convention.40 It is significant that
the combined effect of Articles 3 and 5 of the OAS Convention constitutes a variant of the
principle as formulated in Article 7 of the 1970 Hague Convention. While the Hague model
‘requires the State concerned to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, irrespective of the existence of a prior request for the extradition of the suspect’,41
under the 1971 OAS Convention ‘the obligation to submit for prosecution comes into play
only when a request for extradition has been refused’.42 Such obligation is therefore subsidiary,

37 1971 OAS Convention, art 1; See J Murphy, ‘Protected persons and diplomatic facilities’, in
A Evans and J Murphy (eds), Legal Aspects of International Terrorism (Lexington, 1978) 301.

38 See Lagos and Rudy, above n 20, 1629.
39 Member States’ Contributions and Comments on the Draft Inter-American Convention for the

Prevention and Elimination of Terrorism (United States), OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.G/CP/CAJP-1844/01 add.
I (6 November 2001).

40 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, adopted 16 December 1970, 860
UNTS 106 (entered into force 14 October 1971), art 7 (‘1970 Hague Convention’).

41 Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Judgment),
unreported (21 July 2012) [94].

42 M Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M Wise, Aut Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty to Extradite or
Prosecute in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 18.

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as it is conditional on a prior refusal to extradite in a given case.43 This was due to the greater
degree of homogeneity within a regional organization, where it was expected that a decision
on extradition would be easier than in the wider and more politically diverse international
community.44

The 1971 OAS Convention had already deprived terrorists of the protection of the political
offence exception, still included in certain extradition treaties. Article 2 of the Convention pro-
vides that the specific criminal offences ‘shall be considered common crimes of international
significance, regardless of motive’.45 Significantly, Article 11 of the 2002 Inter-American
Convention reaffirmed the inapplicability of the political offence exception to requests for
extradition or mutual legal assistance.

The subsequent two provisions of this treaty are then aimed at ensuring adequate imple-
mentation of Resolution 1373 (2001), which calls upon states to ‘take appropriate measures
[…] before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum seeker has not
planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of terrorist acts’, as well as ‘to ensure, in
conformity with international law, that refugee status is not abused by the perpetrators, organ-
izers or facilitators of terrorist acts’.46 During the negotiations much debate was devoted to
the content of Article 13, which provides that states shall take appropriate measures to ensure
that ‘asylum is not granted to any person in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to
believe that he or she has committed an offense established in the international instruments
listed in Article 2 of this Convention’. The reference to ‘reasonable grounds’ allowed some
delegations to overcome their reluctance to include limitations on the granting of asylum,
since, in their view, such decisions should remain a state prerogative.47 Be that as it may, the
OAS General Assembly has urged member states to deny safe haven to those who finance,
plan, support or commit terrorists acts, in accordance with Resolution 1373 (2001), by way of
full implementation of the principle of aut dedere aut judicare.48

B Human Rights Remedies and Prosecution

Finally, one should not overlook the emerging trend within the Inter-American human
rights system towards the recognition of a duty to punish serious human rights violations.49
With regard to acts of violence committed by the irregular armed groups in Colombia, the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has stated that:

the State may also incur international responsibility for the illicit acts of private individuals or groups
when the State fails to adopt the necessary measures to prevent the acts and/or where it fails to

43 For a similar formulation see European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted 27
January 1977, 1137 UNTS 93 (entered into force 4 August 1978).

44 Edward McWhinney, Aerial Piracy and International Terrorism (2nd edn, Martinus Nijhoff,
1987) 145.

45 1971 OAS Convention, above n 1, art 2.
46 UN Security Council Res 1373, above n 17, [3(f)–(g)].
47 See Lagos and Rudy, above n 20, 1638.
48 ‘Extradition of and Denial of Safe Haven to Terrorists: Mechanisms for Cooperation in the Fight

against Terrorism’ OAS General Assembly Resolution AG/RES. 2249 (XXXVI-O/06) (6 June 2006).
49 Anja Seibert-Froh, Prosecuting Serious Human Rights Violations (OUP, 2009) 51.

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The legal response of the OAS in combating terrorism 633

properly investigate and sanction those responsible for committing the acts and to provide adequate
compensation to the victims.50

Given that terrorism ‘impairs the full enjoyment and exercise of human rights’,51 states have
‘the right and duty to guarantee [their] security’,52 which includes a duty to diligently protect
individuals within their jurisdiction from terrorism. The IACHR has further specified that:

the State’s national and international obligation to confront individuals or groups who use violent
methods to create terror among the populace, and to investigate, try, and punish those who commit
such acts means that it must punish all the guilty, but only the guilty.53

This leads to the crucial further issue of the protection of fundamental rights while counter-
ing act of terrorism, from the viewpoint of the American Convention on Human Rights.54
Twenty-three of the 35 OAS member states are currently parties to the American Convention,
though it has a wider influence on standard-setting and practice.

4 THE ROLE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM IN THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WHILE COUNTERING
TERRORISM

Despite criticism levelled by some delegations against the inclusion of such a provision, Article
15 of the 2002 Inter-American Convention clearly states that ‘[t]he measures carried out by
the states parties […] shall take place with full respect for the rule of law, human rights, and
fundamental freedoms’. Article 14 is also relevant in this context as it prohibits the furnishing
of mutual legal assistance if the request is made on discriminatory grounds. Significantly,
one of the original proposals to introduce a reference to the protection of human rights was
submitted by Peru, a country that had experienced the excessive reaction of the authoritarian
government of Alberto Fujimori against the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas,
whose armed insurgency began around 1980. The OAS General Assembly has reaffirmed in
various resolutions that, ‘all member states have a duty to ensure that all measures adopted to
combat terrorism are in compliance with their obligations under international law, in particu-
lar international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian

50 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights 1996, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 (14 March 1997) 68, 80. See Liesbeth Zegveld,
Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups in International Law (CUP, 2002) 169. More recently, see
Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v Colombia (2006) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 140 [126], [140]; Case of the
‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v Colombia (2005) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 134 [123]; Valle Jaramillo v Colombia
(2008) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 192 [76] et seq.

51 See, e.g., ‘Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’
OAS General Assembly Res AG/RES. 2238 (XXXVI-O/06) (6 June 2006).

52 Neira Alegría v Peru (1995) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 20 [75].
53 Odolfo Gerbert Asencios Lindo, Rodolfo Dynnik Asencios Lindo, Marco Antonio Ambrosio

Concha and Carlos Florentino Molero Coca v Peru (2000) IAComHR Case 11.182, Report No. 49/00
[58].

54 American Convention on Human Rights, adopted 22 November 1969, 1144 UNTS 123 (entered
into force 18 July 1978) (‘ACHR’).

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law’.55 Also, the CICTE and the IACHR have played an important role in assisting states and
supervising their efforts to comply with their human rights obligations.56

Following a petition filed by a coalition of civil society groups in 2002, the IACHR has held
various hearings and delivered a series of statements and decisions related to the situation of
the detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. It has granted precautionary measures requesting the
US, an OAS member state, not only to take the urgent measures necessary to have the detain-
ees’ legal status determined by a competent tribunal, but also to investigate, prosecute and
punish all allegations of torture and other ill treatment of detainees. In Resolutions 2/06 and
2/11, the IACHR affirmed that the failure to give effect to the requested measures had resulted
in irreparable harm to the fundamental rights of the detainees and it urged the US ‘to close the
Guantánamo Bay facility without delay and arrange for the trial or release of the detainees’.57

Moreover, the IACHR exercised a decisive standard-setting function in its 2002 Report on
terrorism and human rights58 and subsequently through the 2006 OAS Recommendations for
the Protection of Human Rights in the Fight Against Terrorism.59 Both documents set out the
regime of permissible derogations from human rights in times of emergency. They also clarify
the specific conduct that member states should take to ensure respect for particular human
rights in the fight against terrorism, including: the right to life, with regard to the use of force
and capital punishment; the right to personal liberty and security, with regard to administrative
and other forms of detention; the right to humane treatment in relation to detention conditions;
the right to a fair trial during criminal or other proceedings relating to terrorism; and the right
to freedom of expression, assembly, association, conscience and religion.60

Such human rights standards were instrumental in the evaluation of the governments’
responses towards the widespread phenomenon of criminal organizations and gangs (maras)
in Latin America, in which children and adolescents are used and abused. In particular, the
IACHR expressed concern as regards the possible use of anti-terrorist laws against the alleged
members of the maras.61

Both the 2002 terrorism report and the OAS Recommendations extensively rely on the
previous case law of the IACtHR, particularly as regards the complex question of the rela-

55 OAS General Assembly Res AG/RES. 2238 (XXXVI-O/06) [2].
56 IACHR, ‘Report on Terrorism and Human Rights’ OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116 – Doc.5 rev. 1 (22 October

2002); CICTE, ‘Declaration of Port-au-Spain on Strengthening Cooperation on Strategies to Sustain and
Advance the Hemispheric Fight against Terrorism’ (17 February 2005); CICTE, ‘Declaration of San
Carlos on Hemispheric Cooperation for Comprehensive Action to Fight Terrorism’ (24 March 2006).

57 See the documentation reproduced in Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human
Rights (OUP, 2013) 415–30. Moreover, IACHR, ‘Towards the Closure of Guantánamo’, OEA/Ser.L/V/
II. – Doc.20/15 (3 June 2015). See also B Tittemore, ‘Guantánamo Bay and the precautionary measures
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A case for international oversight in the struggle
against terrorism’ (2006) 6 Human Rights Law Review 378.

58 See C Cerna, ‘The role and legal framework of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
in securing justice for victims’, in Ana María Salinas de Frías, Katja Samuel, and Nigel White (eds),
Counter-Terrorism: International Law and Practice (OUP, 2012) 811.

59 IACHR, ‘Recommendations for the Protection by OAS Member States of Human Rights in the
Fight Against Terrorism’, CP/doc.4117/06 (8 May 2006).

60 See Diego Rodríguez-Pinzón and Claudia Martin, ‘The Inter-American Human Rights system:
Selected examples of its supervisory work’, in Sarah Joseph and Adam McBeth (eds), Research
Handbook on International Human Rights Law (Edward Elgar, 2010) 353, 361.

61 IACHR, ‘Report on Violence, Children and Organized Crime’, OEA/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 40/15 (11
November 2015) [419].

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The legal response of the OAS in combating terrorism 635

tionship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law, and on
respect for human rights in the following areas: criminalization of terrorism; judicial guar-
antees during criminal proceedings; and the execution of the sanctions imposed.62 The OAS
Recommendations emphasize that, ‘the struggle against terrorism and the protection of human
rights are complementary, not antithetical, responsibilities of member states, and respect for
fundamental human rights constitute an essential component of a successful campaign against
terrorism’.63 In doing so, the OAS Recommendations recall what the IACtHR had already
stated in the Velasquez-Rodriguez case, that:

[R]egardless of the seriousness of certain actions and the culpability of the perpetrators of certain
crimes, the power of the State is not unlimited, nor may the State resort to any means to attain its
ends. The State is subject to law and morality. Disrespect for human dignity cannot serve as the basis
for any State action.64

In this vein, the IACtHR further held that ‘the prohibition of torture is absolute and
non-derogable even in the most difficult circumstances, such as a war, the threat of war and
the fight against terrorism’.65

Various cases before the IACtHR dealt with the very tense situation in Peru, particularly at
the beginning of the 1990s, when the Fujimori Government ordered states of emergency and
took exceptional measures. The main question addressed by the IACtHR was to what extent
suspected terrorists were entitled to full protection of human rights. The Court emphasized
that, while terrorist violence was not justified, the Court’s ‘primordial function [was] to safe-
guard human rights in all circumstances’.66 As regards Peru’s criminalization of terrorism, the
IACtHR stressed that conduct ‘must be classified and described in precise and unambiguous
language that narrowly defines the punishable offense, thus giving full meaning to the princi-
ple of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege praevia in criminal law’,67 as codified by Article
9 of the ACHR (namely, freedom from retrospective criminal punishment, incorporating
the principle of legality or certainty in criminal offences). Under the Peruvian legislation,
the crimes of terrorism and treason were in many respects similar and the vague distinction
between the two offences was regarded by the IACtHR as ‘prejudicial to the defendants’ legal
situation on several counts: ‘the applicable penalty, the court with jurisdiction, and the nature
of the proceedings’.68 Persons charged with treason were tried by military courts characterized
by summary proceedings before ‘faceless’ judges. Therefore, the IACtHR found that ‘the
individual’s right to a hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law and, a fortiori, his right to due process are violated’.69

62 S Garcia Ramirez, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ perspective on terrorism’, in
Salinas de Friás et al., above n 58, 785; Scalabrino, above n 7, 191.

