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Article Analysis Assignment
Content Requirements
Carefully read the article corresponding to your topic. (Articles can be found in the locker corresponding to your group.) Identify the
purpose,
hypotheses,
key variables (independent, dependent, or correlational) and how they are operationalized,
type of research design (e.g., experimental, correlational, quasi-experimental), procedure (including cover story),
and key results. You can use the
article analysis form
to summarize these details if you wish, but this form does not need to be submitted. If your article is a multi-study paper, read the whole article, and summarize the first study and then briefly (in 1-2 sentences) mention how the subsequent studies differed from the first study.
Then describe implications of the results (in plain language) and a possible follow-up study. Explain why your follow-up study is important and what it would tell us about this line of research. Aim to propose something original rather than something described in the Discussion section of the article. Finish the paper with an APA style reference for the article. The paper should be written in paragraph format, in accordance with APA style. As writing quality is especially essential in such a short piece, plan to write multiple drafts.
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Maximum two double-spaced pages with one-inch margins (including reference on the last page). Do not include a title page. Your name and the title should appear at the top of the first page.
Font: 12-point
Topic Available
Anti Immigration Attitudes
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Article Analysis Assignment Marking Scheme
Your article analysis will be marked according to the following criteria:
Criteria
Weight
1. Purpose and Hypotheses – 3 marks
2. Key Variables and how they are Operationalized – 3 marks
3. Type of Research Design – 2 marks
4. Procedure – 2 marks
5. Summary of Key Results & Implications – 3 marks
6. Possible Follow-up Study – 4 marks
7. APA Style for Reference at end of paper – 2 marks
8. Organisation, Clarity of Writing, Style – 1 mark
Total = 20 marks
Received: 22 September 2021 | Revised: 9 February 2022 | Accepted: 10 March 2022
DOI: 10.1111/jasp.12871
OR I G I NA L A R T I C L E
Psychological bases of anti‐immigration attitudes among
populist voters
Valerio Pellegrini1 | Marco Salvati2 | Valeria De Cristofaro1 |
Mauro Giacomantonio1 | Luigi Leone1
1Department of Social and Developmental
Psychology, Faculty of Medicine and
Psychology, Sapienza University, Rome, Italy
2Department of Human Science, University of
Verona, Verona, Italy
Correspondence
Valerio Pellegrini, Department of Social and
Developmental Psychology, Faculty of
Medicine and Psychology, Sapienza University
of Rome, Rome, Italy.
Email: valerio.pellegrini@uniroma1.it
Abstract
The ascent of populism has been linked with economic and cultural disruptions of
modernization. From this perspective, it could be implied that factors such as
psychological insecurity and uncertainty are key in making voters gravitate toward
the populist narrative. The present research aimed at highlighting the psychological
determinants that uncertainties deriving from modernization processes may activate
in populist voters. Specifically, we focused on immigration in Italy, investigating
whether and how support for different populist parties relates to development of
negative attitudes toward immigrants. Two samples of Italian adults (total N = 1655),
who voted in the Italian general elections of March 4, 2018 took part in the research.
Multigroup path analysis showed that assumption of anti‐immigration stances
through the joint mediating role of Dangerous World Belief and Right‐Wing
Authoritarianism was shared by different groups of populist voters. However,
different populist voters differed in the strength of the path passing through
Competitive Jungle World Belief and Social Dominance Orientation. Results
underline the relevance of social worldviews and ideological attitudes in shaping
the attitudes of the Italian populist electorate.
1 | INTRODUCTION
A growing literature has tackled the question of explaining the rise of
populism and its connections with immigration phenomena (e.g.,
Diehl et al., 2019; Hochschild, 2016; Zaslove, 2004). Research
focusing on populist voters often overlooks individual differences
characterizing this electorate and the psychological dynamics that
might explain their stances on a variety of issues (e.g., Ivaldi
et al., 2017). Support for populist ideology and the empirically
related expression of anti‐immigration attitudes are often traced back
to the economic and cultural changes that mark postmodern society
(Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012; Ibsen, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2016;
Rodrik, 2018), and to the globalization processes which have
produced the so‐called “losers of modernization” (Betz, 1994).
Previous research has provided valuable insights about the
current varieties of populism. However, apart from recent excep-
tions (e.g., Fatke, 2019; Salvati et al., 2022; Van Hiel et al., 2021),
scant emphasis has been posed on the psychological reactions—in
terms of specific psychological variables—that lead people to
resolve their concerns through adhering to populism and endorsing
anti‐immigration attitudes. The present research attempts to
address this gap.
Populism has been conceptualized as a “thin‐centered ideology,”
lacking a central political core (Mudde, 2004, 2007). Because of this
J Appl Soc Psychol. 2022;52:449–458. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jasp | 449
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2022 The Authors. Journal of Applied Social Psychology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC.
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5735-9239
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4904-785X
mailto:valerio.pellegrini@uniroma1.it
https://wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jasp
lack, populism often needs to lean on themes and issues belonging to
traditional ideologies. Such a distinctive characteristic of the populist
ideology suggests that support for it and the assumption of certain
stances on various social issues might be explained by resorting to
psychological factors that are key for endorsing classical ideologies.
