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INSTRUCTIONS:
The objective of the integrated semester is to help you extend your knowledge of how the
finance, operations, management, and marketing disciplines work, and how they integrate
their functioning in the real world of business.  This assignment is an assessment of how well
you understand this integration.

Please read all the instructions carefully before beginning to answer the questions. The
assignment must be submitted as instructed.  You will lose points if you fail to follow the
instructions or if the submission is formatted incorrectly.  
• The assignment should be prepared as a Word document.
• The document should be double-spaced, using Arial font #12.  
• Add any Appendices at the end of the Word document.
• Your reference sources, in addition to the base case and question sets, should be online
sites and articles, Bloomberg terminals, your Integrated Semester textbooks, PowerPoint
slides, and other sources you professor assigns.

There are two Disney cases that you must read to complete this assignment.  
You must also refresh your understanding of the six key operations management functions
(listed below for your convenience) discussed in the course and their impact on the other
areas (finance, marketing, management/HR).  
Forecasting    Project Management
Quality Management  Process Design
Supply Chain Management Inventory Management

1.Out of the six OM Functions, which, if any, were impacted by the sexual harassment
controversies in Disney. How and why? (50 -100 words)
2. Leadership plays an important role in shaping up the operations of a corporation. Were the
six OM functions impacted by leadership styles of Isner and Iger? How and Why? (100 – 150
words)
3. As you know that in a corporation, decisions made in one functional area [finance,
Marketing, operations, HR practices (management)] impact on the other functional areas.  
Disney is considering opening a new Disney Park in a foreign country.  Select two OM
decisions (out of the six) that, in your opinion, require a high degree of interaction from the
other three functional areas. Justify your selections while highlighting the impact of OM
related decisions on the other areas. (150 – 250 words) 

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W20696

THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND
CONTROVERSIES ON SOCIAL MEDIA1

Wiboon Kittilaksanawong and Yiwen Chen wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other
identifying information to protect confidentiality.

This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized, or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) cases@ivey.ca; www.iveycases.com. Our goal is to publish
materials of the highest quality; submit any errata to publishcases@ivey.ca.

Copyright © 2020, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2020-08-27

“In a strange way, I am the brand manager of Disney.”

– Robert Iger, chief executive officer (CEO) of The Walt Disney Company. 2

Between 2017 and 2019, The Walt Disney Company (Disney)—a 96-year-old diversified multinational
United States (US)-based mass media and entertainment conglomerate—faced two major scandals that
threatened to damage its family-friendly brand image.3 Disney’s brand value had decreased by 5 per cent
from 2017 to 2018, although it remained the most valuable media brand worldwide (see Exhibit 1).4 In

November 2017, John Lasseter, the executive producer who oversaw all the films made by Pixar Animation
Studios (Pixar), was accused of sexual misconduct at Pixar. Following the allegations, he left the company
in December 2018.5 Then, between June and September 2018 at Disney subsidiary Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC
(Lucasfilm), Rian Johnson, the writer and director of The Last Jedi, a major instalment in the pop-culture

phenomenon Star Wars, posted unprofessional, aggressive, and insulting remarks on his personal Twitter
account directed toward fans who hated the series.6 In April 2019, Iger announced that no new Star Wars
movies directed or written by Johnson would be put into active development.7

Given that Disney’s nearly 100 years of global success had been built on its family-friendly brand image,

why did the company not take immediate action to address these two scandals? Instead, Disney chose not
to make any comments about the scandals. Lasseter continued to work for the company for over a year after
the sexual harassment scandal broke, while Johnson remained affiliated with the company for almost a year
before the announcement that the development of his movie had been stopped. How could Disney mitigate
the losses from these two scandals and prevent the same thing from happening again? What should Disney
do to further grow its sustainably?

DISNEY

Founded in 1923 by Walt and Roy Disney, The Walt Disney Company was a multinational mass media and
entertainment company. 8 The company’s debut film was Steamboat Willie, a short animation that featured
the character Mickey Mouse. In 1990, Disney arranged for financing of $200 million from Nomura

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Securities Co., Ltd. to fund its growth.9 In 1991, it generated 28 per cent of its total revenues from its home
video distribution, hotels, and merchandising activities. 10 In 1993, Disney acquired Miramax, LLC
(Miramax Films) to broaden its movie offering for adults.11 In 1996, it acquired Capital Cities/ABC Inc.,

an American media company, in an effort to enhance its international competitiveness. 12 Disney’s

businesses experienced a steep decline during the global financial crisis of 2007–2008.13 In 2019, in one of
the largest ever media mergers, it acquired Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. (Fox). Disney expected to lay
off 4,000 Fox employees after the merger.14

Alongside technological advancements, the global film industry continued to grow, with China being the
largest growth market, followed by India and the US.15 The technological advancements also led to new
distribution channels for animated films, ranging from cable networks to subscription video-on-demand

(SVOD) services. These new distribution channels changed customer expectations and opened up more
opportunities for artists around the world to develop and distribute their own original content.16

Robert Iger

In 2005, Iger became CEO of Disney, following the resignation of Michael Eisner, who had been in the role
for 21 years.17 Prior to Iger’s time in charge, Disney had not been performing well. In terms of innovation,
its animation department had created only one new character during the decade ending in 2005. Meanwhile,
the financial performance and rating of its major media subsidiary, ABC (American Broadcasting
Company) networks, had also fallen behind its competitors.18 As a result, in 2004, Comcast Corporation

proposed a hostile takeover of Disney for $54 billion.19 However, the bid was not supported by investors,
and it was rejected by Disney. During the 14 years of Iger’s tenure as the CEO, from 2005 to 2019, Disney’s

stock gained a total of 482 per cent, or 8.7 per cent annually.20 Iger’s strategic vision emphasized three
pillars, namely generating the best creative content, fostering innovation and utilizing the latest technology,

and expanding into new markets around the world.21 Iger considered it his job, in the words of the late Steve

Jobs, the founder of Apple Inc., to build more “brand deposits” than “brand withdrawals.”22 He believed
that a good leader should possess characteristics such as optimism, courage, focus, decisiveness, curiosity,
fairness, thoughtfulness, authenticity, integrity, and perfectionism.23

Business Model

Disney had four main business segments: media networks, parks and resorts, studio entertainment, and
consumer products and interactive media (see Exhibits 2, 3, and 4).24 According to Iger, “We’re in the

business of telling stories.”25 Disney’s business model involved building brands around its characters and
stories. Since its establishment, Disney had created a lot of original characters, which were registered
intellectual properties that allowed only Disney to produce any related products. Entertainment platforms
paid fees to broadcast Disney movies. Disney leveraged its brands and licensed its characters to
manufacturers for use in relation to their products, ranging from shows to souvenirs. Its business model was
scalable because its brands fuelled many value propositions and generated diverse revenue streams.26

