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Senior Researcher David Kiron of the Global Research Group prepared this case under the supervision of Professor Youngme Moon. Authors
give thanks to Research Associate Brenda Cheng for her assistance. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discussion. Cases are
not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management
.
Copyright © 2002 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685,
write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. No part of this publication may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School.
Y O U N G M E M O O N
D A V I D K I R O N
Vans: Skating on Air
Fourteen year-old boys have three things on their mind: sports, music, and girls. Our goal is to own the
first two . . . the third, we’ll let the kids handle on their own.
— Gary Schoenfeld, president and CEO of Vans
Early evening April 22, 2002: Gary Schoenfeld, the CEO of Vans, was standing in the middle of
the star-studded, invitation-only crowd that had turned out for the Hollywood premiere of Dogtown
and Z-Boys, a documentary about the history of skateboarding. Smiling, Schoenfeld noticed that
many in the crowd were wearing the specially-designed Dogtown shoes the company had sent to all
invitees.
Vans was best known for selling footwear and apparel to skateboarders and surfers; the company
also sold products for other alternative sports, including snowboarding, BMX bike-riding, motocross,
wakeboarding, and supercross (Vans called these activities “Core SportsTM“; see Figure A for a
description of each sport). Vans had financed the Dogtown film at the request of one of its sponsored
athletes, skateboarding pioneer Stacy Peralta.
Now, as Schoenfeld looked over the crowd, he could not help but feel a sense of satisfaction.
After seven years at Vans, Schoenfeld had managed to turn the company around, revitalizing the
brand and transforming Vans into a $350 million business (see Exhibits 1 through 3 for additional
financial information). In a market in which the customers were notoriously fickle and few brands
ever topped $100 million in annual sales, this was quite an accomplishment.
At the same time, Schoenfeld was keenly aware of how fleeting success could be. Exactly 20 years
before, the company had gotten a big boost from another movie, a cult classic called Fast Times at
Ridgemont High. Eager to capitalize on the increased demand for its products, Vans had expanded
too rapidly and had ended up in bankruptcy. While Schoenfeld was determined not to repeat the
mistakes of the past, he felt strongly that Vans was at a crossroads:
I believe that at $350 million, we’re not maxed out. I look at Nike as a $9 billion brand. Can
we be 10% of what Nike is? Yes, that doesn’t feel uncomfortable to me. On the other hand, I’m
not running the business to become a $1 billion company. We’ve got to proceed incrementally,
so as not to alienate our core customer base.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
2
Already, Schoenfeld had broadened Vans’ product assortment and expanded its distribution
system. The company now sold everything from women’s sandals to outdoor hiking shoes, in retail
outlets ranging from company-owned stores to mass-market chains such as Foot Locker and J.C.
Penney. The company was also involved in a number of entertainment-related ventures: In addition
to financing Dogtown, Vans operated a snowboarding camp in Oregon, it licensed content to
videogame developers for Microsoft’s Xbox and Sony’s Playstation, and it was in the process of
starting a record label. Schoenfeld commented:
The biggest question I’m dealing with today is how to drive that next stage of growth.
Which product categories should we participate in? Which distribution channels should we be
in? I know that lots of shoe industry people are wondering, why is Vans getting involved with
movies, with record labels, with videogames? But what they don’t realize is that our vision is
to integrate ourselves into the places our customers are most likely to be.
Figure A Vans’ Core Sports
Source: Vans; casewriter research.
Surfing
The sport of riding the surf
on a surfboard.
Skateboarding
A short board mounted on
small wheels
.
Snowboarding
A board-like wide ski ridden
in a surfing position downhill
over snow.
BMX
Abbreviation for bicycle
motocross. A cross-country
bicycle race over rough
terrain.
Wakeboarding
A short, broad water ski
ridden like a surfboard by a
person towed by a
motorboat.
Motocross
A closed-course motorcycle
race over rough terrain.
Supercross
An indoor version of
motocross.
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
3
Source: Vans.
The Early Days
Paul Van Doren launched Vans in 1966 with his brother James and two partners. Steeped in the
techniques of footwear manufacturing,1 Van Doren set out to make the most durable and affordable
casual deck shoe in the market. The result was a rubber-soled shoe that was reinforced with clay and
was twice as thick as those produced by the competition. The upper canvas was double-stitched, and
the entire shoe was washable. At prices ranging from $2.49 to $4.99 a pair, Vans shoes were,
according to one industry observer, “built like a battleship.”2
Unlike other shoe manufacturers, Vans sold its sneakers directly to
consumers out of its own retail store in Anaheim, California. At the time,
industry insiders derided the unconventional business model because
“nobody had a store that sold only sneakers.” The skepticism didn’t dissuade
Van Doren, however, who opened his second, then his third, and then his
fourth retail outlet within months.
Promoting the stores was strictly a grassroots affair, managed almost entirely by Van Doren with
the aid of his children. Van Doren’s son Steve recalled, “When a new store was ready to open, my
dad would give me a bunch of flyers to pass out after school. The family was always involved that
way.” Steve also recalled how the senior Van Doren acquired customers—“one surfer at a time”:
I remember there was a surfing competition once, down near Costa Mesa where we grew
up. My dad, who was not a surfer, headed down to the beach to show the surfers our shoes.
He walked straight up to this really famous Hawaiian surfer, Duke Kahanamoku, and said,
“Hey Duke, I like your shirt. Why don’t you let me make you a pair of shoes that match that
shirt? All I need is some material to match it.” Duke grinned, turned to his buddy—who was
wearing an identical shirt—and made him take his shirt off and give it to my dad. My dad
took the shirt, used the material to make the shoes, and delivered them to Duke the next day.
That’s how we did business at Vans back then.
Surfers were not the only ones who enjoyed customized Vans. Because manufacturing was done
in-house, customers could choose from a “Baskin Robbins-like”3 assortment of more than 50 fabrics
and colors. Steve Van Doren—who more than 30 years later was still promoting Vans products,
albeit in a more official capacity as vice president of promotions—explained:
From the beginning, you could choose your own canvas fabric and color. No one else could
do this because nobody else had his own factory. The kids would come in and they’d say, “Oh,
I want green on this side, yellow on this side, blue on this side, make the tongue checkered…”
Or if one foot was a seven and the other was a nine, we’d accommodate that too, for a dollar
extra. By making only the shoes people wanted, we were able to avoid the inventory problems
that afflicted other footwear companies.
“At one point,” Van Doren continued, “every school in Southern California, the cheerleaders, the
drill teams and the marching bands, they were all wearing our shoes. We were the only company
that could match the school colors.” Vans was also a favorite of hard-to-fit customers, who required
1 Prior to launching Vans, Van Doren worked for 25 years at the nation’s third largest footwear manufacturer, Massachusetts-
based Randolph Shoe Company.