For instance, sensitivity of populist voters to the immigration issue
might be explained through psychological dimensions that are
traditionally posed as the underpinning of political ideologies and
discriminatory attitudes toward outgroups. Dangerous World Beliefs
(DWB) and Competitive Jungle Beliefs (CJB; Duckitt, 2001) represent
prominent conceptual candidates to fill such a role. Belief in a
dangerous world and belief in a competitive jungle world were found
to be central antecedents of the ideological dimensions of Social
Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA;
Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt, 2001), which in turn are relevant
predictors of adherence to the ideologies of the classical left‐right
political spectrum (Conway et al., 2018; Duckitt, 2001) and of
prejudice (Asbrock et al., 2010). The present research thus focused
on how support for populist parties and movements is linked to the
adoption of prejudicial attitudes toward immigrants through beliefs
about the social world (i.e., DWB and CJB) and ideological attitudes
(i.e., SDO and RWA).
1.1 | Populism and anti‐immigration attitudes
As mentioned above, the thin‐centered conceptualization of populism
(Mudde, 2004, 2007) posits a void of typically populist policy tenets,
underlining that populism needs to rely on classical ideologies.
Political movements that clearly show such feature have risen to
political prominence across the world, assuming different ideological
shades. Populism represents a malleable ideology able to incarnate
under left‐ and right‐wing semblances (Ibsen, 2019). The shift toward
a left‐ or right‐leaning direction occurs as a function of which social
issues become salient in a particular context. In countries that have
been affected less drastically by the Great Recession (e.g., Northern
Europe and North America), populism materializes in its ethnocentric
right‐wing variant. In countries that still struggle to recover from the
financial crisis (e.g., Latin America and Southern Europe), populism
materializes in its left‐wing antielitist variant, focused on justice,
social equality, and redistribution.
Italy represents a peculiar case in which both economic and
identity‐threat issues became salient. Economic hardship was felt
acutely during the financial crisis and its aftermath (austerity) in the
decade before 2018 (Corbetta et al., 2018). This favored the spread
of antielitist sentiments against the so‐called “old politics,” allowing
hybrid populist movements (e.g., the Five Stars) to attract voters on a
platform of redistribution and fight against political corruption. At the
same time, a constant inflow of immigrants deftly framed as an
identity threat has allowed the use of nationalism and ethnocentrism
as viable political platforms (e.g., the populist right‐wing).
Copious research has shown that anti‐immigration attitudes
can be traced to natives’ economic (e.g., Facchini & Mayda, 2009;
Hanson et al., 2007) and identity (e.g., Brown, 2011; Louis et al., 2010)
concerns. Immigration may represent a convenient issue to exploit as a
means to boost political gains. It may be framed as a threat to the
usages and customs of a nation, or it may be portrayed as the cause of
a potential drop in economic resources available for natives. Consistent
with this, Ivaldi et al. (2017) described how the Populist Right‐Wing
advanced an ethnocultural exclusionist conception of the people,
rooted in a nativist and nationalist ideology (e.g., “Italians first”). On the
other hand, the Five Star Movement, though not relying explicitly on
cultural and identity motives, opportunistically embraced the public
opinion’s fear of immigration to compete with the Populist Right‐Wing
(Gerbaudo & Screti, 2017). The Five Star Movement added to the
narrative the topic of bad management of migratory flows by the
European Union (a quintessential elite) as the biggest failure of
traditional national parties (i.e., “old politics”). These narratives were
used to speak to specific portions of the population with characteristics
congruent to the electoral prototypes of the two parties. The Italian
populist right‐wing pressed traditional conservative issues as reducing
taxation, along with a strong emphasis on security and immigration
control. This message resonated particularly in the rich Northern
Italian regions and among small‐business owners and trades people
(Faggian et al., 2021). The five‐star movement, on the other hand, has
been followed above all in the less economically thriving regions of
southern Italy. It has made its themes typically associated with a left‐
wing ideology by proposing a redistribution of wealth or social support
systems such as basic income. Its message has resonated among the
young educated unemployed in Southern Italy (Faggian et al., 2021).
For these reasons, the five‐star movement has been likened to other
left‐wing populist movements such as the Spanish Podemos or the
Greek Syriza (e.g., Font et al., 2021). Despite this apparent socialist
semblance, the five‐star movement has repeatedly highlighted some
ideological contradictions, sometimes veering toward right‐wing
positioning on issues like immigration control.
1.2 | Psychological bases of traditional political
ideologies and prejudice
Immigration undoubtedly has represented an issue on which the
Populist Right‐Wing and the Five Star Movement based their political
narratives and gained support among Italian voters. However, the
psychological motives that lead populist voters to be sensitive to the
immigration phenomenon remain unexplained.