63 IACHR, OAS Recommendations, above n 59.
64 Velazquez-Rodriguez v Honduras (1988) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 4, [154]. See also, Neira Alegría v

Peru (1995) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 21 [75].
65 Maritzia-Urrutia v Guatemala (2003) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 103 [89].
66 Lori-Berenson-Mejía v Peru (2004) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 119 [91]. See also L Lixinski, ‘The

rights/security debate in the Inter-American system’, in Scheinin et al., Law and Security: Facing the
Dilemmas, EUI Working Papers LAW 2009/11 (EUI, 2009) 97.

67 Castillo Petruzzi v Peru (1999) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 52 [121].
68 Ibid, [119].
69 Ibid, [128].

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The question of the judicial guarantees under Articles 8 and 25 of the ACHR arose in
cases where the IACtHR found Peru responsible for extra-legal executions of alleged terrorist
suspects.70 In other cases involving convictions for terrorism, the Court held that the state had
‘violated the right to presumption of innocence as enshrined in Article 8(2) [of the ACHR]’.71

Concern has been raised in recent years about the risk of misapplication of anti-terrorism
legislation in various American countries because of the vague or imprecise character of the
criminal offences, leaving ‘wide discretion to judicial officers who use them against [human
rights] defenders in order to prosecute them and limit their activities’.72 In 2014 the IACtHR
concluded that Chile violated the ACHR for having applied its Counter-terrorism Act against
leaders and activists of the Mapuche indigenous people, in relation to offences committed in
the context of the social protest. The Court found that use of stereotypes and prejudices on
the reasoning of the judgments against the indigenous authorities, constituted a violation of
the principle of equality and non-discrimination and the right to equal protection of the law,
recognized in Article 24.73

It is significant that 1971 OAS Convention had already recognized the right of every
person to enjoy the legal guarantees of due process and the right of every person deprived of
their freedom to defend themselves.74 In its advisory opinion on the right to habeas corpus,
the IACtHR affirmed that ‘writs of habeas corpus and of “amparo” are among those judicial
remedies that are essential for the protection of various rights whose derogation is prohibited
by Article 27(2) [of the ACHR] and that serve, moreover, to preserve legality in a democratic
society’.75 As for the conditions of detention, the IACtHR has constantly held that impris-
onment in overcrowded conditions, isolation in a small cell, with a lack of ventilation and
natural light, without a bed to lie in or adequate hygiene conditions, and solitary confinement
or unnecessary restrictions of visits, constitute a violation of the right to humane treatment.76
The Court therefore ordered the concerned state to immediately adopt the necessary measures
to meet international standards.77

5 CROSS-BORDER USES OF FORCE TO COMBAT
TERRORISM: THE COLOMBIAN RAID IN ECUADOR IN 2008

In the post-9/11 world, the threat of terrorism in Latin America has been mainly associated
with the activities of armed groups in Colombia, some of which have been engaged in
violence for many decades. When a car bomb exploded in a parking garage in Bogota on

70 Barrios Altos v Peru (2001) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 75; La Cantuta v Peru (2006) IACtHR (Ser C)
No. 162.

71 García-Asto and Ramírez-Rojas v Peru (2005) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 137 [160].
72 IACHR, ‘Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders’ OEA/Ser.L/V/II – Doc. 49/15

(31 December 2015).
73 Norín Catrimán et al v Chile (2014) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 279 [228].
74 1971 OAS Convention, arts 4 and 8(c).
75 Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American Convention on

Human Rights) (Advisory Opinion) (1987) IACtHR (Ser A) OC-8/87 No. 8.
76 Cf e.g., Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v Peru (2006) IACtHR (Ser C) No. 160 [315].
77 See, e.g., Lori-Berenson-Mejía v Peru, above n 66, [241]. See JM Pasqualucci, The Practice and

Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2nd edn, CUP, 2012) 222.

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The legal response of the OAS in combating terrorism 637

February 2003, causing the death of 35 people, the Security Council condemned the attack
as an act of terrorism in Resolution 1465 (2003). The OAS Permanent Council also adopted
a Resolution in which explicit reference was made to ‘the commitment of the member states to
step up actions for the strict observance of the provisions of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1373 and the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism’.78

The renewed escalation in the confrontation between the government of Colombia and
a guerrilla movement, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC), reached one of its peaks on 1 March 2008.
Colombian armed forces entered the territory of Ecuador, in the province of Sucumbíos,
without the express consent of the Ecuadorian Government, to carry out an operation
against members of FARC who maintained camps on the Ecuadorian side of the border. The
Colombian Foreign Ministry had initially declared that Colombia had acted according to the
principle of self-defence.79

The UN Security Council did not condemn the raid, however the OAS Permanent Council
affirmed that the operation constituted ‘a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of Ecuador and of principles of international law’.80 Two days later, the heads of state or gov-
ernment of the Rio Group denounced ‘a violation of the territorial integrity of Ecuador,’ but at
the same time noted, with satisfaction, ‘the full apology’ offered by the Colombian President
Alvaro Uribe.81 The Colombian incursion in Ecuador has been recognized as an important
instance of state practice in ascertaining whether there exists a post-9/11 right of self-defence
against attacks by non-state actors that are not attributable to a state.82 However, far from being
conclusive, the incident has been equally invoked in support of opposing views on the scope
of the right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.83

6 CONCLUSION

In contrast to past decades, and unlike certain other regions of the world, the threat of a trans-
national terrorist attack is now considered to be low for most countries in the American
hemisphere.84

The OAS portrays itself, like any other regional organization, as a ‘valuable partner in the
global fight against terrorism’: it has ‘a deeper understanding of the dynamics and realities of

78 Permanent Council of the OAS Resolution OEA/Ser.G CP/RES. 837 (1354/03) (12 February
2003).

79 See Comunicado No. 081 del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Colombia (2 March 2008)
http:// web .presidencia .gov .co/ comunicados/ 2008/ marzo/ 81 .html.

80 Permanent Council of the OAS Resolution CP/RES. 930 (1632/08) (5 March 2008).
81 Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the Rio Group on the Recent Events between

Ecuador and Colombia (7 March 2008).
82 See S Murphy, ‘Protean jus ad bellum’ (2009) 27 Berkeley Journal of International Law 22, 40; C

Tams, ‘The use of force against terrorists’ (2009) 20 European Journal of International Law 359.
83 Cf e.g., Tom Ruys, ‘Armed attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary

Law and Practice (CUP, 2010) 462–4; A Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or unable”: Toward a normative framework
for extraterritorial self-defense’ (2012) 52 Virginia Journal of International Law 483, 537ff.

84 See M Sullivan, ‘Latin America: Terrorism issues’ CRS Report for US Congress (March 2012).

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their Member States’, and is instrumental ‘in strengthening implementation of international
obligations by promoting buy in and a sense of ownership by governments’.85

After the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC, the drafting of the 2002
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism reflected the pragmatic approach proposed
by the US and Canada at the time of negotiations. Instead of adopting a comprehensive con-
vention, OAS member states focused on the complementary function of a new treaty, as an
‘added value’ in the implementation of both the existing sector-specific international treaties
and the relevant Security Council resolutions, and in augmenting the limited (but nonetheless
influential) 1971 OAS Convention dealing with threats to protected persons. It is not therefore
by chance that the global survey of the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001) by member
states, prepared by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), recognized that:

The South American States have made tangible progress in implementing a variety of counter-terrorism
measures in compliance with resolution 1373 (2001). They have enacted counter-terrorism legisla-
tion, and most have ratified at least 12 of the international counter-terrorism instruments. Efforts have
been made to further strengthen regional coordination and cooperation.86

The importance attached to preventing the financing of terrorism by both the 2002
Inter-American Convention and, at an operational level, the CICTE has achieved practical
results. All Latin American states have adopted anti-money-laundering legislation and set up
financial intelligence units. In terms of future areas for improvement, the CTC has strongly
recommended that Latin American states improve their monitoring of the non-profit sector and
alternative remittance systems, and detection of the illegal movement of cargo, cash and other
monetary instruments.

In the post-9/11 era, the Inter-American system has taken a firm position as regards the protec-
tion of human rights while countering terrorism. Already in 2002, the IACHR had stressed that:

any measures taken by member states to restrict these rights must comply strictly with the procedural
and substantive requirements governing restriction clauses under international human rights instru-
ments. This requires that any restrictions be necessary for the security of all and in accordance with
the just demands of a democratic society and must be the least restrictive of possible means to achieve
a compelling public interest.87

85 ‘Opportunities and challenges in strengthening international cooperation through the sharing of
information, expertise and resources’ Remarks by AA Treppel, Executive Secretary, Inter-American
Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), UN High-Level Conference on Counter-Terrorism, New York
(28 June 2018) http:// www .un .org/ en/ counterterrorism/ hlc/ statements .shtml.

86 UN Counter-terrorism Committee, Global survey of the implementation of Security Council reso-
lution 1373 (2001) by Member States, Annex to UN Doc S/2011/463 (1 September 2011) 54.

87 Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, above n 56, Executive Summary, [34].