2 Ed Leibowitz, “The Ultimate Trendoid Sari Ratsula’s Job Is To Figure Out What Teenagers Will Embrace Next As A Fashion
Statement For The Feet. This Is No Joke. This Is Risky Business,” Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1996.
3 Baskin Robbins was a popular ice cream store chain in the United States known for its wide assortment of flavors.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
4
non-standard widths and lengths. As a result, by the end of the 1960s, the canvas, easy-to-wash
shoes had developed a small but loyal following among the Southern California surf set.
Dogtown and the Birth of the Z-Boys
The 1970s ushered in a wave of anti-establishment, anti-Vietnam, anti-war sentiment among
American youth. It was within this context that—in a depressed area of Santa Monica, California (a
place dubbed “Dogtown” by its inhabitants)—a talented group of disenfranchised teenagers began
creating a new style of skateboarding that ultimately ended up redefining the sport. This group of
self-described misfits (the “Z-Boys”) took pride in pushing the limits of conventional skateboarding,
becoming the first to replicate complex surfing moves on asphalt park embankments and the upper
lips of empty swimming pools. (See Figure B.)
Figure B The Z-Boys in Action
Source: Vans.
For these skateboarding rebels, Vans quickly became the sneaker of choice. The vulcanized
rubber “waffle” soles were ideal for maintaining a solid grip on the skateboard, and the double-
stitched canvas was perfect for withstanding the wear and tear associated with the reckless sport.
Tony Hawk, a skateboarding icon who grew up idolizing the Z-Boys, recalled, “I would climb walls
in them, [the shoes] were so grippy.” In addition, the price was right. Glen Friedman, who grew u
p
skating with the Z-Boys, put it simply: “We wore Vans because they were seven bucks, end of
story.”4
In 1975, the Z-Boys dominated the first national skate competition in Del Mar, California, wearing
matching blue Vans deck shoes and T-shirts emblazoned with their team name, Zephyr. Their
innovative moves overwhelmed both competitors and judges, who had no categories for judging
their style. In the words of Zephyr member Tony Alva, it was clear “we were a step above.”
5
Word quickly spread, and skaters around the country began emulating Z-Boy skating techniques.
A number of skateboarding magazines were launched, and dozens of outdoor skateparks began
opening all over North America. Skateboarding was on the verge of becoming a $400 million
4 Maureen Tkacik, “Nike nips at skate-shoe icon Vans as extreme becomes mainstream,” The Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2002,
p. 1.
5 G. Beato, “The Lords of Dogtown,” Spin Magazine, March 1999.
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
5
Source: Vans.
business,6 and Vans—whose sales had risen rapidly—appeared to be ideally positioned to take
advantage of its close affiliation with the radical sport.
Just as quickly, however, the market began to decline. By decade’s end, the infatuation with
skateboarding had been replaced by a fascination with other alternative sports (such as BMX riding),
dozens of skateparks had closed as a result of the skyrocketing cost of liability insurance, and
skateboard manufacturers had suffered tremendous losses. According to one skateboarding
historian, by the end of 1980, “skateboarding [had] died.”7 That same year, Paul Van Doren turned
the company over to his brother James.
Topsy-Turvy
The ensuing eight years were turbulent for Vans. In 1982, a youth-oriented movie called Fast
Times at Ridgemont High featured a teenage surfer dude named Jeff Spicoli (played by actor Sean
Penn) hitting himself on the head with a pair of black-and-white checkerboard Vans slip-ons. The
movie catapulted Vans back onto the national scene, creating virtually insatiable demand for its
shoes.
James Van Doren responded by broadening Vans’ product mix in
an effort to grab share from Nike and Reebok in the (then) rapidly
expanding athletic shoe market. Soon, Vans was producing shoes for
baseball, football, soccer, basketball, wrestling, boxing, and even
umpiring. But the move backfired: High production costs at its
California-based factory, strong competition from mainstream
brands, and an unreceptive market led first to debt, and in 1984, to
bankruptcy.
Paul Van Doren returned to revitalize the company. “We just put it back on the same road,” he
explained. “To hell with fashion trends.”8 Things started to look up again, as Paul managed to get
the company out of debt, pay back 100 cents on every dollar owed, and then sell the company in 198
8
to a private equity firm, McCown, DeLeeuw Co.
The rollercoaster ride continued into the early 90s, however, when a variety of factors thwarted
Vans’ struggle for growth. A deep recession hit the nation in 1991; the Gulf War followed in 1992.
Oil shortages led to higher rubber costs, which led to higher shoe prices and lower margins.
Meanwhile, “grunge” fashion trends and “urban chic” replaced the surf-and-sun look.
By the mid-90s, the company had closed one of its two factories, had laid off 1,000 workers, and
had replaced a number of its company-owned stores with off-price outlets to move $10 million of
slow-moving inventory.9 In short, the volatile currency of “cool” no longer favored Vans.
6 G. Beato (1999).
7 Michael Brooke, The Concrete Wave: The History of Skateboarding, (Toronto, ON: Warwick Publishing, 2001).
8 Leibowitz (1996).
9 Kelly Barron, “Vans–-No Loafin’: The Orange Company must restore its image and a series of financial and management
upheavals,” The Orange County Register, June 11, 1995.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
6
The Turnaround
In 1995, Gary Schoenfeld took over operations at Vans; two years later he assumed the mantle of
CEO. One of Schoenfeld’s first moves was to close Vans’ remaining factory, effectively eliminating
the company’s manufacturing division. He explained:
For more than 25 years, Vans’ competitive advantage was its U.S. manufacturing with a
cycle time of 19 days from receipt of order to completion of finished goods. Yet by the mid-
90s, anyone could go to Asia and make stuff cheaper and with a far greater range of styling.
There were no barriers to entry. Fortunately, the brand was strong. When you mentioned
Vans to people, they knew what the name meant: young, fun, Southern California, beaches,
skateboarding, and surfing. So our point of difference was going to be our heritage, our
connection to this new generation of sports, the kids who played them, and their lifestyles.
In the late-90s, it was estimated that about 25 million Americans, mostly between the ages of 6 and
24, participated in some kind of alternative sport. This number included an estimated 7.8 million
skateboarders, 4.7 million snowboarders, 2.7 million wakeboarders, and 3.7 million BMX bikers.
10
“Extreme sports” were believed to be more popular among boys aged 12 to 15 than Major League
Baseball or the National Hockey League,11 and more teenage males watched the X-Games on ESPN
than the SuperBowl.