Over the last few decades, some variables have been persua-
sively connected with enhanced prejudice and convincingly framed as
the psychological basis of the assumption of traditional ideological
stances. Specifically, SDO (Pratto et al., 1994) and RWA (Altemeyer &
Altemeyer, 1996) have been proven as stable ideological orientations
that characterize people’s general views of intra‐ and intergroup
relationships (Asbrock et al., 2010; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002).
They have been shown also as relevant dimensions associated with
left‐ and right‐wing voting behaviors (e.g., Conway & McFarland,
2019; Conway et al., 2018; Crowson & Brandes, 2017), as well as
450 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.
with adhesion to conservative rather than liberal political orientations
(Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Wilson & Sibley, 2013).
Duckitt (2001) proposed that ideological orientations derive from
particular worldviews held by individuals. According to Duckitt, social
worldviews may in turn be stimulated by contextual factors that—or
are perceived to—characterize society, leading people to attribute
unpleasant characteristics to intergroup interactions. They can be
viewed as threatening the established society and consequently lead
to believing that the world is a dangerous place (i.e., DWB). Belief in a
dangerous world activates the need for control and security that is
expressed in authoritarian and conservative attitudes and values. It is
oriented to the defense of conventions and punishment of those who
threaten them (i.e., RWA). On the other hand, intergroup interactions
may be perceived as ungovernable and unregulated. People may see
the world as a lawless place, where only the strong rule—the belief in
a competitive jungle world (CJB). The view of intergroup interactions
as competitive and ruthless may elicit the need to defend and
maintain order and social stability through power and dominance, and
through attitudes glorifying inequality (i.e., SDO).
It could therefore be reasoned that the psychological uncertain-
ties deriving from cultural‐norm modifications and economic changes
could make these worldviews salient and lead individuals to adopt
ideological attitudes aimed at reducing such insecurities. The political
response to these processes could in turn be found in the populist
narrative and in the related firm adoption of hostile attitudes toward
minority groups (i.e.,
immigrants).
1.3 | Research hypotheses
Drawing on this reasoning, we aimed mainly at investigating whether
the dual process outlined by Duckitt (2001) could account for the
psychological dynamics characterizing the Italian populist electorate.
We aimed to explore if social worldviews and ideological attitudes
may represent the psychological underpinnings of the association of
the Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing voting with anti‐
immigration attitudes. We anticipated that populist (vs. nonpopulist)
voters could show enhanced levels of the competitive jungle world
belief and dangerous world belief. These were expected to favor,
respectively, the adherence to ideological attitudes based on
dominance relationships (i.e., SDO) and susceptibility to the
traditional norms and conventions (i.e., RWA), which in turn should
positively affect the rise of hostile sentiments toward immigration.
Specifically, we would anticipate that:
Hypothesis 1. (H1): Populist voting was positively associated with CJB
and DWB.
Hypothesis 2. (H2): CJB and DWB related positively and respectively
to SDO and RWA.
Hypothesis 3. (H3): RWA and SDO were positively associated with
anti‐immigration.
Hypothesis 4. (H4): Populist voting was indirectly associated with
anti‐immigration attitudes through the joint mediating role of
DWB with RWA and of CJB with SDO.
We thus investigated the relationship between populist voting
and anti‐immigration attitudes, focusing on how it could operate
through different social worldviews and ideological attitudes.
2 | METHODS
2.1 | Participants
The predicted associations were examined for two distinct conve-
nience samples of Italian participants. The decision to use two
independent samples was made to increase the robustness of the
results and confidence in their generalizability across a relatively
short, though significant, time‐gap. The size of both samples was
established according to a power analysis specifically designed for
mediational effects. The analysis was performed by means of an R
application written by Schoemann et al. (2017), which entails a Monte
Carlo simulation approach. We estimated statistical power for a serial
mediation model, by setting a high power threshold of 0.90 and
conservative effect sizes (i.e., expected correlation of 0.15) among
predictors, mediators and criterion (Cohen, 1988). Following
Schoemann et al. (2017), we also opted for a large total number of
power analysis replications (5000) and wide coefficient draws per
replication (20,000). A sample size of around 700 participants was
needed to achieve a statistical power of .90.
Sample A consisted of 774 Italian participants (418 female,
Mage = 38.4, standard deviation [SD]age = 13.9) recruited by psy-
chology students who were instructed to enroll nonstudent adult
participants in exchange for extra course credits (i.e., snowball
sampling). 78.8% of the sample was indeed represented by
nonstudent adults involved in various occupations: 68.5% employed,
5.1% retired or houseworker, 3.2% unemployed. The remaining
22.2% were students. As for educational level, 4.4% had a lower
secondary school diploma, 45.2% a high school diploma, 39.5% a
degree, while 9.4% had a postgraduate qualification (for a detailed
description of the Sample A data, see Pellegrini et al., 2019).
Importantly for our research purposes, the data were collected in a
period immediately following the Italian general elections of March 4,
2018, when the first government led by Prime Minister Giuseppe
Conte had not yet been formed.