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How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money?
Terrorist Funding and Innovation in the Case of al-
Shabaab

Ido Levy & Abdi Yusuf

To cite this article: Ido Levy & Abdi Yusuf (2021) How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money?
Terrorist Funding and Innovation in the Case of al-Shabaab, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 44:12,
1167-1189, DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2019.1628622

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How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money? Terrorist
Funding and Innovation in the Case of al-Shabaab

Ido Levya and Abdi Yusufb

aMcCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., USA; bLauder School of
Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the funding sources of the terrorist group
Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen. Using existing research and ori-
ginal interviews, this study outlines al-Shabaab’s history and funding
sources. It theorizes that an organization’s capacity to operate in dif-
ferent fields of economic activity drives innovation in funding.
Applying a framework for terrorist innovation to al-Shabaab’s fund-
ing sources, this study finds support for the theory. Development of
intelligence and taxation capabilities is especially prevalent in the al-
Shabaab context. Holding territory considerably increases organiza-
tional ability to raise funds. Increasing reliance on criminality may
compromise an organization’s ideological character and leave it
more vulnerable to inter-group competition.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 24 December 2018
Accepted 27 May 2019

The radical Islamist terrorist organization Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen has
recently resurged in Somalia.1 Although the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) and the Somali military, with backing from the UN, EU, and United States,
have been campaigning against the group since 2007, al-Shabaab has managed not only
to endure, but also regain territory and carry out increasing numbers of attacks in East
Africa. The 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack and 2015 Garissa University College
attack killed over 67 and 147 people, respectively while the withdrawal of thousands of
Ethiopian troops from Somalia has allowed al-Shabaab to easily take over towns in
which Ethiopian forces were previously stationed. Al-Shabaab attacks over only the last
two years have claimed hundreds, if not thousands of lives.2 The deadliest of these was
a truck bomb in Mogadishu that killed over 300 and wounded hundreds more.3

A recent al-Shabaab ambush even killed one U.S. commando and injured four others.4

How has al-Shabaab persevered despite serious international pressure? Innovativeness
and adaptability may be the answer. Having operated in different forms, first as an
Islamist movement that rose to control most of Somalia’s southern cities, then as an
organization that dominated Somali government, and now as a group with limited terri-
tory, al-Shabaab has shown it can carry out diverse activities and survive despite persist-
ent opposition. One area in which al-Shabaab has shown particular adaptability is
funding. For example, al-Shabaab originally relied on donations from diaspora

CONTACT Ido Levy iel6@georgetown.edu McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University, Washington,
D.C., USA; Abdi Yusuf Abdi.mohammed@post.idc.ac.il Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy,
Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel.
� 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM
2021, VOL. 44, NO. 12, 1167–1189
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communities and charcoal exports, but became limited in its ability to collect external
contributions as a growing global effort to thwart terrorist funding increasingly closed
international funding routes. In response, al-Shabaab has created internal revenue sour-
ces through taxation, port fees, racketeering, and possibly piracy.5 Today, an al-Shabaab
no longer in control of large cities and ports must find new sources of revenue, and it
is demonstrating diabolical innovation.
This paper examines al-Shabaab’s funding sources, with special attention to its latest

ones, namely extortion of nomadic pastoralists, tribal elders, and businesspeople outside
al-Shabaab’s territory and importation of cars from Arab Gulf states for resale in
Somalia. This paper seeks to answer the question: how does al-Shabaab develop new
sources of funding? The next section presents a theoretical framework based on terrorist
funding and innovation studies through which to understand al-Shabaab’s funding
activities. It then describes the data and methodology this study uses to qualitatively test
hypotheses derived from the theoretical framework. Next, it analyzes al-Shabaab’s new
funding mechanisms through the lens of this framework to assess the hypotheses’
explanatory power.

A theoretical framework for terrorist funding innovation

Scholarship has yet to integrate the literature on terrorist funding with that on terrorist
innovation. Both fields remain predominantly descriptive, categorizing and taxonomizing
known funding methods and innovation processes, and do not generally attempt to theor-
ize about or predict trends. This section reviews and integrates scholarship on terrorist
funding and innovation toward constructing a theoretical framework for understanding
how terrorist organizations, al-Shabaab in particular, secure new sources of funding.

Terrorist funding

A large portion of the literature on terrorist funding focuses on “external,” or cross-bor-
der acquisition of funds. Most external methods entail transferring money through dif-
ferent types of intermediaries. The crudest method is via a personal courier who
physically retrieves money from individuals and organizations through smuggling
routes.6 Organizations may also exploit formal banking systems, building international
financial networks capable of circulating funds through multiple states.7 Experts and
public officials have designated acquiring funds through Islamic charities and front
companies as another source of funding for Islamist terrorist groups.8 Terrorist organi-
zations can use a number of online channels to solicit funds, such as crowdfunding9

and fraudulent front websites.10 For instance, one operative from the jihadist group
Islamic State (IS) gathered funds through fraudulent eBay transactions.11 One funding
method that has attracted particular attention in the context of jihadist organizations is
“informal transfer” or “alternative remittance systems,” most notably the Islamic money
transfer system, “hawala.”12 “Hawala” (Arabic for “change” or “transfer”) functions
through an informal network of “hawaladars” who act as intermediaries between send-
ers and receivers of funds. Hawaladars usually do not record transactions and offer
faster and cheaper service than formal remittance systems.13 The increasing use of

1168 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

mobile phone money transfer has facilitated informal remittance, rendering the system
more vulnerable to malicious exploitation. This is especially true for Somalia, where
mobile money has superseded use of cash.14 An international legal regime has emerged
to combat these activities, with the UN,15 Financial Action Task Force (FATF),16 and
United States17 taking center stage on the issue.18

Discussion of “internal” funding sources focuses on terrorist involvement in crim-
inal activity. Terrorist organizations may engage in illicit trade through taxation,
import, and export of illegal goods, such as drugs19 and ivory.20 Extracting funds
from pirate ransoms may also support terrorist activity.21 Additional internal funding
sources include kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, human and organ trafficking,22 and
racketeering,23 as well as bank robbery and other forms of outright theft.24

Terrorists may also engage in credit card and check fraud25 and use banks and char-
ities to conduct illegal trade, converging with the aforementioned exploitation of for-
mal banking systems.26 Smuggling of legitimate goods, including cigarettes,27 honey,
diamonds,28 fuel,29 charcoal,30 and gold can support terrorist funding as well.31

Acquisition of territory opens another category of funding sources for terrorist organi-
zations. The 2014-2015 rise of IS to control a large territory in Iraq and Syria invigorated
research into this field. IS’s capture of oil granted it an estimated $1 million per day.32

Territory-holding organizations may also impose taxes on their populations for utilities,
alms, and security and collect tolls and passage fees from those seeking transit through
their territories. Control over dams and power plants further boosted IS’s income.33 Al-
Shabaab’s control of ports facilitated its ability to export goods and interact with traders.34

IS even attempted creating its own money, minting gold, silver, and bronze “caliphate
coins,” selling them for bitcoin cryptocurrency, and encouraging supporters to use these
coins or cryptocurrency to avoid strengthening Western currencies.35

Variation in terrorist funding sources has prompted researchers to produce typolo-
gies. Loretta Napoleoni posits a “New Economy of Terrorism” has emerged in which
terrorist organizations feed off Western economies and take control of economies in
areas of less effective government to become self-sustaining “state-shells.”36 According
to this theory, terrorist organizations evolve from relying on external sponsorship, often
from states, to developing self-sufficient funding mechanisms by taking advantage of
areas of weak government, such as Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal.
Through predatory practices, such as ransom, extortion, and territorial conquest, terror-
ist organizations develop their own sources of funding and become increasingly inde-
pendent from external sponsorship. Similarly, the U.S. Department of State has
distinguished between and “traditional” terrorist funding methods, including money
laundering, hawala, and personal courier, and “new modalities.”37 Neumann categorizes
terrorist funding sources under three broad factors and one “revolutionizing” factor:
public support, access to illegitimate economies, and access to legitimate economies,
and control over territory, respectively.38 Dobayev and Dobayev present an internal-
external sources typology and combine the “origins” of a terrorist organization with its
sources of funding to produce terrorist financing models.39 Freeman offers six criteria
terrorist organizations consider when seeking funding sources: quantity, legitimacy,
security, reliability, control, and simplicity, as well as four primary sources of funding:
state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, and popular support.40

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1169

These typologies offer much descriptive power, but fall short in explanatory and pre-
dictive ability. The Department of State and Napoleoni help put terror organizations on
a spectrum from less to more advanced and older and newer financing methods, but do
not explain what factors cause terrorist organizations to move up or down the spectrum
or how to account for moments of change in terrorist funding. Neumann’s typology
may explain some changes through his four indicators, but lacks the parsimony and
generalizability necessary for prediction. While Freeman and Dobayev and Dobayev
help understand and analyze different funding mechanisms, they fall short in explaining
why and how terrorist organizations may seek to open or refrain from searching for
new funding sources. This paper proposes an application of terrorist innovation theory
to produce a more parsimonious, explanatory, and predictive framework for terror-
ist funding.

Terrorist innovation41

Terrorist innovation refers to any change in the behavior of terrorist organizations.
Economist Joseph Schumpeter’s analysis of “development” sets the groundwork for a
better understanding of innovation in general and terrorist innovation in particular.
Schumpeter defines “development” as a process of continuously creating “new
combinations” of “materials and forces within our reach.” This process entails five phe-
nomena: 1) “The introduction of a new good… or of a new quality of a good,” 2) “The
introduction of a new method of production,” 3) “The opening of a new market,” 4)
“The conquest of a new source of supply,” and 5) “The carrying out of the new organ-
ization of any industry.” In addition, this process may proceed “discontinuously” or by
“small steps,” i.e. radically or incrementally.42 This paper treats “innovation” as the phe-
nomenon, rather than the process, of these occurrences.
Scholarship conceptualizes innovation by types, drivers, and levels. Perhaps the best-

known work in terrorist innovation is Dolnik’s Understanding Terrorist Innovation, in
which he defines innovation “an act of introduction of a new method or technology or
the improvement of an already existing capability.”43 Through analysis of several case
studies, Dolnik identifies various types of terrorist innovations, from use of primitive
assaults, to bombings, to suicide bombings, to airplane hijacking, to chemical and bio-
logical attacks. He finds as a key determinant of terrorist innovation “attachment to
weaponry,” or affinity for a certain tactic or weapon due to its symbolic significance.44

Crenshaw, who defines innovation more broadly as “adoption of new patterns of behav-
ior” or “new ideas,” points out that Dolnik’s study covers only “tactical innovations,” or
“changes in method or operations” toward achieving constant objectives.45 She proposes
in addition to tactical innovation “strategic innovation,” or changes in objectives, and
“organizational innovation,” or “changes in group structure and institutions.”46 Dolnik
and Crenshaw, hence, present different innovation types.
In a thorough case study on the 9/11 plot, Moghadam posits “integrative innovation,”

a combination of “top-down” innovation by terrorist leaders and “bottom-up” innov-
ation by mid- and low-level operatives. He notes innovation may emanate from mem-
bers of an organization or from cooperation with outside forces.47 He also identifies
five drivers of innovation: ideology, inter-group competition, pressure from problem

1170 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

solving, opportunity, and organizational capital.48 Moghadam, therefore, presents agents
and drivers of innovation.
Christensen coins the term “disruptive innovation” to describe introduction of prod-

ucts that are “cheaper, simpler, smaller, and… more convenient to use” than more
sophisticated ones. The simplicity of these products can give them advantages over
more advanced ones.49 He says that because “terrorism is at the bottom of the market,”
a disruptive innovation itself, it is more difficult for the larger, more sophisticated con-
ventional forces of states to combat.50 Cheung, Mahnken, and Ross elaborate on seven
“degrees of innovation,” ranging from duplicative imitation – simple copying of an
existing innovation – to radical innovation – innovations causing major breakthroughs.51

Disruptive innovation and degrees of innovation constitute analysis of levels of innov-
ation. Applying these concepts to terrorist innovation provides rich frameworks for
scrutiny of innovation types, drivers, and levels.
Scholars have discussed organizational learning as an important component of innov-

ation. A RAND study outlines terrorist organizational learning, examining how terrorist
organizations acquire, store, distribute, and interpret knowledge as well as different fac-
tors that affect learning processes.52 The study presents five case studies to illustrate ter-
rorist organizational learning in practice. For example, Jackson’s case study on the
Provisional Irish Republican Army shows how organizational capital, ideology, and
engineering experience contributed to its effective learning and resulting technological
innovation.53 U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 describes “counterinsurgency” as a “learning
competition” in which the “side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better
learning organization—usually wins.”54 In the case of terrorism, as groups learn new
tactics and strategies, counter-terrorism forces must learn ways to combat them. For
example, Ariely and Bitzer show how terrorists operating in the Sinai Peninsula became
increasingly adept at smuggling materiel and knowledge across the Israeli, Egyptian, and
Gaza borders to support terror activities. In 2005, Israeli security forces withdrew from
the Sinai and built barriers in response along the Gaza border. Smugglers adapted by
building tunnel networks in more vulnerable areas and studying the activities of Israeli
border guards, thus perpetuating a learning competition.55 The learning competition
framework defines the nature of conflict as a function of a group’s ability to adapt and
innovate more proficiently than its adversary. Hence, organizational learning and learn-
ing competition feature prominently in terrorist innovation.