12
Vans’ customer base included both hardcore enthusiasts as well as occasional athletes. The
former tended to spend hours of their free time practicing their sport, while the latter tended to
exhibit a broader range of interests. By far, the most popular of Vans’ core sports was skateboarding.
The average Vans customer was a white, skateboarding male between 12 and 18 years of age who
lived with his parents in the suburbs. His interests typically included punk or hip-hop music and
videogames, and he most likely held skateboarder Tony Hawk in much higher esteem than Michael
Jordan.
13
Schoenfeld believed that the company’s key challenge was maintaining a relationship with these
unpredictable, fashion-conscious kids, so he actively solicited input from his young staff members
(many of whom were skateboarding aficionados) to figure out a way to reach this youthful
demographic:
One of my most important jobs was to listen. We have lots of people within the company
who are part of the lifestyle. . . they live it, embrace it, lead it. They were the experts, not me. I
never pretended to be the target customer. So I spent a lot of time sitting with athletes, talking
with Steve Van Doren and a number of young people in the company who were passionate
about core sports.
Some of these discussions involved debates about which sports could “legitimately” be
considered “hardcore.” In recent years, a number of alternative sports—including snowboarding,
BMX bike riding, rollerblading, and so on—had grown in popularity, and it was not clear which of
these should be included under Vans’ “Core SportsTM” umbrella. As Schoenfeld remembered, “We
considered each of these sports very seriously. Over time, we decided to officially add five sports
10 American Sports Data, Inc., based on 1999 estimates.
11 Teenage Research Unlimited.
12 Based on a TV Guide report (June 1998), John J. Shanley and Paula Kalandiak, “Vans, Inc.” Wells Fargo Van Kasper, February
8, 2001.
13 Based on a survey by Alloy Inc., cited in Tkacik (2002), p. 1.
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
7
[see Figure A], but we also rejected a number of sports—like rollerblading and skiing—that we
didn’t believe were consistent with our message.“
More generally, Schoenfeld’s in-house listening sessions led to the development of a revamped
marketing approach. The centerpiece of the new approach was the sponsorship of a number of
carefully-selected, alternative sporting events and related forms of entertainment. As Schoenfeld put
it:
Our goal was to create a proprietary branding platform that would build on our unique
heritage and give us a long-term leadership position. We always knew a Nike or Reebok could
outspend us, so we focused on furthering the authenticity of our brand and connection to the
lifestyle associated with core sports.
The Promotional Mix
Triple Crown Series
One of the first events that Vans sponsored emerged out of a suggestion from Steve Van Doren
who, as vice president of promotions, spent much of his time cultivating personal relationships with
prominent skateboarders. Van Doren suggested that Vans create a world championship of
skateboarding as a mechanism for recognizing skateboarding’s elite.
The inaugural event was a humble affair—nothing more than a couple of ramps set up in a
parking lot in Newport Beach, California—but the response “from the street” was astonishing: Over
10,000 kids jammed into the parking lot to witness the two-day competition. Van Doren marveled,
“ESPN ended up airing the event 8 to 10 times and we got tons of magazine exposure, which meant
we spent a paltry $50,000 for publicity worth 7-figures! At that point, we knew we were on to
something.”
The following year (1998), the company recast the competition as the “Triple Crown of
Skateboarding.” This time, the competition consisted of three different events (street skating, bowl
riding and vertical ramp riding) designed to reflect the various specialties of the top professional
skateboarders in the world. Around the same time, Schoenfeld learned that the owner of a Hawaii-
based competition called the “Triple Crown of Surfing” was retiring and was willing to sell Vans the
rights. Schoenfeld recalled,
Once we owned both the Triple Crown of Skateboarding and the Triple Crown of Surfing, a
light bulb went on in our heads and we said, “Why don’t we create the Vans Triple Crown
Series?” We then added two more sports [snowboarding and wakeboarding], along with a
couple more sponsors. The final step was taking the extravaganza to ESPN and convincing
them to televise it.
By 2000, the Triple Crown Series had become so big that NBC outbid ESPN for television rights.
Two years later, the competition had grown to include seven alternative sports and 21 events, and a
number of major sponsors (including Ford, Mountain Dew and Microsoft) had become involved.
Moreover, the competition had become a global attraction—Triple Crown Champions hailed from
several continents, including North America, South America, and Europe. (See Exhibit 4 for Triple
Crown Series attendance data.)
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
8
Vans Warped Tour
In 1996, Vans signed on as one of the sponsors of the Warped Tour, a series of concerts that
traveled to various cities, showcasing up-and-coming punk, hip-hop, and hard rock bands.
Schoenfeld explained:
The philosophy behind the Warped Tour was to feature acts like Blink 182 and Green Day
before they hit it big. It was a very grassroots, low-priced, kind of music event that fit well with
our image. Most of the kids who attended the Warped Tour were between 13 and 20 years old;
they spent their day wandering between six different stages featuring dozens of smaller bands.
The approach was totally different from other concert tours like Lilith Fair and Lollapalooza,
which focused on well-known acts. When we got involved, we added things like a “reverse
daycare center,” where parents could hang out while their kids had fun.
It was at this point that my father had an idea. He suggested that, since our Triple Crown
Series was really for professional athletes, we should create some kind of amateur event, where
kids around the country could compete for a chance to become the Amateur Champion of
Skateboarding. Steve Van Doren took the suggestion a step further by proposing that we
combine the amateur competition with the Warped Tour. His thought was, why not set up a
skate ramp next to the music stages so that skateboarding could become an integral part of the
whole scene? That way, we could take the competition from city to city, crowning local
champions along the way.
Tour organizers embraced the idea almost immediately, and the Warped Tour Amateur
Competition became an annual event. Each year, Vans crowned amateur winners in the Tour cities;
the winners from all the cities were then invited to attend a competition in Southern California,
where a single amateur champion was selected. The grand prize was an official sponsorship from
Vans; i.e., the amateur became one of Vans’ sponsored athletes. Schoenfeld grinned, “For the kids,
it’s all pretty exciting.” (Eventually, Vans ended up buying the Warped Tour; see Exhibit 4 for Tour
attendance data.)
Vans Skateparks
Although skateparks had been popular in the late-1970s, most had been forced to shut down by
the end of the decade because of liability costs. In 1997, however, California passed legislation that
categorized skateboarding as a “hazardous sport.” The legislation made skateboarders personally
responsible for the risks associated with participation in the sport; in other words, skateparks could
no longer be held liable for skaters’ injuries.
Vans responded to the new legislation by opening its first skatepark in November 1997. Located
in an outlet mall in Orange County, California, the 46,000 square-foot skatepark could accommodate
150 skaters at a time. Admission cost $7-$9 for a two-hour session.