Sample B was recruited with the same data collection procedure
and answered the same questionnaire as Sample A. These data were
collected about 10 months after the general elections of March 4,
2018, during the month of January 2019, while Italy was governed by
the populist coalition formed by the Five Star Movement and the
League. Sample B consisted of 881 participants (476 female,
Mage = 46, SDage = 17.2), of which 79.5% were nonstudent adults
who varied in terms of employment conditions (59.1% employed,
16.3% retired or houseworker, 4.3% unemployed). The educational
PELLEGRINI ET AL. | 451
level was distributed as follows: 9.6% had a lower secondary school
diploma, 46.7% a high school diploma, 38.7% a university degree, and
5.7% a postgraduate qualification.
2.2 | Measures
2.2.1 | Self‐reported vote
Participants were asked to indicate for which party (e.g., Democratic
Party, Five Star Movement, and League) they voted in the Italian
general elections of March 4, 2018. In Sample A, the self‐reported
vote was distributed as follows: 23.3% Five Star Movement, 24.4%
Populist Right‐Wing Coalition, 19.9% Democratic Party, 12.3% other
left‐wing parties, and 12.8% abstained. In Sample B, 27.8% of
participants declared to have voted for the Five Star Movement,
14.6% for the Populist Right‐Wing Coalition, 32.7% for the
Democratic Party, 12.7% for other left‐wing parties, while
the remaining 12.8% abstained. Because of analysis purposes, the
reported voting behavior was coded into dummy variables opposing
populist (i.e., Five Star Movement or Populist Right‐Wing = 1) and
nonpopulist voters (i.e., the remaining voters and abstained = 0)1. We
considered this variable as indicating belongingness to specific
electorate clusters. We were thus able to investigate the distinctive
psychological processes that linked these electoral clusters to anti‐
immigration stances.
2.2.2 | Social worldviews
Participants answered two distinct 10‐item scales of beliefs in a
dangerous world and beliefs in a competitive jungle world (DWB,
CJB; Duckitt, 2001). A high score on DWB reflects the extent to
which participants deem that the social world is a dangerous and
threatening place, where the values and lifestyle of good and
respectable people are threatened by bad people. Items were rated
on a 7‐point Likert scale and then averaged to obtain an overall score
(Sample A: M = 4.05, SD = 1.0, α = .82; Sample B: M = 4.01, SD = 1.04,
α = .83). A high score on the CJB scale indicates instead the view of
the world as a place characterized by a ruthless and amoral struggle
for resources and power. Items were again rated on a 7‐point Likert
scale and averaged to get a whole score (Sample A: M = 2.51,
SD = 0.98, α = .85; Sample B: M = 2.39, SD = 0.93, α = .83).
2.2.3 | Ideological attitudes
As measures of ideological attitudes, participants were asked to
answer 10 items of the RWA scale (Altemeyer & Altemeyer, 1996)
and eight items of the SDO scale (Pratto et al., 1994). RWA taps the
tendency to submit to the authorities, to adhere to the conventions
and norms of society, and to be hostile toward those who do not
adhere to them (Sample A: M = 3.54, SD = 1.02, α = .85; Sample B:
M = 3.11, SD = 1.28, α = .86). SDO gauges the adherence to an
ideological attitude based on support for the social hierarchy and the
desire that one’s group is superior to the outgroup (Sample A:
M = 2.47, SD = 1.10, α = .87; Sample B: M = 2.09, SD = 1.03, α = .86).
Participants provided their answers for both measures on a 7‐point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”).
Responses to each item were averaged to obtain an overall score
whose high values corresponded to high SDO or RWA levels.
2.2.4 | Anti‐Immigration attitudes
Participants rated one item taken from the American National
Election Study (2016). It asked participants to select one of four
response options about the policies that the government should
adopt about immigration, ranging from permissive (“Allow irregular
immigrants to stay in Italy and apply for citizenship, without
penalties”) to restrictive political actions (“Make irregular immigration
a crime, and expel legal immigrants to their countries of origin”). The
average score of the item was equal to 2.45 (SD = 0.93) and 2.27
(SD = 0.78), respectively for Sample A and Sample B.
3 | RESULTS
The main aim of our research was to investigate whether the Duckitt
(2001) dual‐process model could weave the psychological dynamics
delineating the Italian populist voters. Thus, we tested a multiple
serial mediation model where voters of the Five Star Movement and
Populist Right‐Wing (vs. abstainers and voters of nonpopulist parties)
could develop negative attitudes toward immigration through two
parallel paths: on the one hand, passing through the dangerous world
belief and then RWA; on the other hand, through the CJB and then
through SDO. We therefore dummy coded the Five Star Movement,
Populist Right‐Wing, nonpopulist groups of electors, and abstainers
with two variables: the first, opposing Five Star Movement voters
(coded 1) to all other electors (coded 0), and the second, opposing the
Populist Right‐Wing electors (coded 1) to all other participants
(coded 0). By keeping constant the non‐populist group coding across
the two dummy variables, we were able to obtain a straight
comparison between the Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐
Wing groups of voters with voters of nonpopulist parties. Differently
put, the mutual partialization of the two variables’ associations
allowed us to interpret the unique paths that characterized the Five
Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing participants as opposed to
the nonpopulist participants.
