Each Module 2 through 7 has an associated small group discussion that should focus on discussing the course content for that Module. Each discussion will span the two-weeks of the Module. Each group member is required to make an initial post during the first week of the Module (i.e., the first Wednesday through Tuesday of the Module) and then respond to each of the other group members’ initial posts during the second week of the Module (i.e., the second Wednesday through Tuesday of the Module). Initial posts should aim to be 200-400 words and while there is no range for peer response posts these should be substantive and include more thought than “I agree with your point” or “I said something similar in my post”.
Use your own creativity in approaching the posts. Types of observations and reflections in the posts could include the following (but aren’t limited to this):
- Pick a topic or concepts from required readings to reflect upon (e.g., what and why something interested you; what did you find the most interesting or practical that helped you gain new insight or skill).
- Critique readings by adding something you can justify, showing how an author missed a point.
- Validate something from the readings based on your own experience or other reading.
- Include a discussion question for the group based on readings. DO NOT pose generic questions such as “What was your favorite part of the reading?” or similar questions.
- Relate readings to contemporary events or news and post a link.
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The Entangled Twins: Power and
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Bing Ran
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https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399718801000
Administration & Society
1 –30
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0095399718801000
journals.sagepub.com/home/aas
Original Article
The Entangled Twins:
Power and Trust
in Collaborative
Governance
Bing Ran1 and Huiting Qi1
Abstract
Power and trust are two important issues of interorganizational relations
in collaborative governance. This article develops a critical conceptual
analysis of the dyadic relationship between power and trust in the context
of collaborative governance. Three dynamic relationships and seven
corresponding propositions are proposed regarding the shared sources of
power and trust, the effects of power asymmetry and power sharing on
trust building, and the influence of trust building on the management of
power relationship in collaborative governance. These dyadic relations will
help scholars and practitioners to deal with the dynamics brought forth by
power and
trust in
collaboration.
Keywords
power, trust, collaborative governance
Introduction
Collaborative governance has been studied extensively by both scholars and
practitioners in recent decades. Similar terms, including partnership, alliance,
network, and joint working, all capture this emerging phenomenon (Ansell &
1Penn State Harrisburg, Middletown, PA, USA
Corresponding Author:
Bing Ran, School of Public Affairs, Penn State Harrisburg, 777 West Harrisburg Pike,
Middletown, PA 17057, USA.
Email: bingran@psu.edu
801000 AASXXX10.1177/0095399718801000Administration & SocietyRan and Qi
research-article2018
2 Administration & Society 00(0)
Gash, 2008; K. Emerson, Nabatchi, & Balogh, 2012; Huxham, Vangen,
Huxham, & Eden, 2000). In this article, we define collaborative governance
as a multi-organizational arrangement where a number of identified partici-
pants work together based on deliberative consensus and collective decision
making to pursue shared purposes (Ansell & Gash, 2008; K. Emerson et al.,
2012; Huxham et al., 2000; Ran
& Qi, 2017).
Prior literature analyzed numerous factors impacting collaborative gover-
nance, among which power and trust are two important ones (Ansell & Gash,
2008; Huxham & Vangen, 2000). Most of the literature on power and trust in
collaborative governance focused on their independent roles rather than their
dynamic interplays (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Purdy, 2012; Saz-Carranza,
Salvador Iborra, & Albareda, 2016; Vangen & Huxham, 1998; Vangen &
Huxham, 2003). Studies on power in collaborative governance often consider
power as a challenge to the success of collaboration due to potential negative
effects resulted from unavoidable power asymmetry (Ansell & Gash, 2008;
Provan & Milward, 2001; Purdy, 2012; Ran & Qi, 2016). Power asymmetry
is commonly noted as a problem as power is almost always distributed asym-
metrically across participants, which may lead to the manipulation by stron-
ger actors in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone,
2006; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Some literature further analyzed different
sources and arenas of power in collaboration (Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Purdy,
2012), providing a framework to make sense of power dynamics in interorga-
nizational domains. Scholars tend to view power sharing as a solution to
power asymmetry but a series of challenges in sharing power is still difficult
to overcome (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Gray, 1989).
Comparatively, trust is often considered in terms of its positive influence on
collaboration (K. Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham et al., 2000; Ring & Van de
Ven, 1992). The benefits of trust include developing positive attitudes and con-
fidence between partners (Huxham et al., 2000; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992),
cultivating mutual understandings (K. Emerson et al., 2012), lowing transaction
cost (Berardo, Heikkila, & Gerlak, 2014; Gulati, 1995), boosting openness of
expression (Van Oortmerssen, van Woerkum, & Aarts, 2014), promoting con-
fliction resolution (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), and improving performance of
activities (Johnston, McCutcheon, Stuart, & Kerwood, 2004; Oh & Bush, 2016).
Some researchers focused on trust building, providing a series of approaches to
enhancing trust in collaboration, such as communication and adaption (Das &
Teng, 1998), competence to perform in collaboration (Blomqvist & Ståhle,
2000), and collective problem-solving activities (Booher, 2004).
It is important to note that a set of challenges in power and trust building
in collaborative governance are still unsolved effectively by the current lit-
erature, which largely focused on the individual roles of power and trust in
Ran and Qi 3
collaboration, such as how to budget and justify the necessary time and cost
in power and trust building in collaboration (Ansell & Gash, 2008), how to
effectively manage various conflicts and reduce mistrust among stakeholders
resulted from power issues (Gray, 1996; Huxham & Vangen, 2005), and how
to cope with participants’ reluctance, possible stalemate, and inaction in shar-
ing power (Gray, 1985). These unsolved challenges inspire us to study the
relationship between power and trust from a dyadic perspective rather than
focusing on their independent and individual roles in collaborative gover-
nance. In fact, both power and trust are social forces (Ireland & Webb, 2007),
entangled and intertwined with each other to coordinate interactions between
individuals or groups (Luhmann, 1979). The dyadic perspective often studies
the common bases or sources of two concepts and their mutual influence on
each other. Accordingly, we discuss three dyadic relationships between power
and trust in collaborative governance: the shared sources of power and trust,
the influence of power relationship on trust building, and the influence of
trust building on power relationship. We argue that the three dyadic relation-
ships will effectively address the challenges in power and trust building in
collaborative governance. Promoting shared sources of power and trust can
help participants save time and cost of collaboration by managing power rela-
tionship and building trust simultaneously. The influence of power relation-
ship on trust building is important for understanding and managing various
conflicts and reducing distrust among partners caused by power issues. The
influence of trust building on the management of power relationship is sig-
nificant for promoting confliction resolution, improving performance of
activities, and reducing possible stalemate and inaction in pursuing power
sharing. We believe the analysis of these three relationships can advance our
understanding of power and trust both conceptually and practically.
From the conceptual perspective, most prior research on power and trust in
collaborative governance stops at the individual roles, impacts and mecha-
nisms of power or trust in collaboration (e.g., Bryson et al., 2006; Huxham,
2003; Purdy, 2012; Saz-Carranza et al., 2016; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). This
limits our interpretation of power and trust as it fails to uncover some similari-
ties and interactions between these two elusive concepts. Through a dyadic
perspective that bridges these two concepts together, we identify certain impor-
tant similarities and interactions between different dimensions of power and
trust, such as their sources, types, and effects, all of which are helpful to further
our understanding of these two critical concepts in collaborative
governance.
From the practical perspective, as collaborative governance is full of para-
doxes (Huxham et al., 2000), carrying the dynamics of dependency, coopera-
tion, competition, and conflict, neither power nor trust alone can make the
collaboration work effectively in practice. Focusing on the independent role
4 Administration & Society 00(0)
of power or trust leads to difficulties in dealing with certain challenges in
collaboration, such as time and cost consuming resulted from trust building
(Ansell & Gash, 2008); questions on authority, transparency, and account-
ability caused by power disparities among participants (Purdy, 2012); and
threats to the performance of collaboration due to stalemate and inaction pro-
voked by pursuing inappropriate equality in power relationship (Gray, 1985).
The dyadic analysis of power and trust used in this article provides a different
way of thinking and solving these issues. Taking advantage of some underly-
ing relationships between different dimensions of power and trust provides
important managerial implications in collaborative governance, which can
help participants consider their power and trusting relationships with each
other simultaneously and explore some useful strategies in coordinating their
interactions more effectively.
This article is organized as follows: We will first provide a critical review
on power and trust in collaborative governance, and then propose three rela-
tionships and seven propositions between power and trust in the context of
collaborative governance. We conclude this article with a discussion of con-
ceptual similarities between power and trust, trust-based power and power-
based trust, as well as a set of managerial implications for participants to
manage power and trust in collaboration.
Power and Trust in
Collaborative Governance
In this section, we will first review some general conceptualization of power and
trust that is primary in literature to provide a basic introduction of these two
complex concepts, such as their definitions and widely used typologies. Because
this article discusses power and trust in the context of collaborative governance
at organizational (meso and macro) levels rather than at interpersonal (micro)
level, we will focus on some dimensions of power and trust that have been dis-
cussed frequently in collaborative governance literature, such as power asym-
metry, power, and trust building in interorganizational interactions.
Power in Collaborative Governance
Essentially, power is a property of a relationship (R. M. Emerson, 1962), refer-
ring to a potential ability of controlling or influencing others (individuals,
groups, or organizations). The control or influence can be conceptualized in
terms of evoking an influence or change in others’ behaviors (Bachrach &
Baratz, 1962; Dahl, 1957; Hunt & Nevin, 1974) or manipulating others’
desires, attitudes, and behaviors through social structure and cultural patterns
(Dawson, 1996; Lister, 2000; Lukes, 1974). Scholars categorize power in
Ran and Qi 5
many different ways, such as a widely used typology proposed by French and
Raven (1959) where power was categorized into reward power, coercive
power, legitimate power, referent power, and expert power. A binary categori-
zation is also frequently used: coercive or noncoercive (Ireland & Webb,
2007). Coercive power refers to the actors’ ability to control negative or unde-
sired outcomes through punishment or threatened sanctions (French & Raven,
1959; Molm, 1997). Noncoercive power is the ability to promote positive or
desired outcomes by providing or withholding rewards (Molm, 1997).
In recent years, scholars have made good attempts in expanding the con-
ceptualization of power beyond individual or group exercising power, which
is helpful in studying power in the context of interorganizational collabora-
tion. For example, Crosby and Bryson (2005) used structuration theory spe-
cifically to understand power in settings where no one is in charge. Power is
viewed as organizational controls of ideas, resources, rules, modes, media,
and methods in interorganizational dynamics. Applying this understanding of
power in collaborative governance, what literature recognized as ambiguous,
complex, and rapid changing nature of power in collaboration (Huxham
et al., 2000; Purdy, 2012) could be elucidated by a framework that delineates
the influencing factors in power relationship in a collaborative network (Ran
& Qi, 2017).
To understand power in collaborative governance, Huxham and Vangen
(2005) proposed two levels of power in interorganizational relations: the
macro level and micro level. The macro-level power is about various sources
of power and the power shift from one partner to another with the transfer of
power sources between partnering organizations. The power sources are
“macro” as they are related to groups, organizations, or networks rather than
to individuals in collaborations (Huxham & Beech, 2008). The micro-level
perspective on power focuses on the way in which power is enacted by indi-
viduals (who are often the representatives of partnering organizations) or the
partnering organization (as a collective entity) during the daily interaction in
collaboration, such as managing membership and setting agenda (Huxham &
Vangen, 2005). For instance, reward or coercive power exists when some
representatives (at micro level) perceive that other partners can use resources
(at macro level) to control or influence them by rewarding for compliance or
by punishing for noncompliance (Purdy, 2012).
In collaborative governance, power-related issues have been analyzed
extensively, such as major sources of power (Hardy & Phillips, 1998), differ-
ent arenas of power (Purdy, 2012), and factors affecting power relationship
(Hardy & Phillips, 1998), among which power asymmetry has been regarded
as the most critical issue (Huxham et al., 2000; Provan & Milward, 2001;
Purdy, 2012). To address the problems caused by power asymmetry,
6 Administration & Society 00(0)
researchers advocated power sharing as a solution (Berkes, 2010; Huxham
et al., 2000). Power sharing can produce ethos of cooperation and trust
(Linder, 1999); promote sharing of responsibility, knowledge, and risk
(Linder, 1999); establish firm partnerships (Carmichael & Knox, 1999);
secure legitimacy of governance (Jentoft, van Son, & Bjørkan, 2007); and
reduce fragmentation (Ehler, 2003). Difficulties in power sharing have also
been recognized, such as the time-consuming process of fostering trust to
share power, stalemate, and inaction caused by poor implementation of power
and failed collaboration due to unwillingness to share power (Coff, 1999;
Gray, 1985).
All of these conceptualizations of power constitute the major power
mechanisms, which affect actors’ behaviors in face of different possibili-
ties (Luhmann, 1979) and coordinate social interactions between actors
(Bachmann, 2001). They provide a sound base for scholars to further
investigate power issues in collaborative governance.
Trust in Collaborative Governance
Similar to power, trust has also been studied in different disciplines, all char-
acterizing trust in terms of “confident expectations” and “willingness to be
vulnerable” (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015; Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; Mayer,
Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Trust
implies confident expectations of outcomes of an uncertain event, with one
party willing to give up the control over outcomes and to be vulnerable to
risks from another party (Hosmer, 1995; Zand, 1972). A trustor’s confident
expectations come from a trustee’s certain characteristics perceived by the
trustor. Three characteristics of a trustee are prominently discussed in litera-
ture (Mayer et al., 1995; Mayer & Gavin, 2005): ability (about skills and
competencies), benevolence (about good motivation), and integrity (about
adherence to moral and ethical principles). A trustor can be betrayed or
undermined if the trustee is proved to lack such characteristics to realize the
trustor’s confident expectations. The risks of trust include partners’ opportu-
nistic action and inability to perform (Currall, 1992; Inkpen & Currall, 1998,
2004). The risks of trust may even result in considerable losses for the trustor
and damages for a relationship when trust is misplaced (Bachmann, 2001).
To cultivate trusting relationship in collaborative governance, both inter-
personal and interorganizational levels of trust should be taken into account,
because individuals as points of contact between organizations and partner-
ing organizations represented by these individuals are important for trust
building in collaborative governance. Interpersonal trust has two noteworthy
types: affect- and cognition-based trust (Blomqvist, 1997; Lewis & Weigert,
Ran and Qi 7
1985; McAllister, 1995). Affect-based trust consists of emotional bonds, in
which genuine care and concern for the welfare of partners are invested.
Cognition-based trust is based on the economic rationality to generate ratio-
nal reasons for trust. Interpersonal notion of trust can be extended to the inter-
organizational level, referring to the extent to which members of one
organization have a collective trust orientation toward another organization
(Dyer & Chu, 2000; Jeffries & Reed, 2000; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone,
1998). This collective trust orientation can be linked to the predictability of a
partnering organization’s behavior toward a vulnerable focal organization,
reflecting the confidence of the focal organization in its partnership with
another organization (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008). Yet the collectively held
trust orientation is not the simple aggregation of trust attitudes of all individu-
als in an organization because not all organizational members are equally
involved in organizational interactions with another organization due to the
unequal power distribution within an organization (Blomqvist & Ståhle,
2000; Janowicz-Panjaitan & Krishnan, 2009).
In collaborative governance, trust, both at the interpersonal level and
interorganizational level, is produced and reproduced through interactions
over time. Interorganizational trust is tied to interpersonal trust through insti-
tutionalization (Sydow, 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998), started when individuals
as points of contact between organizations developed trust orientation on
each other during the collaborative work. Trust can be further strengthened,
recreated, patterned, and institutionalized throughout the collaborating orga-
nizations as the interaction continues (Zaheer et al., 1998). Through collabo-
ration and interaction, interpersonal trust of the points-of-contact individuals
will affect the trust orientation of other organizational members toward the
partnering organization (Zaheer et al., 1998). As this trust orientation becomes
institutionalized, an interorganizational trust is formed, which will further
serve as a behavioral constraint on both organizations and individuals.
Trust has been identified as a key factor in collaborative governance (K.
Emerson et al., 2012; Huxham & Vangen, 2005) because it can ensure adher-
ence to agreed rules (Lyon, 2006); promote understanding of others’ interests,
needs, and values (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Thomson & Perry, 2006); and
improve performance (Child, 2001). Low level of trust will produce a series
of problems in collaboration, such as insufficient commitment, strategies of
manipulation, and dishonest communications (Ansell & Gash, 2008). Yet
trust building is a time- and effort-consuming process (Henneman, Lee, &
Cohen, 1995), in which repeated and quality interactions (K. Emerson et al.,
2012), successful past actions and cooperation (Vangen & Huxham, 1998),
and sufficient competence of partners (Blomqvist, 1997; Blomqvist & Ståhle,
2000) are needed.