Disney’s business was, therefore, not just making movies but also creating and sustaining brands. The more

characters it developed, the more revenues it could generate from its brands. This logic led to Disney’s
growth through an acquisition strategy. As Pixar, Marvel Entertainment, LLC (Marvel Entertainment), and
Lucasfilm were all good at storytelling, Disney acquired them in 2006, 2009, and 2012, respectively. In

2017, Disney also acquired Fox, which, according to Iger, helped Disney “to penetrate international markets
more deeply, more effectively.”27

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Human Resource Management (HRM) and Corporate Culture

Disney had to carefully plan ways to develop its HRM base to support its continuous expansion, especially
with regard to its parks and resorts around the world. A series of acquisitions, such as the acquisition of
BAMTech Media in 2017 and of Fox in 2019, required that Disney provide sufficient training for its newly
acquired employees to understand Disney’s culture.28 Meanwhile, Disney had to ensure that its employees
were kept up to date regarding newly introduced technologies.29 Disney was committed to encouraging a

culture of building inclusive, safe, and respectful working environments across its operations. Disney highly
valued its reputation and its history of focusing on ethics, quality, and social responsibility. Its HRM was
based on six principles:

Remember, everyone is important. [Disney utilized the acronym RAVE, which stood for
“respecting, appreciating, and valuing everyone.” Employees were expected to greet each other
with sincerity and to be ready to reach out to include everyone.]

Break the mold. [Disney’s structural changes, especially the integration of departments, had opened
up various opportunities for the company and its employees in the long term.]

Make your people your brand. [Disney hired the best candidates by defining and selecting on the
basis of essential qualities and skills.]

Create magic through training. [Disney implemented training and development at every level of
the company. All employees would be trained until they could “feel the pixie dust” before they
began to learn how to do a particular job.]

Eliminate hassles. [The leaders should identify and solve problems quickly.]

Learn the truth. [The leaders should never stop learning and experiencing new things.]30

Disney followed the philosophy of “Dream as a team.” Employees were divided into diverse groups that
worked as a team to realize big dreams through brainstorming sessions known as “blue sky” thinking
sessions. These sessions created a sense of belonging and inspired employees to contribute to the company’s

future. Employees became highly productive as they were more aware of their roles and free to think
independently beyond their imaginations.31 Each group of employees was assigned a mediator who owned
the project or problem to be solved. Each session was typically organized outside the routine office
environment to ensure that the group members were free of any constraints, including budgets. The
mediator then assembled all the diverse ideas and further divided the group members into smaller groups
to refine their ideas and eventually come up with the most appropriate ideas for further implementation.32

Risk Management

Disney placed corporate risk management among its priority strategies.33 The process would begin with
identifying, defining, and quantifying or assessing its risks, and it would move on to developing strategies
to manage those risks and then implementing them through the leadership within business units as well as
through partnerships with external resource providers. This risk management process focused on pure risks
(i.e., absolute risks), which were reported through the corporate treasury.34 The treasury, finance, and

business units would manage financial and operational risks. Risk management specialists within the
business units would report operational risks to the leaders of the business units. 35

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Risk identification at Disney was a constant process that operated on a repetitive loop. Disney identified
three key risk areas—property and business interruption, work injury or illness, and motion picture and
television production—and applied various risk management techniques according to the levels of risk
exposure. These techniques included risk mapping, risk modeling, and dynamic analysis and simulation.
The company determined the level of risk tolerance and risk taking based on its financial, operational, and
reputational impacts. A strong balance sheet and cash flow would increase the company’s financial
tolerance. After identifying risks, depending on the nature of those risks, the company would determine
whether a particular risk was insurable. The company used several types of risk financing; however, it
would use commercial insurance for pure risks that could be economically transferred. To mitigate such
risks, Disney developed long-term partnerships with insurers, made its partners understand Disney’s

businesses, and ensured compliance with respect to its people, processes, and infrastructure.36

MAJOR ACQUIRED ENTITIES

Pixar

Pixar was an American film studio that used computer animation to develop feature films. Acquired by
Disney in 2006 for $7.4 billion, it was an industry leader with many world-famous animations and
intellectual properties as well as diverse distribution channels.37 Prior to the acquisition, seven of its movies
had achieved total box office sales of $3.8 billion. All of its movies had high box-office rankings. 38 The
acquisition allowed Disney to recreate the Disney Renaissance (the period from 1989 to 1999), when it
achieved great commercial success with animated films featuring classic and famous cartoon characters.39

Pixar’s key success factors included the balance struck between business and creative decisions, whereby
the creative directors were given sufficient autonomy; the post-mortem system, whereby the developing
team learned from its experience after each movie was released; and the in-house training facilities, which
helped to improve the skills of its animators.40 According to Edwin Catmull, the president of Pixar, its
management principles were as follows:

Care about people first. [Leaders were responsible for prioritizing and protecting their people as
the source of ideas. This principle was similar to Disney’s HRM principle that “everyone is

important.”]

Focus on a purpose that makes people feel proud. [As long as Pixar focused on producing high-

quality films, it would continue to make profits and attract good employees.]

Encourage self-expression and delivery of thought. [Good movies were made from so many ideas

throughout the development of the stories. As the best ideas could come from anyone, the leaders

needed to remove obstacles to sharing ideas while also encouraging self-expression. This

principle aligned with Disney’s “blue sky” brainstorming sessions.]41

Disney and Pixar shared several cultural similarities, including valuing employees, open communication,

and continuous employee training. By positioning people as the priority and encouraging expression from
every employee, the two companies focused on creating a sense of belonging so that valued employees
produced better products. However, to keep each studio’s culture unique, they established an absolute rule
that neither studio could do any production work for the other.42

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Lucasfilm

Disney acquired Lucasfilm for $4.05 billion in 2012 in order to leverage the Star Wars franchise.43 Five Star

Wars films were released after the acquisition, leading to total revenues of $5.92 billion. Among them, The

Force Awakens generated the highest revenue of $2.07 billion, followed by The Last Jedi with $1.33 billion
(see Exhibit 5).44 The key success factors associated with Star Wars, which began with the first movie in 1977,
were the innovative studio, business-minded orientation, and merchandise sales.45 When George Lucas, the
founder of Lucasfilm, created the design for Star Wars, he also thought about selling character-related toys.
Over the years, sales of Star Wars toys had made about $14 billion, twice the amount of the series’ box office
returns, with more than 1 billion toys having been sold since 1978.46 However, in 2018, the number of retail
orders for Star Wars toys, particularly for The Last Jedi, decreased by 56 per cent when compared with The
Force Awakens and by 47 per cent when compared with Rogue One: A Star Wars Story. 47

Lucasfilm used several innovations during the production of the original Star Wars trilogy. These
innovations included Dykstraflex, a computer-operated tool for mounting the camera and shooting the

movie; three-dimensional (3D) computer animation, the very first tool used to create incredible visual
effects; go motion, a technology that allowed frames to be created using images of a moving object; THX,
a quality assurance system for audio quality; and bluescreen technology, which allowed filmmakers to
construct a comparatively seamless and realistic picture.48

Lucasfilm emphasized trust as the core element in managing people. The top talents would earn basic
salaries, while sharing the profits from the movies. The profit sharing was based on trust rather than
contracts. While Lucasfilm’s organization was generally flat, its creative units had an absolute top-down

culture led by Lucas.49 However, after the acquisition by Disney, Kathleen Kennedy became the president.