Local skateboarders greeted the opening with enthusiasm. More than 100,000 paying customers
showed up the first year (along with nearly 2 million skatepark visitors), generating about $2 million
in revenue.14 Most skaters were 12 to 14 year-old boys, although customers’ ages ranged from 5 to 35.
According to Van Doren, the skateparks created a “win-win” for parents and kids: “Parents are
excited because we provide a place where their kids can exercise safely—we run it clean, we don’t
14 Revenues included the sale of merchandise. (All Vans skateparks sell Vans merchandise.) Skatepark members, who paid an
annual $50 fee, received admission discounts.
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
9
put up with any stuff; this is the Disney element we borrowed. And the kids love it because they
finally have a technically-sophisticated arena in which to practice their moves.”
The Orange skatepark was followed by the opening of two more skateparks in 1999, three more
skateparks in 2000, and two more skateparks in 2001. (See Exhibit 4 for recent skatepark attendance
data.) By 2002, dozens of skateparks were back in business around the country; 11 of the most
technically-superior were owned and operated by Vans.
Endorsements of Athletes
The one element of Vans’ 2002 promotional mix that was not new was the company’s
endorsement strategy. Vans’ endorsement of athletes dated back to the 1970s, when it had become
the first footwear company to sponsor a skateboarder. That skateboarder had been Stacy Peralta,
director of Dogtown and an original Zephyr team member: “[Vans was] the first shoe company to
ever pay attention to skateboards. They took a liking to us Z-boys when everyone else dismissed us.
Once a month we’d get free shoes from the Little Corner store in Santa Monica. And they’ve stayed
authentic ever since.”
15
Figure C. A Few of Vans’ Sponsored Athletes
16
Source: Vans.
By 2002, Vans was actively endorsing over 600 athletes across all seven of its core sports. (See
Figure C above for a look at some of Vans’ endorsed athletes.) As Schoenfeld explained, the
company’s affiliation with these high-profile athletes not only built brand credibility, it also enabled
Vans to build bridges to new consumer markets:
All of our athletes are very carefully selected. We want our athletes to be icons for kids, not
posters on police station walls. Plus, they’ve got to have charisma. So we’re interested in the
whole package. For example, we’ve got a skater named Geoff Rowley from England. This
15
16 From left: Omar Hassan, Willie Santos, Steve Caballero, Ethan Fowler, Tony Trujillo, John Cardiel, Dustin Dolin, Jim Greco,
Geoff Rowley, Bastien Salabanzi.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
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guy’s 25-26 years old, and he’s one of the most well-known skaters in the world right now. But
he’s also got a certain look, a certain style, that we think resonates with a lot of kids out there.
Another one of our athletes is from France, Bastien Salabanzi, who’s just 16. He’s a real up-
and-comer, and he’s got a completely different image. He’s multi-ethnic, into hip-hop music.
So what he allows us to do is to be a little bit more urban and credibly extend the brand
beyond a strictly suburban type of message. So as an example, we used a graffiti artist to
design the insole of his shoes.
Now compare Bastien to Jason Adams from San Jose. Jason lives off of caffeine and country
music. He despises anything trendy, hates fad diets, and has got a pot belly to prove it. And
then compare Jason to Jim Greco, who’s pretty much a punk rock icon. So we market him in a
totally different kind of way. The list goes on and on, but the point is, we let the diversity and
the unique personalities of our athletes both market and define the sports and lifestyle
positioning of our brand.
Endorsement contracts for individual athletes ranged in value from $200 to $2500 a month.
Sponsored athletes often received free shoes and apparel, and the most elite athletes were given
“Signature Shoe” contracts that could result in six-figure shoe royalties (royalties typically ranged
from 50 to 75 cents a pair). Vans’ skateboarder Steve Caballero, for example, made $200,000-$300,000
a year from royalties alone. One of Vans’ athletes explained:
For me, the appeal of having Vans as a sponsor is not so much their historical connection
with the sport, which they’re really pushing now. Rather, it’s that they really take care of their
athletes. Steve [Van Doren] is truly behind the skaters and it’s great to be with a solid
company that has dug down deep into the core of the sport.
The Channel Mix
Vans distributed its products through both retail and wholesale divisions.17 On the retail side,
Vans owned and operated 65 full-priced stores that sold a wide range of Vans products for men,
women, and children. In recent years, the company had also opened 62 outlet stores, which
generated lower gross margins than the full-priced stores, but were well-positioned to handle excess
inventory and slow-moving merchandise. By 2002, Schoenfeld had supplemented these retail stores
with the 11 skateparks, each of which sold a large line of Vans footwear, apparel, and accessories.
(See Exhibit 2 for sales by division.)
On the wholesale side, Vans sold its products through a number of national and independent
retailers. This part of the business had undergone significant fine-tuning since 1995; the end result
had been the segmentation of the company’s wholesale partners into three distinct “tier” groups:
• Independent Specialty (“Core”) Skate Stores. These first-tier stores consisted of independent
skate shops frequented primarily by skate professionals and hardcore enthusiasts. Examples
included stores like Blades on the east coast, Jack’s Garage on the west coast, and Fast
Forward in Texas. In addition to carrying Vans products, independent skate shops generally
offered a variety of niche, hardcore brands, which meant that Vans products in this channel
tended to compete against small, highly-specialized competitors. First-tier core shops
represented about 10% of Vans’ domestic wholesale business.
17 Vans also had an international division, which accounted for about 25% of sales.
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
11
• Mall-based Specialty Stores, Better Department Stores, and Sporting Goods Stores. The
second tier of wholesale distribution included mall-based specialty chains (e.g., Pacific
Sunwear, Journeys, Foot Locker and Finish Line), better department stores (e.g., Nordstrom’s),
and sporting goods stores. The chains tended to carry a number of mainstream brands,
including Nike, Adidas, Puma, and Skechers. Second-tier retailers represented 35% to 45% of
Vans’ domestic wholesale business.
• Moderate Department Stores and Family Shoe Stores. The third tier of wholesale
distribution included moderate department stores such as Mervyn’s and Kohls, and family
shoe stores such as Famous Footwear. Third-tier retailers represented 45% to 55% of Vans’
domestic wholesale business.
One of Schoenfeld’s early goals had been to increase Vans’ overall penetration, both at the core
shops and in the second- and third-tier outlets. He had accomplished this goal slowly but steadily
during his tenure, so that by the beginning of 2002, the company’s products were being sold in over
12,000 domestic locations (versus just 6,000 in 1995), including more than 600 core skate shops.