8 Administration & Society 00(0)
Relationship Between Power and Trust in Collaborative
Governance
The relationship between power and trust is generally believed as two-sided,
both complementary and opposing (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015; Ireland &
Webb, 2007). For example, Luhmann (1979) argued power and trust are
functionally equivalent alternative mechanisms in coordinating communica-
tion and social interaction. While coercive power may have negative effects
on trust building (Frost & Moussavi, 1992) and there is almost no simultane-
ous coexist of coercive power and trust in relationships (Ireland & Webb,
2007), some other types of power, such as expert and referent power that can
be exerted noncoercively, can exist simultaneously with trust (Fedor &
Ramsay, 2007; Ireland & Webb, 2007). In collaborative governance, scholars
believe that power asymmetry will undermine trust, and the excessive use of
power will also do harm to trust (Gray, 1989). Built from these prior studies,
we argue a contingent relationship between power and trust. We believe that
the negative influences from power asymmetry and positive influences from
power sharing on trust are not absolute but contingent upon many factors,
such as different types of power exercised in collaboration. This contingent
perspective (Ran & Qi, 2017) provides a holistic understanding of power
asymmetry, power sharing, different types of power, and trust building in the
dynamic context of collaboration.
The relationship between power and trust has also been revealed
largely through the control function shared by power and trust. Power can
be considered as an important mechanism of control when exerted
(Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Reed, 2001). Trust is also believed as a spe-
cific type of control mechanism in social interaction (Merchant, 1985),
which is a substitute mechanism for hierarchical control (Ring & Van de
Ven, 1994). Researchers found that displays of power become a substitute
for trust when there is a failure or deficiency of trust between actors
(Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015). Participants may also resort to power due to
its easiness to exercise compared with spending time and effort to foster
and maintain trust (Bachmann, 2001; Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015).
Extending this perspective, in this article, we will explore major functions
shared by power and trust in collaboration. By exploring the shared
sources of power and trust in collaboration, we argue that both power and
trust can contribute to the formation of collective goals, group consensus
and shared values, the improvement of participants’ compliance with
other partners, and the enhancement of the legitimacy of collaboration.
Complementary to the control function, all of these functions also play a
significant role in promoting collaboration by reducing risks caused by
opportunistic behaviors.
Ran and Qi 9
Moreover, as discussed previously, many scholars propose power sharing as a
solution to power asymmetry in collaboration and encourage participants to pur-
suit power sharing to enhance the effectiveness of collaboration (Berkes, 2010;
Carmichael & Knox, 1999; Ehler, 2003; Huxham et al., 2000; Jentoft et al., 2007;
Linder, 1999). In this article, we propose trust building as a supplemental mecha-
nism in tackling power asymmetry. When the existing power relationship is well
established and promoted, or when power is difficult to share due to some histori-
cal or bureaucratic reasons, trust building will make participants more competent
to ameliorate issues resulted from power asymmetry. Through trust building, par-
ticipants’ abilities, such as identifying appropriate members to collaborate with,
making agreement on collaboration goals, managing risks associated with oppor-
tunistic behaviors and vulnerability, and dealing with dynamics coming from
environmental context, can be improved (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), which will
help participants to handle the problems brought forth by power asymmetry.
Indeed, scholars tend to argue that trust is a beneficial factor in coordinat-
ing partners’ relationships because it can relief some negative outcomes
caused by the exercise of power. However, we argue that although trust build-
ing is critical in collaboration, attention should also be paid to potential draw-
backs of the extreme case of trust, blind trust, in collaborative governance.
Blind trust can lead to the loss of collaborative advantages due to limited
innovation and creativity (De Wever, Martens, & Vandenbempt, 2005;
Jeffries & Reed, 2000). Blind trust could also lead to potential loss of suffi-
cient mutual trust in collaboration if the trustees behave opportunistically
(Nooteboom, Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997). As a result, participants’ con-
fidence in their relationship with others is weakened. This failure or defi-
ciency of trust can increase the tendency of using power as a substitute for
trust to handle collaborative dynamics (Bozaykut & Gurbuz, 2015), or some
participants may even withdraw from the collaboration, which will result in
more challenges in managing power relationships between partners.
In the following sections, we will detail three relationships and seven
propositions between power and trust in collaborative governance, and then
discuss the conceptual similarities between power and trust as a “twin” con-
cept and the entangled dynamics in terms of trust-based power and power-
based trust. We will end our discussion by exploring some managerial
implications that are useful in developing strategies to manage power and
trust in collaboration.
Three Relationships Between Power and Trust in
Collaborative Governance
In this section, we provide a dyadic analysis of power and trust to facilitate a
more comprehensive understanding of them in collaborative governance.
10 Administration & Society 00(0)
Three relationships and seven corresponding propositions regarding power
and trust in collaboration are identified.
Relationship 1: Shared Sources of Power and Trust in
Collaborative Governance
The dynamic relationship between power and trust in collaborative gover-
nance starts from the bases or sources shared by them. Power and trust root
in some shared sources, which are important for the management of power
relationship and cultivation of trust in collaboration. As we mentioned in the
previous section, sources of power and the shift of these power sources are at
the macro level in collaborative governance, which are relevant to participant
organizations rather than individuals who represent their organizations. It is
true that power sources can derive from individuals in general, but in the
specific context of collaborative governance, individuals as representatives
of participant organizations are the people who enact power rather than actual
entities who have power sources. It is the partnering organizations that pos-
sess power sources and form the macro-power context. Therefore, when we
consider the similar sources shared by power and trust in collaborative gov-
ernance, we start with the primary sources of power at the organizational
level, which have been widely discussed in collaborative governance litera-
ture, including authority, resource control, and discursive legitimacy (Hardy
& Phillips, 1998; Purdy, 2012). We argue that these power sources are also
significant in generating trust among participants in collaboration.
Authority. Authority is a socially acknowledged and legitimate right to exer-
cise judgment, make a decision, or take actions (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984;
Purdy, 2012). Purdy (2012) argued that authority is different from power and
contradicts with coercive force although it may be achieved coercively. Peo-
ple could exert power by virtue of their noncoercive, socially acknowledged,
and legitimate right. In collaboration, power rooted in authority can rest with
one particular participant or be dispersed among different participants (Hardy
& Phillips, 1998).
Authority as a socially acknowledged and legitimate right implies group
consensus, shared values, and promotion of collective goals (Grimes, 1978),
which will encourage reciprocity, increase the degree of adaption among
partners, and reduce the possibility of opportunistic behaviors, all of which
are important sources of trust in collaboration (Das & Teng, 1998; Heide &
John, 1992; Larson, 1992; Ouchi, 1980). When partners’ goals and interests
are bonded through consensus and the authority of partners who exert power
is accepted, they are more willing to adjust their own needs and behavioral
Ran and Qi 11
patterns in collaboration and do favors instead of hurting each other. Thus,
the collective goals, group consensus, and shared values associated with the
power holders’ authority will enhance trust in collaboration.
Resource control. Resource control as a source of power has been empha-
sized in many studies (Astley & Sachdeva, 1984; K. S. Cook, 1977).
Resource refers to any valued activity, service, or commodity (K. S. Cook,
1977), tangible or intangible. Controlling critical resources needed by oth-
ers and the asymmetry in resource control can create dependency among
actors, which will lead to power asymmetry (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005;
R. M. Emerson, 1962).
As we discussed in the previous section, affect- and cognition-based trust
are two notable types of trust. The building of cognition-based trust among
partners is closely related to resource control in collaborative settings.
Cognition-based trust is based on rational choice in the interaction of eco-
nomic change (Rousseau et al., 1998), during which trust emerges when the
trustor perceives the benefits performed by a trustee’s action. According to
resource dependence theory, a crucial precondition of collaboration is that
participants can obtain some critical resources from other partners in collabo-
ration that they otherwise cannot get access to (Wood & Gray, 1991). In this
situation, those participants who can bring critical resources to their partners
and benefit the collaboration are more likely to obtain their partners’ cogni-
tion-based trust. This cognition-based trust relying on calculation and ratio-
nal choice appears more often in the early formation process of collaboration
(Child, 2001).
The resources controlled by participants also indicate participants’ ability
in benefiting partners in collaboration. Trust often stems from the belief that
a given partner with sufficient resources will have the ability to properly per-
form a given set of tasks in the partnership (Ireland & Webb, 2007; Mayer
et al., 1995). From this analysis, resource control is a source for both power
and trust in collaborative arrangements.
Discursive legitimacy. Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and defi-
nitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). A variety of “strategies” or “tactics” to
obtain or preserve legitimacy are discursive in nature (Phillips, Lawrence,
& Hardy, 2004; Seidl, Sanderson, & Roberts, 2013), resting heavily on the
interactive process of conveying ideas in a discourse through which we
construct, interpret, discuss, and analyze problems (Seidl et al., 2013; Stef-
fek, 2009; Suchman, 1995).
12 Administration & Society 00(0)
Power derived from discursive legitimacy is rooted in society (Huxham &
Vangen, 2005), and it becomes stronger when the values, norms, and beliefs
represented by power holders are widely shared and relatively uncontested
(Purdy, 2012). In collaborative governance, when a participant can speak of
a socially important or collectively desired issue, discursive legitimacy will
afford them more power in some key arenas such as prioritization and fram-
ing of issues to be addressed (Purdy, 2012).
Discursive legitimacy is also a source of trust between partners. Through
discursive process of sense giving and sense making (Weick, 1995), partici-
pants’ compliance with values, norms, and beliefs can be developed in col-
laboration. Based on this compliance, participants are more likely to perceive
benevolence and integrity from each other and have positive response to the
participants within their own groups and partnerships, viewing them as more
trustworthy (Williams, 2001). Moreover, participants with more discursive
legitimacy can exert more influences on the prioritization and dominance of
the important issues identified in collaboration (Purdy, 2012), upon which
diverse goals of participants can be converged. These participants with dis-
cursive legitimacy can obtain more trust from others by framing or represent-
ing these convergent goals shared in collaboration.
In summary, authority, resource control, and discursive legitimacy serve
as profound sources of power and trust, which makes power and trust become
“twin” concepts that are rooted in these shared sources. The effective
enhancement of these three shared sources will promote a participant’s access
to power and gain of trust in collaboration. Based on these arguments, we
suggest the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The increasing acquisition of shared sources through author-
ity, resource control, and discursive legitimacy positively contributes to
both participant’s access to power and gain of trust in collaboration.
Relationship 2: Influence of Power Relationship on Trust
Building in Collaborative Governance
Both collective identity formation and justice preservation are believed as
critical factors for trust building (Child, 2001; Das & Teng, 1998; Korsgaard,
Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; Kramer, 1993; Rousseau et al., 1998), but both
of them will encounter some challenges due to a primary concern on the rela-
tive power of participants in collaboration, that is, power asymmetry and
power sharing (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Hardy & Phillips, 1998; Huxham et al.,
2000; Purdy, 2012; Saz-Carranza et al., 2016; Vangen & Huxham, 2003).
When participating in a collaboration, participants’ individual identities are at
Ran and Qi 13
stake if their autonomous goals differ from the collaboration’s goals, and
participants tend to protect their own identities by having individual control
over collaboration. In this case, it is unavoidable for participants to construct
a new collective identity for the collaboration (Thomson & Perry, 2006).
Similarly, the challenges to justice preservation are also unavoidable in col-
laboration in that asymmetrically distributed power will always impact jus-
tice among participants.
Influence of power relationship on collective identity. An important reality in col-
laborative governance is that participants share a dual identity: distinct self-
identity separated from (although simultaneously with) a collective identity
(Thomson & Perry, 2006). Self-identity focuses on the distinct attributes,
autonomy, and self-goals (Thomson & Perry, 2006), while collective identity
“addresses the ‘we-ness’ of a group, stressing the similarities or shared attri-
butes around which group members coalesce” (Cerulo, 1997, p. 386). This
dual identity leads to the intrinsic tension between self-interest and collabora-
tive interest as well as dilemma between autonomy of individual organiza-
tions and accountability to other partners (Huxham, 1996; Thomson & Perry,
2006). Compared with self-identity, the reinforcement of collective identity
can enhance an actor’s perception of trusting relationship with other partners
(De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1998).
Partners in collaboration protect their self-identities by maintaining indi-
vidual control rather than sharing control with others (Thomson & Perry,
2006). Power is asymmetric; powerful participants can have more power to
control others and emphasize their own identities, interests, and goals,
especially when their own interests and goals conflict with those of the col-
laboration. The emphasis on self-identity and ignoring collective identity
can increase the uncertainty and vulnerability for less powerful partici-
pants, decreasing their trust in collaboration. Comparatively, if power is
shared, participants will have stronger collective identity because of their
stronger perception that the collaboration is based on equal inclusion, suf-
ficient representativeness, as well as share accountability, congruent goal,
and collective interests. This strong collective identity can breed trust by
reducing uncertainty and vulnerability yet enhancing mutual dependency in
collaboration.
Influence of power relationship on justice preservation. Justice is an important
element of integrity (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007). Justice preservation is
critical for trust building in interorganizational cooperation (Das & Teng,
1998; Korsgaard et al., 1995). Procedure justice and distributive justice are
two related components of overall equity or fairness in creating trust (Kumar,
14 Administration & Society 00(0)
1996). A fair procedure is essential for institutional legitimacy through which
trust can be created (Cropanzana, Bowen, & Gilliland, 2007). Otherwise, par-
ticipants who perceive the unfair procedure may resort to opportunistic
behaviors to achieve their goals. Equity in outcome distribution is important
for trust building as well (Greenberg, 1987; Kay & Hagan, 2003). Calculative
trust tells us that trust can rest on calculation of relative costs and benefits of
each alternative (Child, 2001), and the perceived failure in distributive justice
can undermine participants’ calculative trust due to their loss of benefits.
Power asymmetry may negatively affect justice in collaboration because
participants with more power tend to focus on their own goals with less atten-
tion to others’ needs (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Kipnis,
1976). This will make high-power participants less likely to treat others fairly
and prevent them from caring about the norms to act fairly (Blader & Chen,
2012), which will undermine both cognition-based and affect-based trust.
The possibility of opportunistic behaviors conducted by powerful ones may
increase, which makes weaker participants feel unconfident and results in the
decline of their trust.
Different from power asymmetry, power sharing can promote participants’
perceptions of fairness in collaborative process by enhancing representative-
ness, inclusion, and equal influence (Gray, 1985; Purdy, 2012), especially for
less powerful but more vulnerable ones. In addition, a fair procedure of deci-
sion making in collaboration needs participants to share responsibilities and
risks, which can be promoted by power sharing as well (Linder, 1999).
Participants can also perceive more distribution justice when they share power
with each other because the equity of outcome distribution relies on procedure
justice to a great extent. The preservation of justice promoted by power shar-
ing can cultivate trusting relationship among partners in collaboration.
Different types of power as contingency factors. We argue that the influences of
power relationship, either power sharing or power asymmetry, on trust build-
ing are not absolute but contingent upon different types of power. Generally
speaking, two commonly used types of power, coercive and noncoercive
power, can moderate the influences of power relationship on trust building.
French and Raven (1959) identified five types of power: expert power, refer-
ent power, legitimate power, reward power, and coercive power. The first
four types of power are often exerted in a noncoercive manner (Molm, 1997),
although some of them, such as legitimate power, can be exerted coercively.
The different influences of power and power asymmetry on trust building can
be impacted when power holders have sufficient competencies (expert
power), enjoy personal admire (reference power), influence others by inter-
nalized values and accepted obligations (legitimate power), and improve
Ran and Qi 15
other participants’ positive calculation of interests (reward power) (Nichol-
son, Compeau, & Sethi, 2001; Wahl, Kastlunger, & Kirchler, 2010). These
four kinds of noncoercive power could cultivate trusting relationship by pro-
viding more profound sources of trust (Butler & Cantrell, 1984), producing
consensus among partners (Ireland & Webb, 2007), promoting innovation to
address threats (Cox, 2001), and enhancing legitimacy and stability to the
relationship (Ireland & Webb, 2007; C. Oliver, 1990). Differently, coercive
power is based on exercise of force (French & Raven, 1959), which can
impede trust building as it may decrease rewards for participants and increase
retaliation between partners (Ireland & Webb, 2007).
In summary, power sharing is beneficial for trust building while power
asymmetry in collaboration brings difficulties in generating mutual trust
between partners. Nevertheless, noncoercive and coercive power are impor-
tant contingencies affecting trust building in collaboration. Based on these
arguments, we suggest the following propositions:
Proposition 2a1: Power asymmetry negatively influences trust building,
yet the more noncoercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the less
negative the influence of power asymmetry is on trust building.