She reorganized the creative units by forming 11-member story groups to develop projects that were
consistent with the existing characters and mythology.50

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT PIXAR

The first harassment incident occurred in November 2017 when Lasseter, the chief creative officer of Pixar
and Walt Disney Animation Studios (WDAS), was accused of workplace sexual misconduct. Aside from
his brilliant work making animated movies, he was notorious for being vulgar and making explicit and
offensive sexual references toward his female colleagues. His behaviour included lustful staring, suggestive
comments, unwanted hugs and touching, and even unwanted rubbing and kissing on the lips.51 Many female

employees felt very uncomfortable but also felt they could not do much about it due to the “boys’ club”

culture of the studio.52 Nevertheless, Lasseter addressed his behaviour as a “misstep” and apologized to the
victims, claiming that his intentions were harmless.53

The Pixar leadership tried to conceal the problem, although to prevent it from happening again, they banned
Lasseter from being in a closed environment with female colleagues during meetings. Allowing the culprit
to keep working freely may have hindered productivity and risked damaging the work environment and

career progression of female employees. It was clear that due to Lasseter’s experience and skills in making
animated movies, the management team decided to protect him.54

Replacement of Lasseter

Rather than being immediately replaced, Lasseter was allowed to continue working on some titles even
after the sexual harassment allegation was made public. It seemed that Pixar did not have qualified backup

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personnel resources available in case a top executive had to be replaced. Importantly, Lasseter had been
working with Disney since 1979 and with Pixar since 1986, and he had exerted a significant influence on
the company’s creative decisions, which had resulted in a very high level of achievement in the movie

industry.55 Disney’s strategy of not commenting on Lasseter’s behaviours in an effort to minimize the
damage to its brand caused people to be even more upset, and it also negatively signaled to the public
regarding the company’s ethical responsibility.56

Boys’ Club Mentality

As a leader, Lasseter was accused of having fostered a culture based upon a “boys’ club” mentality.57 There
was a clear bias against women and in favour of male employees. Male employees acted like frat boys,
while female employees became their targets. Several men other than Lasseter had been reported for
sexually harassing behavior.58 Female employees were treated differently and not given much opportunity

to lead the company. For example, there was an instance where a female leader asked her team to work and

was ignored until she became emotionally exhausted and decided to give up. Later, the company replaced
her with a male employee who led the team’s work on the same task.59 She was then given a review of
“trying too hard” and “asks too many questions.”60 Female employees realized that speaking up, telling the
truth, and asking for justice could lead to them being demoted or even laid off.61

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOLLYWOOD

Within the US movie industry, around 94 per cent of female employees had experienced sexual harassment.
Such behaviours included “unwelcome sexual comments, jokes, or gestures” (87 per cent), “being touched
in a sexual way” (69 per cent), and “being shown sexual pictures without consent” (39 per cent). Even
worse, 21 per cent and 10 per cent of them said they had been, respectively, “forced to do a sexual act” and
“ordered unexpectedly to appear naked for auditions.”62 According to Leah Meyerhoff, the founder of Film
Fatales, a non-profit organization working for gender parity in the entertainment industry and a community
of women feature-film directors, “The root of the harassment issue is actually inequality in employment.”

She also said, “When the majority of people in power are these able-bodied straight white men, a side effect
is sexual harassment on set and in the world.” According to San Diego State University, among the top 100
grossing films in 2017, women represented only 10 per cent of writers, 8 per cent of directors, 24 per cent
of producers, 2 per cent of cinematographers, and 14 per cent of editors.63

Three Possible Responses

To tackle the problem, Meyerhoff suggested that, first, Hollywood simply hire more talented women.
Adding more women as creative talents and leaders would accelerate the process of changing the workplace
culture.64 Second, 300 of the most famous names from Hollywood, including America Ferrera, Ashley Judd,
Donna Langley, Natalie Portman, Shonda Rhimes, Jill Soloway, Emma Stone, Kerry Washington, and
Reese Witherspoon, teamed up to launch the sexual harassment prevention initiative “Time’s Up.” This
initiative focused on empowering all women to have access to fair, safe, and respectful work environments.
The initiative provided a legal defense fund for women in relatively labour-intensive industries, such as
retail, manufacturing, food service, and construction,65 so that they could fight against sexual harassment.66

It also supported “the 50/50 by 2020” movement, which aimed to achieve gender equality at the executive

level in Hollywood.67

When announcing the Time’s Up initiative, Rhimes said:

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Earning a living should not come at the cost of anyone’s safety, dignity or morale. . . . Every person
should get to work in an environment free from abuse, assault, and discrimination. It’s well past
time to change the culture of the environment where most of us spend the majority of our day—the
workplace. Fifty-one per cent of our population is female, over thirty per cent of our population is
of colour. Those are important, vital, economically powerful voices that need to be heard at every
level. Time’s Up is working to make sure the people walking the corridors of power within the
workplace and in politics truly reflect the full mix of America—the real America that looks like
and includes all of us. Look, this isn’t going to be easy, but it is right. And fighting for what is right
can seem hard. But letting what is wrong become normal is not easier—it is just more shameful.68

The third response came from the movie audience. The audience had the power to change the tide by
choosing to support films or television shows with women either at the centre or behind the scenes. The
industry usually listened to what the audience wanted and followed such trends in order to obtain greater
revenues. In fact, there had been an increasing number of female-centered productions, which was a positive

sign of gradual change in Hollywood.69

SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW

According to the US Civil Rights Act of 1964, sexual harassment was a form of gender discrimination that
was illegal, regardless of whether the alleged perpetrator was a person’s supervisor or co-worker. The
process of achieving justice for victims in the US started with filing a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The EEOC would then notify the victim’s employer and begin an

investigation. The EEOC might try to settle the complaint through a mediator. If the parties could not reach
a settlement, the EEOC might file a lawsuit in federal court or choose to dismiss the charge. In such cases,
the EEOC would advise the victim to sue in court. However, many states had additional ways of filing
discrimination and harassment complaints against employers.70

According to the high court, quid pro quo and hostile work environment harassment represented two types
of sexual harassment. The former occurred between subordinates and their superior. In the case of this form
of harassment, the superior often asked the subordinates to tolerate the harassment in order to gain a higher
salary or promotion. The supervisor might even blackmail the subordinates by threatening them not to
reveal any harassment if they wanted to keep their job. The latter form of harassment occurred when anyone
in the workplace engaged in sexual misconduct, such as groping or unwanted touching. However, from the
legal perspective, it was unclear how severe such behaviors would have to be before they could be regarded
as harassment. Judges and juries would also consider several other factors, such as the frequency of the
harassment, the number of persons involved, and even the positions of those involved. This latter type of
harassment was the one that judges most often dismissed.71

