Assignment

Q#1: 

Context

GDP and Per Capita GDP are two of the most basic and most widely used economic measures. These broad measures provide interesting and useful information about a nation’s economy as a whole, and per capita GDP is the standard measure of the standard of living.

These measures are often criticized for not being a measure of quality of life(whatever that means, as there is no standard definition of quality of life). However, GDP was never intended to measure quality of life, just output and the income that the production process produces.

Please read these handouts to learn more about GDP and Per Capita GDP.

• GDP Overview Presentation
• Quality of Life Discussion Paper

Discussion Questions — Answer All

Please share your thoughts on the following:

• Is GDP an adequate measure of national economic activity?
• Should GDP be replaced by a new quality of life measure?
• Or should there be separate measures of economic output (GDP) and quality of life?
• Or some combination?

Q#2:

An answer to the initial set of questions you choose. Your post should be least 300-350 words long and include two quotes or specific references to vocabulary or concepts in the Learning Materials with citations in

MLA format

.

Option #1: Terminology 

Choose five terms from the vocabulary list for this week that are new to you or discussed in our readings in a way you have not thought about. Make sure you choose a few terms from the readings on culture and a few from the readings on technology.  

For each of your five terms: 

1. Provide a brief definition in your own words. This should be a paraphrase of the definition from one of the readings. Please see tips on paraphrasing here.  
2. Cite where you got the definition from in MLA format. 
3. Explain in a few sentences how you think this term might help you look at technology and culture in a new way in this class.

Here are the readings: 

Please see attached for readings. 

Option #2: Quotes 

Review the following quotes from the article “From Technological Autonomy to Technological Bluff: Jacques Ellul and Our Technological Condition” in the Learning Materials. 

“A technological society, Ellul reasoned, begets autonomous technique, a condition in which technology’s values drive technology, and following from this technology will determine the rest of society…Ellul theorized that once human beings enter the technological society (our current situation), technology is not controlled by anything.”

“While the means–the technologies–become ever more complex…Goals such as freedom or wealth are seldom questioned, but it is often unclear what these mean, for whom, and at what cost. The focus is on extending the means of development, pursuing new technologies. Goals are given such content as will the technological means available. Thus “success” becomes not a state of flourishing but as acquiring more possessions. “educated” no longer connotes wisdom but possessing measurable and marketable skills.” 

“We now generally, if sometimes grudgingly, accept new technology. This is the case even when it creates new difficulties, when it raises profound ethical questions, when it might work less well, or when it exacts greater demands than previous technologies.” 

“Through advertising of particular devices or propaganda for acceptance of technologies in general, the marketing of technology persuades the public to accept new technologies. This process denies that technologies are simply freely chosen by the public in the marketplace and emphasizes the ability of advertising to sell the technologies to the public.”

Choose one of these quotes and do the following:  

1. Place the quote at the top of your post. 
2. Paraphrase the quote in your own words. Please see tips on paraphrasing here.  
3. Discuss how it relates to your relationship with technology in your everyday life OR why you disagree with something in the quote.  
4. Use at least one or two specific examples from your life or our culture to illustrate your points.  
5. Use at least one additional quote from this article in your discussion.  
6. Make sure to cite your quote in MLA style. 

Vocabulary List

Below is a vocabulary list with terms divided in accordance with the headings for each of the Required Learning Materials. Please use this as a guide for the terminology you should know for this course. 

The Elements of Culture

· nonmaterial culture

· material culture 

· symbol 

· Sapir-Whorf hypothesis 

· formal and informal norms 

· language 

· ritual 

· norms 

· values 

Kinds of Culture & Cultural Change

· subculture 

· counterculture 

· cultural lag 

· globalization 

· diffusion 

· cultural evolution 

Defining Terms in the Study of Technology 

· Technology (list all possible definitions) 

· Artifact 

·

Technique

 

· Institutions 

· Technological determinism 

· Artifactual determinism 

· Technological politics 

· Technological momentum 

· Technological frames 

· Unintended consequences 

Technique

· techne

 

· semantic void

 

· mechanic arts

 

· sociotechnical system

 

· reification 

· technological determinism

 

· Technological automatism 

· Technological bluff 

Technology as a Concept

· techne
· semantic void
· mechanic arts
· sociotechnical system

· technology

Technological Determinism & Social Constructivism 

· technological determinism

· social constructivism

Digitization

· technocratic idea of progress 

· material practice 

· heterogenous technology 

· information 

· computerization 

· digitization 

· digital data 

· artifacts

On Technological Determinism: A Typology, Scope Conditions, and a Mechanism

Author(s): Allan Dafoe

Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values , November 2015, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November
2015), pp. 1047-1076

Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43671266

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https://www.jstor.org/stable/43671266

Article

On Technological
Determinism:

A Typology, Scope
Conditions, and
a Mechanism

Science, Technology, & Human Values
2015, Vol. 40(6) 1047-1076

© The Author(s) 20 1 5
Reprints and permission:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 1 0. 1 1 77/0 1 622439 1 5579283

sthv.sagepub.com

®SAGE

Allan Dafoe1

Abstract

“Technological determinism” is predominantly employed as a critic’s term,
used to dismiss certain classes of theoretical and empirical claims. Under-
stood more productively as referring to claims that place a greater emphasis
on the autonomous and social-shaping tendencies of technology, techno-
logical determinism is a valuable and prominent perspective. This article will
advance our understanding of technological determinism through four
contributions. First, I clarify some debates about technological determinism
through an examination of the meaning of technology. Second, I parse the
family of claims related to technological determinism. Third, I note that
constructive and determinist insights may each be valid given particular
scope conditions, the most prominent of which is the scale of analysis.
Finally, I propose a theoretical microfoundation for technological deter-
minism – military-economic adaptationism – in which economic and military
competition constrain sociotechnical evolution to deterministic paths. This

‘Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA

Corresponding Author:
Allan Dafoe, Yale University, 1 15 Prospect Street, Rosenkranz Hall, New Haven, CT 06520,
USA.

Email: allan.dafoe@yale.edu

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1048 Science, Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

theory is a special case of a general theory – sociotechnical selectionism –
which can be regarded as also including (mild) constructivist theories as
special cases. Greater understanding of, respect for, and engagement with
technological determinism will enhance the study of technology and our
ability to shape our sociotechnical systems.

Keywords
technological determinism, constructivism, trends, momentum, unintended
consequences, autonomy, competition, selectionism, levels of analysis,
functionality, power

Who – If Anyone – Controls Technological Change?
A central issue in the study of technology is the question of agency. To

what extent do we have control over the tools we use – and hence also our

systems of production, social relations, and worldview? To what extent are
our technologies thrust upon us – by controlling elites, by path-dependent
decisions from the past, or by some internal technological logic?