We first examined zero‐order associations among the measured
variables (Table 1). They highlighted a positive relationship of the two
voting dummies with the DWB, and only of the Populist Right‐Wing
dummy with the CJB. Consistently with the Duckitt model, DWB and
CJB were respectively associated with RWA and SDO, which in turn
related positively with anti‐immigration attitudes. Analysis of zero‐
order association thus provided initial support to our expectations,
452 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.
suggesting that they could be profitably probed by means of a path
analysis model.
As depicted in Figure 1, the model thus specified the two dummy
variables opposing Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing
voters to the nonpopulist participants as the exogenous variables,
DWB and CJB as first step mediators, RWA and SDO as second step
mediators; anti‐immigration attitudes were modeled as the final
criterion.
The model was tested by a robust maximum likelihood method,
with the Huber–White correction. We used this correction since we
were also interested in testing indirect associations, which are
conventionally not normally distributed. Analysis was conducted with
lavaan (Rosseel, 2012), an R package for Structural Equation
Modeling, by using the RStudio graphical interface (2020).
The proposed model was performed simultaneously across the
two research samples by means of a multigroup path analysis.
We initially set free to vary the effect among variables, obtaining a
specific baseline model on which to examine any differences
between the samples. Figure 1 summarizes the standardized
parameter estimates for Samples A and B. The free model fitted
very well (χ²[10] = 30.39, p = .001; Comparative Fit Index [CFI] = 0.99;
Tucker–Lewis Index [TLI] = 0.95; Standardized Root Mean Square
Residual [SRMR] = 0.018; Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
[RMSEA] = 0.050, 90% confidence interval [CI] = 0.031–071). We
then imposed equality constraints on all regression coefficients to
gauge if the structural relations in the specified model could be
considered invariant in magnitude across Samples A and B. This
model fitted the data nicely (χ²[23] = 55.91, p < .001; CFI = 0.98;
TLI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.032; RMSEA = 0.041, 90% CI = 0.027–071).
However, as can be seen in Table 2, an omnibus difference test
between the two models showed that they differed significantly in
terms of overall fit, and hence the coefficients could not be
TABLE 1 Intercorrelations of Five Star Movement (5SM) and Populist Right‐Wing (PRW) dummies, Dangerous World Belief (DWB),
Competitive Jungle Belief (CJB), Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), Right‐Wing Authoritarianism (RWA), and Anti‐Immigration Attitudes
(Anti‐Imm)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. 5SM – −.25** .10** −.03 −.08* .09** .08*
2. PRW −.31** – .17** .12** .18** .36** .25**
3. DWB .19** .16** – .15** .03 .48** .29**
4. CJB −.03 .13** .08* – .53** .25** .19**
5. SDO −.05 .21** .04 .54** – .30** .23**
6. RWA .06 .35** .46** .25** .23** – .43**
7. Anti‐Imm. .09* .17** .22** .20** .19** .32* –
Note: Sample A (N = 774) below the diagonal and Sample B (N = 881) above the diagonal.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
F IGURE 1 Path analysis model. Note: Figure shows standardized parameters. Sample B in parentheses. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. CJB, Competitive Jungle Belief; DWB, Dangerous World Belief; RWA, Right‐Wing Authoritarianism; SDO, Social Dominance Orientation
PELLEGRINI ET AL. | 453
considered fully invariant across samples. Some coefficients
appeared to be slightly different across the two samples. Specifically,
the relationship between the Five Star Movement and DWB was
slightly higher in Sample A (β = .26) than in Sample B (β = .15). Thus,
we decided to again fit the model, removing the constraint on this
pair of coefficients. The model fit was highly satisfactory
(χ²[22] = 48.54, p = .001; CFI = 0.99; TLI = 0.97; SRMR = 0.030;
RMSEA = 0.038, 90% CI = 0.024–0.53). The omnibus hierarchical
difference test between this latter model and the baseline
unconstrained model resulted nonsignificant. Hence, coefficients
could be considered equivalent across the two samples, except for
the abovementioned (small) difference in a coefficient pair. We thus
reported and discussed standardized beta coefficients common to
both samples, except for the association between the Five Star
Movement dummy and DWB, and for estimated indirect effects.2
Turning to the associations, support for the Five Star Movement
was found to be related to the belief in a dangerous and threatening
world. As previously made explicit, this relationship was significantly
higher in sample A, albeit slightly (β = .26, SE = 0.037, z = 7.17,
p < .001, 95% CI = 0.192–0.336), than in sample B (β = .15,
SE = 0.031, z = 4.67, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.085–0.209). To obtain the
most parsimonious model possible, we decided not to relate the Five
Star Movement dummy to the belief in a competitive jungle world.
This decision was also supported by the results of correlation
analyses, which highlighted the lack of a significant link between
these variables in both samples. Support for the Five Star Movement
was unrelated to SDO, but directly associated with RWA (β = .11,
SE = 0.021, z = 5.39, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.071–0.153) without media-
tion of DWB.