Sandra Sperino and Suja Thomas, law professors and the authors of Unequal: How American Courts
Undermine Discrimination Law, reviewed more than 1,000 cases of job discrimination and found that
federal judges had exhibited a disturbingly narrow interpretation of what constitutes sexual harassment over
the past 40 years. This interpretation was incorporated into laws and thus created an unsafe work
environment for women. Surprisingly, sexual comments, groping, and propositions were sometimes not
considered to be examples of sexual harassment. Consequently, many well-documented sexual harassment
cases were dismissed by judges, while only 2 per cent of these harassment cases made it to trial.72

There was a 50 per cent chance that the EEOC would determine that the alleged perpetrator had engaged

in sexual harassment. Only for a very severe case could the EEOC sue the alleged perpetrator. There were
6,758 sexual harassment cases reported to the EEOC in 2016, and only 23 per cent of them were resolved

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in favour of the victim. The EEOC was unable to gather sufficient evidence to determine whether
harassment had occurred in 54 per cent of the cases. 73 Out of 100 job discrimination lawsuits that went to
court, only about four lawsuits resulted in some kind of relief for the victims. Such a high dismissal rate
was not due to the lack of evidence but rather to the fact that the judge did not think that the actions were
severe enough to be categorized as sexual harassment. From time to time, federal judges seemed to only
consider rape to be a clear-cut case of illegal sexual harassment. Besides, many companies required
employees to sign an arbitration agreement to prevent them from suing the company and to require them to

resolve the issue privately.74 To win a case, the worker had to overcome four hurdles, namely pretrial
motions, trial, post-trial motions, and appeal.75

PRICE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

When a victim won a lawsuit, the company should fire the perpetrator immediately and also change its
workplace culture.76 However, in reality, the cost of the lawsuit was often not high enough to push the
company to implement the necessary corrective and preventive actions. In 2017, Bill O’Reilly, a journalist at
Fox News, was accused by several women of sexual harassment.77 To settle the claims, Fox News paid $55

million, while O’Reilly paid $32 million privately. When he left the company, he received $25 million as
severance pay. After that, Fox News established a council to prevent such incidents from happening again.78

In Disney’s two cases, given the potential threat to the company’s brand image, Lasseter’s alleged sexual
misconduct and Johnson’s controversial tweets were indeed severe, but they still did not lead to lawsuits.

Cars 2, the feature film that Lasseter directed for Pixar in 2017, the same year his misconduct was revealed,

made more than $562 million, while The Last Jedi, the series installment directed by Johnson, generated
about $1.33 billion in the same year. 79 The company might have lost some of its positive image, but by
keeping silent about the incidents, the costs seemed to be offset by the potential revenues that Lasseter and
Johnson could generate.80

The amount required to settle potential claims was high, but the company and the perpetrator could afford
to pay it and still continue to work together to generate even more revenues. Such a dilemma caused the
company to hesitate about firing the perpetrator. If the company decided to keep the perpetrator, it might
not change its workplace culture at all, as such claims were far less important than the future revenues that
the perpetrator could generate.81

SOCIAL MEDIA CONTROVERSIES AT LUCASFILM

The Last Jedi made a lot of money for Disney, but it was arguably also the most controversial Star Wars
movie to date following its release in December 2017. The controversy stemmed from the audience’s

disappointment with several aspects of the film. Moviegoers felt that The Last Jedi did not connect with the
previous movies in the series, had a low-quality plot and sub-plot, and mistreated an original character. The
fans that hated the movie actively voiced their negative opinions on social media.82 They particularly
blamed Johnson, the movie’s director.83 People began to call out Johnson and to express opinions on his

personal Instagram and Twitter accounts. In June 2018, he blocked the comments on his Instagram account
and started to be aggressive in his messaging. Instead of handling the incident professionally, Johnson

replied to the tweets with name-calling and the use of other insulting and inappropriate language.84

The latest controversy occurred in September 2018, when Johnson made fun of a fan and YouTuber named
Mike Zeroh, who was famous for his Star Wars-related content. Zeroh always informed his audience about
recent news and rumours concerning The Last Jedi. Many of the rumours were about Johnson being fired

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from Lucasfilm. When Johnson and his team watched Zeroh’s videos, Johnson did not like what he saw.

He then tweeted, “Wait. Hahahahahaha this is all because of Zeroh? HAHAHAHAHAHAHA. When we

were in production we had a guy keeping an eye on online rumours. At some point we started using ‘Zeroh’
as a verb. Like, ‘throws trash at basket, but it slips out of your hand and falls behind you.’ ‘Zeroh’d it.’”
People thought that these responses were very unprofessional because Zeroh simply informed his audience
about Star Wars-related news and rumours. Johnson later deleted his tweets.85

Disney’s Double Standard

While Disney remained silent about Johnson’s controversial tweets, the company rapidly fired James Gunn,
the writer and director of Guardians of the Galaxy, due to similar controversial and offensive tweets he
posted years ago, between 2008 and 2010.86 The decision was made after the conservative website The
Daily Caller dug up the tweets in July 2018. In the tweets, Gunn made a number of jokes about pedophilia
and molestation.87 Afterwards, Gunn released a statement expressing his regret and claiming that the tweets
did not represent who he actually was and that he had changed into a very different person. 88

Regardless of Gunn’s apology, Alan Horn, the chairman of Walt Disney Studios, responded, “The offensive
attitudes and statements discovered on James’ Twitter feed are indefensible and inconsistent with our studio’s

values, and we have severed our business relationship with him.”89 The decision to fire him in July 2018

generated diverse opinions on the issue. From the cast’s perspective, they considered Gunn to be the perfect
director and writer for the Guardians of the Galaxy series. The cast even wrote an open letter asking the studio
to bring him back. Given that Disney had sought to improve people’s perceptions of the racism, sexism, and

homophobia in its old movies, was the company’s zero-tolerance approach to Gunn’s past faults a valid one?90

When the cases of Gunn and Johnson were compared, Johnson’s controversies occurred more recently, in
2018, and directly affected the brand image of Lucasfilm as well as its relationship with loyal fans.
However, Gunn’s case occurred longer ago, during 2008 and 2010, and the controversies had no direct
connection to the production at Marvel Studios LLC.91 In the end, Disney chose not to respond to Johnson’s

controversies, while the company decided to fire Gunn quickly.92 Given that the two incidents occurred in
different time periods and that Gunn’s actions deliberately violated social norms, should Disney’s differing
approaches to Gunn and Johnson be considered a double standard?

CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE

Lasseter’s sexual harassment at Pixar was made public through the Me Too movement, a campaign against
sexual harassment and sexual assault, in 2017.93 Victims had the courage to speak up and tell the public the
truth about the perpetrators because of the movement. If it were not for the movement, the sexual
harassment problem at Pixar might have remained concealed. Lasseter would have continued to work for
Disney and its Pixar studios as if nothing had happened. Regarding Johnson’s social media controversies,
no comment had been made by Iger. However, Iger stated in September 2018 that he would slow down Star
Wars productions because of declining sales. He thought that doing so would increase demand for Star Wars
films.94 In April 2019, Iger announced that there would be no new Star Wars movies put into development.95

Disney’s standards of business conduct clearly stated that the company should comply with international
labor standards, which prohibited coercion, harassment, and unfair discrimination in connection with the
production of Disney-branded products. These requirements applied to Disney and all related companies.96

Thus, it remained questionable why Disney did not take immediate action against Lasseter, instead choosing
to postpone his termination, and why the company did to say anything about Johnson’s social media
controversies. What should Disney do to mitigate the losses from these two incidents and to further grow
the company’s sustainably?

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EXHIBIT 1: TOP TEN MEDIA BRANDS 2017–2018 (IN BILLION US$)

2018
ranking

2017
ranking

Company name
2018

Brand
value

2017
Brand
value

1 1 The Walt Disney Company 32.6 34.5

2 2 Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc. 17.0 15.8

3 3 National Broadcasting Company (NBC) 14.9 13.7

4 n/a Universal Pictures 12.1 n/a

5 4 CBS Corporation 10.5 9.9

6 5 American Broadcasting Company (ABC) 10.4 9.4

7 6 Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. 10.2 8.1

8 n/a Sky Group Limited 10.2 n/a

9 8 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 5.7 5.9

10 11
Entertainment and Sports Programming
Network (ESPN)

5.4 4.4

Source: Created by the case authors based on “Media 25 2018 Ranking,” BrandFinance, accessed March 3, 2020,
https://brandirectory.com/rankings/media/2018/table.

EXHIBIT 2: DISNEY’S CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 2017–2019 (IN MILLION US$)

2019 2018 2017

Revenues

Services 60,542 50,869 46,843

Products 9,028 8,565 8,294

Total revenues 69,570 59,434 55,137

Costs and expenses
Cost of services (36,450) (27,528) (25,320)

Cost of products (5,568) (5,198) (4,986)

Selling, general, administrative, and other expenses (11,541) (8,860) (8,176)

Depreciation and amortization (4,160) (3,011) (2,782)

Total costs and expenses (57,719) (44,597) (41,264)

Other income 4,925 499 398

Other expenses (2,691) (1,075) (869)

Total income before taxes 14,085 14,261 13,402

Income taxes (3,031) (1,663) (4,422)

Net income 11,054 12,598 8,980

Source: Created by the case authors based on The Walt Disney Company, The Walt Disney Company – Annual Report 2019,
74, accessed March 1, 2020, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2020/01/2019-Annual-Report .

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Page 11 9B20M147

EXHIBIT 3: DISNEY’S CONSOLIDATED REVENUES AND OPERATING INCOMES BY BUSINESS
SEGMENTS AND GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS 2017–2019 (IN MILLION US$)

2019 2018 2017

Business segments

Revenue
Operating

income
Revenue

Operating
income

Revenue
Operating

income
Media networks 24,827 7,479 21,922 7,338 21,299 7,196

Parks, experiences, and
products

26,225 6,758 24,701 6,095 23,024 5,487

Studio entertainment 11,127 2,686 10,065 3,004 8,352 2,363

Direct-to-consumer and
international entertainment
channels

9,349 (1,814) 3,414 (738) 3,075 (284)

Intercompany eliminations (1,958) (241) (668) (10) (613) 13

Total consolidated values 69,570 14,868 59,434 15,689 55,137 14,775

Geographical regions

United States and Canada 50,555 10,031 45,038 11,396 41,881 10,962

Europe 8,006 2,433 7,026 1,922 6,541 1,812

Asia Pacific 7,796 2,167 5,531 1,869 5,075 1,626

Latin America and others 3,213 237 1,839 502 1,640 375

Total consolidated values 69,570 14,868 59,434 15,689 55,137 14,775

Source: Created by the case authors based on The Walt Disney Company, The Walt Disney Company – Annual Report 2019,
82–83, accessed March 1, 2020, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2020/01/2019-Annual-Report .

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Page 12 9B20M147

EXHIBIT 4: DISNEY’S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET 2017–2019 (IN MILLION US$)

2019 2018 2017
Current assets

Cash and cash equivalent 5,418 4,150 4,017

Receivables 15,481 9,334 8,633

Inventories 1,649 1,392 1,373

Television costs and advances 4,597 1,314 1,278

Other current assets 979 635 588

Total current assets 28,124 16,825 15,889

Film and television costs 22,810 7,888 7,481

Investments 3,224 2,899 3,202

Parks, resorts, and other properties 31,603 29,540 28,406

Intangible assets 23,215 6,812 6,995

Goodwill 80,293 31,269 31,426

Other assets 4,715 3,365 2,390

Total assets 193,984 98,598 95,789
Current liabilities

Account payables 17,762 9,479 8,855

Current portion of borrowings 8,857 3,790 6,172

Deferred revenues 4,722 4,591 4,568

Total current liabilities 31,341 17,860 19,595

Borrowings 38,129 17,084 19,119

Deferred income taxes 7,902 3,109 4,480

Other long-term liabilities 22,723 7,713 7,591

Total liabilities 100,095 45,766 50,785
Equity

Stocks 53,907 36,779 36,248

Retained earnings 35,877 79,582 69,078

Costs of treasury stock (907) (67,588) (64,011)

Non-controlling interests 5,012 4,059 3,689

Total equity 93,889 52,832 45,004
Total liabilities and equity 193,984 98,598 95,789

Source: Created by the case authors based on The Walt Disney Company, The Walt Disney Company – Annual Report 2019, 76,
accessed March 1, 2020, https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2020/01/2019-Annual-Report ; The Walt Disney
Company, The Walt Disney Company – Annual Report 2018, 64, accessed March 1, 2020,
www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/NYSE_DIS_2018 .

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EXHIBIT 5: REVENUE OF THE STAR WARS SERIES AFTER THE ACQUISITION

Title Revenue (billion US$) Time of release
Star Wars: The Rise of Skywalker 1.07 December 2019

Star Wars: Episode VIII – The Last Jedi 1.33 December 2017

Rogue One: A Star Wars Story 1.06 December 2016

Solo: A Star Wars Story 0.39 May 2018

Star Wars: Episode VII – The Force Awakens 2.07 December 2015

Total 5.92

Source: Created by the case authors based on “Star Wars: The Rise Of Skywalker (2019),” Box Office Mojo, accessed
February 21, 2020, www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt2527338/?ref_=bo_se_r_2; “Star Wars: Episode VIII – The Last Jedi (2017),”
Box Office Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020, www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt2527336/?ref_=bo_se_r_3; “Rogue One: A Star
Wars Story (2016),” Box Office Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020, www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt3748528/?ref_=bo_se_r_5;
“Solo: A Star Wars Story (2018),” Box Office Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020,
www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt3778644/?ref_=bo_se_r_6; “Star Wars: Episode VII – The Force Awakens (2015),” Box Office
Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020, www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt2488496/?ref_=bo_se_r_8.