Theory and hypotheses

This paper defines terrorist innovation as any change in the behavior of a terrorist
organization. The word “new” may seem conspicuously absent, but the literature on ter-
rorist innovation has developed such a rich, nuanced set of variables that together may
show that no two terrorist behavioral changes are exactly alike, i.e. all have an element
of newness. The acquisition of a new weapon may be a radical innovation by an organ-
ization that developed it itself or simply an imitation by one that appropriated the
know-how from another entity. It can drive tactical innovation for an organization that
begins to employ it in attacks or strategic innovation for one that decides to select dif-
ferent types of targets with its new capability. The assumption that any change in

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1171

behavior is novel emboldens scholarship in this field by allowing more nuanced analyses
and shifting focus away from deciding what constitutes novelty in the first place. In
addition, the focus of innovation on phenomenon rather than process allows for less
cumbersome analysis.
Applied to terrorist funding, terrorist innovation produces an explanatory, predictive

framework. This paper theorizes that organizational reach drives innovation in terrorist
funding. Because this theory does not confine itself to a field of economic activity, such
as banking or criminality, it is generalizable to all such activities of terrorist organiza-
tions and reserves ample space for predicting the introduction of new funding sources.
Its application to all terrorist funding activities not only frees it from confinement to
certain kinds of activities, but also makes for a more parsimonious theory. Its explana-
tory power derives from its focus on reach. Reach refers to a terrorist organization’s
capacity to operate in different fields, specifically economic in the context of this study.
Reach has four main components: extent of territory, access to different markets and
resources, level of public support, and number of network ties. The authors derive four
hypotheses from this theory:

H1: Territoriality. Territorial conquest increases a terrorist organizations’ number of
funding sources.

H2: Access. Terrorist organizations’ increased access to markets and resources increases
their number of funding sources

H3: Public support. Terrorist organizations’ level of public support has a positive
relationship with the effectiveness of their financing methods.

H4: Network ties. Terrorist organizations’ number of network ties has a positive
relationship with their number of funding sources.

Methodology and data

This paper conducts a case study of al-Shabaab’s funding sources through the lens of
the above framework to qualitatively test the hypotheses. It bases its qualitative
approach to theory and hypotheses on King, Keohane, and Verba’s Designing Social
Inquiry.56 The authors choose to study al-Shabaab due to its particular diversity in
funding sources. Further, al-Shabaab has operated in different forms as the extremist
wing of a larger Islamist group (as part of the Islamic Courts Union, 1994-2006), an
independent insurgent terrorist force, the governing power in southern Somalia (2008-
2011), and a criminal entity. Al-Shabaab’s diverse activities enable study of a wide array
of terrorist innovations in funding. Moreover, its funding sources are understudied in
scholarship despite the group’s rising power and adaptability, particularly in recent
years. This study examines all of al-Shabaab’s known funding sources and conducts a
focused analysis of al-Shabaab’s newest funding innovations: extortion of tribal elders,
farmers, and businesspeople outside its territory, illegal importation of cars from the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) for resale in Somalia, and theft of pastoralists’ livestock.57

For each funding source, it indicates the innovation types and drivers. This study relies
on academic, think tank, and news sources for its analysis of al-Shabaab’s historical

1172 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

funding sources and interviews with Somali government officials for scrutiny of al-
Shabaab’s new funding sources. To protect interviewee identities, the paper refers to all
interviewees in the masculine regardless of their true genders and does not refer to
them by name. This study’s theory and hypotheses derive inductively from the case of
al-Shabaab.

A short history of al-Shabaab and its funding sources

Al-Shabaab originated as part of a group of sharia courts known as the Islamic Courts
Union (ICU). In 1991, the government of Somalia collapsed, beginning the ongoing
Somali Civil War. In 1994, the ICU emerged in Mogadishu to provide security and services
in the absence of a functioning government. The courts based their style of government on
Islamic law (sharia) and originally did not intend to expand their control. However, fol-
lowing disagreements between “moderate” and “radical” elements within the group, as
well as growing tensions with secular clan-based warlords, the group began operating out-
side of its bases in Mogadishu.58 Between 2004 and 2006, al-Shabaab emerged as one of the
ICU’s more radical militias, espousing the overthrow of the secular Somali government
and creation of an Islamic state in its place. By mid-2006, the ICU took over most of south
and central Somalia, including Mogadishu. Ethiopian and African Union (AU) interven-
tion pushed the ICU out of its major strongholds and the group dispersed into smaller
organizations. In 2008, al-Shabaab resurged as the strongest of the ICU’s successors, rap-
idly regaining the territory it had lost two years earlier and setting up quasi-governmental
administrative bodies. In 2011, the group again began losing ground as intra-organiza-
tional strife led to conflict between al-Shabaab’s leaders, partly fueled by a 2012 decision
the group’s amir (leader) Ahmed Godane to formally affiliate al-Shabaab with al-Qaeda.59

Since 2014, al-Shabaab has lost its hold over Somalia’s major cities and ports, retaining
control over mostly rural areas.
During its early years, al-Shabaab received its funds from both external and internal

sources, namely diaspora contributions, charcoal exports, taxation of local businesspeo-
ple, and international jihadist support. Since the mid-90s, some Somali diaspora com-
munities have viewed the ICU as the most effective option for maintaining law and
order in Somalia and staving off warlordism and foreign powers like Ethiopia. The fall
of the ICU and subsequent rapid growth of al-Shabaab caused many of these diaspora
communities to shift toward the latter, sending money via hawala and courier.60 In add-
ition, many of al-Shabaab’s founders maintained strong relations with al-Qaeda leaders,
having spent time in al-Qaeda’s Afghan training camps. Their ties to the global jihadist
movement generated income through the Arabian Peninsula and Kenya.61 Thus, during
its early years, al-Shabaab seems to have relied on public support from Somali diaspora
communities and ties with al-Qaeda for its funding sources.
Al-Shabaab’s conquest of territory in 2008-2011 coincided with the group’s shift to

internal funding sources. Perhaps most notable is its construction of an elaborate tax-
ation system. Al-Shabaab finance officers collect detailed records on businesses and agri-
cultural lands under its control.62 Its “Finance Office” imposes a “zakah” tax on traders
and corporations of 2.5% as well as tolls, fees, and taxes on agricultural produce and
land.63 The office also imposes provisional taxes, or “Infaaq” toward emergency funds

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1173

or specific military campaigns.64 The “Zakawaat Office” handles non-monetary taxes,
namely taxes in-kind on livestock.65 Those who do not pay face severe punishment by
al-Shabaab’s intelligence wing, “Amniyaat.”66 Thus, the access to large population areas
al-Shabaab gained through its acquisition of territory between 2008 and 2011 allowed it
to implement a sophisticated taxation system that has accounted for much of
its revenues.
Conquest of Somali ports and trade routes gave al-Shabaab access to illicit markets.

Charcoal smuggling has proven especially lucrative. A UN estimate claims al-Shabaab
makes $15-$50 million per year overall from illegal trade.67 Al-Shabaab exploited char-
coal smuggling routes by taxing coal bags en route to Somali harbors, forcing traders to
pay multiple taxes and bribes before reaching port. This practice reportedly continued
through corruption after Kenyan troops took over Kismayo, leading the UN to ban
importation of Somali charcoal. Al-Shabaab has identified major sugar smuggling routes
and charged up to $1,000 per truck. In 2011, the illicit sugar trade generated between
$400,000 and $800,000 for the group.68 Kenyan officials are reportedly involved in this
trade as well. In addition, reports indicate al-Shabaab’s involvement in illegal mining
and export of minerals in East Africa in conjunction with a Ugandan militant group.69

Finally, al-Shabaab forces aid agencies to pay commissions in exchange for permission
to operate inside Somalia.70 Therefore, it acquired the ability to tax illegal trades by con-
quering the territories through which they pass and gained access to markets and
resources through its involvement in illicit dealings outside of Somalia.
Following its 2008 resurgence, al-Shabaab began losing popularity with the Somali dias-

pora, largely due to its terrorist attacks outside of Somalia, increasingly hardline stances,
and the retreat of foreign forces.71 Internal fracturing, battlefield defeats after 2011,72 and
the arrest of al-Shabaab supporters outside Somalia further compromised the group’s sup-
port.73 Until circa 2009, Eritrea began providing financial and material support to al-
Shabaab to undermine its strategic rival, Ethiopia.74 In 2010, piracy became an increasingly
common occurrence off the Somali coast and al-Shabaab allegedly imposed taxes of 15-
20% on pirates generating revenues from al-Shabaab-controlled ports, most notably
Haradheere, which the group seized in 2010.75 Further, between 2007 and 2011, al-
Shabaab developed ties with other jihadist groups, namely al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb,76 al-Qaeda Central, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Nigeria-based Boko
Haram, receiving official al-Qaeda sponsorship in 2012.77 Despite loss of public support
and diaspora funding due to its strategic reorientation, al-Shabaab compensated by forging
ties with other jihadist groups and accepting state sponsorship.
Following the ouster of al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo, the group began

relying increasingly on its taxation system and criminal activity. Between 2011 and
2012, AU and Somali government forces succeeded in forcing al-Shabaab out of
Somalia’s major population areas, relegating the group mostly to rural areas in south
and central Somalia.78 Al-Shabaab has boosted illegal imports and solicited Kenyan
traders and corrupt officials to secure buyers.79 Further, al-Shabaab has become
involved in the illegal ivory trade through maintaining ties with poachers in Kenya, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic and buyers in Asian and
Gulf markets.80 It has reduced its involvement in charcoal as the trade began signifi-
cantly benefitting the group’s government adversaries in Kismayo. In fact, the group has

1174 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

reportedly cracked down on charcoal, impounding contraband, fining traders, and even
punishing its own members if they take part in the trade.81 At the same time, illegal
charcoal exports generating tax revenues for al-Shabaab have reportedly persisted
through smuggling routes in the Gulf, particularly Iran.82 The ongoing Syrian Civil War
has prompted heroin smugglers to divert their business through East Africa. Al-Shabaab
has reportedly taken the opportunity to import the drug from the Middle East and
resell it to Nigerian, Kenyan, and South Sudanese criminal groups.83 Finally, al-Shabaab
has resorted to blockading villages and towns that refuse to pay its taxes, threatening
them with starvation.84 Hence, al-Shabaab’s loss of territory has caused it to lose signifi-
cant sources of funding, but access to import, ivory, and heroin markets has compen-
sated for its losses.

Al-Shabaab’s new sources of funding

Al-Shabaab has increasingly resorted to criminal activity to finance its activities. A
dwindling tax base due to loss of territory and an intensifying global effort to crack
down on terrorist funding have threatened al-Shabaab’s coffers. Relying on original
interviews with Somali government workers, analysts, businesspeople, elders, and former
al-Shabaab members, as well as a report by the Hiraal Institute, this section outlines al-
Shabaab’s newest sources of funding.85 These include extortion of elders, businesspeo-
ple, and farmers outside al-Shabaab territory, illegal importation of cars from the UAE
for resale in Somalia, and theft of pastoralists’ livestock.