The Product Mix
In addition to the changes in the distribution system, Schoenfeld had worked on overhauling
Vans’ product development process: “Having been a domestic manufacturer of vulcanized shoes for
30 years, we had to completely transform our approach to product in order to become truly
competitive with the rest of the industry, which enjoyed far greater flexibility working with third-
party factories in Asia.” The organizational structure Schoenfeld installed was structured and
iterative, and incorporated feedback from several sources, including in-house merchandisers,
athletes, and core retailers. (See Figure D below for a description of Vans product development
process.) Schoenfeld believed there was still room for improvement in this area; as he put it, “we
need to be recognized as a leader both in terms of how we have built our brand as well as with the
products we bring to the market.”
The general philosophy behind Vans’ product strategy was to create a product portfolio that
corresponded with the segmentation of the company’s various distribution outlets. (See Table 1
below.) This strategy was reflected in the following footwear lines:
Signature Collection. This collection consisted of shoes that were designed to match the skating
style of Vans-endorsed athletes; examples included the “Geoff Rowley,” the “Cardiel 2” (named after
skate veteran John Cardiel), and the “Santos III” (named after technical skate whiz Willy Santos).
Signature shoes were distributed through independent skate shops, full-priced Vans stores, and Vans
skateparks.
Pro Series Collection. The Pro Series shoes were highly technical products, designed for serious
skaters. They were sold through limited distribution to independent skate shops only.
Skate Performance Collection. These shoes, which tended to appeal to the general youth market,
were targeted to skateboarders who were not professional athletes but expected functionality and
durability. They were sold primarily in athletic footwear outlets and fashion/lifestyle stores.
Skate Casual Collection. This collection consisted of non-technical shoes for consumers who were
interested in “skate look” footwear at lower price points. This collection was primarily targeted for
third-tier wholesale distribution.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
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Vans also produced a Classics Collection, which consisted of its original deck shoe in a variety of
styles; this collection was sold in all retail channels. More recently, the company had introduced new
lines of sandals and outdoor (hiking) shoes.
18
Figure D Vans’ Product Development Process
8/01 11/01 12/01 1/02 2/02 3/02 7/02 10/02
Product briefs, drawings,
first samples
The merchandiser, the athlete, and
the designer create a brief
outlining the product and their
proposal. Then the designer
creates a design and the athlete
and merchandiser fine-tune it.
Samples are then made.
Second set of
samples return
from factory
Start sketching a
product line
Internal teams sketch the
product line, including
demonstrating the models
to the different international
offices and contacts to
get feedback.
Internal U.S. review begins
with salespeople targeting
specific customers for
fine-tuning the product.
Confirm the line,
confirm the samples,
then order sales samples.
The product will go back
to the factories for one
more set of samples.
Photos for the
catalogues
must be taken.
4/02 5/02
The Sales Department recruits
sales for the following spring.
Catalogues must be finished
for trade shows in July/August.
Place orders for factories for
deliveries in February (‘03).
April/May
catalogues
appear.
8/01 11/01 12/01 1/02 2/02 3/02 7/02 10/02
Product briefs, drawings,
first samples
The merchandiser, the athlete, and
the designer create a brief
outlining the product
proposal. The designer
creates the design and the athlete
and merchandiser fine-tune it.
Samples are made.
Second set of
samples return
from factory
Product line sketches
Internal teams sketch the
product line.
Models are demonstrated
and feedback is solicited.
.
Internal U.S. review begins.
Salespeople solicit
specific customers for
fine-tuning and feedback.
Lines are confirmed,
samples are confirmed,
sales samples are ordered.
The product returns
to the factories for one
more set of samples.
Photos for the
catalogues
are taken.
4/02 5/02
Sales Department lines up
sales for the following spring.
Catalogues must be finished
for trade shows in July/August.
Factory orders placed for
deliveries in February (‘03).
April/May
catalogues
appear.
Source: Vans.
Table 1 Footwear Lines by Channel (xxx reflects primary distribution target)
Product Line
VANS Stores
(non-outlet)
Independent
Skate Shops
Mall-based
Specialty
Dept. Stores/
Sporting Goods
Price
Range
Signature xxx xxx $55-$85
Pro Series xxx $70-$90
Skate Performance x x xxx $45-$75
Skate Casual x x xxx $35-$65
Classics x x x x $30-$50
Sandals x x x x $20-$40
Source: Vans.
18 The company also sold bike shoes and snowboarding boots.
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
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Competition
By 2002, the number of skateboarders in the United States had grown to an estimated 12 million,
creating an $800 million market for skate shoes.19 And while the rest of the athletic footwear market
was stagnant, the skate shoe market was growing at a healthy clip. (See Exhibits 5 through 7 for
additional industry data.)
Because of this, Vans now faced increased competition on three fronts: (1) larger companies, such
as Nike and Adidas, were attempting to make inroads with the alternative, anti-corporate, youth
crowd; (2) medium-sized competitors, such as Airwalk and Skechers, were competing with Vans in
various mass distribution channels; and (3) smaller, hardcore brands, such as DC and eS, were
competing with Vans for the loyalty of the skateboarding enthusiast.
Nike. During the 1990s, Nike made several attempts to win over skate shoe customers. Nike’s
most ambitious marketing effort, in 1995, involved clever TV ads featuring cops chasing golfers,
runners, and tennis players, with the tag line: “What if we treated all athletes the way we treat
skateboarders?”20 Nike won several advertising awards for the expensive campaign, but to no avail:
The skateboarding community refused to accept the brand, and Nike ended up withdrawing its
product.
By 2002, however, Nike was peddling a new, retro-styled “Dunk” shoe to independent skate
shops. Nike had also purchased an ownership stake in Savier shoes; the private company had
immediately taken advantage of Nike’s technology to produce a technically-advanced skate shoe that
was apparently generating positive word-of-mouth within the skateboarding community.
Although Vans’ sponsored athletes were remaining loyal—one of Vans’ athletes had recently
turned down a lucrative Nike endorsement—Schoenfeld admitted, “Of course I’m concerned about
Nike. Remember, Nike’s marketing budget alone is larger than our total revenues.”
Adidas. Adidas’ efforts in the skate shoe market revolved around DAS, an alternative sports sub-
brand the company had launched in 1998. Adidas’s conspicuous trademark, three left leaning
stripes, was nowhere to be found on DAS products, and the entire product line was being kept out of
Adidas’s traditional distribution channels (which consisted primarily of mall-based stores). Instead,
Adidas was attempting to distribute the DAS line exclusively through specialty skate shops because,
according to one Adidas manager, “That’s where the kids who are into [extreme] sports are shopping
today. . . If you look at what’s happening in teen fashion, most of it is coming from specialty and
going to the mainstream retailers.”