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Page 14 9B20M147

ENDNOTES

1 This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretations and perspectives
presented in the case are not necessarily those of The Walt Disney Company or any of its employees.
2 Claude Brodesser-Akner, “Does Disney Have an Identity Crisis?,” Vulture, May 11, 2012, accessed February 22, 2020,
www.vulture.com/2012/05/why-cant-disney-find-a-studio-chief.html.
3 David Ng, “Disney Has a Wholesome, Family-Friendly Image. Will Acquiring Fox Create a Culture Clash?,” Los Angeles
Times, December 14, 2017, accessed February 25, 2020, www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-disney-culture-clash-
20171214-story.html.
4 “Disney Sparkles as Most Valuable Media Brand of the Year,” Brand Finance, accessed March 3, 2020,
https://brandfinance.com/news/press-releases/disney-sparkles-as-most-valuable-media-brand-of-the-year/.
5 Gene Maddaus, “John Lasseter Will Exit Disney at the End of the Year,” Variety, June 8, 2018, accessed February 17, 2020,
https://variety.com/2018/film/news/disney-john-lasseter-harassment-bob-iger-1202734060/.
6 John F. Trent, “Rian Johnson and John Boyega Attack Star Wars Fans and Consumers at Their Own Risk!,” Bounding Into
Comics, June 13, 2018, accessed February 17, 2020, https://boundingintocomics.com/2018/06/13/rian-johnson-and-john-
boyega-attack-star-wars-fans-and-consumers-at-their-own-risk/;

www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/06/rian-johnson-response-kelly-marie-tran-instagram; B. Alan Orange, “Last Jedi Director
Trashes Star Wars Youtuber Mike Zeroh Then Deletes Tweets,” Movieweb, September 1, 2018, accessed February 17, 2020,
https://movieweb.com/last-jedi-director-rian-johnson-mike-zeroh-tweets-response/.
7 Matt McGloin, “Bob Iger, Rian Johnson Confirm No Star Wars Movies in Development,” Cosmic Book News, April 11, 2020,
accessed February 28, 2020, https://cosmicbook.news/bob-iger-rian-johnson-no-star-wars-movies-development.
8 “The History and Evolution of The Walt Disney Company,” WorldAtlas, accessed May 4, 2020,
www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-history-and-evolution-of-the-walt-disney-company.html.
9 $ = USD = United States dollars; all currency amounts are in USD unless otherwise specified. “History Walt Disney Studios
(Division),” Bredemeier, accessed May 4, 2020, https://bredemeierbredemeier.blogspot.com/2010/09/history-walt-disney-
studios-division.html.
10 “The Walt Disney Company – Company Profile, Information, Business Description, History, Background Information on The
Walt Disney Company,” Reference for Business, accessed May 4, 2020, www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/75/The-
Walt-Disney-Company.html#ixzz6LTwRDPDF.
11 James Bates, “Disney Snaps Up Miramax for Estimated $60 Million: Films: Independent Company Gained Fame with ‘The
Crying Game.’ Weinstein Brothers to Retain Control,” Los Angeles Times, May 1, 1993, accessed May 4, 2020,
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1993-05-01-mn-29789-story.html.
12 Steven P. Rosenfeld, “Disney To Acquire CapCities/ABC in $19 Billion Merger,” AP News, July 31, 1995, accessed February
29, 2020, https://apnews.com/cb452149b6aef0235a0ed9696ec8278d.
13 Matthew Garrahan, “Disney’s Profits Yield to Recession,” Financial Times, February 4, 2009, accessed February 19, 2020,
www.ft.com/content/a32aa9a2-f246-11dd-9678-0000779fd2ac.
14 Trey Williams, “Disney Expected to Lay Off 4,000 Employees at Fox,” TheWrap, March 21, 2019, accessed February 19,
2020, www.thewrap.com/fox-expected-to-lay-off-4000-after-disney-acquisition/.
15 Amy Watson, “Film and Movie Industry – Statistics & Facts,” Statista, December 19, 2018, accessed February 23, 2020,
www.statista.com/topics/964/film/.
16 Julia Alexander, “Netflix Will Stop Carrying Disney, Marvel and Star Wars Movies by the End of 2019,” Polygon, August 8,
2017, accessed February 23, 2020, www.polygon.com/2017/8/8/16115890/netflix-disney-star-wars-marvel-lucasfilm-bob-iger.
17 Matt Krantz, “Disney Nears Buy Point; This CEO Made Investors $200 Billion Richer,” Investor’s Business Daily, June 18,
2019, accessed February 21, 2020, www.investors.com/etfs-and-funds/personal-finance/bob-iger-vs-michael-eisner-who-
was-best-disney-ceo/.
18 David Collis and Ashley Hartman, “Reawakening the Magic: Bob Iger and the Walt Disney Company,” Harvard Business
School, December 2018, accessed August 27, 2020, https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=50998.
19 Paul R. La Monica, “Comcast Bids for Disney,” CNN, February 18, 2004, accessed February 21, 2020,
https://money.cnn.com/2004/02/11/news/companies/comcast_disney/.
20 Krantz, op. cit.
21 “Robert A. Iger,” The Walt Disney Company, accessed February 19, 2020, www.thewaltdisneycompany.com/leaders/robert-
a-iger/.
22 Brodesser-Akner, op. cit.
23 Jade Scipioni, “10 Principles for Great Leadership, According to Disney’s CEO,” CNBC, October 23, 2019, accessed
February 20, 2020, www.cnbc.com/2019/10/23/disney-ceo-bob-igers-principles-for-great-leadership.html.
24 “The Walt Disney Company,” The Walt Disney Company, accessed February 21, 2020, www.thewaltdisneycompany.com.
25 Ameet Ranadive, “5 Leadership Lessons from Bob Iger (CEO of Disney),” Medium, February 11, 2016, accessed February
21, 2020, https://medium.com/@ameet/5-leadership-lessons-from-bob-iger-ceo-of-disney-92512b7efc1f.
26 Nabila Amarsy, “Disney’s Business Model: A Scalable Dream Factory,” Strategyzer, March 17, 2015, accessed February 21,
2020, www.strategyzer.com/blog/posts/2015/3/17/disneys-business-model-a-scalable-dream-factory.