Prior to the 1980s, many scholars of technology took seriously the view
that technological change could be, in some sense, an out-of-control
history-shaping process (Winner 1977). To these scholars, often looking
over large spans of time, technology seemed to develop autonomously, fol-
lowing an internal technical logic, and profoundly shape society in ways
that were not intended by anyone.

More recently, this view has been dismissed by many sociologists and
historians of technology as “technological determinism.” These scholars
generally prefer constructivist approaches to the study of technology,
employing descriptive narrative and emphasizing historical and social
context, human agency, interpretive flexibility, and contingency. Con-
structivist scholarship has been very productive, in general by providing
a rich framework for the study of the social shaping of technology, and in
particular by challenging technological determinism. Through many
detailed studies of the design, interpretation, and use of technology (for
a useful overview, see Hackett, Amsterdamska, and Wajcman 2008), con-
structivist scholarship has convincingly shown the important role in the
evolution of technology of different social groups, historical context, and
varying perceptions of the meaning and purpose of a technology. In so
doing, constructivist scholarship has shown the implausibility of simplis-
tic technological determinisms.

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Dafoe 1 049

But the field of science and technology studies (STS) has gone much
further, largely rejecting the many questions and conjectures that are cen-
tral to technological determinism. Summarizing this rejection of techno-
logical determinism, Ronald Kline (2001) writes that “historians and
sociologists of technology have discredited the tenet of technological
determinism, so much so that it has become a critic’s term and a term
of abuse in their academic circles”(p. 15497), and Michael Lynch
(2008, 10) states that “technological determinism has been reduced to the
status of a straw position in technology studies.” To provide some sys-
tematic evidence on the state of the literature, I reviewed sixty references,
selecting the twenty references that ranked highest in a Google Scholar
search for “technological determinism” within each of the following
three leading STS journals ( Science , Technology , & Human Values ;
Social Studies of Science^ Technology and Culture ); of the twenty-five
articles that offered an explicit judgment of the merits of technological
determinism, 76 percent of the references were critical (for data and cod-
ing details, see http://dx.doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28473).

While most STS scholars will agree that, in addition to the social shaping
of technology, there is an “influence of technology upon social relations”
(Mackenzie and Wajcman 1999, 41), questions about the effects and auton-
omy of technology are neglected. Important underexplored areas of inquiry
include the study of the political effects of technology, the inertia of tech-
nological systems, the existence of trends and an internal logic in technolo-
gical developments, and the historical transformations associated with key
technological innovations.1 Leonardi and Barley (2010), reflecting on the
field of technology and organization, similarly argue that the field has
swung strongly away from technological determinism, in so doing neglect-
ing issues of “knateriality and power” (p. 42). The contemporary lack of
interest in deterministic questions and propositions within STS is all the
more concerning because most of the disciplines in social science, and busi-
ness and the military, continue to take them seriously. In short, STS no lon-
ger seriously engages with one of its founding debates.

A recent move within STS to take technological determinism “more
seriously” involves studying beliefs about technological determinism using
a constructivist lens (Wyatt 2008; Söderberg 2013). While these works do
direct attention to technologically deterministic claims, they treat them as
subjects of study to be explained , not as potentially insightful theoretical
arguments that can explain.

I propose that “technological determinism” should be reclaimed from its
use as a critic’s term and straw position and should instead be employed to

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1050 Science , Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

(Mild) Social Constructivism (Soft) Technological Determinism

Radical

Social ‘* *’■ Technological
Constructivism Determinism

Figure I . A continuum of scholarship, from social constructivism to technological
determinism.

respectfully characterize works that are closer to the determinisi side of the
continuum of scholarly claims (similar to the proposed usage in Smith and
Marx 1994, xiii). Going too far in either direction leads to the generally
implausible positions of hard technological determinism (Smith and Marx
1994, 2) or radical social constructivism (Sismondo 1993; see Figure 1).
The question should not be a dichotomous one of whether technological
determinism is right or wrong, but a set of questions of degree, scope, and
context: to what extent, in what ways, and under what scope conditions are
particular kinds of technology more autonomous and powerful in shaping
society? The complement of this framing also clarifies questions about
human agency: to what extent, in what ways, and under what scope condi-
tions are particular groups of people able to shape their sociotechnical
systems?

This article seeks to reclaim “technological determinism” as a legiti-
mate intellectual position through the following contributions. The first
section discusses the definition of technology, clarifying some debates
about technological determinism. The second section outlines the rich
family of ideas related to technological determinism. In it I clarify differ-
ent aspects of technical determinism and how they logically relate to each
other; I discuss the role of technological trends in deterministic thinking;
and I note that deterministic claims are more prevalent in studies with
macro levels of analysis and that contrary findings from micro levels
of analysis do not necessarily invalidate macro-insights. The third section
addresses a serious weakness in technologically determinisi accounts: the
lack of a compelling causal microfoundation. This article outlines a the-
ory of military-economic adaptationism in which military and economic
competition can give rise to harder forms of technological determinism.
In so doing, it shows how it is possible for both radical constructivism
and hard determinism to be simultaneously true on different scales of
analysis. At the micro level, social groups can have extreme flexibility
in interpreting, using, and designing technology. At the macro level, how-
ever, strong military and economic competition could lead to emergent

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Dafoe

patterns in which technology evolves as if according to an inner logic that
determines society.

What Is Technology?
Confusion about technological determinism is in part due to confusion
about the meaning of the term technology. Technology can refer to vast
sociotechnical systems, such as the Internet, as well as specific arti-
facts, standards, routines, and beliefs that make up these systems, such
as computers, the Internet protocol, e-mail routines, and beliefs about
the reliability of online information. Leo Marx (1997, 982-83) argues
that the term technology , by conflating specific artifacts and broad
sociotechnical systems, induces erroneous deterministic thinking and
that the abstract concept “is almost completely vacuous.” Whenever
possible, this ambiguity can be avoided through the use of more pre-
cise terms. Artifact can stand for specific objects intended for a func-
tion, such as machines, devices, and tools. Technique can refer to
“softer” functional configurations, such as habits of mind, analytical
methods, and behavioral routines. Institutions can refer to organiza-
tional hierarchies, legal codes, and incentive structures. Sociotechnical
systems can refer to the vast functional configurations of all these
components.
While I agree that these other terms can clarify thinking, I nevertheless
believe the abstract term technology is useful. Technology , like its
“immediate precursors – words like machine , invention, improvement,
and … the mechanic (or useful . . . ) arts ” (Marx 1997, 967, italics in orig-
inal) is rooted in the metaphor of the machine and the application of sci-
ence to commercial and military objectives. As such, technology
highlights the functionality of sociotechnical configurations. This is
apparent in present-day definitions of technology as “a manner of accom-
plishing a task” (Merriam Webster 2005) and as “configurations that
work ” (Rip and Kemp 1998, 330). The defining characteristic of technol-
ogy is its functionality, not its specific materiality. Technology , thus, (1)
denotes those entities – artifacts, techniques, institutions, systems – that
are or were functional and (2) emphasizes the functional dimension of
those entities.