Extortion of elders and businesspeople outside al-Shabaab territory86

Al-Shabaab has recently begun demanding payments from leaders of Somali clans and
businesses based outside of its territory. The expansion of Amniyaat and the creation of
an effective auditing system have enabled this practice. The Hiraal Institute reports that
Amniyaat has established a presence as far north as Puntland – significantly outside al-
Shabaab’s traditional areas of operation. The Finance Office summons clan elders and
businesspeople to al-Shabaab territory annually to pay their dues or face Amniyaat
enforcement. Al-Shabaab collectors bring money to accountants at checkpoints, who
then deliver it to auditors that ensure receipts match collections and return approved
collections to accountants. Accountants then carry approved money to banks, from
which they retrieve verification slips for auditors. Al-Shabaab assigns an auditor and
accountant to each town and gathers information on the targets of its extortion through
a network of checkpoints and informants.87 Those who refuse to pay face often severe
penalties. The group may increase its demands, kidnap an uncooperative individual, or
kill the individual altogether. Amniyaat usually handles these operations.88

Al-Shabaab specifically targets Somali businesspeople for extortion. The group
imposes a 2.5-5% tax on the properties of local businesspeople both inside and outside
its territory, destroying the businesses of those who refuse to pay. Heads of international
businesses face higher rates and often must contribute an automobile to the group.89

The group may occasionally demand lump sum taxes from businesspeople. One Somali
businessman says al-Shabaab summoned him from Mogadishu to pay a $30,000 lump

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1175

sum as contribution to the group’s activity. Following his refusal, Amniyaat abducted
him to al-Shabaab territory, where Amniyaat members informed him the price had
increased to $75,000, since now he had to ransom himself. Once he agreed to pay the
amount, Amniyaat warned it would kill him if he refused again.90

Amniyaat extorts funds also from tribal elders. Somali society and identity are
strongly tied to tribe/clan.91 Borders between Somali regions often reflect tribal concen-
trations and militias operating in Somalia claim allegiance to various clans.92 Tribal eld-
ers play central roles as community leaders. Al-Shabaab coopts them to keep order in
the areas under its control. It delegates taxation and policing to elders, who have preex-
isting authority among local populations. In return, al-Shabaab refrains from punishing
cooperative clans, facilitates arbitration of inter-tribal disputes, and provides financial
assistance to some clans.93 Some elders residing outside of al-Shabaab territory or in
areas formerly under the group’s control have cooperated with it out of desire for finan-
cial gain, fear of punishment, and ideological affinity. These elders carry out several
kinds of activities for the group, including transfer of funds collected from fellow tribes-
men, sharing of intelligence, and recruitment of youth to the group. Elders occasionally
must report the names of uncooperative community members, whom al-Shabaab may
threaten with extortion, imprisonment, or death.94

Extortion and employment of farmers

Although al-Shabaab has long imposed land taxes and taxes in-kind on Somali farmers
supposedly in accordance with sharia, it has only recently begun demanding fixed taxes
with little religious justification. In general, the group levies a 2.5% tax on crops and a
$50 fixed tax on each hectare of land. It threatens those who do not cooperate with
death, killing of family members, and destruction of property.95 One farmer from
Middle Shabelle region says, over the past two years, finance and Zakawaat officials
started demanding exorbitant payments. For example, al-Shabaab finance officials now
levy $1,000 every half-year for ownership of one tractor (even if in disrepair) and $1 for
each of a farmer’s lemon trees levied every season.96

This new approach plays a dual purpose of filling al-Shabaab coffers and acquiring
new recruits. Al-Shabaab began extorting farmers in south-central Somalia following the
introduction of international food assistance programs. One such program, initiated in
2014 by the UN, EU, and Austria, aimed to support Somali agriculture by purchasing
200 metric tons of maize from local farmers for use in food assistance activities.97

While this increased the income of Somali farmers, it seems to have also served as an
impetus for al-Shabaab to target farmers for extortion. The organization often summons
those unable to pay to become its agents or face punishment.98 These farmers often
must perform low-level activities, such as courier runs.

Importation of used automobiles

Since the collapse of the Somali central government in 1991, many Somalis have moved
their businesses to the UAE. This has allowed al-Shabaab to establish ties with Somali
businesspeople abroad, particularly in Dubai. They in turn facilitate the group’s access

1176 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

to the used automobile market. After securing buyers, al-Shabaab orders a number of
used automobiles from contacts in the UAE, usually paying $6,000-$8,000 for each car
through hawala and mobile money transfer services. It then bribes port officials to allow
cars into Somalia and resells them locally for $10,000-$12,000.99

The group imposes import taxes on other importers in the country. It charges a
lump sum of $200 for automobile registration and a $30 toll for entering cities with an
al-Shabaab presence. The group taxes automobile imports differently depending on the
model, though it usually demands a high rate and prefers for companies and individuals
to pay it in-kind with cars. This grants the group automobiles virtually free of charge
that it may resell or use in its operations.100 Refusal to comply with these taxes can
result in harsh penalties. One interviewee says that when a relative entered a city with-
out al-Shabaab permission, the group demanded $1,800. The relative refused and the
group soon imprisoned him, threatening to hold him until he paid. He was released
after finally paying the fine.101

Taxation and theft of pastoral livestock in Somalia

Al-Shabaab taxes and steals pastoral livestock in south-central Somalia to finance its
activities. About a quarter of Somalia’s inhabitants are nomadic pastoralists, subsisting
on the meat and milk of camels, sheep, cattle, and other pastoral animals.102 Al-
Shabaab imposes in-kind taxes according to livestock type. It takes one goat from herds
of more than 40 and two from those with more than 100. Further, it takes one goat for
every five camels and one camel from herds of more than 50 camels. For every 30
cows, the group takes one. Camels and cattle sell for hundreds of dollars each on the
Somali market while goats may fetch up to $60. At the same time, al-Shabaab increas-
ingly outright steals the livestock of pastoralists without attempt at justification.103 One
pastoralist says the group stole so many of his animals that he had to sell them himself
or risk losing his livelihood. He was then forced to use the money to buy a vehicle and
become a courier for the group. He finally escaped the organization’s territory, though
lives in fear it will attempt to force him back or seek retribution.104 The large presence
of pastoralists in Somalia and the fact that al-Shabaab devoted one of its two tax offices
to in-kind taxation suggests this is a major funding source for the group.105

Al-Shabaab funding sources and terrorist innovation

This section uses the terrorist innovation framework to discuss the data on al-Shabaab
funding sources. Progressing historically, it identifies changes in funding sources to
indicate types, drivers, and levels of terrorist innovations.

The ICU phase: 1994-2006

During al-Shabaab’s membership in the ICU, inter-group competition and ideology
drove innovation. As part of an organization that received most of its funds from dias-
pora community remittances, al-Shabaab had to vie with other factions for recognition.
Al-Shabaab strove to show it was doing the most in the ICU’s struggle against

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1177

warlordism, foreign invasion, and a supposedly corrupt, Western-backed government
unable to maintain order. Accordingly, it implemented a strategic innovation – targeting
of high-level Somali government, Ethiopian, and clan militia targets. This strategy led to
the confrontation between the ICU and clan militias that resulted in the former’s con-
quest of Mogadishu, setting al-Shabaab to become the ICU’s most powerful successor.106

Therefore, al-Shabaab’s strategy of aggressively, visibly targeting the ICU’s adversaries
set it apart from other factions.
Ideology features prominently in al-Shabaab’s early innovation in funding sources. Al-

Shabaab frequently employs gangster-esque tactics, such as hits, kidnapings, and thefts,
against its adversaries to convey a brutal intolerance to resistance. This comprises an
“attachment to weaponry,” or affinity for a certain tactic or weapon due to its symbolic sig-
nificance, in this case, the need to appear a strong organization that crushes its enemies.107

At the same time, its jihadist mission facilitated al-Qaeda sponsorship and justified con-
flicts with other factions in Somalia. Hence, al-Shabaab’s attachment to gangster-esque tac-
tics and its jihadist character drove its adoption of more aggressive strategies, early
interactions with al-Qaeda, confrontation with other Somali groups, and conquest
of Mogadishu.
Al-Shabaab’s use of hawala and courier to transfer funds features in a learning competi-

tion between al-Shabaab and international forces. International efforts to hinder funding
of terrorist activities have increased since the September 11, 2001 attacks. The international
anti-terrorist funding regimes of the FATF, UN, and United States have developed increas-
ingly effective mechanisms to identify individuals and organizations supporting terrorist
activities and halt their transfers.108 As this system becomes more effective, terrorist organ-
izations like al-Shabaab have had to adjust their funding sources. Developing harder-to-
trace hawala networks and resorting to personal courier are two major tactical innovations
al-Shabaab has made in response.109 The use of courier is a disruptive innovation since it
is simpler and lower-tech than bank or hawala transfers, but its simplicity makes it harder
to trace. These new tactics have allowed al-Shabaab to maintain external sources of funding
despite international counterterrorism innovation.

Independence and conquest phase: 2006-2011

After the fall of the ICU and al-Shabaab’s conquest of south-central Somalia, pressure
from problem solving and opportunity came to drive al-Shabaab innovation. Increasing
difficulty in securing external funding forced the group to seek alternative sources. In
2008, the U.S. State Department designated al-Shabaab a “foreign terrorist organ-
ization,” blocking any provision of funds and materials suspected of transfer to it.110 In
addition, U.S. law enforcement increased efforts to thwart support for al-Shabaab by
U.S. nationals. For example, “Operation Rhino” targeted twenty Somali youths in
Minneapolis suspected of supporting the group.111 At the same time, al-Shabaab began
using two new tactics: terrorist attacks abroad and suicide bombings.112 These exemplify
tactical and strategic innovation since these operations, although unpopular with the
Somali diaspora, aimed to not only inflict casualties, but also attract support
from within the global jihadist movement, most notably al-Qaeda.113 This later helped
al-Shabaab gain al-Qaeda sponsorship.

1178 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

Similarly, the taxation system largely developed out of the need to solve funding
problems. Al-Shabaab originally imposed an interpretation of the Islamic taxation sys-
tem, but quickly shifted toward extortive lump sums and ransoms as it began losing ter-
ritory. Especially after its loss of major cities and ports since 2011, the group has
intensified its involvement in criminal activity under the guise of taxation. For example,
the expansion of Amniyaat – an organizational innovation – and subsequent extortion
of elders, pastoralists, and businesspeople coincided with al-Shabaab’s setbacks. Indeed,
the group discouraged members seeking a purely Islamic tax system. Sheikh Fuad, the
first head of the Zakawaat Office, was promptly dismissed after distributing collected
taxes to the poor.114 To further compensate for diminished revenues, al-Shabaab levied
taxes on markets easily accessible to it, including charcoal, heroin, and sugar smuggling,
aid delivery, and imports. Therefore, al-Shabaab’s taxation system developed out of the
need to ensure continued acquisition of compromised resources.
Al-Shabaab’s profiting from the illicit ivory trade and Eritrean sponsorship reveal

opportunity drove al-Shabaab innovation to an extent. Since 2010, al-Shabaab began
facilitating ivory smuggling through its territory and reportedly training some of its
members to poach in Kenya.115 This requires a certain level of organizational capital
and organizational innovation that would enable participation in the trade, which al-
Shabaab proved it could deliver. Still, it could not deploy such capital to seize the
opportunity without the easy access to border crossings it obtained through its conquest
of south-central Somalia. Similarly, state sponsorship became available to al-Shabaab
because Ethiopia had become a common enemy for al-Shabaab and Eritrea, opening the
opportunity for sponsorship. Therefore, opportunity seems to have driven the organiza-
tion’s involvement in the ivory trade and sponsorship from Eritrea.