Proposition 2a2: Power asymmetry negatively influences trust building,
and the more coercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the more
negative the influence of power asymmetry is on trust building.
Proposition 2b1: Power sharing positively influences trust building, and
the more noncoercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the more
positive
the influence of power sharing is on trust building.
Proposition 2b2: Power sharing positively influences trust building, yet
the more coercive the power exercised in collaboration is, the less positive
the influence of power sharing is on trust building.
Relationship 3: Influence of Trust Building on the Management
of Power Relationship in Collaborative Governance
Researchers have emphasized the necessity of having a trusting relationship
for successful collaborations (Das & Teng, 1998; Gray, 1985; Huxham et al.,
2000; McGuire, 2006; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). The failure or deficiency
of trust will make actors resort to pursuing and exerting power as a substitute
mechanism to coordinate their interactions with others (Bozaykut & Gurbuz,
2015). In collaborative governance where power is almost always distributed
asymmetrically, sufficient levels of trust is a lubricant for collaborative trans-
actions and a soft control mechanism to manage power relationships even if
certain partners are dominant in the collaboration (Das & Teng, 1998; A. L.
16 Administration & Society 00(0)
Oliver, 1997; Ring, 1997; Vangen & Huxham, 2003). The positive influences
of trust building on the management of power relationship are fundamentally
based on the characteristics of trust and the small-wins strategy for trust
building. However, trust building cannot always benefit the management of
power relationships. The extreme case of trust, blind trust, will negatively
affect the management of power relationships in collaboration.
Positive influence based on the characteristics of trust. Two basic characteristics
of trust, confident expectations and willingness to be vulnerable, can help
participants manage their power relationships in collaboration. Confident
expectations imply the faith in others’ ethical, fair, and nonthreatening inten-
tions and actions in a relationship (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; J. Cook &
Wall, 1980). Willingness to be vulnerable means trustors are willing to place
themselves in potential jeopardy or risks of others’ future behaviors (Car-
nevale & Wechsler, 1992; Hosmer, 1995). Confident expectations and will-
ingness to be vulnerable provide foundations for Lukes’s (1974) perspective
of power, which argues that the power from A on B makes B voluntarily
willing to do what A wants. This “voluntary willingness” can be promoted by
trust building between A and B because high levels of trust enhance B’s con-
fident expectations about the outcome of A’s use of power as well as the
willingness of taking the risks caused by A’s use of power. Trust building, as
a lubricant for the interaction between A and B, is thus a soft mechanism that
contributes to managing power relationships in collaboration.
Positive influence based on small-wins strategy. Small-wins strategy is a useful
approach to coordinating the interactions among partners in collaboration by
providing positive-feedback loop into collaborative process (Bajwa, Kitchlew,
Shahzad, & Rehman, 2018). When small-wins strategy is used in trust building,
it is helpful for managing power relationships in collaboration. Based on small-
wins strategy, participants build trust gradually by getting started on some
actions with partners and achieving some small positive outcomes, without hav-
ing to deal with all aspects of trust building (Bryson, 1988; Vangen & Huxham,
2003). Through small-wins approach, participants can take limited risks and
gradually achieve their goals rather than putting themselves into highly risky
situations. With the increased achievement of small positive outcomes and
decreased risks, participants tend to be more confident in their partners and more
willing to accept the power relationship formed and stabilized in this process.
Participants’ abilities to manage power issues can also be improved when build-
ing trust through small-wins strategy (Vangen & Huxham, 2003), such as iden-
tifying appropriate collaborating members, making agreement on collaboration
aims, managing risks associated with opportunistic behaviors and vulnerability,
Ran and Qi 17
dealing with dynamics coming from environmental context, avoiding radical
challenges in a stable power relationship, and maximizing power sharing among
partners. Some small-wins can also be produced in the process of managing
power relationships in collaboration, and then provide the positive-feedback
loop into collaboration for trust building among partners. This positive-feedback
loop derived from small-wins strategy is critical for understanding the relation-
ship between power and trust in collaborative governance.
Negative influence of blind trust. An extreme case of trust building is blind
trust, referring to trustors’ largely unconditional perception and expectation
that their trustees are trustworthy and could be given full discretion to behave
(Brenkert, 1998; Williamson, 1993). Blind trust will lead to some unhealthy
situations in interorganizational collaboration (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007),
such as impediment of innovation and creativity as well as increased risks for
the trusting party.
The first unhealthy situation has to do with the loss of collaborative advan-
tages due to the impediment of innovation and creativity. Innovation and cre-
ativity are important collaborative advantages in solving complex issues
(Rogers & Weber, 2010). However, blind trust in collaboration is likely to
cause participants think alike (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), accommodate
excessively or please other partners (Bidault & Castello, 2010; Kern, 2000),
have too much faith in partners’ actions (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), and even
generate groupthink (Janis, 1972), all of which will hamper innovation and
creativity (De Wever et al., 2005; Jeffries & Reed, 2000).
The second unhealthy situation caused by blind trust relates to potential
risks taken by the trusting party. Trust can influence power positions between
partners (Baier, 1986; Sydow, 1998), helping the trustee obtain more power
than the trustor. When trust becomes blind, it will produce an extremely
unbalanced power relationship between partners. The trustees become
extremely powerful and can easily conduct opportunistic behaviors while the
trustors will recognize the risky situations that go beyond their expectations
sooner or later (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Once opportunistic behaviors are
conducted by the trustee, trustors are more likely to feel unsatisfied with their
partners. Their previous mutual trust will easily be damaged or even turned
into distrust (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Nooteboom et al., 1997).
As these two unhealthy situations can increase participants’ dissatisfac-
tion, diminish their trust, or even lead to distrust on the collaborative relation-
ship, participants tend to have strong perceptions of uncertainty and
vulnerability. When participants perceive the uncertainty and vulnerability
unacceptable, they will either enhance their own influences on the collabora-
tive process, especially decision-making process, by acquiring and exerting
18 Administration & Society 00(0)
more power, or withdraw from the collaboration, both of which will impose
more difficulties in managing power relationships in collaboration.
To sum up, trust building can contribute to the management of power rela-
tionship between partners because of the characteristics of trust and small-
wins strategy. Nevertheless, blind trust will bring in a set of problems that
increase the difficulties for managing power dynamics in collaboration.
Based on these arguments, we suggest the following propositions:
Proposition 3a: Through promoting confident expectations and willing-
ness to be vulnerable as well as employing small-wins strategy, trust
building will positively influence the management of
power relationship.
Proposition 3b: Blind trust leads to the loss of some collaborative advan-
tages and the excessive risks taken by trustors that will cause disappoint-
ment or even distrust, thereby negatively influences the management of
power relationship.
Discussion
In this article, power and trust in collaborative governance are treated as
entangled twins rather than one causing the other. Different from the causal-
ity that can identify which concept comes first and which concept causes the
other, power and trust always come together like a “twin,” share similar
sources, and entangle with each other. That is, as twins, power and trust
largely share same sources and enjoy significant conceptual similarities.
However, as entangled twins, power and trust co-existed in any social rela-
tion, generating a complex interplay between them.
Power and Trust as Entangled Twins
We argue that besides the same sources discussed earlier, the concepts of power
and trust share some conceptual similarities as well, a critical aspect in analyz-
ing their interplay. Fundamentally, both power and trust are relational constructs,
in which certain patterns of attitudes and behaviors exist among different actors.
Power is a property of relationship based on the dependence between actors,
either balanced or imbalanced (R. M. Emerson, 1962). Similarly, trust involves
a relationship between the trustor and trustee, indicating that the trustor usually
has positive expectations and willingness to be vulnerable in the trusting rela-
tionship with the trustee. Furthermore, both power and trust have perceptual
basis, relevant to the perception of participants in a relationship. Power relates to
power recipients’ perceptions of others’ ability to control or influence them,
either in a coercive or noncoercive way. The perceptual aspect of trust is about a
Ran and Qi 19
faith in others’ will, ability, and behavior. Last but not the least, both power and
trust are reciprocal concepts. One actor exerting power or acting to trust will be
reciprocated for such behavior simultaneously or at a future point of time,
though the degree of reciprocated power and trust between them are not neces-
sarily the same. The actor exerting power will affect the desire and behaviors of
power recipients who will also, in turn, influence the power holder’s decision
and action. Trust is reciprocal in terms of the goodwill of mutual benefits
between actors (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992).
Power and trust, as twin concepts, are two crucial mechanisms entangled
in managing interorganizational relationships in collaboration. On one hand,
trust can serve as a base of power, making this type of trust-based power as
innocuous “façade of trust” that is less visible, taken-for-granted, and stable
(Hardy, Phillips, & Lawrence, 1998; Kroeger, 2012). Through acquiring the
shared sources, trustors can obtain more power and preserve this power by
building trust to influence the trustees’ perceptions, cognitions, and prefer-
ences. This trust-based power is consistent with Lukes’s (1974) conception of
power from social construction perspective. Power relationships based on
trust has the potential to be more effective and enduring as it is viewed as
natural and beneficial by participants (Kroeger, 2012; Lukes, 1974). However,
when a trusting relationship evolved into blind trust, the impediment of inno-
vative solutions to complex problems and high risks of trustees’ opportunistic
behaviors may undermine the benefits of trustors and cause trustors’ disap-
pointment sooner or later, which will ultimately diminish trust or even lead to
distrust, thus further damage the trust-based power.
On the other hand, power plays a significant role in building trust, espe-
cially in the production of institutionalized trust (Kroeger, 2012). Similar to
trust-based power, the sources shared by power and trust also contribute to
generating power-based trust when power holders obtain or control these
shared sources effectively. During the interaction between actors, to foster
shared meaning and compliant behaviors, power holders can use their power
to determine formal institutional rules and templates regulating participants’
behaviors as well as to affect informal routines and practices shaping partici-
pants’ perceptions, cognitions, and preferences (Hardy et al., 1998; Kroeger,
2012). All of these formal and informal factors constitute a set of institutional
patterns through which trust can be cultivated. When these institutional pat-
terns are formed under the influence of power, trust is ingrained in the power
relationships in which conflicts between actors are less observable.
Nevertheless, if the power relationship is so asymmetrical that it leads to
excessive actual and observable conflicts between partners, this type of
power-based trust will be at risk due to the resistance and challenges from
trustors whose benefits are undermined excessively by powerful ones.
20 Administration & Society 00(0)
Managerial Implications
In this article, to interpret the complex dynamics of power and trust, we ana-
lyzed three important dyadic relationships between them, which are helpful
for practitioners managing interorganizational relationships in collaborative
governance.
First, participants should manage power asymmetry and build trust by
obtaining more similar sources (authority, resource control, and discursive
legitimacy) shared by power and trust. If participants can improve their abil-
ity to obtain and use these shared sources, they can exert their power based
on sufficient trust from their partners. Trust based on these shared sources can
also legitimize and strengthen power relationships in collaboration. Both
power and trust coming from these shared sources can contribute to securing
commitment from members, building legitimacy for the collaboration, and
creating a favorable environment for productive interaction, which are sig-
nificant factors in managing a collaborative network (Mandell, 2001).
Therefore, it is important for different participants to recognize and enhance
the particular authority they have, the useful resources they control, and the
specific discursive legitimacy they can increase.
For example, different from nonprofit and private organizations, a govern-
ment’s authority is tied to its legitimate right of establishing and enforcing
rules in governance (Purdy, 2012). If the government as a participant can
enhance this authority by establishing and enforcing rules in collaborative
governance appropriately, it can legitimize its exercise of power, promote
reciprocity, increase adaption, and reduce opportunistic behaviors in collabo-
ration, all of which can cultivate other partners’ trust on it. Participants also
need to evaluate what resources they control are needed by other partners in
collaboration, such as human resource, financial resource, and technology,
and then benefit other partners and the collaboration by providing these
resources effectively to have a solid foundation for obtaining power and gen-
erating trust from other partners. In addition, based on various roles played
by different types of participant organizations in a society, it is critical for
them to speak on behalf of certain important values of norms of a society. For
instance, when environmental organizations collaborate with government
and other private organizations, they can focus on speaking on behalf of the
societally important ideal of ecological preservation to obtain more power
and trust in collaboration (Purdy, 2012).
Second, participants should build trust under certain power arrangements
by exerting power in a noncoercive way. In practice, noncoercive way of
exerting power is operationalized as several types of assistance provided by
the actors who exert this power, such as rewards, knowledge, or expertness
Ran and Qi 21
(Lusch & Brown, 1982). In contrast, the indicator of coercive way of exerting
power is different in that it involves potential punishment or threat to the
power recipients based on the exercise of force (French & Raven, 1959; Lusch
& Brown, 1982; Molm, 1997). Participant organizations need to manage their
collaboration in collaborative and nonhierarchical ways (Thomson & Perry,
2006). This managing approach requires participants prevent themselves from
using potential punishment or threat to their partners, especially to those less
powerful partners. Instead, participants who provide high-quality assistance in
collaboration can legitimize their efforts to gain power and help to get the
power recipients to yield power willingly (Lusch & Brown, 1982).
Coercive power may result in aversive consequences perceived by power
recipients and lead to the decrease of satisfaction and increase of resistance,
while noncoercive power can reflect the power holder’s ability to provide
potential assistance, which are evaluated as desirable by power recipients.
Trust can be fostered in the process of noncoercive exercise of power as it
increases the perceived legitimacy of power and authority (Hough, Jackson,
Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010), improves voluntary compliance (Wahl
et al., 2010), and promotes the integration (Yeung, Selen, Zhang, & Huo,
2009), all of which will help to relief potential resistance of exercising power.
This managerial implication provides a perspective to answer the key ques-
tion asked by Huxham and Vangen (2005): “whether and how power imbal-
ances can be deliberately shifted to sustain an adequate level of trust” (p.
171). We believe that trusting relationship can be promoted by focusing on
noncoercive way of using power to mitigate power imbalance.
Third, participants should prevent themselves from excessively relying on
either power or trust in collaboration. Although exerting power noncoer-
cively can contribute to trust building, excessive use of power, coercively or
noncoercively, will intensify the problem of power asymmetry thus under-
mining trust building. Exerting power implies the power holder’s ability to
withhold resources or assistance from a relationship, which will constrain
other partners’ opportunities and prospects of long-term survival and devel-
opment (Ireland & Webb, 2007). Trusting relationship is difficult to promote
if some participants concern about their long-term survival and development
in a collaboration. It is also necessary for participants to avoid trusting their
partners “blindly,” which will undermine the reciprocity, trust, and commit-
ment of participants in a long term.
Given the complexity and uncertainty of collaboration, both dynamism
and inertia can be created in collaborative practices (Thomson & Perry,
2006), which requires participants understand the variable nature of both
power and trust when interacting with other partners. The adjustment of
power relations and evolvement of trusting relations are contingent upon
22 Administration & Society 00(0)
different factors relevant to collaboration. For instance, when participants
consider to share power in collaboration, it is necessary for them to consider
some important contingencies (Ran & Qi, 2017), such as institutional envi-
ronment external to collaborations (e.g., static or not), different missions
accomplished by collaborations (e.g., exigent or not), different types of col-
laborative networks (e.g., mandated or voluntary), previous power-sharing
experience of participants (e.g., rich power-sharing experience or not), diffu-
sion of power sources among participants (e.g., widely diffused or not), and
cost-benefit calculation in collaborations (e.g., acceptable or not).
Rational cost-benefit analysis is important for participants when develop-
ing trusting relationship in collaboration. Although participants in collabora-
tion might not initially start with a cost-benefit analysis but start with a kind
of idealism in which trust is a key element (Thomson & Perry, 2006), they
will then start to realize that there is a cost they have to pay in collaboration
(Thomson, 2001). If the cost of trust building is much more than the benefits
gained in the collaboration or the risk of high-level trust is extremely large,
participants need to reconsider the trusting relationship with partners or even
resort to using power appropriately.
Certainly, due to the complexity of power and trust, it is unrealistic to sort
out or exhaust all relevant elements, factors, or dimensions involved in the
dynamic interplay between them. For example, in the second relationship
between power and trust, we cannot exhaust all contingency factors influenc-
ing the relationship between power sharing/power asymmetry and trust build-
ing in collaboration. We expect future studies, both conceptual and empirical,
can further investigate more contingencies to develop a more comprehensive
framework. Similarly, when we discuss how collective identity and justice
preservation are affected by power asymmetry and power sharing, we realize
that some other factors, such as individual participants’ moral level and insti-
tutional rules, can also impact collective identity and justice preservation,
which, however, are beyond the scope of this article. Moreover, we proposed
seven propositions on power and trust in this article, but these propositions are
conceptual formulations that need to be operationalized in the future.