This understanding of technology helps to resolve a central confusion
in debates over technological determinism. Critics of technological
determinism often portray the debate as centered on the definition of
technology as artifact. However, while some aspects of technological

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1052 Science, Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

determinism are about artifactual determinism, the core of the literature
is more about kinds of functional determinism: the way that history often
seems to follow inexorable functional logics that drive and are driven by
technological change.

Technological Determinism
The term technological determinism , as Ronald Kline (2001) points out,
is presently employed to criticize the extreme position that (1) technol-
ogy develops according to an “internal logic independent of social influ-
ence” (p. 15495) and that (2) “technological change determines social
change in a prescribed manner” (p. 15495). Exemplifying Kline’s argu-
ment, Bimber (1994) offers the extreme definition of technological
determinism as the view that history is “determined by laws. . .rather
than by human will” (p. 86) and that these laws involve physical arti-
facts as a necessary component (p. 88). Technological determinism so
defined does not allow the possibility of any human agency and thus
does not refer to the vast majority of perspectives that takes the effects
of technology seriously.

I propose defining technological determinism more moderately as
approaches that emphasize (1) the autonomy of technological change and
(2) the technological shaping of society. Following Smith and Marx
(1994, 2), who offer a similar moderate definition, we can situate determi-
nistic theories along a continuum, with harder determinists putting more
emphasis on the autonomy and power of technology, and softer determi-
nists allowing for more social control and context. This moderate defini-
tion provides a terminological umbrella for a large set of respectable
scholarship, spanning the disciplines that study technology.

In the following section, I analytically separate a number of distinct
claims related to technological determinism (with distinct theories itali-
cized). The family of claims include the views that: (1) functional entities
(artifacts, techniques, institutions, and systems) exert an effect on the
world independent of human choice ( technical determinism ); (2) there
is a broad sequence and tempo of scientific and technological advance
{technological trends) that seems to follow an internal logic , making
technological change seem autonomous ; and (3) that people are insuffi-
ciently conscious of their technological choices ( technological somnam-
bulism) or have been co-opted ( the magnificent bribe), such that the
social order is becoming more machine-like over time.

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Dafoe

Technical Determinism

The claim most often associated with technological determinism is that of
artif actual determinism : the view that artifacts shape social relations.
Technical determinism , on the other hand, denotes the broader view that
technical entities, such as artifacts, routines, and the technical dimensions
of institutions and systems, exert effects on the world. Harder variants
claim that thes^ effects are more extensive and powerful.
The form of technical determinism that leaves the greatest role for
human agency is the idea of technological politics (Winner 1980,
1986): intentions can be inscribed into technologies, which then influence
others. In this view, technological decisions “are similar to legislative
acts or political foundings that establish a framework for public order that
will endure over many generations” (p. 29). Examples include the con-
struction of fences, speed bumps, bulletproof glass, surveillance technol-
ogy, encryption algorithms, and the broad linear Parisian boulevards that
facilitated the Suppression of riots (Lay 1992, 97). Prisons, schools, art
studios, and other institutions all employ technology to evoke specific
kinds of behavior, from compliance to creativity. Latour (1992) refers
to technology as the “missing mass” of sociology, since it invisibly holds
together the social order. Feenberg (2010, 18) refers to the way that tech-
nology provides “material validation of the social order” as the “‘bias’
of technology.” A handful of other scholars have contributed to the con-
versation between ST S and the study of technological politics (Hamlett
2003; Wachelder 2003), though more is required given the importance
of these questions.
Two other technically deterministic theories are the ideas of technologi-
cal momentum (Hughes 1983, 295) and technological frames (Bijker 1995).
These ideas emphasize the constraints arising from established technologi-
cal systems; these can be regarded as more deterministic than technological
politics because the constraints need not have been designed by any partic-
ular human or group. Hughes found that as systems mature they seem to
gain inertia. This inertia follows the logic of sunk costs: assets have been
bought, standards set, infrastructure built, employees trained, interactions
routinized, and interests entrenched, all of which constrain subsequent deci-
sions. Likewise, Bijker (1995, 282) rejects the idea that “social groups [can]
fantasize whatever they want, without constraints.” Instead, Bijker (1995,
264) argues that practices, shared meanings, and infrastructure produce
technological frames which “constrain freedom of choice in designing new
technologies.”

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1054 Science , Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

Few scholars would deny the premise that there can be an “influence of
technology upon social relations” (Mackenzie and Wajcman 1999, 41).
This premise, however, implies the possibility of harder forms of technical
determinism whenever technologies have unintended consequences. Due to
the lack of foresight or concern by the designer, or the sheer unpredictability

of complex sociotechnical processes, unintended consequences can arise
that fundamentally shape social relations.

Examples of unintended consequences abound in the history of tech-
nology: the invention and deployment of the machine gun and barbed
wire unexpectedly gave rise to a terrible form of warfare that was
abhorred by all – even the generals and politicians responsible for con-
tinuing the war (Ellis 1975). The decision by a few members of the Skolt
Lapps of Finland to use snowmobiles in their herding practice began
a process that undermined their traditional egalitarian culture (Pelto
1973). A report by the US National Security Council shares this view that
“as technologies emerge, people will lack full awareness of their wider
economic, environmental, cultural, legal, and moral impact

Trends- 2015 2000, 14). If technological change proceeds too quickly
and extensively, “societies face the distinct possibility of going adrift
in a vast sea of ‘unintended consequences'” (Winner 1977, 89). Under
this perspective, while people may control initial technological choices,
if they are sufficiently ignorant of the consequences of their decisions
society can be fundamentally shaped in ways that no one intended.
Taken to the limit so that technical effects are powerful and conse-

quences unforeseeable, the simple premise that technology can shape social
relations implies a hard technological determinism: a world where technol-
ogy evolves in a seemingly autonomous and society-determining way. The
difference between most mainstream STS theories and hard determinism is

therefore not fundamental, but a matter of degree that depends on how
strongly technologies shape social relations and how foreseeable are the
consequences of technology. The extent to which hard technological deter-
minism has merit, therefore, is an empirical and context-specific question,
not something that can be assumed, deduced, or casually generalized across
empirical domains.