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Page 15 9B20M147

27 Katie Kuehner-Hebert, “Under Bob Iger, Disney Continues to Flourish Throughout the Globe,” Chief Executive, June 18, 2018,
accessed February 21, 2020, https://chiefexecutive.net/under-bob-iger-disney-continues-to-flourish-throughout-the-globe/.
28 Sarah Perez, “BAMTech Valued at $3.75 Billion Following Disney Deal,” Techcrunch, August 9, 2017, accessed May 5,
2020, https://techcrunch.com/2017/08/08/bamtech-valued-at-3-75-billion-following-disney-deal/; Emily VanDerWerff, “Here’s
What Disney Owns After the Massive Disney/Fox Merger,” Vox, March 20, 2019, accessed May 5, 2020,
www.vox.com/culture/2019/3/20/18273477/disney-fox-merger-deal-details-marvel-x-men.
29 Sean McCracken, “Lessons on tackling tech innovation from Disney,” Hotel News Now, August 8, 2019, accessed July 25,
2020, https://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Articles/297526/Lessons-on-tackling-tech-innovation-from-Disney.
30 Stephen Bruce, “Disney World: It’s Not Magic, It’s Work,” HR Daily Advisor, October 25, 2009, accessed February 21, 2020,
https://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2009/10/25/disney-world-it-s-not-magic-it-s-work/.
31 “Brainstorming Tricks from Disney Imagineering,” YouTube video, 3:58, posted by “kignite,” February 18, 2013, accessed
July 2, 2020, www.youtube.com/watch?v=EAE9CXjaBmo.
32 Ibid.
33 Jordan M.K. Daley, The Keys to Disney’s Magic and Success, 10, Honors College University of Maine, May 2018, accessed
May 5, 2020, https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1324&context=honors.
34 Pure risk is a category of threat that is beyond human control and that results in losses. It includes incidents such as natural
disasters, fire, and untimely death. This category of risk is managed by purchasing insurance coverage. Margaret Rouse,
“Pure Risk (Absolute Risk),” TechTarget, June 2017, accessed February 23, 2020,
https://searchcompliance.techtarget.com/definition/pure-risk-absolute-risk.
35 Tim East, “The Walt Disney Company Risk Finance and Risk Management Strategy,” AON, September 13, 2011, accessed
February 23, 2020, https://slideplayer.com/slide/4529413/.
36 Ibid.
37 Paul Hellard, “Pixar Animation Studios: 4 Secrets to Success,” CreativeBloq, October 9, 2018, accessed February 23, 2020,
www.creativebloq.com/features/pixar-animation-studios-4-secrets-to-success.
38 Paul R. La Monica, “Disney Buys Pixar,” CNN Money, January 25, 2006, accessed February 29, 2020,
https://money.cnn.com/2006/01/24/news/companies/disney_pixar_deal/.
39 Peter Debruge, “Disney’s Pixar Acquisition: Bob Iger’s Bold Move That Reanimated a Studio,” Variety, November 22, 2016,
accessed February 29, 2020, https://variety.com/2016/film/features/disney-pixar-acquisition-bob-iger-john-lasseter-
1201923719/.
40 Greg Satell, “The Little Known Secret To Pixar’s Creative Success,” Forbes, May 29, 2015, accessed February 25, 2020,
www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2015/05/29/the-little-known-secret-to-pixars-creative-success/.
41 Michael Lee Stallard, “3 Ways Pixar Gains Competitive Advantage from Its Culture,” Fox Business, May 23, 2014, accessed
February 26, 2020, www.foxbusiness.com/features/3-ways-pixar-gains-competitive-advantage-from-its-culture.
42 David A. Price, “Managing Creativity: Lessons from Pixar and Disney Animation,” Harvard Business Review, April 9, 2014,
accessed February 29, 2020, https://hbsp.harvard.edu/product/H00R2U-PDF-
ENG?Ntt=&itemFindingMethod=Recommendation&recommendedBy=905014-PDF-ENG.
43 Nathan Ingraham, “Disney Buys Lucasfilm, Plans to Release ‘Star Wars: Episode 7’ in 2015,” The Verge, October 30, 2012,
accessed February 29, 2020, www.theverge.com/2012/10/30/3577656/disney-buys-lucasfilm-plans-to-release-star-wars-
episode-7-in-2015.
44 “Star Wars: The Rise Of Skywalker (2019),” Box Office Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020,
www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt2527338/?ref_=bo_se_r_2; “Star Wars: Episode VIII – The Last Jedi (2017),” Box Office Mojo,
accessed February 21, 2020, www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt2527336/?ref_=bo_se_r_3; “Rogue One: A Star Wars Story
(2016),” Box Office Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020, www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt3748528/?ref_=bo_se_r_5; “Solo: A
Star Wars Story (2018),” Box Office Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020,
www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt3778644/?ref_=bo_se_r_6; “Star Wars: Episode VII – The Force Awakens (2015),” Box Office
Mojo, accessed February 21, 2020, www.boxofficemojo.com/title/tt2488496/?ref_=bo_se_r_8.
45 Jeff Giles, “5 Technical Breakthroughs in Star Wars that Changed Movies Forever,” Rotten Tomatoes, December 6, 2017,
accessed February 29, 2020, https://editorial.rottentomatoes.com/article/5-technical-breakthroughs-in-star-wars-that-
changed-movies-forever/.
46 Melissa Leon, “How ‘Star Wars’ Revolutionized the Toy Industry,” The Daily Beast, January 6, 2018, accessed February 29,
2020, www.thedailybeast.com/how-star-wars-revolutionized-the-toy-industry.
47 Paul Bond, “Star Wars ‘Last Jedi’ Toy Shipments Down Sharply From ‘Force Awakens,’” Hollywood Reporter, December 20,
2017, accessed February 26, 2020, www.hollywoodreporter.com/heat-vision/star-wars-last-jedi-toy-shipments-down-sharply-
force-awakens-1069479.
48 Giles, op. cit.
49 Paddy Miller, “George Lucas on Leadership, Salaries and Company Culture,” The Innovation Architect, October 26, 2009,
accessed February 29, 2020, https://millerwedell.wordpress.com/2009/10/26/george-lucas-on-leadership-salaries-and-
company-culture/.
50 “Star Wars’ Low-Key Commander Plots a Bold Course for Lucasfilm,” Business Weekly, December 13, 2017, accessed
February 29, 2020, www.fwbusiness.com/business/latest/businessweekly/article_c0c3355e-e01e-11e7-afb5-0fc1f5a1211d.html.
51 Maddaus, op. cit.