Researchers have been struggling to empirically test both power and trust, and
many measurements of power and trust have been developed in terms of per-
ceptual rather than objective dimensions. We hope the conceptual exploration
about the interplay between power and trust discussed in this article could
shed some light on future empirical studies that this field is in dire need.
Conclusion
Power and trust are the basic entangled building blocks of partners’ inter-
action in collaborative governance. But the relationships between them in
Ran and Qi 23
collaboration are far from clear in prior literature. In this article, we ana-
lyzed the roles of power and trust through a dyadic approach and concep-
tualize their interdependence to disentangle these twin concepts. The three
relationships and seven propositions between power and trust proposed in
this article provide a starting point for an empirical examination of power
and trust. Our article also sheds light on how to promote a successful col-
laboration by managing power and trust in practice. This article calls on
more dyadic or multi-level research investigating the complex relation-
ships between power and trust empirically, which are significant for under-
standing complex dynamics in collaborative governance.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publi
cation of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.
ORCID iD
Bing Ran https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1179-9116
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Author Biographies
Bing Ran is an associate professor of public administration in the School of Public
Affairs, Penn State Harrisburg. His research interests focus on the dynamic interac-
tions between society’s complex infrastructure and human behavior, tackling topics
such as collaborative governance networks, organizational identity, knowledge inte-
gration, social entrepreneurship, and hybrid organizations.
Huiting Qi is a doctoral candidate in the School of Public Affairs, Penn State
Harrisburg. Her research interests include collaborative governance networks, behav-
ioral public administration, and organizational theory.
766 Public Administration Review • September | October 2017
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 77, Iss. 5, pp. 766–776. © 2017 by
The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.1111/puar.12765.
Mariafrancesca Sicilia is associate
professor at the University of Bergamo, Italy,
and visiting fellow in the Department of
Public Leadership and Social Enterprise at
The Open University, United Kingdom. Her
research covers public sector accounting
and accountability and models of public
service delivery.
E-mail: mariafrancesca.sicilia@unibg.it
Alessandro Sancino is a lecturer in
management in the Department of Public
Leadership and Social Enterprise, The Open
University, United Kingdom. His research
focuses on citizen participation and
stakeholder engagement across the public
policy cycle and how public outcomes are
co-created within a place.
E-mail: alessandro.sancino@open.ac.uk
Tina Nabatchi is associate professor
of public administration and international
affairs and a Tenth Decade Scholar in
the Maxwell School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Her
research focuses on citizen participation,
collaborative governance, and dispute
resolution in public
administration.
E-mail: tnabatch@syr.edu
Abstract : Despite an international resurgence of interest in coproduction, confusion about the concept remains.
This article attempts to make sense of the disparate literature and clarify the concept of coproduction in public
administration. Based on some definitional distinctions and considerations about who is involved in coproduction,
when in the service cycle it occurs, and what is generated in the process, the article offers and develops a typology of
coproduction that includes three levels (individual, group, collective) and four phases (commissioning, design, delivery,
assessment). The levels, phases, and typology as a whole are illustrated with several examples. The article concludes
with a discussion of implications for research and practice.
Practitioner Points
• Reflecting on the who, when, and what of coproduction can help address the conceptual confusion and
ambiguity surrounding coproduction.
• The typology developed in this article provides terminological clarity by offering vocabulary for describing
and defining variations of coproduction.
• The typology of coproduction enables practitioners to identify different forms of coproduction and to select
the type that is best aligned with their goals and purposes.
• Describing and explaining the variations in coproduction may facilitate the examination and comparison of
cases and experiences and contribute to improvements in evaluation, transparency, and communication.
Tina Nabatchi
Syracuse University
Alessandro Sancino
The Open University, United Kingdom
Mariafrancesca Sicilia
University of Bergamo, Italy
Varieties of Participation in Public Services:
The Who, When, and What of Coproduction
Interest in coproduction has waxed and waned
since the concept was first introduced in the 1970s
and early 1980s to explain and give theoretical
foundation to practices that involved members of
the public in the delivery of public services. In recent
years, the concept has seen a global resurgence of
interest among scholars and practitioners, evidenced
by the growing number of international study groups,
special journal issues, and scholarly and practitioner
publications, as well as by the growing number
of coproduction programs and activities in public
organizations. Despite the volume of scholarly and
practitioner work in public administration, confusion
about coproduction remains (Brandsen and Honingh
2016 ; Jo and Nabatchi 2016 ). This confusion stems
from several definitional and conceptual problems, as
well as from empirical issues, with the latter arguably
being a function, at least in part, of the former.
First, although it is perhaps better defined and
understood in the business sector (Agarwal 2013 ), no
clear and consistently used definition of coproduction
appears in the public administration literature. In
public administration, coproduction is generally
understood to mean “the involvement of both users
and public sector professionals in the delivery of
public services” (Nabatchi et al. 2016 ); however, “this
definition is neither used consistently nor applied
in ways that make clear what does (and does not)
constitute coproduction” (Jo and Nabatchi 2016 ,
1104; cf. Brandsen and Honingh 2016 ; Van Kleef and
Van Eijk 2016). This definitional ambiguity, along
with the growing bandwagon effect, has led scholars
and practitioners to apply the term “coproduction” to
a wide range of areas and activities that involve a wide
range of actors.
Second, given definitional and conceptual confusion
and the breadth of applications, the evidence base for
coproduction is relatively weak (Bovaird and Loeffler
2016 ; Brandsen and Honingh 2016 ). Coproduction
is often the subject of exploratory, single case study
research, seldom the subject of explanatory research, and
rarely, if ever, the subject of comparative research
and meta-analysis (Brandsen and Honingh 2016 ; Jo
and Nabatchi 2016 ; Voorberg, Bekkers and Tummers
2015 ). Moreover, the normative appeal and orthodoxy
surrounding coproduction may be hindering needed
empirical scrutiny. Thus, different studies use different
interpretations of coproduction, calling into question
Varieties of Participation in Public Services: The Who, When, and What of Coproduction 767
the comparability of findings (Brandsen and Honingh 2016 , 428)
and limiting the ability of scholars to produce systematic, generalizable
research (Jo and Nabatchi 2016 ).
In this article, we seek to address some of these challenges by
exploring the who, when, and what of coproduction. We begin
with a literature review, focusing mainly on coproduction ’ s
history, definitions, and applications. Based on some definitional
distinctions, we then present a 3 x 4 typology of coproduction
constructed around who is involved in coproduction and when in
the service cycle the activity takes place. When these dimensions
are taken together, we are able to develop a better sense of the
what of the activity (i.e., the nature of the product generated in
coproduction). We illustrate these dimensions and the coproduction
typology as a whole with several examples. We conclude with a
discussion about the implications of the typology for research and
practice.
Understanding Coproduction
Coproduction entered the lexicon of public administration in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Coined by Elinor Ostrom and her
colleagues at the Indiana University Workshop in Political Theory
and Policy Analysis, the term was used to help explain the role
of citizens in the production of public services (Ostrom 1972 ,
1996 ; Ostrom and Ostrom 1977 ; Parks et al. 1981 ; Percy 1978).
Specifically, coproduction was used to describe “an emerging
conception of the service delivery process which envisions direct
citizen involvement in the design and delivery of city services with
professional service agents” (Brudney and England 1983 , 59).
Perhaps not surprisingly, the rise of the concept coincided with a
period in the United States marked by fiscal cutbacks, which led to
calls to produce more with less, redevelop intergovernmental service
delivery arrangements, focus on operational productivity, and
deprofessionalize bureaucracies (Alford 1998 ; Brudney and England
1983 ; Levine and Fisher 1984 ; Parks et al. 1981 ). These and similar
efforts flourished around the world throughout the 1980s and early
1990s, particularly under the banner of New Public Management
(NPM) (Hood 1995 ; Pollitt 1990 ; Stewart 1993 ).
Many have criticized NPM and similar reforms for their heavy
focus on market-oriented tools and mechanisms, arguing that
the reforms failed to improve accountability, transparency, and
responsiveness and instead contributed to various public sector
crises (for discussions, see Pollitt 1990 ; Terry 1998 ). We do not wish
to repeat those arguments here. Instead, we wish to note one of the
unintended consequences of these reforms: the rise and evolution
of coproduction as both an academic concept and a professional
practice.
In rather simplistic terms, NPM and other market-oriented reforms
led to the involvement of public, private, and nongovernmental
actors in public services, who in turn devolved responsibilities to
individual service users (cf. Levine and Fisher 1984 ). The logic was
straightforward: through their contributions, service users could
help reduce costs and improve the quality of services provided
to them (Alford 2014 ). Much of the early research assumed
that coproduction was part of the natural state of organizations
(even if it was not called coproduction): organizations involved
in health, education, policing, fire, environmental, and similar
activities implicitly involved citizens in service delivery. However,
as organizations increasingly were asked to do more with less,
assumptions about coproduction changed. Rather than being
seen as an already occurring practice, coproduction was viewed as
something to be introduced to organizations and integrated into
operations. This shift in assumptions gave wide berth to practical
applications of the concept in the public sector. 1
Attention to coproduction waned in the 1990s, but the concept
regained popularity in the twenty-first century for at least three
reasons. First, the early 2000s saw widespread recognition of the
increasingly multisectoral nature of governance. Sometimes dubbed
the “new governance” (e.g., Bingham, Nabatchi, and O ’ Leary 2005 ;
Salamon 2002 ), this approach recognizes the complex relationships
between actors and organizations in the public, private, and
nongovernmental sectors. It emphasizes a pluralistic model of
public service based on interorganizational relationships, networks,
collaborative partnerships, and other forms of multiactor policy
making and public action (Agranoff and McGuire 2003 ; Emerson
and Nabatchi 2015 ; Huxham and Vangen 2005 ; Kickert, Klijn, and
Koppenjan 1997 ; Stoker 2006 ). Second, the global financial crisis,
which hit nations around the world in 2007 and 2008, further
strengthened interest in coproduction. Indeed, many modern calls
for coproduction in light of fiscal constraints mirror those of the
1970s and 1980s. Third, the progressive decline of citizenship and
the sense of moi commun (a shared ideal in which the individual is
fully part of the whole community, literally a “common self ”) has
prompted scholars and practitioners to look for new public service
delivery mechanisms that will reinvigorate the role of citizens in
their communities beyond simply voter and customer (Levine and
Fisher 1984 ).
Coproduction has thus reentered the public administration stage,
capturing the attention of a wide range of actors, from government
officials and academics to leaders in the nonprofit and private
sectors. Some see coproduction as necessary in an era of austerity,
and others see it as a way to redefine the roles of government,
civil society, citizens, and service users (Nabatchi et al. 2016 ). Still
others argue that it creates public value: it has instrumental value
for organizations in terms of improving efficiency, effectiveness,
and innovation (Osborne, Radnor, and Nasi 2013 ); instrumental
value for citizens in terms of satisfaction, need fulfillment, and
empowerment (e.g., Levine and Fisher 1984 ; Needham 2008 ;
Sancino 2016 ); and normative value for society in terms of
citizenship and democratic governance (e.g., Dunston et al. 2009 ),
social capital (e.g., Jakobsen 2013 ; Marschall 2004 ; Meijer 2011 ;
Schneider et al. 1997 ), and accountability (e.g., Ostrom 1996 ).
Regardless of its raison d ’ être, coproduction is often viewed as an
option that “can add to the repertoire of institutional arrangements
available to public sector organizations in seeking to achieve their
purposes” (Alford 2009 , 10). It relies on the idea that people
represent “huge untapped resources” that can be mobilized to trigger
“radical innovation in public services” (Boyle and Harris 2009 , 14,
3; see also Osborne and Strokosch 2013 ).
Despite growing interest in coproduction, the concept remains
muddled. The lack of a clear and consistently used definition has led
to tremendous variety in how coproduction is practiced and studied
in public administration. In the next section, we explore various
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768 Public Administration Review • September | October 2017
definitions of coproduction, paying particular
attention to how those definitions contribute
to understanding about the who and the what
of coproduction.
Defi ning Coproduction: The Who and
The What
In its initial formulation, the “co-” side of
coproduction involved two sets of actors:
“regular producers” (i.e., government
professionals) and “citizen producers” or “coproducers” (i.e.,
laypeople who participate voluntarily as individuals or in groups)
(Ostrom 1996 ; Parks et al. 1981 ). Over time, however, scholars
expanded both the variety of actors in coproduction and the
conditions of their relationships (Alford 2014 ; Bovaird 2007 ).
Table 1 illustrates this point with a sample of coproduction
definitions from the last several decades. These definitions variously
identify the “regular producers” as public agencies, public agents,
professionals, or service providers and the “coproducers” as citizens,
clients, consumers, service users, community members, families,
or neighbors. They also identify other actors such as community
organizations, volunteers, or people outside of an organization or
government. Moreover, some specify voluntary engagement among
actors, while others do not, and still others add additional relational
requirements such as active engagement, long-term or reciprocal
interactions, resource contributions, or value creation.
Likewise, the “production” side of coproduction initially focused on
service delivery, but now is applied across the public service cycle,
as well as to areas that are generally unrelated to public services.
Thus, the “what” of coproduction is complicated by the range of
activities to which the term is applied. Among myriad examples,
coproduction has been used to describe activities such as the
following:
• Park and neighborhood cleanup programs
(Brudney and England 1983 )
• Residential security measures, crime
prevention education, and neighborhood
watch, witness assistance, and auxiliary
police programs (Layne 1989 )
• Parental participation in child care services
(Pestoff 2006 ) and school activities (Bifulco
and Ladd 2006 )
• Garbage collection, waste recycling, filing taxes, and using
postal codes (Alford 2009 )
• Fire services and public housing (Alford 2014 )
• Participatory budgeting (Barbera, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2016 )
• Probation (Surva, Tõnurist, and Lember 2016 ) and
immigration services (Jakobsen and Andersen 2013 ; Tu 2016 )
In sum, the term “coproduction” is applied to a wide range of
professionals and laypeople, and it is used to describe activities
involving traditional and untraditional service areas, as well as
activities that have nothing to do with service delivery but rather
attend to other elements of public services and public policies. For
some, the broad range of actors, activities, and applications may be
seen as a negative development, an indication that coproduction
is used indiscriminately to describe virtually any activity involving
people other than government agents. In contrast, we believe the
multiple uses and applications demonstrate that coproduction
is a provocative concept with high generalizability (a criterion
in evaluating the strength of concepts and theories) and proven
usefulness to a broad range of scholars and situations.
We also believe that the concept needs to be refined, particularly
because its widespread application has implications for practice
and study. For practice, the inability to clearly define and explain
Table 1 A Sampling of Coproduction Definitions
Author(s) Definition
Whitaker ( 1980 ) “Three broad types of activities constitute coproduction: (1) citizens requesting assistance from public agents; (2) citizens providing assistance to
public agents; and (3) citizens and agents interacting to adjust each other ’ s service expectations and actions” (p. 242).
Brudney and
England ( 1983 )
“Coproduction consists of citizen involvement or participation (rather than bureaucratic responsiveness) in the delivery of urban services. . . .
Coproduction stems from voluntary cooperation on the part of citizens (rather than compliance with laws or city ordinances) and involves
active (rather than passive) behaviors” (p. 63).
Levine and Fisher
( 1984 )
“The joint provision of public services by public agencies and service consumers” (p. 181).
Ostrom ( 1996 ) “The process through which inputs used to provide a good or service are contributed by individuals who are not ‘in’ the same organization” (p. 1073).
Alford ( 1998 ) “The involvement of citizens, clients, consumers, volunteers and/or community organizations in producing public services as well as consuming
or otherwise benefi ting from them” (p. 128).
Joshi and Moore
( 2006 )
“Institutionalized co-production is the provision of public services (broadly defi ned, to include regulation) through a regular long-term
relationship between state agencies and organized groups of citizens, where both make substantial resource contributions” (p. 40).
Bovaird ( 2007 ) “The provision of services through regular, long-term relationships between professionalized service providers (in any sector) and service users or
other members of the community, where all parties make substantial resource contributions” (p. 847).
Pestoff ( 2009 ) “Co-production provides a model for the mix of both public service agents and citizens who contribute to the provision of a public service”
(p. 197).
Boyle and Harris
( 2009 )
“Co-production means delivering public services in an equal and reciprocal relationship between professionals, people using services, their
families and their neighbors” (p. 11).