Trends in Technological Change

A second prominent theme of technological determinism is that there are
trends in the patterns of sociotechnical evolution. Over the large sweep
of time, the pool of artifacts seems to continually increase in diversity and

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Dafoe

number. New innovations arise that exceed the previous in their complexity,

power, and utility. To cite some specific trends, there seems to have been a
persistent increase in the maximum levels of the: speed of transportation
and communication, lethality of weapons, durability of materials, efficiency
of engines, marginal productivity of labor, ability to store and reproduce
information, height of buildings, and so forth. These “trends in the maxi-
mum” are the easiest trends to define, though it seems likely that many
other kinds of trends could be operationalized given closer study. The
medievalist historian Joseph Stray er (1955, 224), summarizing the history
of Western Europe during the Middle Ages, notes that “if there is steady
progress anywhere, it is in the field of technology.” Similarly, a number of
anthropologists and archaeologists have identified a direction in the evo-
lution of civilization toward increased social complexity. Robert Wright
(2000, 16), summarizing this literature, writes that “archaeologists can’t
help but notice that, as a rule, the deeper you dig, the simpler the society
whose remains you find.” These trends need not extend monotonically –
in one direction at all scales of analysis – for them to warrant being taken
seriously. Some of these technological trends follow logically from the
apparent cumulative nature of technological innovation (Heilbroner
1967): it is hard to imagine a society developing nuclear power before first
harnessing simpler sources of power.
Some technological trends are so predictable and persistent that they
seem to follow an internal logic. Historian of computing Paul Ceruzzi
(2005, 593) observes that an “internal logic is at work” in the evolution
of some technologies. Specifically, over the past forty years, the “exponen-
tial growth of chip density has hardly deviated from its slope,” (p. 586) as
described by Moore’s Law. The belief in Moore’s Law, Ceruzzi writes, is
not “an indication of the social construction of computing [but] an indica-
tion of the reality of technological determinism. Computing power must
increase because it can” (p. 590). Ceruzzi concludes that historians of
technology should “step back from a social constructionist view of tech-
nology” and consider that, in at least some cases, “raw technological
determinism is at work” (p. 593).
Similarly, many early theorists observed the trend that society was
becoming more rationalistic, technical, and materialistic. Max Weber
(1978, lix) warned that “rational calculation . . . reduces every worker to a
cog in [the bureaucratic] machine and, seeing himself in this light, he will
merely ask how to transform himself from a little into a somewhat bigger
cog.” Ellul (1962, 30) was concerned with the spread of “la technique,”
which “is artificial, autonomous, self-determining, and independent of all

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1056 Science, Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

human intervention.” Mumford (1966, 3) warned that “man will become a
passive, purposeless, machine conditioned animal.” These processes could
be due to our insufficient awareness about our technological choices ( tech-
nological somnambulism , Winner 1977, 167).

A potential mechanism for the spread of la technique could be called the
magnificent bribe : the tendency for the system to co-opt individuals by
using the material incentive to become a “somewhat bigger cog.” Mumford
(1964, 6) writes that: “We are being asked to ratify … a magnificent bribe”
under which “each member of the community may claim every material
advantage, every intellectual and emotional stimulus” in exchange for sur-
render to “authoritarian technics.” Winner (1977, 167) concurs that “each
group with any appreciable social power has gained auxiliary membership
in the technostructure or has been put on its payroll.” An example of this
involves the 1997-1998 transformation of Massachusetts Institute of

Technology’s Technology Review. Motivated by “years of declining
advertising revenue” (Crum 1998), a former advertising director from
Fortune magazine was brought in to increase the magazine’s profits. He
managed to turn red ink to black, but only after a new editor ensured that
“nothing will be left of the old magazine except the name” (Warsh 1998,
CI). The regular columnists and editorial staff were fired. The magazine
transformed from a policy-relevant publication that was reflective about
the social implications of technical choices to one whose new mandate,
as characterized by former editor Marcus, was “cheerleading for innova-
tion” (Warsh 1998, CI). The need for profit transformed Technology
Review. How many other public conversations about the sociotechnical
order are similarly influenced?

The seeming trend toward greater rationalization may be explained by
the fact that people perceive it to be beneficial. Leo Marx (1987) describes
the technocratic concept of progress in which scientific, technological,
and economic progress is thought to improve “all the conditions of
life – social, political, moral, and intellectual, as well as material”
(p. 34). If enough people perceive technological progress to improve life,
then associated trends may not be evidence of technological determinism,
but simply the product of a social choice to pursue certain technological
changes. However, while technological development has improved many
dimensions of life for many people in recent decades, there remains abun-
dant evidence in history of technological trends going against the will of
elites at the time (see, for example, discussion of the Meiji Restoration
below). The modern miracle of economic development may only tempo-
rarily coincide with the interests of most people; for example, trends in

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information technology and automation are plausibly eroding the income
of the majority of Americans.2
In summary, there appear to be trends in the evolution of human civili-
zation, particularly in the character of our technologies. Some of these
trends follow logically from the implausibility that an advanced technology
could be developed before the development of its prerequisites. Some of
these trends are so striking and persistent in their rhythm that they seem
to suggest an internal logic of development. One trend is toward the greater
rationalization of society, which may arise from lack of consciousness,

selective co-opļtation, or from its perceived benefits.

Scope Conditions and Levels of Analysis

The sociotechnical trends that are most suggestive of determinism are gen-
erally those thàt take place over longer time scales: five decades of expo-

nentially increasing density of transistors; two centuries of technological
progress and economic growth since the Industrial Revolution; and two mil-
lennia of the growth in the size, complexity, and energy intensity of civili-
zations. In a survey of scholarship on technology, Thomas Misa (1988)
identified that technologically deterministic scholarship tends to look at
larger scales of time and space than scholarship that is more constructivist.
Both across disciplines and “within each discipline, the authors affirming
some version of technological determinism adopt a “macro” perspective,
whereas those denying technological determinism adopt a “micro” per-
spective” (Mis^ 1988, 309).
How can we reconcile these divergent findings? One response is to assert
epistemologicai superiority for micro studies’, the findings of more detailed
smaller scale Scholarship are more valid than those adopting a macro-
perspective. Misa (1998) articulates this view: “the Machine as causal force
vanishes when [scholars] adopt a detailed analysis” (p. 315), “from a shop-
floor perspective, the Machine is an irrelevant abstraction, and what makes
history is individuals (perhaps classes) in conflict or accommodation. A row
of machine tools is not itself a compelling historical agent” (p. 320). Simi-
larly, Williams (2002, 116) writes that to a historian, technological deter-
minism is “self-evidently untrue: human beings construct machines, not
the reverse.” Epistemologicai superiority for micro-studies is implicit any-
time a scholar rejects findings from macro-studies using evidence from
micro-studies.

Is it not possible that different processes could be at work on different
scales of analysis (Leonardi and Barley 2010, 37)? In complex systems,

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1058

there are often emergent patterns visible over larger scales of analysis which
may be impossible to perceive at smaller scales of analysis (Byrne 1998).
Consider the example of traffic: the fact that humans driving vehicles have
intelligence, idiosyncrasies, and free will does not refute the fact that traffic

patterns often follow a simple, counterintuitive, and unintended logic. For
example, in some situations, traffic throughput can be increased by inten-
tionally slowing down traffic (Resnick 1996). Traffic jams do not need
an obvious proximal cause, such as a car accident, to come into existence;
they emerge spontaneously when vehicle density exceeds certain levels
(Nagel and Paczuski 1995). Similarly, in history, there may arise unex-
pected, deterministic, macro-patterns that are independent of human inten-
tion and not apparent at smaller scales.
Many of the claims of technological determinists are macro-observations

about patterns in history. Scholars looking at smaller scales of analysis may
reject these macro-patterns because it is not clear how they could emerge
from micro social processes. However, such an inference does not follow.
It would be incorrect to reject Boyle’s Law because the motion of individual
molecules is chaotic and unpredictable. It would be incorrect for pre-
Newtonian scholars to reject the systematic association between the motion
of the moon and tides because they could not conceive of a mechanism to
link them.