21
Airwalk. Founded in 1986, Airwalk had risen to prominence during the early 1990s, primarily
through its strong support of skateboarding athletes and events. At its peak, Airwalk had enjoyed
annual revenues of more than $200 million. The company had subsequently attempted to transform
itself into a billion-dollar megabrand but had failed miserably, largely because its expansion into
department stores had been perceived by its core customer base as “selling out.” Airwalk’s new CEO
19 2002 estimates; Kate Betts, “The whoosh of what you’ll be wearing,” The New York Times, May 5, 2002.
20 Zina Moukheiber, “Later, Skater: Hey, dude, skateboarding is hot, but the wrong kind of skateboard promotion is bound to
backfire on your marketing department,” Forbes, November 29, 1999.
21 Simon Ashdown, “Adidas courts smallness to sell extreme gear,” TeenScreen, March 1, 2000.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
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was currently focusing the company on three sports—skateboarding, snowboarding, and BMX
bicycling22—and the brand was struggling to regain market share.
Skechers. Founded in 1992, Skechers made flat, well-cushioned trendy sneakers that appealed to
teen and female consumers. (Sketchers was the market leader in the female skate shoe segment.) Its
edgy advertising campaigns used big name endorsers such as Rob Lowe and Britney Spears.
Skechers sold many categories of men’s and women’s shoes, and had significant penetration in most
of the mall-based retailers.
Sole Technologies (Etnies, eS, and Emerica). Sole Technologies owned three niche brands, all of
which were extremely popular among skate enthusiasts. In fact, in a 2001 survey of skateboarding
enthusiasts, all three of the brands had made the list of top ten skate brands, with eS occupying the
top spot.23 The eS and Emerica brands were only available in independent skate shops. The Etnies
brand (the company’s biggest moneymaker) was sold in both independent skate shops and mall-
based specialty chains. It was generally believed that Sole Technologies sold more shoes in the
independent skate channel than any other company.
Other Niche Brands. Other niche brands—such as DC Shoes, Circa, DVS, ipath, Lakai, Osiris, and
Globe—also marketed shoes to the skate community. Schoenfeld commented, “Within the core
segment, momentum tends to fluctuate a lot. A year or two ago, I’d have said that Etnies had all the
momentum. Today, I’d say it’s DC.” Most of the products produced by these smaller companies
were priced at $65 to $100, and were sold in core skate shops. Occasionally, one of these brands
would gain enough mainstream market recognition to penetrate the second-tier retail outlets; DC and
Etnies were two examples.
Homeward Bound: I wish I was
After the Dogtown premiere, Schoenfeld headed home. On the drive back, he considered several
issues that the company needed to resolve in the new fiscal year. In the past, Vans had always been
organized into three business units: retail, wholesale, and international. But Schoenfeld was now
considering reorganizing the company along six business lines:
1. Men’s Footwear
2. Women’s Footwear
3. Kids’ Footwear
4. Apparel (e.g., clothing, backpacks, and other accessories)
5. Entertainment (e.g., Triple Crown Series, Warped Tour, Dogtown movie)
6. Hard Goods (e.g., wheels, helmets, pads, and other paraphernalia)
Footwear: Men’s, Women’s, and Kids’
In footwear, much of Schoenfeld’s energy was focused on two struggling product lines:
• The Women’s Collection. In the core sports community, girls and young women constituted
an underdeveloped market. As one line manager put it, “We’ve got to be in this category,
22 Ashdown (2000).
23 Slap 2001 Reader Survey. The Top Ten list: eS (17% of the vote), Osiris (14%), Vans (11%), DC (10%), Circa (6%), Emerica
(8%), Etnies (5%), Adio (5%), Globe (5%), DVS (4%).
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
15
there are hordes of ladies who want to be part of this skate-inspired, Southern California
lifestyle.” But after several years of effort, Vans’ women’s collection still only made up about
15% of the company’s sales. Part of the problem was that the company’s 15-month product
development cycle had a hard time keeping up with the pace of fashion trends among teenage
girls. Schoenfeld added, “Women’s footwear has been much more of an item-driven business
for us. A certain shoe will catch on, and we’ll sell a lot of that one shoe. But it’s always hard
to sustain; tastes bounce around so much in this segment.”
• The Outdoor Line. In the late 1990s, Timberland and Merrell—two outdoor shoe brands—
had started to become fashionable within the skateboarding community. In response, Vans
had decided to produce its own line of outdoor hiking shoes. Schoenfeld explained,
“Skateboarders and snowboarders don’t necessarily go working out in a gym; they go
running out on trails and hills. So why should we give this business away to companies like
Timberland or New Balance?” To date, sales of the outdoor line had been unimpressive,
although to be fair, Schoenfeld believed the product line needed more time to build a market.
Long-term, Schoenfeld felt strongly that the company needed to “broaden the universe of
what Vans products look like.”
Entertainment
Vans’ entertainment division consisted of the Vans Triple Crown Series (which the company was
now producing for NBC), the Vans Warped Tour, and the skateparks. The division also included a
number of new projects that Schoenfeld realized were raising questions about the company’s
strategic direction. For example:
• Vans was currently in the process of promoting the full-length documentary, Dogtown and Z-
Boys. The project had originated when Vans athlete Stacy Peralta, one of skateboarding’s
original talents, had asked the company to finance a film he wanted to make about the birth of
modern skateboarding. Once the film had been completed, it had been submitted to the 2001
Sundance Film Festival. The film had not only been accepted, but it had ended up winning
two major awards at the Festival—the Best Director Award and the Best Audience Award.
Vans had then partnered with Sony Pictures Classic to distribute the movie, which was
already receiving glowing reviews from critics. (See Exhibit 8 for sample reviews.)
Schoenfeld was the first to admit that he was entering uncharted territory with the Dogtown
promotion: “The reality is, we don’t know the first thing about the movie business. But at the
same time, I do believe that this is all part of building buzz about our brand. Just how big the
movie’s going to be—we’ll have to wait and see, but we’re confident that the PR will far
outweigh whatever cost we end up having in the film.”
• In March of 2002, six weeks before the national release of Dogtown, Vans announced the
creation of its own record label—Vans Records. Its mission was to develop and distribute
music by artists emerging out of the skate, surf, and snowboard communities. The music
label was headed up by Steve Van Doren and Jim Lindberg, a Warped Tour veteran of the
punk band Pennywise.