Alford ( 2009 ) “Co-production is any active behavior by anyone outside the government agency which: is conjoint with agency production or is independent
of it but prompted by some action of the agency; is at least partly voluntary; and either intentionally creates private and/or public value, in the
form of either outputs or outcomes” (p. 23).
Brandsen and
Honingh ( 2016 )
“Coproduction is a relationship between a paid employee of an organization and (groups of) individual citizens that requires a direct and active
contribution from these citizens to the work of the organization” (p. 431).
Bovaird and Loeffl er
( 2016 )
“Co-production is “public services and citizens making better use of each other ’ s assets and resources to achieve better outcomes or improved
effi ciency” (p. 1006).
Surva, Tõnurist, and
Lember ( 2016 )
“A way to involve citizens as co-designers and co-implementers of services that are usually delivered by public organizations” (p. 1031).
Th e lack of a clear and con-
sistently used defi nition has
led to tremendous variety in
how coproduction is prac-
ticed and studied in public
administration.
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Varieties of Participation in Public Services: The Who, When, and What of Coproduction 769
coproduction means that public servants and officials do not see its
full potential, underestimate its use and impacts, are challenged to
attract participants, and supply inadequate resources to such efforts
(Bovaird and Loeffler 2016 ; Jo and Nabatchi 2016 ). For scholars,
the lack of conceptual clarity makes it difficult to discern variations
in coproduction processes, analyze the use of coproduction, conduct
cumulative research, and generate sound, generalizable knowledge
(Jo and Nabatchi 2016 ). Simply put, the lack of demarcation
“has obscured critical appraisal of the meaning and implications
of coproduction from both a conceptual and a policy-making
perspective” (Brudney and England 1983 , 59; cf. Brandsen and
Honingh 2016 ).
To address these problems, some scholars have suggested narrowing
the definition of coproduction and focusing on core elements
(e.g., Brandsen and Honingh 2016 ). Others have suggested simply
accepting coproduction as a “heterogeneous umbrella concept”
(e.g., Verschuere, Brandsen, and Pestoff 2012 ; Jo and Nabatchi
2016 ), and still others have suggested widening coproduction
to include co-planning, co-design, co-delivery, co-monitoring,
and co-evaluation (e.g., Bovaird 2007 ; Sicilia et al. 2016 ). Either
through contraction or expansion, all of these approaches seek to
define coproduction in ways that allow for the categorization of
different kinds of activities, the connection of common points of
reference, and the comparison of research findings.
In this article, we take a mixed approach
to defining coproduction. Specifically, we
define coproduction as an umbrella concept
that captures a wide variety of activities
that can occur in any phase of the public
service cycle and in which state actors and
lay actors work together to produce benefits.
This definition is sufficiently broad to
maintain the generalizability of the concept
and ensure its usefulness to a range of
scholars and situations but also allows for
the specificity scholars need to categorize
activities, position and compare findings,
and ultimately improve research validity. In the next sections of
this article, we unpack this definition and introduce a typology of
coproduction that distinguishes among activities based on the “co”
and “production” sides of the term.
Creating a Typology for Coproduction
As suggested earlier, the differences among definitions and
applications of coproduction are related to both sides of the term,
where the “co” side captures who is involved, and the “production”
side captures what occurs and when (Alford 2014 ; Fugini, Bracci,
and Sicilia 2016 ). We believe that further specification of these two
sides may lead to better classification of coproduction activities
and, therefore, to better empirical study. To this end, we first
identify three levels of coproduction, distinguishing the numbers
and types of actors involved on the “co” side of the term. We then
identify four phases of the service cycle during which coproduction
can be used that distinguish among the timing and nature of the
“production” activities. Finally, we merge the levels and phases to
create a 3 x 4 typology of coproduction. We illustrate the levels,
phases, and typology as a whole with several examples.
Levels of Coproduction: Who Is Involved?
On the “co” side of the term, we find the labeling of professionals as
“regular producers” and citizens as “coproducers” to be confusing.
Since both sets of actors are involved in coproduction, both are
technically coproducing, and thus both are technically coproducers.
To address this issue, we assert that coproduction involves two types
of participants: (1) state actors who are (direct or indirect) agents
of government serving in a professional capacity (i.e., the “regular
producers”) and (2) lay actors who are members of the public serving
voluntarily as citizens, clients, and/or customers (i.e., the “citizen
producers”).
Several points about this interpretation of coproduction need
clarification. First, the state actors are often, but not always,
government employees; they may also be employed by a
nongovernmental entity (i.e., a nonprofit, civil society, or private
organization). However, the professional must work on behalf of the
state—whether directly or indirectly—and be engaged in some kind
of state-related or state-sanctioned activity.
Second, the lay actor may serve in multiple roles: (1) as a
citizen—a member of a geographic or political community; (2) as
a client—a recipient of public services to which he or she is legally
entitled and for which he or she is not required to directly pay
the providing organization; or (3) as a customer—a recipient of
public services for which he or she must directly pay the providing
organization. The roles of citizen and client
are more common than those of customer,
and actors may simultaneously serve in
multiple roles, in differing proportions
depending on the specific situation.
Regardless of the role, the layperson benefits
from state services or actions, whether
through the political or legal entitlements of
citizens and clients or through the payments
of customers.
Third, the number of actors, and therefore
the size of the coproduction activity, may
vary. For example, the state actor and the lay actor may participate
in a one-on-one interaction, or multiple state and/or lay actors may
participate as individuals or in groups.
Fourth, as suggested earlier, the coproduction activity produces
some kind of benefit. Expounding on the nature and differences of
benefits is beyond the scope of this article, largely because of the
challenge of generating precise language within limited space. For
the purposes of this article, we identify two categories: (1) personal
benefits that are enjoyed individually and (2) social benefits that
are enjoyed more broadly and communally (cf. Alford 2002 ,
2014 ). Sometimes these benefits are independent of each other,
sometimes they overlap, and sometimes they have spillover effects
(such that personal benefits generate social benefits or vice versa).
In most cases, state actors use coproduction to produce a public
good in a way that offsets costs; thus, the production of social
benefits is the primary driver, although this may be done through
the aggregation of personal benefits. Lay actors may be motivated
by the realization of either personal or social benefits, depending
on the situation.
We defi ne coproduction as an
umbrella concept that cap-
tures a wide variety of activities
that can occur in any phase
of the public service cycle and
in which state actors and lay
actors work together to produce
benefi ts.
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770 Public Administration Review • September | October 2017
Fifth, this interpretation excludes activities that are not voluntary
for the layperson. Although may some disagree (e.g., Alford 2002 ,
2006 , 2009 ; Osborne, Radnor, and Strokosch 2016 ), we assert
that the voluntary participation of lay actors is a requisite for
coproduction (cf. Brudney and England 1983 ; Parks et al. 1981 ;
Pestoff 2006 ). Because coproduction requires cooperative action
by the lay actor (as opposed to compliant, compelled, or habitual
action), the lay actor must consciously and freely decide to give or
withhold assistance in the coproduction process (Whitaker 1980 ).
Therefore, coproduction does not include activities in which the lay
actor is a subject of government, that is, in which the lay actor is (or
feels) obligated, induced, or coerced to abide by legal or regulatory
requirements and/or is sanctioned for noncompliance. Thus, for
example, activities such as paying taxes, serving on a jury, using
postal codes, and food, drug, building, and other types of health
and safety inspections are not coproduction.
Finally, arrangements such as collaborative governance, network
governance, public–private partnerships, and other forms of
interactive governance are also excluded, as they do not typically
involve lay actors (Sancino and Jacklin-Jarvis 2016 ).
With this interpretation in mind, we reframe and expand
Brudney and England ’ s “three broad types of coproductive
activities: individual, group, and collective” (1983, 63) as levels
of coproduction. For each level, we identify the typical role of lay
actors (citizens, clients, customers) and the type of benefits produced
(personal benefits, social benefits) and provide examples. We opted
to use these levels to identify the “who” of coproduction because
neither the roles of lay actors nor the benefits produced are mutually
exclusive. We summarize the roles, benefits, and examples in table 2 .
In individual coproduction, a state actor and a lay actor work
directly with each other. In most cases, the lay actor is a client or a
customer, and the coproduction activity leads to “benefits [that] are
largely personal” for the lay actor (Brudney and England 1983 , 63),
although spillover effects may generate social benefits. An example
of individual coproduction with a client is when a teacher (the
state actor) and a student (the lay actor) work together to develop a
personal learning plan (e.g., Wybron and Paget 2016 ). The student
receives direct personal benefits from a clearly articulated learning
plan, but there may be social benefits, for example, by helping
the child become a better-educated, more employable adult. An
example of coproduction with a customer is when a community
resident (the lay actor) pays to drop off trash at a municipal dump
(the state actor) (e.g., Alford 2009 ). Beyond the personal benefits of
refuse disposal, the community experiences spillover social benefits
such as cleanliness, resource conservation, and public health.
In group coproduction, one or more state actors work directly and
simultaneously with a specific cluster or category of lay actors
who share common characteristics or interests (e.g., users of a
specific service, residents of a specific neighborhood, or patients
with a specific disease). In most cases, the lay actors are clients or
customers, and the coproduction activity leads to personal benefits
for group members. Spillover effects may generate social benefits;
however, a number of issues may impede equitable distribution
(Brudney and England 1983 , citing Rich 1981 ; Rosentraub
and Sharp 1981 ; Sharp 1980 ). For example, Needham flags as
problematic the “blurring of boundaries between public and private
interests and the shifting of costs and risks on to users” (2008, 222;
cf. Bovaird 2007 ; Needham 2006 ; Ostrom 1996 ). Others point to
possible inequities in and from coproduction, which may exacerbate
the gap between outcomes for advantaged and disadvantaged
citizens (e.g., Brudney and England 1983 ; Jakobsen and Anderson
2013; Levine and Fisher 1984 ). Thus, this mode of coproduction,
which begins to resemble traditional notions of citizen participation,
“may require formal coordination mechanisms” (Brudney and
England 1983 , 64). An example of group coproduction with clients
is when school administrators (the state actors) work with parents
of autistic children (the lay actors) to improve educational services
(e.g., Sicilia et al. 2016 ). The parents and students receive direct
personal benefits from this work, and their efforts may also generate
social benefits. An example of group coproduction with customers
is when officials from a transportation department (the state actors)
work with a group of disabled people (the lay actors) to better
understand their public transportation needs (e.g., Copestake et al.
2014 ). In this case, the participants are likely to experience personal
benefits from an improved ridership experience, and spillover effects
may create social benefits for the broader community.
In collective coproduction, one or more state actors (within a single
organization or across multiple organizations) work directly and
simultaneously with several lay actors to address one or more
Table 2 Levels of Coproduction
Level of Coproduction Role of Lay Actors Types of Benefits Examples
Individual Client, customer Personal benefi ts
(spillover may
generate social
benefi ts)
• A teacher works with a student in one-on-one sessions to set personal learning goals and
targets (e.g., Wybron and Paget 2016 )
• A physician and a patient work together to develop a personal treatment plan (e.g., Realpe
and Wallace 2010 )
• A layperson pays to drop off trash at a municipal dump (e.g., Alford 2009 )
Group Clients, customers Personal benefi ts
Social benefi ts
• One or more school administrators work with parents of autistic children to improve educa-
tional services (e.g., Sicilia et al. 2016 )
• Mental health providers work with patients sharing similar diagnoses to improve services
(e.g., Nesta 2012 )
• Representatives from the regional transportation department work with disabled people to
understand their public transportation needs (e.g., Copestake et al. 2014 )
Collective Citizens Social benefi ts
(spillover may
generate personal
benefi ts)
• Municipal offi cials work with community members to identify budget priorities (e.g.,
Bovaird 2007 ; Barbera, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2016 )
• A municipal council works with community residents to ensure a coherent approach to
environmental management (e.g., APSE 2013)
• A city government works with residents to develop health plans in polluted areas (e.g., Van
Damme, Caluwaerts, and Brans 2016)
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Varieties of Participation in Public Services: The Who, When, and What of Coproduction 771
related issues. Typically, the lay actors are citizens, although their
roles as clients and customers also may be apparent (Fotaki 2011 ).
Unlike group coproduction, which targets a specific segment of the
population and is aimed at producing personal benefits for the group
members, collective coproduction targets diverse members of the
community and is aimed at producing “goods whose benefits may
be enjoyed by the entire community,” although again, several barriers
may impede equitable distribution (Brudney and England 1983 , 64).
Accordingly, this mode of coproduction, which is most in line with
traditional notions of citizen participation, typically requires a great
deal of formal coordination. Examples of collective coproduction
include when municipal officials (the state actors) work with citizens
(the lay actors) to identify budget priorities (e.g., Barbera, Sicilia,
and Steccolini 2016 ; Bovaird 2007 ), to develop an approach to
environmental management (e.g., APSE 2013), or to create health
plans in polluted areas (e.g., Van Damme, Caluwaerts, and Brans
2016). In each case, the goal is to produce social benefits for the
community, which are likely to create personal benefits for individuals.
Coproduction in Phases of the Service Cycle: What Occurs
and When?
Specifying the “production” side of coproduction is perhaps more
challenging given the breadth of activities to which the term has
been applied. In some contributions, coproduction is limited to
situations in which a state actor and a lay actor work together on
a specific service at the point of delivery (e.g., Alford 2009 )—for
example, in education when a teacher and a student work together
to improve learning outcomes. In this formulation, the word
“production” is restricted to its parochial definition. In other
contributions, coproduction is applied across the phases of the
public service cycle (e.g., Bovaird 2007 ; Bovaird and Loeffler 2012 ,
2016 ; Sicilia et al. 2016 ). In this formulation, state actors and lay
actors can work together at any stage to “produce” something of
value. Thus, the word “production” is defined broadly, and the
cooperative activity is denoted by the prefix “co.”
We take the second approach, focusing on the use of coproduction
during the phases of the service cycle—commissioning, design,
delivery, and assessment—and expanding it by discussing the
temporal nature of each phase (prospective, concurrent, or
retrospective). We take this approach for three reasons: (1) it
helps distinguish when the activity is performed, which (2)
directly corresponds to the what of the activity (i.e., the thing
that is produced), and (3) more accurately captures the breadth of
existing applications in the literature. In any phase, coproduction
may occur at the individual, group, or collective level (an issue
addressed later in the article) and can be done synchronously (e.g.,
in face-to-face settings) or asynchronously (e.g., electronically
through information and communication technologies) (e.g.,
Bopp 2000 ; Clark, Brudney, and Jang 2013 ; Meijer 2011 , 2014 ).
Table 3 identifies the temporal nature of each service cycle phase
and provides examples (additional examples can be found at http://
www.govint.org ).
Co-commissioning refers to activities aimed at strategically
identifying and prioritizing needed public services, outcomes,
and users. Although the term “commissioning” is beset with some
contention, we use it here to mean “what needs to be delivered, to
whom, and to achieve what outcomes” (Bovaird and Loeffler 2012 ,
Table 3 Coproduction in Phases of the Service Cycle
Phase of the Service
Cycle
Temporal
Nature Examples
Co-commissioning Prospective • Public offi cials and citizens work
together to set budget priorities for
a community (e.g., Bovaird 2007 ;
Barbera, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2016 ).
• Police departments work with
residents to identify priority or target
areas for community safety efforts
and police patrols (e.g., Layne 1989 ).
• School offi cials work with parent
groups to determine educational pri-
orities (e.g., Bifulco and Ladd 2006 ;
Birchall and Simmons 2004 ).
Co-designing Prospective or
concurrent
• State and lay actors work together
to redesign the application process
for public benefi ts (e.g., Bovaird and
Loeffl er 2012 ).
• State and lay actors work together to
redesign a website for adult care ser-
vices (e.g., Bovaird and Loeffl er 2012 ).
• Social workers work directly with the
elderly to create opportunities for
interdependent living (e.g., Bovaird and
Loeffl er 2012 ; Willis and Bovaird 2012) .
Co-delivery Concurrent • Parents work with teachers and
schools to provide in-class or extra-
curricular activities for students (e.g.,
Pestoff 2006 ).
• Students assist the university in orga-
nizing welcome days (e.g., Brandsen
and Honingh 2016 ).
• A youth council trains young people
as peer educators who then provide
sex education sessions in schools
(e.g., Bovaird and Loeffl er 2012 ;
see also http://www.govint.org/
good-practice/case-studies/london-
borough-of-lambeth/ ).
Co-assessment Retrospective
(sometimes
with
prospective
elements)
• Residents of social housing complexes
work for the Audit Commission as
“tenant inspection advisors” (e.g.,
Bovaird and Loeffl er 2012 ).
• State actors and residents with de-
mentia walk through neighborhoods
to assess the ease of navigation (e.g.,
Brown, Loeffl er, and Christie 2016 ).