Social systems are complex and multileveled and are known to give rise
to emergent unexpected behavior. When limited to their respective empiri-
cal domains, could it not be that the claims of both constructivists and the

determinists are valid? Is it not possible that on certain scales of analysis
technology is socially created, hacked, and interpreted, while on other
scales of analysis technology exhibits trends, an internal logic of develop-
ment, and profoundly shapes history in ways unforeseen by humans?

The Missing Mechanism: Military-Economic
Competition
The previous section argued that it is an error to discard macro-observations
simply because they appear to be inconsistent with micro-observations.
However, macro-observations are much more compelling if a coherent
and plausible theory links the macro-patterns to a believable micro-
foundation. In this section, I offer such a mechanism – military-economic
competition – showing how deterministic macro-patterns could emerge
from social micro-processes. This explanation – military-economic adap-
tationism – can account for most of the claims of technological

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determinists. Military-economic adaptationism states that (CI) when
there is sufficiently intense and prolonged economic and/or military com-
petition, and given that (C2) technology enables new sociotechnical con-
figurations, (C3) some of which confer advantages in economic/military
competition, sociotechnical systems will evolve to become more adapted
to success in the economic and/or military competition.
This section will introduce the general theory of sociotechnical selec-
tionism and show how mild constructivism and military-economic adapta-
tionism can be regarded as special cases, differing on the empirical issue of
what kind of selection process (cognitive/social vs. economic/military) is
dominant. I then discuss military-economic adaptationism in more detail,
showing how it could account for the deterministic claim that there exist
macro-trends in sociotechnical evolution that are (largely) independent of
human will.

Sociotechnical Selectionism

The claim that competition is the mechanism for technological determinism
is a special case of the theory of selectionism (also called Universal Darwin-
ism). Selectionism generalizes the mechanism at the heart of evolutionary
biology: variation and differential proliferation. In a population of varied
forms, if some forms proliferate (reproduce, survive, grow) because of some
characteristic, then that characteristic will be more abundant in future popu-
lations. Over time, these forms, called organisms in evolutionary biology
and interactors more generally (Hull 2001), will fit better with – will appear
as if designed for – the criterion that determines superior proliferation (the
“selection environment”).

This logic applies to sociotechnical entities: which exhibit variety ; for
example, there are many styles of hammer, production strategy, and mili-
tary, and new variants persistently arise. Sociotechnical entities proliferate
at different rates (some negative) as a function of selection pressures ; cer-
tain types of artifact, technique, and institution are reproduced, imitated,
imported to other contexts, or expand in scale. Other types – most
types – of artifact, technique, or institution die out. This proliferation is a
function of cognitive, social, economic, military, ecological, and other
selection pressures. Over the long run , the population of technologies will
become more adapted to their selection environment: hammers become
more effective, production strategies more productive, and militaries more
powerful. Military-economic adaptationism is a special case of sociotech-
nical selectionism that emphasizes the selection pressures associated with

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1060 Science , Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

economic and military competition; military and economic competition
seem to operate over longer time scales than cognitive and social selection
processes, which may account for why deterministic claims are most com-
mon in studies of longer time scales.

Mild social constructivism can also be thought of as a special case of
sociotechnical selectionism in which the selection environment is primarily
cognitive, social, or political. In fact, Pinch and Bijker (1987, 22; see also
Bijker 1995, 51) explicitly proposed selectionism as the model for the
Social Construction of Technology: “In SCOT the developmental process
of a technological artifact is described as an alternation of variation and
selection.” Other historians and sociologists of technology have explicitly
employed selectionist reasoning in their theories (Basalla 1988; Vincenti
1990; O’Connell 1992, and the many contributors to Ziman’s (2003) edited
volume Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary Process). In this
model, cognitive and social processes are crucial for determining the differ-
ential proliferation of ideas and technologies. Note that sociotechnical
selectionism, just like evolution by natural selection, does not imply a linear
evolution of forms (Pinch and Bijker refer to it as a “multidirectional
model”); however, as discussed below, in Trends in Military-Economic
Adaptationism subsection, it could give rise to trends. Selectionist reason-
ing is also prominent in many other fields, including psychology (Campbell
1974), philosophy (Dennett 1995), political science, economics, archaeol-
ogy (see below), and, of course, biology.

Military-economic Adaptationism

The theory of military-economic adaptationism applies when three condi-
tions are present.

Condition 1 (military-economic competition): There is sufficiently
intense and prolonged military and/or economic competition between
groups of people, such that the outcome of the competition determines
the ability of these groups to maintain and proliferate their ways of life.

The strength of economic or military competition varies by region and
era and can be empirically evaluated. Therefore, the appropriateness of mil-
itary-economic adaptationism as a theory of sociotechnical evolution will
vary over time in a measurable way by the applicability of condition 1 . Var-
iation in the intensity of military-economic competition can be exploited to
study military-economic adaptationism (e.g., Turchin et al. 2013).

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Condition 2 (technology enables): Technology enables new socio-
technical configurations.

This condition is probably the mildest definition of the effect of technol-
ogy, and thus can be assumed to be true for almost all situations. It does not
assume that technology “constrains” or has a particular “valence” or deter-
ministically exerts effects of any kind on society. All that is required is that
some technologies enable groups to do things that they otherwise could not.

Condition 3 (imperfection): The configurations enabled by new
technology are sometimes superior to existing configurations for the
selection environment.

This last condition is logically necessary to rule out the implausible sit-
uation in which new technology cannot possibly provide an advantage.
The extent to which condition 3 is true (the probability of a superior con-

figuration becoming feasible per unit time) affects the speed of sociotech-
nical adaptation.

These conditions then support some implications.

Implication 1 (differential proliferation): All else equal, those
groups who adopt configurations that convey economic or military

advantages ^vill proliferate, relative to those who do not.

Implication 2 (military-economic adaptation): Sociotechnical sys-
tems will evòlve so as to be more adapted to the economic and/or mil-
itary competitive environment.