Setback and stagnation: 2011-Present

As al-Shabaab again began losing ground, problem solving and organizational capital
began driving innovation in funding techniques. Increasingly relegated to rural areas,
al-Shabaab kept control over a rapidly shrinking tax base. This posed a grave problem
for the organization, whose financial viability had come into jeopardy due to loss of
essential revenue from taxation.
Foremost among the group’s new funding activities was the deployment of organiza-

tional capital through the dramatic expansion of Amniyaat. Although little is known
about the intelligence unit, its membership and expertise seem to have grown over the
years, as it is now able to conduct effective operations throughout most of Somalia.
Maintaining branches as far south as the Kenyan border and north as Bosaso, experi-
enced Amniyaat agents can now extort funds from virtually all of Somalia’s economic
centers. This organizational innovation seems to have resulted from a learning process
that has taken place inside Amniyaat since its founding. Amniyaat’s increased capability
in turn facilitated al-Shabaab’s tactical shift from taxation to outright extortion. Indeed,
Amniyaat has proven so formidable that the Somali government’s intelligence agency,
the National Intelligence and Security Agency, has employed a significant number of
Amniyaat defectors.116

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1179

Inter-group competition seems another element driving changes in al-Shabaab fund-
ing activities. The group’s partial reduction of its involvement in the charcoal trade, for
example, aimed to reduce the gains of Somali port officials, who were apparently bene-
fitting from the trade more than al-Shabaab was.117 In addition, it shows al-Shabaab is
not so concerned about its survival as to accept any form of funding regardless of the
consequences. On the one hand, this suggests that al-Shabaab, unlike other jihadist
organizations, has not undergone a prolonged period of struggling for survival.
Existential considerations, then, seem to have been minor in al-Shabaab’s innovations.
On the other hand, al-Shabaab’s willingness to reduce certain funding to undermine its
adversaries reveals inter-group competition to be an important criterion for whether al-
Shabaab decides to invest in innovation. Now, as pro-IS groups establish a foothold in
Somalia, al-Shabaab must compete to keep control of its tax base and may well innovate
further.118 Hence, al-Shabaab has partially removed itself from charcoal trade activities
to undermine the Somali government, but stays involved in sugar, ivory, aid extortion,
and drugs since those profiting from these activities do not threaten al-Shabaab and
may even cause harm to its adversaries.
Opportunity continues to comprise another component of al-Shabaab’s funding

innovation. The organization’s involvement in automobile importation and heroin trade
exemplify this trend. These two funding sources became available to al-Shabaab through
developments outside its control, i.e. the migration of Somalis to Arab Gulf states and
the diverting of heroin smuggling routes through East Africa. With capacity to import
materials, al-Shabaab was able to exploit the used automobile trade to its benefit. As
heroin smuggling routes began traversing areas near al-Shabaab’s areas of operations,
the group acquired the ability to profit from importing the drug and reselling it to
criminal groups. Indeed, external factors independent from al-Shabaab’s actions allowed
it the opportunity to profit from the used automobile and heroin trades.
Perhaps the most significant feature of al-Shabaab’s current innovations is the

absence of ideology as a driving factor. Many of the organization’s funding activities
today have little basis in sharia or jihadist ideology.119 For example, the heroin trade is
not only antithetical to Islamic beliefs, but also necessitates contact with non-Muslims
and Muslims the organization considers to be heretics. This applies just as well to the
group’s involvement in other illicit trades. Its increasingly extortive tactics likewise indi-
cate a distancing of its “taxation” system from its supposedly Islamic foundations. This
turn from a system based on sharia toward one amalgamated from a number of crim-
inal activities indicates a strategic innovation derived from al-Shabaab’s aforementioned
attachment to maintaining a formidable image. The organization has arguably deter-
mined efficient funding as a more important objective than the maintenance of a jihad-
ist character. Within this context, al-Shabaab’s attachment to weaponry, i.e. activities
that perpetuate its signature gangster-esque ethos, has become central where it previ-
ously existed as coequal with or lesser than a jihadist ethos.120 Besides precipitating
intra-group conflict or a cooling of relations with al-Qaeda, this change enables predic-
tion that al-Shabaab will continue pursuing criminal activities over jihadist goals, at least
in the short-term. Should this trend continue in the long-term, it may relegate the
group’s jihadist character irrelevant and change the group’s character to criminal rather
than jihadist terrorist.

1180 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

Discussion

This section examines the data as it relates to the theory and hypotheses. Overall, reach
has proven a strong determinant of terrorist innovation in funding in the al-Shabaab
case. The territoriality hypothesis has strong empirical support. Both 2006 and 2008 –
the years al-Shabaab first conquered and reconquered territory, respectively – saw major
changes in al-Shabaab’s funding sources. 2006-2008 saw its forging of an alliance with
al-Qaeda, involvement in the illicit charcoal trade, and sponsorship from Eritrea. At the
same time, its diaspora funding decreased. Around 2008, the organization became
involved in aid extortion, ivory, sugar, and allegedly piracy, and built its taxation sys-
tem. Likewise, its loss of territory in 2011-2012 marked a shift toward criminal activities
and the reduction of charcoal revenues. Territoriality may serve as an indicator for
involvement in other types of funding activities, most notably illicit trades.
Organizational innovation appeared a solid determinant of the extent to which a group
may extort a population under its control. In the case of al-Shabaab, the establishment
of the tax offices and expansion of Amniyaat outside al-Shabaab’s territory exemplified
this trend. Organizations committed to different types of ideologies and objectives may
refrain from extortive and criminal activities. Thus, territoriality can serve as an indica-
tor for a wide array of funding innovations, but other organizational features, like ideol-
ogy, may modify its impact.
The access hypothesis also has strong support. In its early development, al-Shabaab

was dependent on foreign contributions that it received through diaspora remittances,
hawala, or courier. This required access to hawala networks and individuals who had
the know-how to smuggle funds across borders. This need persisted after the group’s
reduced reliance on diaspora funds through its al-Qaeda sponsorship. Territoriality
seems to interact with access since control over south-central Somalia gave al-Shabaab
access to trade routes and export markets that allowed it to extract revenues from illicit
trades. Opportunity appeared to link innovation and access; the group opened new
funding sources as it discovered and conquered new markets. For example, al-Shabaab’s
conflict with Ethiopia incidentally implied it shared a common enemy with Eritrea. This
provided the opportunity to gain access to Eritrean sponsorship. The diversion of the
heroin trade through East Africa provided al-Shabaab with access to the illegal drug
market and the opportunity to extract revenues from drug smuggling, but only as long
as the Middle East remained too risky for drug smugglers to traverse.
The public support hypothesis is supported. Al-Shabaab’s early reliance on diaspora

remittances and the favor of other jihadist groups necessitated support from an external
audience. Somali expatriates and jihadist activists had to willingly send money toward
al-Shabaab activities. Territoriality interacts with public support as the focus of public
support turned toward an internal audience with al-Shabaab’s conquests. Often kept in
check through terrorization, the population under the organization’s control also sup-
ported it willingly when citizens perceived the Somali government as corrupt and inef-
fective and al-Shabaab as a viable alternative. Adequate recruitment necessitates a
certain degree of public support to bolster activities, particularly those of Amniyaat.
The network ties hypothesis enjoys strong support. Contact with liaisons from crim-

inal or jihadist groups or representatives of states can provide insight into al-Shabaab’s
sponsorship (both state and non-state) and involvement in illicit markets. Circles of

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1181

close ties between friends and family can paint a picture of al-Shabaab’s receipt of exter-
nal remittances. How the organization networks itself most likely determines the rela-
tionship between funding and the roles of different members, notably collectors,
accountants, and auditors. Network ties can also shed light on more elusive funding
sources, such as al-Shabaab’s importation of automobiles from the UAE and Kenya.
These sources emanate from outside the organization’s territory and seem to require
more connection to people involved in the market than physical access to the mar-
ket itself.
The reach theory enables prediction of al-Shabaab’s future funding activities.

Territoriality and increasing access to population centers through the expansion of
Amniyaat suggest al-Shabaab will accordingly expand its extortive measures, “taxing” an
increasing number of items, activities, and entities. Should al-Shabaab gain territory, it
will increase revenue from taxation. Should it lose territory, the group will invest more
in Amniyaat activities and seek to expand its network ties and access to markets. Given
its steady involvement in illicit dealings in the Arabian Peninsula, the group will most
likely seek more revenues from the region in the future, through al-Qaeda sponsorship,
ties to businesspeople, or import/export dealings. As its public support increases, al-
Shabaab will gain more revenue from extorting people outside its territory while
decreases will make involvement in illicit trades and criminal activities more likely to
rise and hinder the group’s ability to collect taxes. A prolonged increase in illicit trades
and criminal activities will lead to erosion of the group’s jihadist character, difficulties
with its relationship with al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups, and ultimately its trans-
formation into a criminal gang rather than a terrorist organization. One can expect to
see al-Shabaab investing more in organizational innovation in its expansion of
Amniyaat while it will exhibit strategic innovation as it increasingly resembles a crim-
inal rather than terrorist organization.

Conclusion

This paper investigates al-Shabaab’s sources of funding to formulate a theory of terrorist
funding innovation. This study finds reach, a terrorist organization’s capacity to operate
in various fields, proves a strong explanation of terrorist funding sources. This study
produces four derivative explanations of terrorist funding: territoriality, public support,
access to different markets, and network ties. Using a framework on terrorist funding
and terrorist innovation, this paper examines the case of al-Shabaab against these varia-
bles. It finds that as al-Shabaab’s reach has varied, so too has its funding sources.
Indeed, it developed more and stronger funding sources as it expanded its territory,
enjoyed higher public support, gained access to markets like the charcoal and heroin
trades, and established ties with individuals and organizations that made available spon-
sorship and resources it could not previously acquire. Opportunity indicated al-
Shabaab’s augmentation of funding sources. Inter-group competition marked both the
group’s reduction and adoption of funding sources. The group’s current conflict with
IS-inspired groups will likely lead to further changes in funding. Decreased reach, such
as when al-Shabaab began losing territory, seems to have correlated with weakening of
existing funding sources and the group’s search for new funding sources stemming

1182 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

from the need for problem-solving. In its accumulation of funding sources, al-Shabaab
has demonstrated increasing disregard for its supposedly foundational jihadist ideology,
favoring instead its attachment to a gangster-esque image. This development may influ-
ence al-Shabaab’s competition with IS, which may offer a more ideologically committed
alternative to al-Shabaab. In sum, reach allows for more precise analysis of and offers a
predictive framework for terrorist funding sources.
Reach can serve as a powerful tool for experts and policymakers. Understanding not

only how terrorist organizations fund themselves, but also what causes them to seek differ-
ent funding sources helps develop more sophisticated responses to terrorist funding.
International efforts to stop cross-border money transfers may close one source of fund-
ing, but lead to development of internal or less traceable ones. Depriving groups of terri-
tory may shrink their tax bases, but will not stop them from engaging in criminal activities
or developing capacity to carry on taxation from outside these bases. At the same time,
forcing terrorist groups to adopt funding sources antithetical to their ideologies, such as
the heroin trade in al-Shabaab’s case, may weaken their ideological appeal and public sup-
port. While this may have contributed to al-Shabaab’s ideological deterioration, it also
could have paved the way for more ideological organizations, like IS, to take its place.
Overall, this suggests that international regimes to stop undesirable cross-border transac-
tions, military efforts to deprive groups of their territory, and mechanisms to counter
criminal activities must coordinate to effectively undermine terrorist funding. Adaptable
organizations like al-Shabaab will continue to find ways to sustain themselves even as
counter-terrorism forces deny them access to various funding sources. Instead of proceed-
ing in this learning competition incrementally and reactively, international counter-terror-
ism forces should adopt a proactive approach of coordinating anti-funding efforts to
anticipate organizations’ adoptions of different finding sources.

Notes

1. This paper follows Hoffman’s definition of terrorism as “the deliberate creation and
exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political
change.” Al-Shabaab uses terrorism with the stated political aim of turning Somalia into
an Islamic state.
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 44.

2. Counter Extremism Project, “Al-Shabab,” https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-
shabab#violent_history (accessed November 24, 2018).