• Parents work with special education
auditors to assess services provided
to their autistic children (e.g., Sicilia
et al. 2016 ).
6). Traditionally, commissioning is seen as a “core public sector task
[to be] undertaken by politicians and top managers” (Bovaird and
Loeffler 2012 , 6). However, in coproduction, the commissioning
of services is done by state and lay actors working together, an
approach also recognized in the public participation literature
(e.g., Nabatchi and Leighninger 2015 ). Co-commissioning is
generally prospective in nature—it is oriented toward the future
and concerned with activities that may take place at a later date.
Other terms, such as “co-prioritization” and “co-financing,” are
sometimes used either as synonyms for co-commissioning or to
demarcate specific activities within co-commissioning. Examples
of co-commissioning include when public officials work with
citizens to set budget priorities for discretionary funds (e.g.,
Barbera, Sicilia, and Steccolini 2016 ; Bovaird 2007 ), when police
departments work with residents to identify priority or target areas
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772 Public Administration Review • September | October 2017
for community safety efforts and police patrols (e.g., Layne 1989 ),
and when school officials work with parent groups to determine
educational priorities (e.g., Bifulco and Ladd 2006 ; Birchall and
Simmons 2004 ).
Co-design refers to activities that incorporate “the experience
of users and their communities” into the creation, planning,
or arrangements of public services (Bovaird and Loeffler 2012 ,
9). This “outside-in” perspective enables state actors to better
understand how public services could be designed to be of
greatest use and benefit for individuals and communities.
In many ways, this approach mirrors traditional notions of
direct citizen participation (e.g., Nabatchi and Amsler 2014 ;
Nabatchi and Leighninger 2015 ). Co-design may be prospective
(i.e., future-oriented) or concurrent (i.e., concerned with what
presently exists or is occurring). Examples include when state and
lay actors work together to reshape the application process for
public benefits or to revamp a website for adult care services, or
when social service professionals work with elderly populations to
create opportunities for “interdependent” living (e.g., Bovaird and
Loeffler 2012; Willis and Bovaird 2012 ).
Co-delivery refers to joint activities between state and lay actors
that are used to directly provide public services and/or to improve
the provision of public services (Alford and O ’ Flynn 2012 ;
Thomas 2013a , 2013b ). Co-delivery, which is most in line with
the traditional view of coproduction, is sometimes considered
intrinsic to the provision of certain services (such as health care and
education) and often centers on quality and efficiency improvements
(Osborne, Radnor, and Strokosch 2016 ; Osborne and Strokosch
2013 ). Co-delivery is generally concurrent in nature—it is focused
on presently provided services. Examples include when parents
work with teachers and schools to provide in-class or extracurricular
activities (e.g., Pestoff 2006 ), when students assist in organizing
university welcome days (e.g., Brandsen and Honingh 2016 ), and
when young people work as peer educators in schools (e.g., Bovaird
and Loeffler 2012 ; see also http://www.govint.org/good-practice/
case-studies/london-borough-of-lambeth/ ).
Co-assessment focuses on monitoring and evaluating public services.
Traditionally, performance-related activities are undertaken by
public officials or external consultants; however, in coproduction,
state and lay actors work together to assess service quality,
problems, and/or areas for improvement (Bovaird and Loeffler
2012 ). Co-assessment is generally retrospective in nature—it
is oriented toward the past and concerned with activities that
have already taken place. However, the results of co-assessment
exercises can be used prospectively to rethink or improve services.
Examples include when residents of social housing complexes serve
as “tenant inspection advisors” for government (e.g., Bovaird and
Loeffler 2012 ), when state actors and residents with dementia
assess the ease of navigation in neighborhoods (e.g., Brown,
Loeffler, and Christie 2016 ), and when parents work with special
education auditors to assess services for their children (e.g., Sicilia
et al. 2016 ).
A 3 x 4 Typology of Coproduction
When the three levels (individual, group, collective) and the
four phases of the service cycle (commissioning, design, delivery,
assessment) are merged, they create a 3 x 4 matrix that lays out
12 “types” of coproduction. The variations among these 12 types
are related to, but also reach beyond, the levels and phases of
coproduction; they also vary by characteristics related to the who,
when, and what of coproduction.
First, the types vary by who is involved, including the number of
participants and who they represent. Lay actors may participate
in coproduction as citizens, clients, or customers (or in some
combination of these roles with proportions that differ according to
the situation). They participate alone in individual coproduction,
as a specified segment of the population in group coproduction,
and as diverse representatives of the larger community in collective
coproduction. The number and nature of state actors may also
vary. Individual coproduction is more likely to involve only one
state actor from one agency or organization, whereas collective
coproduction is more likely to include several state actors from
multiple agencies and organizations.
Second, the types vary by when they occur. This includes the phase
of the service cycle in which coproduction is used (commissioning,
designing, delivery, assessment), as well as its temporal orientation
(prospective, concurrent, or retrospective) and whether it
incorporates synchronous and/or asynchronous activities.
Finally, the types vary by what they produce. On one hand, this
relates to the nature and distribution of benefits. For example,
individual coproduction generates personal benefits and collective
coproduction generates social benefits. Sometimes the personal
and social benefits are independent, but often they overlap or
create spillover effects. On the other hand, this relates to what is
created through coproduction. For example, a co-commissioning
process would produce a list of priorities or needs; a co-design
process would produce a plan or arrangement; a co-delivery process
would produce a good or service; and a co-assessment process
would produce a monitoring protocol or evaluation. In table 4 ,
we clarify these and other differences with illustrative examples of
coproduction across the levels and phases.
Of course, additional work is needed to flesh out the typology. But,
as Brudney and England so eloquently state, the issue is to generate
“interpretations of coproduction” that “are useful … [and] relevant both
to policy makers interested in implementing or evaluating coproduction
programs and to academics concerned with operationalizing the
concept in actual service delivery situations” (1983, 61). This typology
is a step in that direction. To support this claim, we conclude with a
discussion of its implications for research and practice.
Implications for Research and Practice
Although the concept of coproduction is increasingly popular, the
lack of conceptual and definitional clarity is impeding scholarly
research and limiting its development in practice. To address these
issues, we clarified the definition of coproduction and created a
typology based on the who, when, and what of coproduction.
Specifically, we defined coproduction as an umbrella term that
captures a wide variety of activities that can occur in any phase
of the public service cycle and in which state and lay actors work
together to produce benefits. We noted that (1) state actors need
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Varieties of Participation in Public Services: The Who, When, and What of Coproduction 773
not be government employees but must work directly or indirectly
on behalf of the state on a state-related or state-sanctioned activity,
and (2) lay actors may serve separately or simultaneously (in
differing proportions depending on the situation) as citizens,
clients, and/or customers. We also explained that coproduction (3)
can vary by the number of actors and size; (4) produces personal
and/or social benefits that may be independent, overlapping, or
have spillover effects; (5) must be voluntary for lay actors; and
(6) excludes interorganizational arrangements that do not involve
lay actors. This definition erects boundaries around coproduction
while maintaining generalizability and allowing for specification
based the “co” (who) and the “production” (when and what) sides
of the term.
On the “co” side, we specified three levels of coproduction, the
typical role of lay actors, and the type of benefits produced.
Individual coproduction refers to activities in
which a state actor works directly with a lay
actor (typically a client or customer) who
receives personal benefits from the effort,
although spillover social benefits are possible.
Group coproduction refers to activities in which
one or more state actors work directly and
simultaneously with a number of lay actors
in a specific population category (typically
clients or customers) who receive personal benefits with potential
spillover social benefits. Collective coproduction refers to activities in
which one or more state actors (from one or more organizations)
work directly and simultaneously with several lay actors from the
community (typically citizens) to generate social benefits, although
participants may also experience personal benefits.
On the “production” side, we specified four service cycle phases and
their temporal nature, noting that activities may be synchronous
or asynchronous. Co-commissioning refers to activities used
prospectively to decide on or prioritize needed public services,
outcomes, and users. Co-design refers to activities used to create,
plan for, or arrange prospective or concurrent public services.
Co-delivery refers to activities used to provide or improve the
provision of concurrent public services. Co-assessment refers to
activities used to retrospectively assess public service quality or
outcomes. We then combined these three levels and four phases to
create a typology of twelve types of coproduction.
This typology has several implications for scholarship. First,
the typology provides terminological clarity by acknowledging
coproduction as an umbrella concept and offering vocabulary
for defining and describing its variations. Explicit use of this
terminology will help scholars better describe coproduction in the
future and avoid the confusion and ambiguity of the past.
Second, the typology sets the stage for stronger empirical research
on coproduction. Specifically, distinguishing among variations in
coproduction will ease the challenges associated with explanatory
analyses and comparative research. For example, scholars could use
the cells in the typology to map cases of coproduction in the public
administration literature, with the goals of determining which types
have received more (and less) attention and
identifying areas in which additional research
is needed. Scholars can also use the typology
to identify and examine design and outcome
differences among the types of coproduction.
For example, it would be useful to know
what legal and organizational factors trigger
the use of different types of coproduction
and how those factors relate to design,
implementation, evaluation, and, ultimately, outcomes. It would
also be interesting to investigate whether and how the motivations
and incentives of state and lay actors vary by coproduction level or
by phase of the service cycle. Similarly, scholars could examine the
managerial, leadership, and engagement styles of state actors, their
goals for coproduction, and their satisfaction with various processes,
or they could explore differences in techniques related to participant
recruitment, preparation, interactions, and satisfaction. They
could also examine the ways in which participation in one form of
coproduction influences the willingness of state and lay actors to
engage in other forms of coproduction (see Bovaird et al. 2015 ).
Studies on these and other topics could be done at a meta level or
disaggregated by policy sector or some other criterion.
Third, and in a similar vein, the typology provides a foundation
for the development of a framework for assessing coproductive
Distinguishing among varia-
tions in coproduction will ease
the challenges associated with
explanatory analyses and com-
parative research.
Table 4 A Typology of Coproduction with Examples
Phase of the Service Cycle
Co-Commissioning Co-Design Co-Delivery Co-Assessment
Level of
Coproduction
Individual A doctor and a patient work
together to identify and
prioritize health problems
and needs.
A doctor and a patient work
together to develop a
strategy or plan for meeting
health needs.
A doctor and a patient work
together to implement
dietary, exercise, smoking
cessation, or other activities
to meet health needs.
A doctor and a patient
evaluate the effi cacy of
the plan and the degree of
health improvement.
Group School offi cials and teachers
work with a group of
parents who have children
with special needs to
identify challenges and
opportunities in education
services.
School offi cials and teachers
work with a group of
parents who have children
with special needs to design
educational activities based
on parental experience and
best practice.
School offi cials and teachers
work with a group of
parents who have children
with special needs to
provide in-class and extra-
curricular educational
activities.
School offi cials and teachers
work with a group of
parents that have children
with special needs to
evaluate the provision of
services.
Collective A local parks department
convenes citizens to identify
and prioritize desired
recreational opportunities in
a community.
A local parks department
works with citizens to
design a series of bicycle
routes throughout the
community.
A local parks department
works with citizens to
construct and maintain
bicycle routes throughout
the community.
A local parks department
works with citizens to
assess the safety and quality
of bicycle routes throughout
the community.
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774 Public Administration Review • September | October 2017
performance. The typology implicitly suggests the need for
multidimensional performance assessments that account for
the numerous actors involved in and affected by coproduction
(Andersen, Boesen, and Pedersen 2016 ). At least four perspectives
are important, including those of the (1) state actors, (2)
organizations represented by the state actors, (3) lay actors engaged
in the process, and (4) potential beneficiaries not involved in the
process. For each perspective, scholars and practitioners should
work together to develop indicators that are generalizable across
the types of coproduction and that are specific to each type (for
discussions of scholar-practitioner collaborations, see Buick et
al. 2016 ; Orr and Bennett 2012 ). Such work would certainly
contribute to knowledge about what works, when, where, why, and
how.
Finally, the typology and the research avenues suggested here pave
the way not only for the application of high-quality explanatory
and comparative research and the use of alternative and innovative
research methods (e.g., Riccucci, Van Ryzin, and Li 2016 ), but also
for the consistent accumulation of knowledge on coproduction. As
the empirical research base for coproduction grows, so, too, will
the possibilities for theory building. Thus, these and other research
efforts could help push the field of public administration toward
the conceptual and analytical clarity on coproduction found in the
business literature (see Agrawal 2013).
The typology also has implications for practice. First, it provides
policy makers and public managers with a tool to enhance decision
making about coproduction. Specifically, the typology enables
practitioners to identify the type of coproduction best aligned with
their goals and purposes, which, in turn, can help them determine
who to involve in what activity and when. Moreover, because
the typology frames coproduction as a dynamic and potentially
longitudinal experience, it may enable practitioners to imagine (and
perhaps use) coproduction across the public service cycle, from
commissioning to assessment.
Second, because the typology provides language for describing and
explaining the variations in coproduction, it facilitates the examination
and comparison of cases and experiences and may improve evaluation
and transparency. Moreover, it enhances top-down, bottom-up, and
inside-out communication. For example, the ability to clearly define
different types of coproduction and articulate their potential uses and
impacts can assist organizational leaders with encouraging frontline
practitioners to use coproduction. Conversely, it can assist frontline
practitioners with communicating up the organizational chain to
request and justify the financial, human, technological, and other
resources necessary for supporting coproduction. It can also assist
practitioners with outward communication, for example through the
development of recruitment language and tactics to attract, engage,
and retain participants.
The typology offers several other potential avenues for research and
practice, but one final implication should be noted. Given fiscal
constraints, organizational imperatives, and citizen expectations,
the use of coproduction is likely to continuing growing in the near
future. Thus, it imperative that scholars and practitioners develop
better ways to explain and study its uses and impacts. Failure
to do so will perpetuate ambiguity, further muddy a complex
phenomenon, and undermine efforts to better engage citizens and
improve public services.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Jeff Brudney and John Alford
for their excellent advice on early versions of this article. We also
appreciate the encouragement and feedback we received from the
participants at the International Institute of Administrative Sciences
Study Group on Coproduction meeting held in Tampere, Finland,
and at the Public Management Research Conference held in Aarhus,
Denmark. Finally, we are grateful for the comments provided by the
anonymous reviewers and the editor.
Note
1 . The marketing and business literatures are rife with articles examining the role of
customers in the value chain, defined as the processes or activities by which a
company adds value to an article, including production, marketing, and the
provision of after-sales service (for a review of this history, see Ramirez 2009).
Coproduction is now used in the business sector in the purchasing process; in
the innovation, design, and (beta) testing of goods; and in the marketing of
products (e.g., Lusch and Vargo 2015 ). In these and other business contexts, the
definition and boundaries of coproduction are clearer and better established than
in the public sector (Agrawal 2013).
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Theory to Practice
John M. Bryson is the McKnight
Presidential Professor of Planning and
Public Affairs in the Hubert H. Humphrey
School of Public Affairs at the University
of Minnesota. His interests are in strategic
management, leadership, and collaboration.
He is author of Strategic Planning for
Public and Nonprofi t Organizations
(4th ed., 2011) and coauthor, with
Barbara C. Crosby, of Leadership for
the Common Good: Tackling Public
Problems in a Shared-Power World
(2nd ed., 2005).
E-mail: bryso001@umn.edu
Kathryn S. Quick is assistant professor
in the Humphrey School of Public Affairs
at the University of Minnesota. Formerly
a public and nonprofi t manager, she now
focuses her research and teaching on civic
engagement, integrative leadership, and
public and nonprofi t management. Through
ethnographic research, she studies a diver-
sity of approaches to public engagement
across a wide range of policy and planning
issues and their consequences for decision
outcomes, implementation, and community
capacity building.
E-mail: ksquick@umn.edu
Carissa Schively Slotterback is asso-
ciate professor in the Urban and Regional
Planning Program in the Humphrey
School of Public Affairs at the University
of Minnesota. Her research is focused on
stakeholder involvement and collaborative
decision making in environmental, land-use,
and transportation planning processes. She
holds a doctorate in urban and regional
planning from Florida State University and
has experience in planning practice in the
public and private sectors.
E-mail: schiv005@umn.edu
Designing Public Participation Processes 23
Public Administration Review,
Vol. 73, Iss. 1, pp. 23–34. © 2012 by
The American Society for Public Administration.
DOI: 10.111/j.1540-6210.2012.02678.x.
Barbara C. Crosby is associate
professor in the Humphrey School of Public
Affairs at the University of Minnesota. She
has taught and written extensively about
leadership and public policy, cross-sector
collaboration, women in leadership, media
and public policy, and strategic planning.