Interestingly, we see the mechanism of economic and military competi-
tion explicitly in the writings of technological determinists. Ellul (1962, 84)
explains that la technique proliferates because it is powerful and that groups
face an illusory choice over whether to adopt or reject la technique : either
they adopt it or they will be defeated. Mumford (1962, 195) argues that
societies pursued technical means because of economic and military com-
petition. Similarly, economic historian Joel Mokyr (1990, 206) summarizes
that “the struggle for survival [in Europe] guaranteed” that rulers had to
accommodate themselves to economically beneficial technological
advances. Mokyr explains that without competition, technological progress
would probably have been willfully stopped long ago: “By and large, the
forces opposing technological progress have been stronger than those striv-
ing for changes” (p. 16). But, “as long as some societies remain creative,

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1062 Science , Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

others will eventually be dragged along” (p. 302). According to Mokyr, the
“stronger” social forces opposed to technological progress have been defeated
because, though they were proximally stronger, they competed against social
groups that became more competitive because of their attitude toward technol-

ogy. In a competitive world, so long as some communities pursue profitable or

powerful technologies, all societies will eventually be “dragged along.”
The mechanism of military-economic competition is prominently theo-

rized in most fields that study the macroevolution of social systems. Many
insights from economics rely on the concept of competition, most notably in
the economics of innovation (Freeman and Soete 1997), evolutionary eco-
nomics (Hodgson 2002; Nelson and Winter 1982), economic history
(Mokyr 1990; North 1990), the two fundamental theorems of welfare eco-
nomics, the idea of path dependence from increasing returns (Arthur 1994),
and the justification of the rational actor assumption in competitive markets
(Samuelson 1998). The prominent theoretical approach in international
relations of structural realism asserts that international competition con-
strains statesmen to pursue military-economic power, irrespective of their
ultimate goals (Waltz 1979). Many scholars see military-economic compe-
tition as the force that gave rise to large coherent political orders such as the
state and nation-state (Carneiro 1970; Tilly 1992; Spruyt 1994; Thompson
2001; Turchin et al. 2013), and even to the altruism-promoting norms, insti-
tutions, and genetically rooted social preferences that allowed humans to
become such a successful cooperative species (Bowles and Gintis 2011).
Emphasis on military-economic adaptationist processes can be found in all
fields of social science that examine large-scale changes, such as history,
sociology, anthropology, and archaeology (McNeill 1984; Sanderson 1990;
Diamond 1997; Carneiro 2003; Wilson 2003; Richerson and Boyd 2004;
Bowles and Gintis 201 1). In summary, military-economic adaptationist the-
ories are prevalent in macro social science and are actively studied.

Military-economic adaptationism allows us to elaborate a prominent
critique of some constructivist approaches to technology, that it ignores
social structure, such as the asymmetric power of some groups over others
(Russell 1986; Klein and Kleinman 2002). Military-economic adaptation-
ism extends this critique by pointing out that when military-economic com-
petition is severe, power goes to those groups who best adapt to the
military-economic pressures.

Trends in Military-Economic Adaptationism

There is a third conditional implication of military-economic adaptationism.

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Implication 3 (trends): If over time the competitive environment con-
tinues to select for more of some trait (such as energy intensiveness,
functional differentiation, processor speed, explosive power), then the
evolution of sociotechnical systems will exhibit trends in that trait.

One of the central differences between determinisi and constructivist

accounts of technological change is whether technology is seen as evol-
ving in a linear or multidirectional way. The theory of sociotechnical
selectionism makes clear that the directionality and linearity of evolution
depends on the character of the selection process over time. Even when
military-economic competition dominates, technological change need not
exhibit trends, For example, though there seems to be a broad trend in his-
tory toward larger polities and greater functional differentiation, certain
technological innovations have reversed this trend: the innovation of iron
weaponry in 1000-1200 BC made flatter social structures more competi-
tive, reducing (for a time) the size of polities and functional differentiation
(McNeill 1984, 13).

Trends in a selectionist system can arise if there is ongoing selection for
the same trait over time. Whether there is, in fact, ongoing selection for
the same trait in sociotechnical evolution, perhaps during particular peri-
ods, is an open scientific question, as is the analogous question in evolu-
tionary biology (McShea 1998). Military-economic adaptationism offers
a mechanism by which certain trends could arise and moves us toward
more productive theoretical and empirical questions: What kinds of selec-
tionist processes give rise to trends? Were the selectionist processes that
were present at particular periods of history the kind that would induce
trends? Do we, in fact, observe these sociotechnical trends? Where are
current selectionist processes likely to take us?

Vicarious Selection

One particularly useful theoretical development is the notion of vicarious
selection , developed by Walter Vincenti (1990) and others. Vicarious
selection is the process whereby a life-form tries to anticipate the external
selection environment and preemptively adapt to it. Accurately doing so
would convey a large advantage to the life-form. It would also accelerate
the process of adaptation and disguise from the analyst the ultimate cause
of the adaptation.

Vincenti offers the example of an aeronautics engineering team. Rather
than implement each idea in a full-scale plane and then see how well it flies,

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1064 Science , Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

engineers test their ideas in simulated environments. These engineers first
select their ideas about wing design based on how well the idea fits with
their cognitive model of a good design; they then submit the idea to selec-
tion by the group’s understanding of good design; they then select wing
designs based on performance in a wind tunnel. By simulating as closely
as possible the actual selection environment, aeronautical engineers can
more quickly and less expensively design the optimal wing shape. Ulti-
mately, however, the wing will have to pass some external selection criteria,
such as the ability to efficiently move a plane through the air so as to con-
tribute to profitability or military efficacy. Similarly, any life-form will be
more successful if it can accurately anticipate and adapt to the external
selection environment.

This concept is useful because it shows how the external selection envi-
ronment could influence the goals and values of an individual or group. A
scholar who seeks to explain technological change using only the deci-
sions, beliefs, values, and ideologies of groups will fail to see the prior
structural causes of these decisions, beliefs, values, and ideologies. Soci-
eties spend tremendous resources trying to develop more powerful mili-
tary systems and more profitable economic enterprises. This obsession
for power and profit has proximal causes in culture, ideology, institutions,
and the preferences of individuals. But ultimately, this social commitment
toward building powerful and profitable sociotechnical systems may be
driven by the imperative for states and firms to survive and proliferate
in a competitive environment. Given competition and enough time, groups
that choose not to adapt to military-economic imperatives will be
defeated, absorbed by more competitive groups, or will realize their peril
and imitate more competitive groups. Many scholars argue that imitation
is an important means by which sociotechnical components or systems
proliferate (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Rogers 1995; Lynn 1996; Gold-
man and Eliason 2003). When observed on a microscale, this decision to
imitate others may appear willful or the product of human psychology or a
particular culture; however, it would be a mistake to underestimate the
underlying causal role of competitive pressures.