Support for the Populist Right‐Wing coalition turned instead
associated with both social worldviews. The Populist Right‐Wing
dummy related positively with the dangerous world belief both in
Sample A and Sample B (β = .22, SE = 0.024, z = 9.36, p< .001, 95%
CI = 0.176–0.269). Similarly, it was also related to CJB in both samples
(β = .12, SE = 0.026, z = 4.80, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.074–0.175). The
dummy was also associated with RWA (β = .29, SE =0.020, z = 14.12,
p < .001, 95% CI = 0.249–0.329) and SDO (β = .12, SE = .022, z = 5.66,
p < .001, 95% CI = 0.081–0.167) without the effects being mediated by
DWB and CJB, respectively. The corresponding associations with DWB
and CJB were invariant across the two samples.
As expected, social worldviews showed in turn to be associated
with ideological attitudes. In particular, DWB was positively related
to RWA in both samples (β = .39, SE = 0.021, z = 18.96, p < .001, 95%
CI = 0.353–0.434). The association between DWB and SDO was not
tested in the path model because such association is also excluded
from the more parsimonious version of Duckitt’s dual process model,
and since they were not related in correlation analyses. Instead, CJB
was positively associated with both RWA (β = .17, SE = 0.020,
z = 8.39, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.129–0.207) and SDO (β = .51,
SE = 0.022, z = 23.48, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.466–0.551). Recall that
these associations held invariant in both samples.
Finally, we found anti‐immigration attitudes to be positively
associated with both ideological attitudes. The rise of hostile
attitudes toward immigration related positively to RWA (β = .31,
SE = .026, z = 11.93, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.262–0.364), and with SDO
(β = .11, SE = .025, z = 4.44, p < .001, 95%CI = 0.063–0.162) in both
samples. Moreover, although equivalent across Samples A and B,
direct associations of anti‐immigration attitudes with voting for both
the Five Star Movement (β = .10, SE = 0.024, z = 3.96, p < .001, 95%
CI = 0.048–0.142) and Populist Right‐Wing (β = .11, SE = 0.028,
z = 3.81, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.052–0.161) were detected.
Overall, these patterns of associations suggested that the
presence of indirect relationships, though partially mediated, could
be probed profitably. We indeed tested and found serial mediation
paths for the Five Star Movement voters, which involve the
sequential association of DWB and RWA on anti‐immigration
attitudes (Sample A: β = .026, SE = .006, z = 4.53, p < .001, 95%
CI = 0.015–0.038; Sample B: β = .021, SE = 0.005, z = 4.29, p < .001,
95% CI = 0.011–0.030). For Populist Right‐Wing voters instead, we
tested two serial mediation paths: one involving the sequential
association of CJB and SDO and another on the serial association of
DWB and RWA. The Populist Right‐Wing dummy resulted indirectly
related to the adoption of anti‐immigration attitudes through the
mediators DWB and RWA (Sample A: β = .024, SE = 0.006, z = 4.41,
p < .001, 95% CI = 0.014–0.035; Sample B: β = .030, SE = 0.006,
z = 5.06, p < .001, 95% CI = 0.018–0.041). Similarly, indirect relation-
ships were found from Populist Right‐Wing voting through CJB and
SDO (Sample A: β = .008, SE = 0.003, z = 2.33, p = .02, 95%
CI = 0.001–0.014; Sample B: β = .007, SE = .003, z = 2.26, p = .02,
95% CI = 0.001–0.012).
These indirect associations indicated that for voters of the Five
Star Movement, anti‐immigration attitudes were conveyed by
concerns related to the view of the world as a dangerous and
threatening place which, in turn, favored the adoption of an
TABLE 2 Omnibus test of nested multigroup models
χ² df TLI CFI SRMR RMSEA Model comparison Δχ² Δdf p
Model 1 Unconstrained 30.394 10 0.95 0.99 .018 .050 (.031, .071) ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐
Model 2 Full Constraints 55.914 23 0.97 0.98 .032 .041 (.027, .055) 1 versus 2 24.26 13 .02
Model 3 Full–5SM_DWB 48.543 22 0.97 0.99 .030 .038 (.024, .053) 1 versus 3 17.21 12 .14
Note: Sample A (N = 774); Sample B (N = 881). Model 3 left free to vary the coefficient and standard error of the path between the Five Star Movement
dummy (5SM) and Dangerous World Belief (DWB).
Abbreviations: CFI, Comparative Fit Index; df, degree of freedom; RMSEA, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR, Standardized Root Mean
Square Residual; TLI, Tucker–Lewis Index.
454 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.
ideological attitude based on traditional norms and conventions. This
pattern was likewise relevant for the Populist Right‐Wing coalition
voters. The overlap of both groups of populist voters was also
corroborated by nonsignificant differences about contrasted indirect
effects for both groups of voters across the two samples. Moreover,
the specific pattern of indirect associations for each distinct group of
electors was non‐significantly different across Samples A and B.