She is author of Leadership for Global
Citizenship (1999) and coauthor, with
John M. Bryson, of Leadership for the
Common Good: Tackling Public
Problems in a Shared-Power World
(2nd ed., 2005).
E-mail: crosb002@umn.edu
Donald P. Moynihan, Editor
John M. Bryson
Kathryn S. Quick
Carissa Schively Slotterback
Barbara C. Crosby
University of Minnesota
Th e purpose of this Th eory to Practice article is to present
a systematic, cross-disciplinary, and accessible synthesis
of relevant research and to off er explicit evidence-based
design guidelines to help practitioners design better
participation processes.
From the research literature,
the authors glean suggestions for iteratively creating,
managing, and evaluating public participation activities.
Th e article takes an evidence-based and design science
approach, suggesting that eff ective public participation
processes are grounded in analyzing the context closely,
identifying the purposes of the participation eff ort,
and iteratively designing and redesigning the process
accordingly.
Government administrators, offi cials, and
community leaders have long recognized
the value of public
participation for a variety of
purposes, processes, and deci-
sions (Cooper, Bryer, and Meek
2006; Rosener 1975; Yang
and Pandey 2011). However,
they frequently do not have a
good understanding of how to
design participation processes
to achieve desirable outcomes. Fortunately, there is
an extensive base of research from which to glean
advice on participation process design that off ers clear,
though nuanced, direction for practice. Th e purpose
of this article is to present a systematic, cross-disciplin-
ary, and accessible synthesis of relevant research and to
off er explicit evidence-based design guidelines to help
practitioners design better participation processes.
To integrate relevant research into a set of practical
participation process design guidelines, we tap into
insights from the evidence-based practice movement
and from the developing design science literature.
Th e evidence-based practice movement originated
in medicine, where it refers to “the conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence
in making decisions about the care of individual
patients” (Sackett et al. 1996) and is accomplished by
integrating research evidence, professional expertise,
and the preferences and concerns of patients (Bauer
2007). It now cuts across many disciplines, includ-
ing public administration (Heinrich 2007), urban
planning (Forsyth 2007), and public policy making
and service delivery (Boaz et al. 2008). Public aff airs
professionals face a number of challenges in enacting
evidence-based practice, however, including gaining
access to, knowing how to read and critique, and hav-
ing time to review applicable research; discerning its
relevance to organizational contexts; and dealing with
confl icting fi ndings across studies (Krizek, Forsyth,
and Slotterback 2009). In addition, many practition-
ers rely on professional colleagues for information and
also are faced with an overload of information avail-
able online (Durning et al. 2010).
We respond to these challenges
by off ering a systematic and
accessible review of the evidence
related to the design of public
participation processes. Th e rel-
evant research is diff used across
a diverse range of disciplines,
research methodologies, con-
texts, and subject areas. We reviewed more than 250
articles and books. Th ough many of the materials were
not written specifi cally to answer the question of how
best to design public participation, they off er incisive
lessons for designing participation. While each of us is
an academic, each also has substantial experience with
the design of participation processes; we drew on each
type of experience as we met regularly over the course
of many months to discuss the research and develop
a concise set of practical guidelines. We are selective
with citations here, balancing an eff ort to point readers
to the primary references (e.g., the earliest written,
most frequently cited, most comprehensive, or most
generalizable sources) with a representation of the
breadth of disciplines and practice fi elds of relevance to
public administration. Readers will note divergences in
the types of support among the recommendations that
we make. Some have emerged through extensive study;
Designing Public Participation Processes
We respond to these challenges
by off ering a systematic and
accessible review of the evidence
related to the design of public
participation processes.
24 Public Administration Review • January | February 2013
science involves utilizing a combination of existing research and
well- understood practice to develop solution-oriented design princi-
ples that are contingent (Simon 1996). Th at is, these principles are
situation and context specifi c, which means that they are neces-
sarily somewhat general, require thoughtful adaptation to specifi c
situations (Boyne and Walker 2010), and typically are readapted in
response to emerging conditions (Cross 2011).
Th e design science focus of this article signifi es a shift from typical
social science, which generally involves hypothesis testing to estab-
lish general patterns of causality, to the design science framework
of developing and testing conjectures, taking a problem-solving
approach, and adapting research-based evidence to context-specifi c,
contingent, and emergent circumstances. Despite a growing desire
to innovate in the public sector, there is limited recognition among
public administrators of design science as a viable way to promote
adaptation and change, perhaps because of the sector’s risk-adverse
culture and structural barriers (Bason 2010; Cowan 2012; Moore
and Hartley 2008).
It is very important, however, not to overemphasize the diff erence
between design science and what probably has always been true of
the best public administration in practice. Th e diff erence is simply
the heightened emphasis on purpose-driven, context-sensitive,
holistic, user- and stakeholder-oriented, evidence-based designing
and designs. Bringing a design science framework into the work of
public administrators is meant to invite practitioners to reconceive
their activities explicitly in terms of an ongoing, active process of
designing (a verb), which is typically iterative and involves testing
various ideas and prototypes before settling on the “fi nal” design
(a noun) (Romme and Endenburg 2006). Practice is thus seen as a
response to explicit or implicit designs—and based on practice, those
designs very well may need to change (Wenger 1999).
Th us, we fi nd it neither feasible nor advisable to generate “rules” or
a step-by-step design template for organizing public participation.
Indeed, a consistent implication of design science and of the diver-
sity of evidence-based research fi ndings synthesized here is that suc-
cessful public participation requires designing iteratively, in response
to specifi c purposes and contexts. As Nabatchi notes, “design
choices are not made in a linear fashion” (2012b, 3). Th erefore, we
synthesize the evidence into design guidelines that we invite public
administrators to consider to help them accomplish the goals of
their public participation processes.
The Design Guidelines
Design to Address Contexts and Problems
Design guideline 1. Ensure that a public participation process is
needed, fi ts the general and specifi c context, and is based on a clear
understanding of the challenge or problem (a part of the specifi c
context) for which public participation is a desirable part of the
response.
Participation processes must fi t the context
in which they are
taking place.
Th e policy
change literature emphasizes the importance
of understanding the general and more
specifi c contexts and staying alert to changes
in them (e.g., Crosby and Bryson 2005; Gaus
others, though supported by less empirical evidence, are well sup-
ported by logic and theory. Our intent was to glean and synthesize
the most relevant guidance for practitioners from this research.
At the same time, it is important for practitioners to couple this
evidence with their own expertise and knowledge of their specifi c
contexts, drawing on research “while also incorporating the tried
and true, or locally relevant, methods for specifi c environments and
contexts” (Krizek, Forsyth, and Slotterback 2009, 470). Th erefore,
while research literature off ers a wealth of practical guidance to
enhance the outcomes of public participation processes through bet-
ter design, we synthesize it here in the form of design guidelines for
creating, managing, and evaluating public participation activities in
order to accomplish desired outcomes (see table 1 and fi gure 1).
Our synthesis is informed by insights from the developing design
science literature, which emphasizes a focus on desired outcomes to
be achieved in a problematic real-world situ-
ation, strong client and holistic orientations,
deliberate use of evidence-based substantive
and procedural knowledge, and understand-
ing and specifying responses that fi t the
particular context (Van Aken 2007). Design
Figure 1 The Cycle of Public Participation Process Design
and Redesign (Numbers indicate the corresponding design
guidelines.)
Table 1 Design Guidelines for Public Participation
Assess and design for context and purpose
1. Assess and fi t the design to the context and the problem
2. Identify purposes and design to achieve them
Enlist resources and manage the participation
3. Analyze and appropriately involve stakeholders
4. Work with stakeholders to establish the legitimacy of the
process
5. Foster effective leadership
6. Seek resources for and through participation
7. Create appropriate rules and structures to guide the process
8. Use inclusive processes to engage diversity productively
9. Manage power dynamics
10. Use technologies of various kinds to achieve participation purposes
Evaluate and redesign continuously
11. Develop and use evaluation measures
12. Design and redesign
Note: These are interrelated, iterative tasks, not a step-by-step template.
Participation processes must fi t
the context in which they are
taking place.
Designing Public Participation Processes 25
design of solutions) with solutions in order to gain clarity about pur-
poses and desired outcomes (Brown 2009; Van Aken 2007).
Diff erent kinds of problems or challenges call for diff erent solution
responses. Designs for participation must be tailored to assist with
developing those responses. For example, problems that are pri-
marily technical or operational are not likely to call for substantial
changes in the applicable knowledge or technology base, stakeholder
relationships, broad organizational strategies, or governance mecha-
nisms. Line managers, operations groups or teams, and program,
product, project, or service coproducers or recipients are the most
likely people who will need to be involved. In contrast, problems
that are more complex and politically charged are likely to require
changes in the applicable knowledge or technology base, new
concepts, and changes in basic stakeholders or stakeholder relation-
ships. Governing or policy boards, senior staff , and an array of key
1947, 6–19; Sabatier 2007). Th e general context includes broad
social, demographic, political, technological, physical, and other
features and trends in an organization’s environment. Th e specifi c
context refers to those parts of the organization’s task environment
that are directly relevant to the achievement of the organization’s
goals, including key stakeholders, applicable mandates, resource
availability, and so on (see Scott and Davis 2006).
Th e decision-making and design science literatures emphasize the
importance of understanding the problem or challenge to be addressed
in such a way that it can be solved, the wrong problem is not solved,
and solutions do not create the problem that they were meant to solve
(Wildavsky 1979). Th ey also assert that possible solutions will need to
be explored before the “real” problem is understood (Janis 1989; Nutt
2002). Doing so calls for iteratively juxtaposing possible defi nitions
of “the problem” (that is, that part of the context that motivates the
Table 2 Multiple Purposes of Public Participation, with Associated Design Considerations and Proposed Outcome Evaluation Criteria
Purposes Design Considerations Proposed Outcome Evaluation Criteria
Meet legal requirements—for example,
to provide public notices of upcoming ac-
tions or in preliminary scoping efforts for
environmental impact assessments (Brody,
Godschalk, and Burby 2003; Slotterback
2008)
• Clarify legal requirements
• Observe sunshine laws
• Consider alternatives to traditional public notices and meetings—
for example, use of social media and online comment boards may
be effective and effi cient ways to fulfi ll these requirements.
• Legal requirements for public noticing and
comment met
• Effi cient cost of communication and outreach
Embody the ideals of democratic par-
ticipation and inclusion—for exam-
ple, to achieve or represent the public
interest through diverse participation,
provide an opportunity for participants to
enhance their own capacities to engage in
democratic citizenship, or produce lasting
achievements of public value (Mansbridge
1999; Young 2000; Fung and Wright
2003; Nabatchi 2010)
• Perform stakeholder analysis and design the process to encour-
age active participation by those with interests at stake, making
particular efforts to be inclusive
• Act in response to participants’ contributions, encouraging diverse
views and refl ecting them in outcomes
• Deliberative approaches can help participants develop capacity
and commitment for ongoing contributions
• Inclusiveness of composition of participants
• Discernible, communicated impact of partici-
pation on outcomes
• Positive effects on citizenship (e.g., partici-
pants’ increased understanding of how to
participate in democratic processes, greater
commitment to do so, or elevated sense of
effi cacy in ability to affect decision making)
Advance social justice—for example, by
improving equity in distributing public
services or by increasing a marginalized
group’s infl uence over decisions (Abers
2000; Andrews, Cowell, and Downe
2010; Corburn 2003)
• Perform stakeholder analysis and recruit diverse stakeholders
• Enable diverse participation (i.e., by enabling multiple ways to par-
ticipate, providing language translation or child care, and selecting
accessible meeting locations and times)
• Consider the distribution of benefi ts and harms
• Adequacy and diversity of stakeholder repre-
sentation
• Improved distribution of benefi ts and harms
ensuing from the decisions
Inform the public—for example, about
decisions that have been made or about
changes in policies, resources, or programs
(Nabatchi 2012b)
• Informing the public and maintaining transparency about deci-
sions may be suffi cient
• Large number of people reached or the target
population reached
• Diversity of modes or venues used to inform
public
• Increased public awareness of targeted policy
issues
• Public satisfi ed they have been informed
Enhance understanding of public prob-
lems, and explore and generate po-
tential solutions (Deyle and Slotterback
2009; Godschalk and Stiftel 1981; Webler
et al. 1995)
• Deliberative approaches and small-group formats can help partici-
pants understand issues and contribute to problem solving
• Design processes for sharing information and engaging and
exchanging views among participants to promote understanding
and discovery of new options; help participants learn about each
other’s perspectives, the broader context, and possibly change
their views; present information in various formats and from a
variety of sources (Daniels and Walker 1996; Webler et al. 1995)
• Balance technical expertise and broader stakeholder representa-
tion (Innes and Booher 2010)
• Changes in individual or collective assump-
tions, frameworks, or preferences
• Changes in participants’ knowledge of issues,
ability to articulate interests, and appreciation
of other perspective
• Generation of new problem defi nitions and
potential solutions
Produce policies, plans, and projects
of higher quality in terms of their
content
• Use deliberative, collaborative approaches to promote learning
(Forester 1999; Healey 1997; Innes and Booher 2010)
• Shift decision making to an appropriate scale (e.g., regional, local)
to take advantage of relevant knowledge and investment in out-
comes (Koontz and Thomas 2006; Mandarano 2008; Margerum
2011)
• If the problem is complex and technical quality is necessary,
engage in boundary work among different ways of knowing
(Feldman et al. 2006), or limit participation to content experts or
give special emphasis to their role (Thomas 1995)
• Validation of the quality of decisions by in-
formed content experts, using context-specifi c
criteria related to, for example, economic
effi ciency, safety, reliability, feasibility, equity,
environmental impact, etc.
26 Public Administration Review • January | February 2013
purposes to be served by the process. Trite though it may sound,
asking “What are the purposes of this participation process?” is a
step that is overlooked remarkably often in practice—frequently
with unfortunate results (Janis 1989; Nutt 2002). Multiple purposes
may be served by a single process, and purposes may change as the
public participation process unfolds. Th e literature identifi es mul-
tiple possible purposes of participation. Th ese are summarized in
table 2, along with associated considerations when designing proc-
esses to achieve these purposes and suggested outcome evaluation
criteria. Particular participation processes are likely to pursue some
subset of these purposes. Evaluation criteria are discussed further
under design guideline 11 but are previewed here because articulat-
ing purposes and evaluation criteria simultaneously can assist public
managers when making design choices with their desired ends in
mind.
Clarity about the purpose of the participation process can help
avoid unnecessary or unwise expenditures of eff ort and resources,
problems measuring the outcomes of the eff ort, or challenges to
the legitimacy of a participation process because confl icting ideas
about its purpose have not been resolved. For example, sometimes a
public participation process is legally required, even though legisla-
tive, budgetary, scheduling, or technical parameters of the decision
sharply confi ne the range of choices that are available to be made
in conjunction with the public. Under these circumstances, if the
stakeholders may need to be involved in coming up with eff ective
responses to such problems (Heifetz, Grashow, and Linsky 2009;
Hill and Hupe 2009; Nutt 2002; Th omas 2012).
First, however, it is important to look at the larger picture of
whether participation is needed or possible. Sometimes it is man-
dated (Brody, Godschalk, and Burby 2003; Slotterback 2008);
sometimes it is not mandated and is more bottom-up in nature
(Boyte 2005); sometimes it is a combination of the two. In general,
participation should be sought when it is required or when it is the
only or most effi cacious way of gaining one or more of the follow-
ing: needed information, political support, legitimacy, or citizen-
ship development (Th omas 2012). In more ambiguous settings,
Stone and Sandfort’s (2009) policy fi eld mapping approach is a
good starting point for identifying key features relating to authority,
stakeholder relationships, and resource fl ows that must be taken into
account when deciding whether a participation process is merited.
Identify Purposes and Design to Achieve Them
Design guideline 2. Clarify and regularly revisit the purposes and
desired outcomes of the participation process and design and
redesign it accordingly.