An apt example of vicarious selection of military and economic pres-
sures comes from Thomas Hughes’ history of electric systems. Hughes
describes how the British systems of electric power before World War I
were much smaller than those in the United States and Germany because
“the British placed a high value on the power of local government”
(p. 79). Under the imperative to improve efficiency during World War
I, however, they were networked and made larger, contrary to “prevailing

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British political values” (Hughes 1987, 79). Hughes explains that “engi-
neers and managers who, because of their experience and special compe-
tence, were committed to smallness of scale nevertheless acknowledged
the primacy of output when personal and national survival seemed to
depend on it” (p. 285). This case illustrates how sociotechnical trends
could arise counter to the wishes of society: the technology of energy pro-
duction and distribution in Britain became larger, more centrally con-
trolled, more complex and differentiated, despite the prevailing political
views. The British chose to have a larger power system in the trivial sense
that a victim chooses to give up his wallet at gunpoint.
Another informative case comes from one of history’s best examples of a
society controlling its technological course: the Tokugawa period of Japa-
nese history. In the sixteenth century, Japan had some of the most sophis-
ticated firearms in the world (Perrin 1979, 25). Japan was unified during
this period due in large part to the advantages conferred on larger warlords
by firearms technology (Chase 2003, 184; Brown 1948). Following this uni-
fication, internal and external military competition subsided, permitting
elites greater control over their destiny: firearms technology was centralized
and then largely eliminated (Perrin 1979), and interchange with foreigners
was strictly controlled. A samurai-dominated social order persisted for over
200 years.
This ended in 1853 when the military threat from foreigners could no
longer be ignored. Commodore Perry, of the US Navy, violated Japan’s
strict seclusion policy with his four “black ships of evil” (Baruma
2004, 11) spewing smoke and mysteriously moving upwind without sails.
Under the implicit threat of bombardment and a famine-inducing blockade
(Samson 1963, 234), the Japanese made concessions. They observed the
fate of China to colonial exploitation and their own powerlessness to repel
Perry’s ships. A debate and then civil war raged about how to respond. The
individuals who emerged as the leaders of Japan had come to appreciate
the necessity of learning from Western countries. They systematically
observed foreign institutions and technologies and imitated those that
seemed to give the foreigners their military power. Within merely a few
decades, the Japanese radically transformed themselves – adopting many
Western customs, institutions, and technologies – contrary to the values of
the Japanese elite pre-1853. The Japanese chose well; whereas Japan’s
neighbors were colonized by Western powers, the Japanese were able
to modernize on their own terms (Totman 2000, chap. 12; Sims 2001,
chap. 1). But the Japanese chose this path in only a very limited sense;
it is more accurate to say that the Japanese adapted to the military pressure

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1066 Science, Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

that they faced. Stark military-economic competition reduces our choice
set to two options: adapt or be dominated.

Limits of and Issues in Military-Economic Adaptationism

Some caveats and complexities need to be discussed.
This article is not arguing that military-economic competition is neces-

sary for technological determinism. As mentioned earlier, some features of
technological determinism can plausibly arise simply from the effects, iner-
tia, and unintended consequences of new technologies. What military-eco-
nomic adaptationism offers is a plausible mechanism for many of the harder
claims of technological determinism.

Military-economic adaptationism is not a complete theory of socio-
technological change. The theory is only applicable to a limited set of
questions and empirical domains, namely, those for which the conditions
(and most importantly condition 1) apply. As stated by condition 1, mili-
tary-economic adaptationism is most applicable when military-economic
competition is severe. In the modern world, for example, military compe-
tition is much less severe. Compared to a hundred or a thousand years ago,
there is much less risk to groups of having their resources militarily con-
quered. Groups (countries) today can afford to worry less about preparing
for war and focus more on material consumption and other goals (Mueller
2007; Pinker 2011). We thus should expect military adaptationism to be
less useful for understanding contemporary global changes in society and
technology.

There are many kinds of “military-economic competition,” such as
interstate military competition, interstate economic competition, interfirm
transnational economic competition, and within-state economic competi-
tion. Each of these will have different implications for the evolution of
society and technology. The selection processes that generate more deter-
ministic outcomes are those whose rules are most given by nature, rather
than by preferences, norms, culture, or law. Accordingly, military compe-
tition between groups who don’t share a culture or institutions would
likely be the most deterministic. By contrast, economic competition
within a well-regulated economy would be the least deterministic since
it is most shaped by socially shaped preferences, norms, and law. Given
severe economic competition, firms will still economically adapt, but the
function determining success (the fitness landscape) is defined by fac-
tors – norms, culture, taste, and law – that are more amenable to social
control. So long as the rules governing economic competition are socially

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controlled, then so can be the processes of economic adaptation taking
place beneath them.
Military competition can also be regulated by social processes, as exem-
plified by the modern taboo against the use of nuclear weapons and other
norms about the proper conduct of war (Morrow 2014). Norms and other
social limits on war are more likely to arise when the belligerents share a
culture, and the advantages from violating a norm are not too beneficial.
However, throughout most of history, military competition was always
present (Gat 2006), and those social restraints that did arise were periodi-
cally overrun during intense conflicts. In summary, the more we value the
social control of history, the more we should seek to understand the conse-
quences of different kinds of military and economic competition and to reg-
ulate them accordingly.
Just as there are many kinds of military-economic competition, so are
there many other kinds of selection processes, such as cognitive, social, and
ecological selection processes. Further, they can all operate simultaneously,
at different levels, push in different directions, be dominant over different
timescales, and interact with each other. For some questions, both construc-
tivist and economic adaptationist theories will be necessary, as in the study
of the evolution of advertising: firms compete to optimize the technology of
socially constructing marketable desires. And, of course, agents are some-
times able to modify the very rules of competition to favor them, as when
firms lobby politicians for favorable legislation or victors of major wars
construct a new regional order to favor their strengths. Adaptationist theory
can accommodate these complexities, known in biology as niche construc-
tion. Recall that selection pressures is simply a term for the, often complex,
processes that determine differential proliferation; adaptiveness is an emer-
gent property of these processes.
However, there is a danger to adaptationist theorizing in such complex
settings. When there is not a clear stable selection process and not a self-
evident definition of adaptiveness, adaptationist theories become highly
flexible, making it possible for scholars to construct unfalsifiable “just
so stories” for almost any observed outcome. This is a problem for any
flexible theory. The fact that a theory is flexible does not make it wrong,
but it does require greater adherence to good scientific practice to mitigate
the risk of “just so” explanations. To mitigate this risk, adaptationist
scholars should try to: provide independent evidence of the character of
the selection process, such as through process tracing whether the alleg-
edly adaptive trait really did help the agent to proliferate; make predic-
tions blind to the outcome and ideally out-of-sample so that there is no

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1068 Science , Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

possibility of fitting the theory to the outcome; and otherwise articulate all
testable implications and scope conditions of the theory so that other scho-
lars can evaluate the theory using other evidence.