3. Ibid.
4. Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss. “US Special Forces Commando Killed in Shabaab Ambush.”

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/06/us-special-forces-soldier-killed-in-shabaab-
ambush.php (accessed November 24, 2018).

5. Al-Shabaab’s alleged connection to piracy is complex. UN and Somali officials report links
between pirate gangs and al-Shabaab operatives. Militants have demanded a cut of up to 20%
of pirate ransoms, though officials do not believe pirates become themselves members of
al-Shabaab. A Reuters investigation found that al-Shabaab maintains a “marine office” that
exacts payments of up to hundreds of thousands of dollars from pirates. Richard Lough,
“Piracy Ransom Cash Ends up with Somali Militants,” https://www.reuters.com/article/
somalia-piracy/piracy-ransom-cash-ends-up-with-somali-militants-idUSLDE7650U320110706
(accessed May 12, 2019); Jonathan Saul and Camila Reed, “Shabaab-Somali Pirate Links
Growing: UN Adviser,” https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE79J0G620111020?sp=

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1183

https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-shabab#violent_history

US Special Forces soldier killed in Shabaab ambush

https://www.reuters.com/article/somalia-piracy/piracy-ransom-cash-ends-up-with-somali-militants-idUSLDE7650U320110706

https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE79J0G620111020?sp=true

true (accessed May 12, 2019); Valter Vilkko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal
Extraction,” (Minor Field Study, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2011), http://
www.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/a_57537-f_MFS_paper_Vilkko ; Khaled Wassef, “Al Qaeda
Urges Somalis To Attack Ships,” https://web.archive.org/web/20110212105724/http://www.
cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-4949488-503543.html (accessed May 12, 2019).

6. Zachary Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 2 (2003): 172-173; Igor
Dobayev and Andrey Dobayev, “Financing of Terrorist Networks in North Caucasus,”
Social Sciences 48, no. 3 (2017): 116; Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing,”
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%
20Typologies%20Report (accessed December 9, 2018).

7. Dobayev and Dobayev, “Financing of Terrorist Networks in North Caucasus,” 112; Herbert
V. Morais, “Fighting International Crime and Its Financing: The Importance of Following
a Coherent Global Strategy Based on the Rule of Law,” Villanova Law Review 50, no. 3
(2005): 619.

8. Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and
Jemaah Islamiya,” 173-180; Kathryn L. Gardner, “Fighting Terrorism the FATF Way,”
Global Governance 13, no. 3 (2007): 342; Jimmy Gurul�e, “The Demise of the U.N.
Economic Sanctions Regime to Deprive Terrorists of Funding,” Case Western Reserve
Journal of International Law 41, no. 19 (2009): 39-40; U.S. Department of State, “Anti-
Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing,” https://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/
c44634.htm (accessed June 26, 2018).

9. Financial Action Task Force, “Emerging Terrorist Financing Risks,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks (accessed December
9, 2018).

10. Georgina Bensted, “Hi Terrorist Financing and the Internet: Dot Com Danger,”
Information & Communications Technology Law 21, no. 3 (2012): 238-247.

11. Mark Maremont and Christopher S. Stewart, “FBI Says ISIS Used eBay to Send Terror
Cash to U.S.,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-says-isis-used-ebay-to-send-terror-cash-to-
u-s-1502410868 (accessed June 28, 2018).

12. Matteo Vaccani, “Alternative Remittance Systems and Terrorism Financing: Issues in Risk
Management” (Working Paper no. 180, World Bank, Washington, DC, 2010), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Alternative_Remittance_Syste
ms .

13. Abuza, “Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah
Islamiya,” 183-185; Shima Keene, “Hawala and Related Informal Value Transfer Systems – An
Assessment in the Context of Organized Crime and Terrorist Finance: Is There Cause for
Concern?” Security Journal 20, no. 3 (2007): 185-196; Robert Looney, “Hawala: The Terrorist’s
Informal Financial Mechanism,” Middle East Policy 10, no. 1 (2003): https://www.mepc.org/
journal/hawala-terrorists-informal-financial-mechanism; Mohammed El Qorchi, Samuel
Munzele Maimbo, and John F. Wilson, “Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the
Informal Hawala System” (Occasional Paper 222, International Monetary Fund, Washington,
DC, 2003), http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Issues/2016/12/30/
Informal-Funds-Transfer-Systems-An-Analysis-of-the-Informal-Hawala-System-16535.

14. Victor Odundo Owour, “Mobile Money Transfers have Taken off in Somalia, but it’s a Risky
Business,” https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-10-17/mobile-money-transfers-have-taken-somalia-
its-risky-business (accessed November 24, 2018).

15. United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, “About the Task Force,”
https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en (accessed June 26, 2018).

16. Financial Action Task Force, “What We Do,” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whatwedo/#d.
en.3146 (accessed June 26, 2018).

17. Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, “Bankrupting Terrorism: The Role of US Anti-terrorism
Litigation in the Prevention of Terrorism and Other Hybrid Threats: A Legal Assessment
and Outlook,” Liverpool Law Review 33, no. 2 (2012): 92-94.

1184 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE79J0G620111020?sp=true

http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/57/a_57537-f_MFS_paper_Vilkko

https://web.archive.org/web/20110212105724/http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-4949488-503543.html

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report

https://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/c44634.htm

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Emerging-Terrorist-Financing-Risks

https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-says-isis-used-ebay-to-send-terror-cash-to-u-s-1502410868

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/FINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/Alternative_Remittance_Systems

https://www.mepc.org/journal/hawala-terrorists-informal-financial-mechanism

http://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Occasional-Papers/Issues/2016/12/30/Informal-Funds-Transfer-Systems-An-Analysis-of-the-Informal-Hawala-System-16535

https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-10-17/mobile-money-transfers-have-taken-somalia-its-risky-business

https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en

http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/whatwedo/#d.en.3146

18. Michael Levi, “Combating the Financing of Terrorism: A History and Assessment of the
Control of ‘Threat Finance,’” British Journal of Criminology 50, no. 4 (2010): 653-661.

19. Chris Dishman, “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2004): 246-247.

20. Tom Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab” (Whitehall Report 2-14,
Royal United Services Institute, London, 2014), https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201412_
whr_2-14_keatinge_web_0 .

21. Yvonne M. Dutton and Jon Bellish, “Refusing to Negotiate: Analyzing the Legality and
Practicality of a Piracy Ransom Ban,” Cornell International Law Journal 47 (March 2014):
305-307.

22. Martin and Solomon, “Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and its
Funding,” 35; Jacob Townsend and Hayder Mili, “Human Smuggling and Trafficking: An
International Terrorist Security Risk?” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 1, no. 6
(2008): 1-3.

23. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing”; Yvonne M. Dutton, “Funding Terrorism:
The Problem of Ransom Payments,” San Diego Law Review 53 (April, 2016): 340-345.

24. Matthew Levitt, “Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State” (Congressional Testimony,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC, November 13, 2014), http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/terrorist-financing-and-the-islamic-state;
Michaela Martin and Hussein Solomon, “Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the
Beast and its Funding,” Contemporary Review of the Middle East 4, no. 1 (2017): 35.

25. Financial Action Task Force, “Terrorist Financing.”
26. Irina Ionescu, “Financing Terrorism: From Offshore Companies to the Charity Paradox,”

SEA – Practical Application of Science 3, no. 2 (2015): 94.
27. Dale Coker, “Smoking may not only be Hazardous to your Health, but also to World

Political Stability: The European Union’s Fight against Cigarette Smuggling Rings that
Benefit Terrorism,” European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 11, no.
4 (2003): 350.

28. Mark Basile, “Going to the Source: Why Al Qaeda’s Financial Network Is Likely to
Withstand the Current War on Terrorist Financing,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 27,
no. 3 (2004): 172.

29. Jonathan M. Winer, “Fighting Terrorist Finance,” Survival 44, no. 3 (2002): 90.
30. Vilkko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extraction.”
31. Valpy FitzGerald, “Global Financial Information, Compliance Incentives and Terrorist

Funding,” European Journal of Political Economy 20, no. 2 (2004): 391.
32. Charles Lister, “Cutting of ISIS’ Cash Flow” (Markaz, Brookings Institute, Washington,

DC, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2014/10/24/cutting-off-isis-cash-flow/.
33. Martin and Solomon, “Islamic State: Understanding the Nature of the Beast and its

Funding,” 37-38.
34. Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab;” United Nations Security

Council, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1916 (2010),” https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/
2011/433 (accessed May 17, 2019).

35. Eitan Azani and Nadine Liv, “Jihadists’ Use of Virtual Currency” (ICT Cyber Desk,
International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, 2018), https://www.ict.org.il/
images/Jihadists%20Use%20of%20Virtual%20Currency .

36. Loretta Napoleoni, Greg Palast, and George Magnus, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the
Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2003).

37. U.S. Department of State, “Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Terrorist Financing,” https://
www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/c44634.htm?utm_campaign=e4&utm_medium=social&utm_
source=FRblog&utm_content=blockchainanswerspart3 (accessed June 28, 2018).

38. Peter R. Neumann, “Don’t Follow the Money: The Problem with the War on Terrorist
Financing,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-
06-13/dont-follow-money (accessed June 28, 2018).

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1185

https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201412_whr_2-14_keatinge_web_0

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/terrorist-financing-and-the-islamic-state

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2014/10/24/cutting-off-isis-cash-flow/

https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/433

https://www.ict.org.il/images/Jihadists%20Use%20of%20Virtual%20Currency .

https://www.state.gov/j/inl/c/crime/c44634.htm?utm_campaign=e4&utm_medium=social&utm_source=FRblog&utm_content=blockchainanswerspart3

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-13/dont-follow-money

39. Dobayev and Dobayev, “Financing of Terrorist Networks in North Caucasus,” 114-115.
40. Michael Freeman, “Sources of Terrorist Funding: Theory and Typology,” in Financing

Terrorism: Case Studies, ed. Michael Freeman (London: Routledge, 2012), 9-22.
41. This section is based on lectures of and personal interactions with Dr. Gil-Ad Ariely.

Gil-Ad Ariely, “Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism Innovation,” (course, Interdisciplinary
Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel, 2018).

42. Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits,
Capital, Credit, Interest, and the Business Cycle (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
1934), 65-66.

43. Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends
(London: Routledge, 2007), 6.

44. Ibid, 156-158.
45. Martha Crenshaw, “Innovation: Decision Points in the Trajectory of Terrorism,” in

Terrorist Innovations in Weapons of Mass Effect: Preconditions, Causes, and Predictive
Indicators, eds. Maria J. Rasmussen and Mohammed M. Hafez (Monterey: Naval
Postgraduate School, 2010), 36, 39.

46. Ibid, 36, 40.
47. Assaf Moghadam, “How Al Qaeda Innovates,” Security Studies, 22, no. 3 (2013): 469.
48. Ibid, 472.
49. Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book that will

Change the Way you do Business (New York: HarperBusiness, 2000), xviii.
50. Canada Broadcasting Corporation Radio, “‘Disruptive Innovation’ Theory Often

Misunderstood, Says Creator Clayton Christensen,” https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/
the-current-for-november-8-2016-1.3840044/disruptive-innovation-theory-often-
misunderstood-says-creator-clayton-christensen-1.3840127 (accessed June 29, 2018).

51. Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas G. Mahnken, and Andrew L. Ross, “Frameworks for Analyzing
Chinese Defense and Military Innovation” (Policy Brief No. 27, Institute on Global
Conflict and Cooperation, San Diego, 2011), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5cr8j76s.

52. Brian A. Jackson et al, “Aptitude for Destruction Volume 1: Organizational Learning in
Terrorist Groups and Its Implications for Combating Terrorism” (MG-331-NIJ, RAND,
2005), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG331.html.