However, the Five Star Movement and Populist Right‐Wing
voting showed different relationships with immigration concerns
through CJB and SDO: this pathway was significant only for Populist
Right‐Wing voting (in both samples).
4 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research investigated whether support for populist
parties and movements could be associated with social worldviews
and ideological attitudes which, in turn, would have led to negative
attitudes toward immigration. Despite the multiplicity of studies on
the possible connection between populism and the emergence of
anti‐immigration attitudes, scant emphasis was paid to the explora-
tion of the psychological mechanisms characterizing populist voters.
Most research has focused on the anti‐immigration populist narrative
(e.g., Ivaldi et al., 2017), while others have investigated the role of the
media discourse in conveying populist positions on immigration (e.g.,
Diehl et al., 2019). However, only few scholars have examined the
psychological dispositions which make populist voters sensitive to
the immigration issue.
Pursuing this aim, we tested a multigroup path analysis model
where the association between support for populist parties and anti‐
immigration attitudes was mediated by the joint role of DWB and
RWA and by the joint role of CJB and SDO. We found that the Five
Star Movement support and Populist Right‐Wing support were both
positively associated with increased DWB levels. These results
indicated that both groups of populist voters (compared to non‐
populist) shared stronger beliefs concerning the world’s dangerous-
ness. Populist voters are often represented as the “cultural losers” of
modernization processes (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012). They are
framed as people disoriented by changes in values, new waves of
migration, and the loss of national sovereignty toward the super-
national entities, such as the European Union (Inglehart &
Norris, 2016). Rapid changes can always be framed as deviance from
a hallowed tradition and as a threat to society as we knew it. In
particular, changes due to increasing migratory flows could prompt
populist voters for motivational goals guided by threat‐control
reasons. As intergroup situational dynamics are perceived as
threatening unwanted change, identity‐threat could in turn translate
into an ideological stance aimed at reducing the pace of change—
thus, the DWB association with RWA. In turn, such an array of
threat‐control motivation and ideological aversion to change tran-
spired into hostile attitudes toward immigration. Immigrants embody
several characteristics that natives may view with discomfort, such as
different worldviews, moral standards, and religious beliefs
(Rustenbach, 2010). Immigrants represent a target that, given the
cultural distance, can easily be framed as threatening and therefore
become objects of hostile attitudes to reject this threat (Salvati
et al., 2020).
Both groups of populist voters shared threat‐control motives,
eventually breeding anti‐immigration attitudes. However, the two
groups differed as far as the path passing to CJBs and SDO was
concerned. Analysis revealed a positive and significant association of
CJB only with the Right‐Wing Populist voting. Instead, the Five Star
Movement vote was unrelated to perception of the social world as a
ruthless jungle. The path from voting to anti‐immigration attitudes
passing through CJB and SDO thus materialized only for right‐wing
populist supporters. As an alternative to the “cultural losers”
perspective, populist voters are referred to further as “economic
losers” (Bornschier & Kriesi, 2012)—those for whom the globalization
process has meant economic hardship, downward social mobility, and
employment uncertainty. This perspective is commonly used to frame
leftist variants of populism oriented toward redistribution
(Rodrik, 2018, 2018). However, our results underlined other motives
deriving from uncertainty about managing resources. Perception of
scarcity of resources could activate a competitive and unregulated
view of their management that elicits a dominant response aimed at
restoring power hierarchies in society, and in turn translates to
discriminatory attitudes toward immigrants.
To summarize, besides threat‐control motivations, for right‐wing
populist voters appeared to be also salient concerns related to
economic uncertainty proposed by the perspective of “economic
losers” (or by those who perceived themselves at risk of becoming so)
about the rise of populism. This result may open an interesting
starting point and a new perspective from which to look at the
outcomes of economic processes of globalization. It might suggest
that psychological insecurity deriving from economic uncertainty may
give rise to motivation aimed not only at restoring social equity;
instead, it may be proposed that this insecurity may also elicit
motivational goals aimed at the oppression of others and the
corroboration of status quo power hierarchies in the distribution of
resources. Deprivations in the economic sphere of individuals’ lives
may represent a key element in shaping their anti‐immigration
attitudes (Pellegrini et al., 2021). Consistently, we found that the view
of intergroup interactions as competitive and ruthless resonated with
a dominance‐enhancing response aimed at restoring hierarchies in
society by discriminating against perceived competing groups (i.e.,
immigrants).
5 | APPLIED IMPLICATIONS
In the last few decades, the Italian context was characterized by an
extraordinary combination of factors that created a platform for
populism to become a central political reality. A concentration of
relevant sociopolitical transformations has occurred. For instance, the
fading of traditional parties which historically led the country after
theWorld War II because of pervasive corruption, the mass arrival of
PELLEGRINI ET AL. | 455
refugees in a country previously quite homogeneous both ethnically
and culturally, and in some cases, recurrent corruption scandals that
plagued the somewhat new political parties that have dominated
Italian politics since the middle 1990s (Corbetta et al., 2018). The
combination of these factors may have emphasized the deficiencies
of the political and institutional systems, which were unable to
respond to uncertainties and insecurities deriving from the cultural
and economic turmoil of the 21st century.