Van Doren explained the logic behind the record label launch: “We don’t really know how to
make and sell music, but we have a built-in farm system for artists through our Warped Tour,
so we’re trying to take advantage of that. Plus, lots of top skaters are in bands, and our guess
is that kids out there are interested in hearing their music.” Schoenfeld added, “Vans Records
is a perfect complement to the Warped Tour. It’s really a natural move for us considering our
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
16
core sports positioning.” The plan was to distribute Vans music through traditional music
outlets, skate shops, Vans retail stores, as well as at events such as the Warped Tour.
• In recent years, Vans had begun working with videogame developers to produce games based
on Vans Triple Crown Series. The company had already produced two games for the Sony
Playstation (it was still collecting sales-based royalties off of these games), and it had recently
signed a three-year deal with Microsoft Xbox. Schoenfeld explained, “Gaming is a huge
market and we own a lot of proprietary content. I can’t say for sure how this will play out,
but its an extremely powerful medium for reaching our target customers and therefore an area
we want to be in.”
As Schoenfeld drove home, he offered some final thoughts about the future of the business:
At times, some of the people on Wall Street have been critical of our getting involved in
things like movies, music and videogames—we’re a shoe company after all! But one of the
things that really distinguishes our brand is that it’s based on a unique heritage. Remember,
we are the company that sold customized deck shoes to Duke Kahanamoku before the rest of
the world even knew what the surf culture was about. We are the company that produced the
seven-dollar grippy shoe that the Z-Boys couldn’t live without. In other words, no one is as
closely identified with the surf-and-skate lifestyle as we are. . . so I believe we have an
opportunity to become the lifestyle brand representing these sports.
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502-077 -17-
Exhibit 1 Annual Earnings Model, VANS, Inc. (Fiscal Year ends May, dollars in thousands)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000A 2001E 2002E
Total revenue $88,055 $117,407 $159,391 $174,498 $205,128 $277,220 $334,664 $399,180
Cost of goods sold 60,340 71,095 96,691 112,198 118,458 158,651 189,890 225,753
Gross profit 27,715 46,312 62,700 62,300 86,670 118,569 144,774 173,427
Selling and distribution 19,355 23,447 28,113 33,570 46,392 64,306 80,197 96,839
Marketing, advertising, and promotion 5,439 8,281 13,162 17,138 20,685 20,229 23,652 27,265
G&A 8,291 4,699 6,085 6,711 8,951 11,124 12,950 15,617
Other income (1,622) (1,933) (2,783) (2,161) (5,998) (862) (1,286) (1,600)
Operating income (3,748) 11,818 18,123 7,042 16,640 23,772 29,261 35,306
Net Income $(37,134) $3,148 $10,437 $(2,677) $8,724 $12,086 $15,441 $22,464
Margin Analysis
Gross profit 31.5% 39.4% 39.3% 35.7% 42.3% 42.8% 43.3% 43.4%
Selling and distribution 22.0% 20.0% 17.6% 19.2% 22.6% 23.2% 24.0% 24.3%
Marketing, advertising, and promotion 6.2% 7.1% 8.3% 9.8% 10.1% 7.3% 7.1% 6.8%
G&A 9.4% 4.0% 3.8% 3.8% 4.4% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9%
Operating margin -4.3% 10.1% 11.4% 4.0% 8.1% 8.6% 8.7% 8.8%
Net income -42.2% 2.7% 6.5% -1.5% 4.3% 4.4% 4.6% 5.6%
Source: Company data.
Exhibit 2 Divisional Sales Analysis, VANS, Inc. (Fiscal Year ends in May, dollars in thousands)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000A 2001E 2002E
U.S. Retail Sales $24,600 $29,400 $36,999 $46,985 $60,413 $77,761 $104,468 $127,068
% of U.S. sales 32.8% 32.3% 32.1% 37.7% 40.8% 41.7% 43.4% 43.4%
% of total sales 27.9% 25.0% 23.2% 26.9% 29.5% 28.4% 31.2% 3
1.8%
Wholesale $50,500 $61,700 $78,127 $77,501 $87,546 $108,663 $136,104 $165,940
% of U.S. sales 67.2% 67.7% 67.9% 62.3% 59.2% 58.3% 56.6% 56.6%
% of total sales 57.4% 52.6% 49.0% 44.4% 42.7% 39.7% 40.7% 41.6%
U.S. Sales $75,100 $91,100 $115,126 $124,486 $147,959 $186,424 $240,572 $293,008
Int’l Sales $12,955 $26,307 $44,265 $50,012 $57,078 $87,086 $94,092 $106,172
% of total sales 14.7% 22.4% 27.8% 28.7% 27.8% 31.8% 28.1% 26.6%
Total Sales $88,055 $117,407 $159,391 $174,498 $205,037 $273,510 $334,664 $399,180
Additional Data
Vans Stores 79 82 84 101 110 126 134 144
Skateparks — — — — 1 4 7 13
Source: Company data.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
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Exhibit 3 Vans’ Revenues by Product Line and Division (FY 2001)
Domestica
Wholesale
International
Wholesale Retail Otherb Total
Sales as % of Total by Division
Men’s > 50% > 70% 40-45% 0.0% 54.3%
Women’s 20-25% 5-10% 10-15% 0.0%
15.1%
Kids 15-20% 5-10% 15-20% 0.0% 15.1%
Snow <5% 5-10% <5% 0.0% 3.1%
Apparel/Accessories <5% <5% 10-15% 30-40% 6.5% Entertainment <5% <5% 5-10% 15-20% 3.0% Hard Goods <5% <5% <10% 0.0% 1.6%
Royalties <5% <5% <5% 40-50% 2.1%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total Channel as % of
Total Revenue 38.4% 25.3% 31.6% 4.6% 100.0%
Source: Vans documents.
a Includes e-commerce.
b Other apparel is VanPac/VASH; other entertainment is HCSC; other royalties is ITC.