53. Brian A. Jackson et al, “Aptitude for Destruction Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational
Learning in Five Terrorist Organizations” (MG-332-NIJ, RAND Corporation, 2005),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG332.html.

54. David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos, Counterinsurgency (Washington D.C.:
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006), ix.

55. Gil Ariely and Tomer Bitzer, “The Sinai Terror Threat – A Misleading ’Fata-Morgana’ of
Tranquil Desert” (Commentaries, International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, 2007).

56. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

57. Amina Wako, “Shabaab Abductors Demand Sh150m Ransom for Kidnapped Cuban Doctors,”
https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Cuban-doctors-abductors-demand-Sh150m-ransom/1056-5117
474-d3jplf/ (accessed May 17, 2019). Al-Shabaab recently kidnapped two Cuban doctors in
Kenya and demanded a $1.5 million ransom for their release. Kenya was employing these
doctors, implying the demand was directed at the Kenyan government. In April, Nairobi
declared it will not pay ransom to Al-Shabaab. This may indicate a new al-Shabaab strategy of
demanding large ransoms from governments. Since it is unclear whether this will become a
trend, the authors have not analyzed it in the paper.

58. Cedric Barnes and Harun Hassan, “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,”
Journal of Eastern African Studies 1, no. 2 (2007): 152-154.

59. Christopher Anzalone, “The Rise and Decline of al-Shabab in Somalia,” Turkish Review 4,
no. 4 (2014): 388-392.

60. Vilkko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extraction.”

1186 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-november-8-2016-1.3840044/disruptive-innovation-theory-often-misunderstood-says-creator-clayton-christensen-1.3840127

https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5cr8j76s

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG331.html

https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG332.html

https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Cuban-doctors-abductors-demand-Sh150m-ransom/1056-5117474-d3jplf/

61. Ibid.
62. Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.”
63. Ibid; Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System,” (Yool, Hiraal Institute, Mogadishu, 2018),

https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/AS-Finance-System .
64. Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System.”
65. Ibid. The general rate is one out of every 25 camels and one out of every 40 goats.

Zakawaat officials issue receipts to pastoralists, who must present it to officials yearly or be
double-taxed.

66. Ibid.
67. Action on Armed Violence, “Sources of Funding (Including Self-Funding) for the Major

Groupings that Perpetrate IED Incidents – al Shabaab,” https://aoav.org.uk/2017/sources-
funding-including-self-funding-major-groupings-perpetrate-ied-incidents-al-shabaab/ (accessed
August 10, 2018).

68. United Nations Security Council, “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia,” https://www.undocs.org/S/
2015/801 (accessed May 17, 2019).

69. Tom Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.”
70. Vilkko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support to Internal Extraction.”
71. William Maclean, “Qaeda’s Somali Allies Take Fight onto World Stage,” https://www.reuters.

com/article/uk-uganda-explosions-shabaab-foreign/analysis-signs-point-to-somali-war-blowba
ck-idUKTRE66B2EC20100712 (accessed August 10, 2018).

72. Anzalone, “The Rise and Decline of al-Shabab in Somalia,” 390-391.
73. Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.”
74. The Somali Transitional Government has accused Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Qatar, and

Yemen of also providing financial support to al-Shabaab, though there is little information
available on possible links. These countries deny having connections to al-Shabaab. Action
on Armed Violence, “Sources of Funding (Including Self-Funding) for the Major
Groupings that Perpetrate IED Incidents – al Shabaab”; Geoffrey Kambere, “Financing al-
Shabaab: The Vital Port of Kismayo,” https://globalecco.org/financing-al-shabaab-the-vital-
port-of-kismayo#6 (accessed May 13, 2019); Vilkko, “Al-Shabaab: From External Support
to Internal Extraction.”

75. Ursula Daxecker and Brandon C. Prins, “Financing Rebellion: Using Piracy to Explain and
Predict Conflict Intensity in Africa and Southeast Asia,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no.
2 (2017): 219; Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.”

76. David Lerman, “African Terrorist Groups Starting to Cooperate, U.S. Says,” https://web.
archive.org/web/20141111084441/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-25/african-
terrorist-groups-starting-to-cooperate-u-dot-s-dot-says (accessed May 13, 2019).

77. Benjamin Acosta and Steven J. Childs, “Illuminating the Global Suicide-Attack Network,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 36, no. 1 (2013): 61-62.

78. BBC Staff, “Who Are Somalia’s Al-Shabab?” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
15336689 (accessed August 12, 2018).

79. Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.”
80. Andrea Crosta and Kimberly Sutherland, “The White Gold of Jihad: Al-Shabaab and the

Illegal Ivory Trade,” (Report, Elephant Action League, Los Angeles, 2016), https://
elephantleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Report-Ivory-al-Shabaab-Oct2016 .

81. Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System.”
82. Michelle Nicols, “Iran is New Transit Point for Somali Charcoal in Illicit Trade Taxed by

Militants: U.N. Report,” https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-sanctions-un/iran-is-new-
transit-point-for-somali-charcoal-in-illicit-trade-taxed-by-militants-u-n-report-idUSKCN1MJ1
58 (accessed May 13, 2019).

83. Action on Armed Violence, “Sources of Funding (Including Self-Funding) for the Major
Groupings that Perpetrate IED Incidents – al Shabaab;” United Nations Security Council,
“Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 2182 (2014): Somalia,”

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1187

https://hiraalinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/AS-Finance-System

Sources of funding (including self-funding) for the major groupings that perpetrate IED incidents – al Shabaab

https://www.undocs.org/S/2015/801

https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-uganda-explosions-shabaab-foreign/analysis-signs-point-to-somali-war-blowback-idUKTRE66B2EC20100712

https://globalecco.org/financing-al-shabaab-the-vital-port-of-kismayo#6

https://web.archive.org/web/20141111084441/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-06-25/african-terrorist-groups-starting-to-cooperate-u-dot-s-dot-says

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15336689

https://elephantleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Report-Ivory-al-Shabaab-Oct2016

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-sanctions-un/iran-is-new-transit-point-for-somali-charcoal-in-illicit-trade-taxed-by-militants-u-n-report-idUSKCN1MJ158

84. Action on Armed Violence, “Sources of Funding (Including Self-Funding) for the Major
Groupings that Perpetrate IED Incidents – al Shabaab.”

85. Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System.”
86. Several of our sources cited al-Shabaab’s extortion of Somali religious leaders as well, but

there are few details about this source of income.
87. Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System.”
88. Interview with a Mogadishu-based businessman, June 2018.
89. Interview with Mogadishu-based businessman, August 2018.
90. Ibid.
91. This paper uses the terms “tribe” and “clan” interchangeably.
92. Ken Menkhaus, “State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts,” Review of African Political

Economy 30, no. 97 (2003): 408.
93. Interview with Lower Shabelle-based tribal elder, August, 2018.
94. Interview with Somali tribal elder, August 2018.
95. Interview with Middle Shabelle-based farmer, July 2018.
96. Ibid.
97. World Food Programme, European Union, Food and Agriculture Organization of the

United Nations, and Government of Austria, “New Initiative Enables Somali Farmers to
Produce Food Assistance,” http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/somalia/documents/
press_corner/20140306_1 (accessed August 17, 2018).

98. Interview with Middle Shabelle-based farmer, July 2018.
99. Interview with a Mogadishu-based political analyst, June 2018.
100. Ibid.
101. Interview with Somali relative of an extortion victim, August 2018.
102. United Nations Population Fund, “Population Estimation Survey 2014 for the 18 Pre-War

Regions of Somalia,” https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Population-
Estimation-Survey-of-Somalia-PESS-2013-2014 (accessed August 20, 2018).

103. Interview with pastoralist from south-central Somalia, August 2018.
104. Interview with pastoralist from south-central Somalia, July 2018.
105. VOA Staff, “Hiraan: Shabaab iyo Xoola Dhaqato oo Dagaallamay,” https://www.voasomali.

com/a/4301516.html (accessed November 18, 2018). Various pastoralist tribes have formed
organized militias to oppose al-Shabaab. One group of pastoralists has pooled its forces to
oppose al-Shabaab near Mahas, a district in the Hiran region. Dozens of pastoralists and
al-Shabaab members have died in the ensuing fighting.

106. Barnes and Hassan, “The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts,” 154.
107. Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics, and Global Trends, 156-158.
108. Thomas J. Biersteker, Sue E. Eckert, and Peter Romaniuk, “International Initiatives to

Combat the Financing of Terrorism,” in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, eds.
Thomas J. Biersteker and Sue E. Eckert (London: Routledge, 2008), 232-241, 253-254;
Interview with Somali political analyst, June 2018.

109. Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.”
110. U.S. Department of State, “Designation of al-Shabaab,” https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/

des/143205.htm (accessed August 13, 2018).
111. Keatinge, “The Role of Finance in Defeating Al-Shabaab.”
112. BBC Staff, “Bombs Kill Somalia Peacekeepers,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7904613.

stm (accessed August 13, 2018).
113. There is an ongoing scholarly debate on the causes of suicide bombing. See, Benjamin T.

Acosta, “The Suicide Bomber as Sunni-Shi’i Hybrid,” Middle East Quarterly 17, no. 3
(2010): 13-20; Acosta and Childs, “Illuminating the Global Suicide-Attack Network,” 49-76;
Anat Berko and Edna Erez, “”Ordinary People” and “Death Work”: Palestinian Suicide
Bombers as Victimizers and Victims,” Violence and Victims 20, no. 6 (2006): 603-623; Mia
M. Bloom, “Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding,”
Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (2004): 61-88.

114. Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System.”

1188 I. LEVY AND A. YUSUF

http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/somalia/documents/press_corner/20140306_1

https://somalia.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Population-Estimation-Survey-of-Somalia-PESS-2013-2014

https://www.voasomali.com/a/4301516.html

https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/143205.htm

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7904613.stm

115. Crosta and Sutherland, “The White Gold of Jihad: Al-Shabaab and the Illegal
Ivory Trade.”

116. Interview with a Somali government official, June 2018.
117. Hiraal Institute, “The AS Finance System.”
118. Harun Maruf, “In Somalia, Businesses Face ‘Taxation’ by Militants,” https://www.voanews.

com/a/in-somalia-businesses-face-taxation-by-militants/4684759.html (accessed December
14, 2018).

119. For a detailed discussion on the relationship between ideology and the shift from terrorism
to criminality, see Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline
and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 146-166.

120. Interview with a Mogadishu-based Somali businessman, August 2018.

Acknowledgements

We thank Benjamin Acosta for his support, Gil-Ad Ariely for inspiring a large part of our work,
Chaim B. Weizmann for preparing us for this work, Bruce Hoffman and Siobhan Steel for assist-
ing us in the publication process, an anonymous reviewer for their valuable feedback, and our
interviewees without whom this project would not be possible.

Disclosure statement

No conflicts of interest arise from the application of this research.

Funding

The authors received no funding for this project.

STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1189

https://www.voanews.com/a/in-somalia-businesses-face-taxation-by-militants/4684759.html

Abstract

A theoretical framework for terrorist funding innovation

Terrorist funding

Terrorist innovation41

Theory and hypotheses

Methodology and data

A short history of al-Shabaab and its funding sources

Al-Shabaab’s new sources of funding

Extortion of elders and businesspeople outside al-Shabaab territory86

Extortion and employment of farmers

Importation of used automobiles

Taxation and theft of pastoral livestock in Somalia

Al-Shabaab funding sources and terrorist innovation

The ICU phase: 1994-2006

Independence and conquest phase: 2006-2011

Setback and stagnation: 2011-Present

Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

Disclosure statement

Funding

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