Consistently, our results highlight that endorsement of populism—
and its correlates (e.g., anti‐immigration)—find their psychological roots
in deep concerns related to the perceived social context. Support for
populist parties appeared as a political response aligned to specific
ideological preferences due to pervading concerns on the functioning
of the polity and of citizens’ social world. Populism and anti‐
immigration attitudes emerged as viable solutions to the uneasiness
experienced in front of individuals perceived as threatening in cultural
and economic terms.
Thus, from an applied perspective, what populist voters seem to
crave fervently are institutional responses to economic and identity
issues representing the triggers of their concerns. Our results could
provide an indication on how to manage social system in which
populism thrives. On the one hand, it would be desirable to
implement policies aimed at reducing—or preventing—economic
inequalities to tackle the disorientation and anomie associated with
them. On the other hand, strategies aimed at alleviating the cultural
disorientation resulting from the modernization processes might be
implemented. Under this light, the immigration issue would represent
an important opportunity for reformed institutions. Virtuous immi-
gration policies may favor an overturning of the perspective capable
to assuaging concerns of identity and economic nature. These
policies could accentuate the enrichment arising from the contact
based on mutual respect and valorization between ethnic groups with
different cultural roots. Similarly, the economic positive implications
that the presence of immigrant population has for the host country
could be emphasized. Thus, placing immigration in a framework of
cultural and economic enrichment might represent a first step toward
a reconciliation between the “malfunctioning” institutions and the
“betrayed” citizens.
6 | CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
The present research may provide interesting insights into the
widely supported theses for the explanation of right and left‐wing
variants of populism. One may speculate that our findings
corroborate the idea that support for right‐wing populist parties is
attributable to identity‐threat motives in face of cultural dis-
orientation. We might somehow speculate that their success can
also be traced back to economic concerns, or at least to the
uneasiness deriving from the competitive and unregulated percep-
tion of resource management. It appears that the explanation
relating to economic losers can be considered as a double‐edged
sword. On the one hand, it may give rise to the demand for a fair
redistribution of resources. However, and in our research this seems
to be the case, it may inspire motivational goals based on the
hierarchical redistribution of resources as a function of dominance
relationships. Future research might usefully focus its efforts on
investigating this second evidence.
Another speculative conclusion could be found in results that
emerged about the Five Star Movement voters. Although this
movement is described as a hybrid populist movement
(Diamanti, 2014b), it has often been associated with issues and
themes shared by the classical left‐wing ideologies. Voting for the
Five Star Movement has been often attributed to the so‐called
“economic losers.” However, we found an identity‐concern associ-
ated with an authoritarian ideological attitude characterizing these
voters. At the same time, they appeared as not associated with
concern about a competitive and unregulated social world and to
ideological attitudes aimed to cope with it. Consistent with findings
of Corbetta et al. (2018), this could indirectly indicate that voting for
the Five Star Movement is not actually the outcome of real or
perceived economic deprivation, which is commonly attributed to
left‐wing variants of populism. Instead, it could align more closely
with forms of alienation independent from the strictly economic‐ and
resource‐focused sphere. Future research could help to clarify the
ambiguous nature of this movement, and of somewhat similar
phenomena, such as Spain’s Podemos, and Greece’s Syriza.
Finally, the present research suggests that populism can pick
freely from the rich menu provided by classical ideologies, and
specifically draws from values and orientations based on power and
hierarchies, on rejection of diversity, and denial of pluralism.
Ironically, these tenets are at odds with most democratic values,
the very same values that populist voters perceive as fundamental
and betrayed by traditional parties. Nevertheless, hierarchy‐
enhancing and authority‐binding values seem to favor endorsement
of populist parties.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This study was not funded by any grant. Open Access Funding
provided by Universita degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza within the
CRUI‐CARE Agreement.
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
DISCLOSURE
No competing financial interests exist.
ETHICAL APPROVAL
All procedures performed in studies involving human participants
were in accordance with the ethical standards of the institutional and
national research committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration
and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. This
article does not contain any studies with animals performed by any of
the authors.
456 | PELLEGRINI ET AL.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data that support the findings of this study are available from the
corresponding author upon reasonable request.
ORCID
Valerio Pellegrini http://orcid.org/0000-0002-5735-9239
Valeria De Cristofaro http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4904-785X
ENDNOTES
1 Despite a lack of empirical evidence on linkages between political
abstentionism and populism, sharing of political cynicism features could
be argued. For this reason, the model was replicated excluding
abstainers. Emerged results were analogous to those of the reported
model.
2 Indirect effects are separately reported for Samples A and B, since they
are not considered in the model’s fit estimation. Equality assumptions
between indirect effects were tested by contrasting the related
coefficients.
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https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931032000167490
https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931032000167490
https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12871
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