There is one last category of selection process that needs to be dis-
cussed: ecological selection. Ecological selection involves the differential
proliferation of groups according to how well they deal with toxins, patho-
gens, extreme climate and climate change, and the need to sustainably
acquire necessary resources. Customs, institutions, and ways of life that
are not well adapted to the local environment can perish, either because
they are abandoned or because the groups holding them perish (for some
examples, see Diamond 2005). Such collapses for ecological reasons may
be difficult to identify because they can “masquerade as military defeats”
(Diamond 2005, 12).

Ecological selection differs from economic and military selection in an
important way: success in economic and military competition is often much
more sensitive to relative performance. If sociotechnical configuration A is
slightly more ecologically adapted than B, then A will typically proliferate
slightly faster (or be slightly less likely to perish). By contrast, if sociotech-
nical configuration A is slightly more economically adapted (say, more effi-
cient at producing a good), it will often proliferate much faster. In a
perfectly competitive market, even the smallest difference in efficiency will
be sufficient to determine which configuration proliferates and which per-
ishes. Similarly, a slight absolute advantage in military performance can
lead to a huge advantage in military contests. When groups compete with
each other, rather than just “against nature,” it is not enough to do well, one
must continually do better .

Ecological selection tends to work on longer timescales than other selec-
tion processes, and it is not uncommon for a way of life that is adapted to its
social, economic, and military pressures to be maladapted to ecological
pressures. For example, it is an open question how well modern civilization
will fare in the face of climate change.

Conclusion

Who – If Anyone – Controls Technological Change?
The answer, of course, is that it depends. From a selectionist point of

view, the degree of human agency depends on the character and intensity
of selection and the character of variation. Neither extreme theoretical posi-
tion – that of the radical social constructivists or the hard technological
determinists – provides a satisfactory general account. There are contexts,

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usually found on smaller scales of analysis, in which the social constructi-
vist insights are most valid. This is because, in the absence of economic and
military competition, humans often have tremendous interpretive flexibility
and freedom of choice. There are also contexts, usually found on larger
scales of analysis, in which the claims of the technological determinists
appear to be more valid. This is probably because military-economic com-
petition directs the evolution of sociotechnical forms, severely limiting the
ability of humans to control their destiny.
Rather than judging theories by the degree of human agency that they
allow, we should evaluate theories based on how well they explain their
subject of study. Assuming that individuals “have choice” and assuming
that humans have none are equally disempowering; we should be exploring
the hard questions of how much and what kinds of agency humans have in
particular circumstances, and why. Hard technological determinism dis-
courages political action by claiming that technological change is inevita-
ble; radical social constructivism similarly handicaps political action by
ignoring the powerful competitive forces shaping history.
Taking technological determinism seriously reopens a large set of
research questions: How should we think about the effects of different kinds
of technology? Can we better parse, evaluate, and understand the different
processes and concepts related to technological determinism, such as tech-
nological politics , technological momentum, the internal logic of develop-
ment, unintended consequences, the magnificent bribe, technological
progress , and military-economic adaptationisml Under what contexts are
these processes more or less amenable to particular forms of social control?
How have different societies regulated economic competition so as to
achieve desired goals, and what can we learn from them? Can we build glo-
bal cultures, institutions, and norms that will regulate military-economic
competition to promote desired goals?
Explicit use of selectionist theories helps reframe some important
research questions. It helps illuminate the nature of human agency by
drawing attention to the intensity of different selection pressures. It pro-
vides a way of linking scholarship at different levels of analysis. It gives
the study of technology a general theoretical framework that spans the
social sciences and other fields. For constructivists, selectionist theory
clarifies some questions and suggests directions for research. For con-
structivist claims that generalize beyond the spatial-temporal scope of the
study, scholars should ask themselves: (1) Are there longer run selection
processes that constrain the ability of agents to socially construct their
technologies? (2) How did the groups come to adopt their beliefs and

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1070 Science, Technology, & Human Values 40(6)

preferences, and in particular, could these be adaptations to perceived
competitive pressures? Constructivist scholars could investigate the rich
ways that groups harness and guide military-economic competition and
explore why these efforts succeed or fail. Finally, constructivist scholars
can investigate vicarious selection. What kinds of experiences are able to
persuade a group that they need to adapt their technologies and social
order? How do individuals and groups learn about and internalize exter-
nal selection pressures?

Finally, military-economic adaptationism provides a solid micro-
foundation for technological determinism. Humans are diverse and per-
sistently generate new ways of living. Technology enables new forms of
sociotechnical life. The proliferation and survival of forms of sociotech-
nical life depend on how well adapted they are to different selection
pressures. Over the long run, military-economic competition has
exerted powerful selection pressures, promoting forms of sociotechnical
life that are militarily powerful and economically productive. This could
account for the long-run trends in sociotechnical systems toward being
large, complex, energy-intensive, technical, functionally differentiated,
and rationalistic. Selection for power and productivity, thus, may
account for many of the macro-patterns observed by technological
determinists.

Lynn White, famous for arguing that the stirrup gave rise to feudalism,
wrote that technology “merely opens a door; it does not compel one to
enter” (White 1962, 28). He was right. Technology opens the door. It is mil-
itary-economic competition that drags us through.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Wiebe Bij ker, Shay David, Edward Hackett, Robert Hudspith,
Jofish Kay, Ronald Kline, Manjari Mahajan, Lisa Onaga, Sergio Sismondo, Nauba-
har Sharif, Janet Vertesi, and especially Judith Reppy for helpful comments, advice,
and support.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or pub-
lication of this article.

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Dafoe

Notes

1. Some examples of science and technology studies work that do engage these
questions, largely emerging from neighboring disciplines, include Rosenkopf
and Tushman (1994), Schroeder (2007), Radder (2009), Feenberg (2010), and
Leonardi and Barley (2010).

2. A survey of leading economists (Initiative on Global Markets Economic Experts

Panel 2014[) found that more of them agreed (33 percent) than disagreed (20 per-

cent) with the statement that ” information technology and automation are the central

reason why median wages have been stagnant in the US over the past decade.”

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Author Biography

Allan Dafoe is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Yale
University. He studies the causes of war and statistical methods, www.allandafoe.com.

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• Contents

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• Issue Table of Contents

Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 40, No. 6 (November 2015) pp. 883-1092

Front Matter

An Illusory Consensus behind GMO Health Assessment [pp. 883-914]

Strategic Science Translation and Environmental Controversies [pp. 915-938]

Translating Science to Benefit Diverse Publics: Engagement Pathways for Linking Climate Risk, Uncertainty, and Agricultural Identities [pp. 939-964]

Advertising Nanotechnology: Imagining the Invisible [pp. 965-997]

Sociology of Low Expectations: Recalibration as Innovation Work in Biomedicine [pp. 998-1021]

Epistemic Commitments: Making Relevant Science in Biodiversity Studies [pp. 1022-1046]

On Technological Determinism: A Typology, Scope Conditions, and a Mechanism [pp. 1047-1076]

Review Essay

Representing Representation [pp. 1077-1092]

Back Matter