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
19
Exhibit 4 Attendance at Triple Crown Events, Warped Tour Events, and Vans Skateparks
VANS TRIPLE CROWN SERIES ATTENDANCE NUMBERS—2001/2002
Event Name Attendance
Mountain Dew Pro Nationals of Snowboarding 9,500
Vans Championships of Snowboarding 17,500
Ford Ranger North American Championships of Snowboarding 15,800
Ford Ranger Wakeboarding Pro 11,500
Mountain Dew WWA Wakeboard National Championships 5,500
Vans WWW World Wakeboard Championships 9,500
Mountain Dew National Championships of BMX 10,000
Right Guard Xtreme Sport BMX World Championships 5,500
Vans Championships of BMX 30,000
Vans Slam City Jam North American Championships of Skateboarding 30,200
Mountain Dew National Championships of Skateboarding 14,300
Xbox World Championships of Skateboarding 30,000
Mountain Dew Nationale of Supercross 45,000
Ford Ranger Pro of Supercross 39,000
Vans Championships of Supercross 34,000
Xbox Pro of Freestyle Motocross 9,500
Mountain Dew National Championship of Freestyle Motocross 14,960
Vans Championships of Freestyle Motocross 23,000
G-Shock Hawaiian Pro 4,500
Rip Curl Cup 5,000
Xbox Pipeline Masters 9,500
TOTAL 373,760
VANS WARPED TOUR ATTENDANCE NUMBERS—2001
45 North American tour
stops
Total 540,000 Up 35% over 2000 tour
VANS SKATEPARKS ATTENDANCE NUMBERS—2001/2002
Total—Fiscal ‘02 5,071,78
4
Total x 1.5 7,607,67
6
This total reflects a 1.5% increase, based on counter misses,
such as when two guests enter the park and the counter only
registers one hit
Source: Vans.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
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Exhibit 5 Total Industry Skate-Shoe Dollar Expenditures by Age Group (2000)
Source: Adapted from Sports Business Research Network,
April 21, 2001).
Exhibit 6 Total Industry Skate-Shoe Unit Purchases by Retail Outlet (2000)
Source: Adapted from Sports Business Research Network,
April 21, 2001).
Notes: “Specialty Athletic Footwear Stores” include Foot Locker, Foot Action, and other mall-based chains. “Specialty Sport
Stores/Pro Shops” include independent skate shops. “Factory Outlet Stores” include Nike and Vans stores. “Sporting
Goods Stores” include Sports Authority and Big 5. “Family Footwear Stores” include Florsheim’s and Payless.
“Discount Stores” include Kmart and Target. “Department Stores” include Macy’s, Federated, Hudson, and Filene’s.
43.0%
32.9%
13.9%
5.9%
2.5%
1.8%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Under 14
14-17
18-24
25-34
35-44
44+
A
g
e
G
ro
u
p
Percentage
13.7%
10.2%
9.7%
9.3%
9.8%
19.5%
15.1%
4.4%
1.5%
6.9%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25%
Department Stores
Discount Stores
Family Footwear Stores
Sporting Goods Stores
Factory Outlet Stores
Specialty Sport Stores/Pro Shops
Specialty Athletic Footwear Stores
Mail Order
Online/Internet
Other
Percentage
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Vans: Skating on Air 502-077
21
Exhibit 7 The Skate-Shoe Market: Marketshare Percentage by Brand (based on unit purchases)
1997 1998 1999 2000
Vans 33.6 37.4 39.6 46.9
Airwalk 26.4 14.8 12.8 6.2
Skechers 1.4 7.7 8.5 5.2
Nike 5.0 5.5 1.8 5.2
Adidas 2.9 3.3 4.3 4.6
Etnies — — — 4.1
DC Shoes n/a 4.4 1.2 3.6
Soap — — — 2.1
Payless 2.1 7.1 2.4 2.1
Converse 2.9 2.2 1.2 1.5
K-Mart — — — 1.0
Avia — — — 1.0
American Eagle — — — 1.0
Simple 4.3 — — 1.0
Easy Spirit n/a 1.1 — 1.0
Source: Adapted from Sports Business Research Network,
(accessed April 21, 2001).
Note: Excludes brands with less than 1% marketshare.
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502-077 Vans: Skating on Air
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Exhibit 8 Sample Excerpts from Reviews of Dogtown and Z-Boys
Stephen Holden of The New York Times:24
[A] giddy, thrilling, rock ‘n’ roll-saturated history of skateboarding in Southern California.
“Dogtown and Z-Boys,” which has won audience awards at the Sundance and AFI film festivals,
could be described as a shrewd entrepreneurial exercise in self-mythologizing. But as this taut,
viscerally propulsive insider’s history of the sport in its early years skids and leaps forwards with a
jaunty visual panache, it is impossible not to be seduced by its hard-edged vision of an endless
teenage summer…
Beyond being an exhibition of physical prowess and daring, the essence of skateboarding
excellence is that elusive personal quality known as style. That’s why the movie’s suggestion that
skateboarding is an art form—with its emphasis on grace, inventiveness and self-expression—doesn’t
seem so far-fetched.
Owen Gleiberman of Entertainment Weekly:25
[A] dazzling crafted documentary about the teenage surf punks of lower Los Angeles who
singlehandedly transformed skateboarding into the extreme sport it has become…
Sure, it’s only skateboarding, but the thrill of “Dogtown” is that the kids who had the audacity to
kick a concrete sport into the third dimension, carving up space with their boards, were as obsessive
in their fervor as the creators of punk rock or Cubism. The movie invites you to share their free ride.
Mark Holcomb of The Village Voice:26
Treading a fine line between documentation and sales pitch, Stacy Peralta’s Dogtown and Z-Boys is
a hyperbolic account of the birth of outlaw skateboarding in the early ‘70s. Its po-faced portrayal of
the era as slightly less epochal than the Renaissance may be risible, but its spirit of iconoclastic
abandon—however canned—makes for unexpectedly giddy viewing.
The film traces the lives and careers of the Zephyr Skating Team. … Thirty years later the moves
they pioneered are the stuff of network-TV sportscasts and multimillion-dollar ad campaigns.
Kenneth Turan of the Los Angeles Times:27
You could draw a straight line, as the new documentary “Dogtown and Z-Boys” doesn’t hesitate
to do, between the Z-Boys, a scruffy group of outlaw Southern California surfers and skateboarders
of the 1970s, and a modern extreme-sports movement so pervasive it’s gotten into the Olympics and
onto U.S. postage stamps…
[T]his doc was co-written and directed by Stacy Peralta, a Z-Boy himself. Also Vans, the sneaker
company oh-so-casually mentioned as the Z-Boys’ shoe of choice, financed the film. Isn’t it wonderful
when friends help friends?
24 Stephen Holden, “Skating on Top of the World During an Endless Summer” The New York Times, April 26, 2002.
25 Owen Gleiberman, “Dogtown and Z-Boys,” Entertainment Weekly, April 26, 2002.
26 Marc Holcomb, “Buy Low, Sell High, The Village Voice, April 24-30, 2002.
27 Kenneth Turan, “Skating into History” Los Angeles Times, April 26, 2002.
For the exclusive use of z. du, 2023.
This document is authorized for use only by zhanao du in MGT 234 – Brand Management Cases 2023 taught by Max Joo, University of California – Riverside from Jan 2023 to Jul 2023.
Present 1 page summary of the case (Times new roman 11pt, 1inch margin, 1.5 spaced), and your suggestion of Vans positioning statement.
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