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Page 16 9B20M147

52 A boys’ club is an informal culture of men bonding with men, which keeps them in more powerful positions. Kaila Kea-Lewis,
“6 Uncommon Signs Your Job May Have a Boys’ Club,” Inhersight, accessed February 16, 2020,
www.inhersight.com/blog/insight-commentary/6-uncommon-signs-your-job-may-have-boys-club?_n=66150371#.
53 Nick Statt, “Pixar’s John Lasseter to leave Disney following sexual harassment complaints,” The Verge, June 8, 2018,
accessed February 29, 2020, www.theverge.com/2018/6/8/17443370/pixar-walt-disney-animation-john-lasseter-leaving-
company-sexual-harassment.
54 Cassandra Smolcic, “How Pixar’s Open Sexism Ruined My Dream Job (Guest Column),” Variety, June 27, 2018, accessed
February 6, 2020, https://variety.com/2018/film/news/pixar-boys-club-john-lasseter-cassandra-smolcic-1202858982/.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Adam White, “Pixar’s Boy Story: John Lasseter and Animation’s Persistent Problem with Women,” Telegraph, June 20, 2018,
accessed May 5, 2020, www.telegraph.co.uk/films/0/boys-story-john-lasseter-pixars-persistent-problem-women/.
58 Smolcic, op. cit.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Andrew Pulver, “94% of Women in Hollywood Experience Sexual Harassment or Assault, Says Survey,” Guardian, February
21, 2018, accessed February 16, 2020, www.theguardian.com/film/2018/feb/21/94-of-women-in-hollywood-experience-
sexual-harassment-or-assault-says-survey.
63 Regan Morris, “Is #MeToo Changing Hollywood?,” BBC News, March 3, 2018, accessed February 16, 2020,
www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43219531.
64 Ibid.
65 “Blue-Collar vs. White-Collar Jobs: Here’s the Difference,” Indeed, October 7, 2019, accessed May 3, 2020,
www.indeed.com/career-advice/finding-a-job/difference-between-blue-and-white-collar-jobs.
66 Ashley Lee, “Sexual Harassment Prevention Initiative Time’s Up Launched by Hollywood Women,” Hollywood Reporter,
January 1, 2018, accessed February 16, 2020, www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/times-up-sexual-harassment-prevention-
initiative-launched-by-hollywood-women-1070896.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Jess Joho, “How to Be Part of the Solution to Sexual Harassment Problems in Hollywood,” Mashable, January 10, 2018,
accessed February 16, 2020, https://mashable.com/article/women-hollywood-project-support-times-up/.
70 “Sexual Harassment – Legal Standards,” Workplace Fairness, accessed July 3, 2020, www.workplacefairness.org/sexual-
harassment-legal-rights#11.
71 Ibid.
72 Alexia Fernández Campbell, “How the Legal System Fails Victims of Sexual Harassment,” Vox, December 11, 2017,
accessed February 16, 2020, www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/11/16685778/sexual-harassment-federal-courts.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Sandra F. Sperino and Suja A. Thomas, “Unequal: How America’s Courts Undermine Discrimination Law,” Oxford University
Press Scholarship Online, May 2017, accessed July 4, 2020,
https://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190278380.001.0001/acprof-9780190278380.
76 “I Need to Discipline or Fire an Employee,” U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, accessed July 2, 2020,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/small-business/7-i-need-discipline-or-fire-employee.
77 Lauren Cook, “Bill O’Reilly Sexual Harassment Scandal Explained,” amNewYork, October 27, 2017, accessed February 16,
2020, www.amny.com/news/bill-o-reilly-sexual-harassment-scandal-explained-1-13367681/.
78 Alyssa Rosenberg, “The Price of Sexual Harassment Should Be Ruin,” Washington Post, December 1, 2017, accessed
February 16, 2020, www.washingtonpost.com/news/act-four/wp/2017/12/01/the-price-of-sexual-harassment-should-be-ruin/.
79 Ibid.
80 Smolcic, op. cit.; “Star Wars: Episode VIII – The Last Jedi (2017),” op. cit.
81 Rosenberg, op. cit.
82 Johnny Brayson, “Why Everyone Is Angry About ‘The Last Jedi,’” Bustle, December 20, 2017, accessed February 17, 2020,
www.bustle.com/p/why-everyone-is-angry-about-the-last-jedi-the-most-controversial-star-wars-movie-ever-7638224.
83 Ibid.
84 Trent, op. cit.
85 Orange, op. cit.
86 Benjamin Lee, “Disney Fires Guardians of the Galaxy Franchise Director after Offensive Tweets,” Guardian, July 21, 2018,
accessed February 17, 2020, www.theguardian.com/film/2018/jul/20/guardians-of-the-galaxy-james-gunn-fired.
87 Ibid.
88 Graeme Mcmillan, “What James Gunn’s Firing Says about the Rising Stakes of Social Media,” The Verge, August 1, 2018,
accessed February 17, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/1/17639430/james-gunn-disney-mike-cernovich-firing-social-
media-guardians-of-the-galaxy.
89 Benjamin Lee, op. cit.

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90 Mcmillan, op. cit.
91 Benjamin Lee, op. cit.
92 Mcmillan, op. cit.
93 “Me Too,” The Me Too Movement, accessed February 17, 2020, https://metoomvmt.org; Benjamin Lee, “Backlash after Ex-
Pixar Head Scores New Job Despite #MeToo Allegations,” Guardian, January 9, 2019, accessed February 17, 2020,
www.theguardian.com/film/2019/jan/09/pixar-john-lasseter-skydancce-animation-times-up.
94 Andrew Liptak, “Disney CEO Bob Iger: Expect a ‘Slowdown’ for the Star Wars Franchise,” The Verge, September 20, 2018,
accessed February 17, 2020, www.theverge.com/2018/9/20/17882574/disney-ceo-bob-iger-star-wars-franchise-slowdown.
95 McGloin, op. cit.
96 The Walt Disney Company and Affiliated Companies, Standards of Business Conduct, 38, 2017, accessed May 5, 2020,
https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/app/uploads/2019/06/TWDC-Standards-of-Business-Conduct-1 .

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This document is authorized for use only by Heba Elwahsh in Disney Winter and Spring 2023 taught by Deniz Ozenbas, Montclair State University from Dec 2022 to Jun 2023.

• THE WALT DISNEY COMPANY: SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND CONTROVERSIES ON SOCIAL MEDIA

DISNEY

Robert Iger

Business Model

Human Resource Management (HRM) and Corporate Culture

Risk Management

MAJOR ACQUIRED ENTITIES

Pixar

Lucasfilm

SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT PIXAR

Replacement of Lasseter

Boys’ Club Mentality

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOLLYWOOD

Three Possible Responses

SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW

PRICE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

SOCIAL MEDIA CONTROVERSIES AT LUCASFILM

Disney’s Double Standard

CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE

EXHIBIT 1: TOP TEN MEDIA BRANDS 2017–2018 (IN BILLION US$)

EXHIBIT 2: DISNEY’S CONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT 2017–2019 (IN MILLION US$)

EXHIBIT 3: DISNEY’S CONSOLIDATED REVENUES AND OPERATING INCOMES BY BUSINESS SEGMENTS AND GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS 2017–2019 (IN MILLION US$)

EXHIBIT 4: DISNEY’S CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET 2017–2019 (IN MILLION US$)

EXHIBIT 5: REVENUE OF THE STAR WARS SERIES AFTER THE ACQUISITION

ENDNOTES