Fitting the participation process to its context and attaining desired
outcomes involve gaining as much clarity as possible about the
Table 2 Continued
Purposes Design Considerations Proposed Outcome Evaluation Criteria
Generate support for decisions and
their implementation—for example,
by producing decisions that address the
public’s needs and concerns; resolving dis-
putes; creating alliances for advocacy and
implementation; and generating resources
for implementation (Brody, Godschalk,
and Burby 2003; Godschalk and Stiftel
1981; Laurian and Shaw 2009; Moynihan
2003;Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000)
• Avoid making decisions so that stakeholders feel left out, for
example, by making them narrowly or hastily or by delegating
decision making to small, elite, or exclusive groups (Feldman and
Quick 2009; Nutt 2002; Thomas 1995)
• Emphasize procedural fairness to enhance acceptance of decisions
even among those with a different preferred outcome (Schively
2007); encourage broad participation, especially of key stakehold-
ers; engage in shared knowledge generation and relational work
to foster joint ownership of the problem analysis and outcomes
(Innes and Booher 2010; Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000)
• Utilize confl ict management and negotiation techniques (Fisher,
Ury, and Patton 2011), including consensus-oriented approaches
that aim for win–win solutions (Forester 1999; Innes and Booher
1999; Margerum 2002)
• Participants satisfi ed with the process
• High level of agreement with fairness of deci-
sion process
• High level of agreement with decision out-
comes, possibly consensus
• Minimal lawsuits, confl icts, delays, mistakes,
or other obstacles to implementing decisions
• Resources available for implementation
Manage uncertainty—for example,
to build trust, increase the quality of
information informing decisions, stabilize
relationships, and minimize risk from
unanticipated changes in the external
environment (Friend and Hickling 2005;
Rowe and Frewer 2004; Wondolleck and
Yaffee 2000)
• Acknowledge where uncertainty exists
• Maximize participation and encourage information sharing to
provide clarity about the external environment and values
• Build relationships to reduce uncertainty in them and provide a
holding frame for negotiating over differences and resources
• Persistence of a structure or relationships for
ongoing learning and negotiation
• Limited number of problems caused by mis-
interpretation of or unanticipated changes in
values, relationships, or information
• Reduced confl ict among stakeholders
• Trust in decision makers or decision-making
process
Create and sustain adaptive capacity
for ongoing problem solving and
resilience—for example, by emphasiz-
ing social and transformative learning;
relationships, social capital, and trust; and
sustained engagement (Forester 1999;
Goldstein 2012; Innes and Booher 1999,
2010; Jordan, Bawden, and Bergmann
2008; Webler et al. 1995)
• Deliberative, consensus-based, or collaborative approaches
frequently facilitate transformative learning; include diverse
perspectives to optimize learning and involve key stakeholders;
support developing shared meaning via interacting and learning
about each other’s interests, preferences, values, and worldviews
through “collaborative science” (Mandarano 2008)
• Build social capital among participants for ongoing work by build-
ing connections, enhancing relationships, and fostering trust that
can carry on beyond a single decision-making process into future
collaboration and communication (Innes and Booher 1999; Quick
and Feldman 2011)
• Creation of new structures (relationships,
partnerships, and resources) to support broad
participation in ongoing planning, implemen-
tation, and evaluation
• Sustained, diverse participation in manage-
ment that adapts to changed circumstances
• Use of collaboratively agreed criteria for deci-
sion making or performance management
• Sustained collective ability to address new
problems and support ongoing management
(e.g., of program, resources, problem)
• Improved alignment of participants’ expecta-
tions and actions with collective understand-
ings and goals
Note: See also design guideline 2 on designing for purpose and guideline 11 on evaluating participation.
Designing Public Participation Processes 27
have a particularly important contribution to make to learning about
the problem, whereas legislators or potential opponents are particu-
larly important to involve if the purpose is to secure broad buy-in to a
proposed solution. Similarly, the same stakeholder might be engaged
in diff erent ways over the course of a participation process as it
unfolds. Th e stakeholder may only wish to be informed when a policy
problem is fi rst being identifi ed, be a collaborator in selecting among
policy options, and return to simply being informed about the policy
implementation. Th erefore, we suggest that practitioners utilize a tool
such as table 2 to iteratively articulate purposes and consider how to
fulfi ll them over the course of the decision-making process.
Establish the Legitimacy of the Process
Design guideline 4. Establish with both internal and external
stakeholders the legitimacy of the process as a form of engagement
and a source of trusted interaction among participants.
An organization that seeks to acquire the support necessary for sur-
vival and mission accomplishment must build legitimacy by making
use of structures, processes, and strategies that are appropriate for its
institutional environment (Suchman 1995). A participation process
is not automatically regarded by others—insiders or outsiders—as
legitimate. Human and Provan’s (2000) work on collaboration
indicates that, by extension, diff erent types of legitimacy may be
involved. Th e fi rst is whether the form that participation takes is
seen as legitimate by key stakeholders and can attract internal and
external support and resources. Th e second is whether the participa-
tion network produces interactions that build trust and legitimacy
among participants and promotes necessary communication.
Part of establishing the legitimacy of the process is letting potential
participants know the purpose of the process (or perhaps coproduc-
ing the purpose, as noted earlier) and how their participation will
infl uence outcomes. Diff erent purposes for public participation
require appropriately matched strategies for communicating with and
engaging (or not) various stakeholder groups (Cooper, Bryer, and
Meek 2006). For example, drawing on the International Association
for Public Participation’s widely used spectrum of participation,
levels of participation can range from ignoring, to engaging as a
data source, to informing, consulting, involving, collaborating, and
fi nally to empowering stakeholders to make all decisions themselves
(see http://www.iap2.0rg/associations/4748/fi les/spectrum ).
Each strategy involves a diff erent kind of promise to stakeholders.
Diff erent kinds of engagement also imply the use of diff erent kinds
of tools and techniques (Creighton 2005; Nabatchi 2012b; Th omas
2012). For example, if the engagement approach is informing, then
consensus-building methods are inappropriate; if the approach is
involving, the appropriate techniques may include workshops and
deliberative polling but not participatory decision making, and so
on. Otherwise, participation processes can easily become mired in
confl icts about their authenticity and legitimacy that may stem from
diff erent expectations rather than a willful attempt to make the par-
ticipation process perfunctory or manipulative (Feldman and Quick
2009).
Foster Effective Leadership
Design guideline 5. Ensure that the participation process leadership
roles of sponsoring, championing, and facilitating are adequately
fulfi lled.
organizers of public participation were to proceed as if they were
welcoming all suggestions because they believe that government
should be responsive to the public, they could overpromise in terms
of how much of the input they receive they can actually use. In this
case, a deliberative design in which various options are developed
and evaluated would be frustrating for both those providing input
and the practitioners who are charged with accounting for the
public’s input. In this setting, a narrowly targeted consultation proc-
ess around specifi c options or an information transmission meeting
would be far more effi cient and eff ective.
Considering the purpose(s) to be served by a design is important,
but settling on the purpose at the outset may not always be possible
or desirable, for several reasons. First, articulating purpose is not
a one-shot exercise because the context may change, as described
earlier. Second, it may be desirable to coproduce the purposes in
conjunction with participants, through the participation process
itself, as discussed in design guideline 9. Th ird, Nutt’s (2002) exten-
sive research on strategic decision making highlights the need to
consult with key stakeholders before fi nalizing purposes and desired
outcomes; otherwise, the chances of what he calls a decision-making
“blunder” increase dramatically.
Analyze and Appropriately Involve Stakeholders
Design guideline 3. Ensure that the design and implementation of
public participation processes are informed by stakeholder analysis
and involve, at a minimum, key stakeholders in appropriate ways
across the steps or phases of a participation process. Note that
specifi c stakeholders may be involved in different ways at different
steps or phases of the process.
Attention to stakeholders is a crucial part of the response to the
context. Th e literature is quite clear that the appropriate stake-
holders should be involved in appropriate ways in a participation
process based on the context, overall task or project purpose, and
goals of the participation process (Friend and Hickling 2005). Of
course, who the appropriate stakeholders are and how to involve
them are questions that process designers must answer. Including
a wide range of participants in planning processes can promote the
sharing of perspectives among diff erent participants and help gather
information from all participants regarding their goals and objec-
tives in the process (Enserink and Monnikhof 2003). Th e literature
on collaboration indicates that when durable solutions are sought
and consensus is the prime decision-making method, it is important
to include the full range of stakeholders (Margerum 2002, 2011).
When it comes to participation processes more generally, however,
it is less clear how to decide who the appropriate stakeholders are
and what the corresponding engagement approaches should be.
Stakeholder analyses provide a set of techniques that can be used to
address both concerns (Ackermann and Eden 2011; Bryson 2004).
We suggest that clarifying the purpose of participation (design
guideline 2) should precede deciding on a basic strategy for engage-
ment—for example, to inform, to collaborate, or to empower. In
other words, the purposes of the participation eff ort should be a key
determinant of which stakeholders should be engaged in which ways.
Second, we suggest that approaches to involving and communicating
with stakeholders should be diff erentiated throughout a process. For
example, experts or people who are directly aff ected by a problem may
28 Public Administration Review • January | February 2013
trade-off s between the two kinds of costs, in that higher production
costs may lower participation costs. It is also possible that in some
situations, production costs may be so high that participation is not
feasible.
But there is also a benefi t side to the cost calculus that participation
process designers should consider and seek to amplify. Certainly
when governments sponsor participation processes, they must
allocate resources, such as funds, staff time, technical assistance, or
information infrastructure. In an era of budget pressures, it may
seem that those resources could be better used elsewhere, but a
carefully managed participation process can contribute resources
for public purposes as well (Delli Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004;
Koontz and Johnson 2004). Participants bring to public processes
new information, self-interest, motivation to address problems, and
new ways of understanding issues. Th ese can be used to uncover
new understandings, generate better projects and policies, secure
buy-in for decisions, and limit delays, mistakes, and lawsuits (Burby
2003). Th e process of participation may also enhance govern-
ment–community trust (Moynihan 2003), social capital (Lake and
Huckfeldt 1998), and infrastructure for ongoing community action
(Abers 2000; Fung and Wright 2003). By designing and imple-
menting public participation to be inclusive, public managers can
generate unexpected resources, such as knowledge, commitment to
follow-through, and enthusiasm, for decision making and policy
implementation (Feldman and Quick 2009).
Create Appropriate Rules and Structures to Guide the Process
Design guideline 7. Create an appropriate set of rules and a project
management team structure to guide operational decision making,
the overall work to be done, and who gets to be involved in decision
making in what ways.
Rules about how the process will be managed
and how decision making will take place pro-
vide a bridge between participation processes
and organizational structures. For organiza-
tions, these rules are often embedded in legal
mandates or commonly held beliefs regarding
appropriate roles and responsibilities. In a par-
ticipatory setting, rules may be formal, such
as written ground rules for working together,
or informal, arising from the actual “doing”
of joint work. In doing joint work, participant interactions (i.e.,
processes) shape and are shaped by structures and rules about how
participants will work together. When these experiences are positive,
moral obligations and commitments increase and trust builds (Chen
2010; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997). Conversely, if partici-
pants violate rules and norms, trust will be undermined and hard
to rebuild. Together, recognition of rules, the substance of rules,
and structures for enforcing rules of three types—operational rules,
general policies about the work to be done, and constitutional rules
regarding who gets to make what kinds of decisions—help allow
process participants to self-monitor (reward and sanction behavior),
build commitment among themselves, and make or contribute to
important decisions (Ostrom 1990).
In narrow, short-term public participation processes involving few
stakeholders, there may be no need for a project management team.
Designing and implementing public participation clearly requires
eff ective leadership—and increasingly so as the level of public
participation increases (from ignoring, to informing, to consulting,
to involving, to collaborating, to empowering) (Crosby and Bryson
2005; Morse 2010; Page 2010). Beyond that, as the problems or
challenges to be addressed become more diffi cult, part of the leader-
ship work becomes helping people who face problems with no easy
answers take responsibility for those problems. A key practice of
eff ective leadership in such circumstances is helping people stay
in a productive zone between avoiding a problem without easy
answers and being overwhelmed by the stress of tackling it (Heifetz,
Grashow, and Linsky 2009).
Leadership can be exercised by one or many individuals associated
with a public participation process, but the evidence indicates that
three leadership roles are particularly important: sponsors, cham-
pions, and facilitators (Crosby and Bryson 2005; Morse 2010;
Schwarz et al. 2005). Sponsors are people with formal authority
that can be used to legitimize and underwrite participation eff orts.
Th e work of sponsoring includes establishing policies and provid-
ing funds and staff that enable participation, endorsing and raising
the visibility of public participation eff orts, and using the sponsor’s
power to protect the participation process and ensure that the results
of these eff orts have impact on policy making.
Champions, in contrast to sponsors, have positions with considerable
responsibility for managing the day-to-day work of the participa-
tion eff ort. Unlike sponsors, however, they typically cannot supply
the resources and legitimacy needed to bring diverse groups into the
participation process. Instead, they must rely heavily on informal
authority accrued through their demonstrated competence over
time, through trusting relationships, and through seniority. Th e
work of championing thus requires generat-
ing enthusiasm for the eff ort, building the
support of sponsors, and sustaining the eff ort
through setbacks. Facilitators structure partici-
pation processes, maintain neutrality toward
outcomes, and help groups work together pro-
ductively. Facilitators help manage confl ict,
coaxing participants to air their views and
listen to each other’s views. As Schwarz et al.
note, skilled facilitators are process experts
who “know what kinds of behavior, process,
and underlying structure are likely to contribute to high-quality
problem solving and decision making” (2005, 29).
Seek Resources for and through Participation
Design guideline 6. Secure adequate resources—and design and
manage participation processes so that they generate additional
resources—in order to produce a favorable benefi t–cost ratio
(broadly construed) for the participation process.
Th ose designing participation processes should identify resources
needed to support participation, but they can also design and man-
age participation to generate resources in such a way that partici-
pation process benefi ts exceed process costs. Th ere are production
costs incurred by organizations in developing and implementing a
participation process; there are also participation costs incurred by
citizens as part of their participation (Cooper 1979). Th ere may be
Rules about how the proc-
ess will be managed and how
decision making will take place
provide a bridge between par-
ticipation processes and organi-
zational structures.
Designing Public Participation Processes 29
and options for resolving confl ict (Lowry, Adler, and Milner 1997).
While consensus building is time-consuming and requires special-
ized facilitation skills as well as political and logistical commitment
(Brownhill 2009; Margerum 2011; Whitmarsh, Swartling and
Jäger 2009), it works well in situations of uncertainty and contro-
versy when all stakeholders have incentives to come to the table
and mutual reciprocity is in their interests; and it off ers numerous
potential desirable outcomes, including surfacing assumptions and
enabling mutual learning among participants (Innes 2004; Jordan,
Bawden, and Bergmann 2008).
Manage Power Dynamics
Design guideline 9. Manage power dynamics to provide
opportunities for meaningful participation, exchange, and infl uence
on decision outcomes.
Public managers should actively consider power dynamics in
participation. To the extent that a participation eff ort simply
rationalizes and reproduces the power of a particular stakeholder
(Flyvbjerg 1998) or neuters diff erence by assimilating people
into the process and pacifying them (Arnstein 1969; Cooke and
Kothari 2001), it cannot be considered authentically participatory.
Subtle power codes—such as the kinds of information and styles
of expression that are considered relevant and appropriate—shape
who participates in the process and how their input is received
(Briggs 1998; Polletta and Lee 2006). For example, shifting from
formal public hearings, which tend to be dominated by a small
number of individuals comfortable with that format, to one-on-one
interactions between public managers and residents, is an example
of making design choices to reduce domination and marginaliza-
tion (Takahashi and Smutny 1998). Managers deciding what is on
the table for discussion is also an inherently powerful move that
frequently places citizen groups at a disadvantage, as they are more
likely to be reactive rather than proactive relative to the agenda for
the participation process (Cooper and Nownes 2003). One way to
share power more evenly among participants is to engage them in
coproducing the agenda and process for decision making as well
as weighing in on the policy decisions (Bovaird 2007; Quick and
Feldman 2011; Roberts 2004).
Another source of power disparities in participation processes is
privileging expert over “local” knowledge. Ozawa and Susskind
(1985) characterize this problem in the context of science-intensive
policy disputes, noting that experts might even disagree among
themselves. Crewe (2001) describes a disconnect between local resi-
dents’ views and those of design experts in eff orts to plan transit cor-
ridors in Boston and fi nds that residents’ knowledge about the local
context ultimately improved the design. Van Herzele (2004) off ers
a case description indicating that local knowledge can be eff ectively
integrated with professional knowledge; in this case, local knowl-
edge helped extend professionals’ contextual frame and, ultimately,
produced a refi ned outcome that was diff erent from the initial con-
cept developed before the public participation process began.
Trusting relationships are one of the desirable means and ends
of managing diversity, confl ict, and power dynamics successfully.
Paradoxically, trust is both a lubricant and a glue—that is, trust
helps facilitate the work of participation and helps hold the eff ort
together (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2006). Trust can comprise
Broader scale, more time-consuming processes do require a project
management team. Th e project management team may include
sponsors, champions, and facilitators, as well as others, and should
have adequate support staff and other resources necessary to func-
tion eff ectively. Depending on the scope and scale of the process,
the team may be fairly large (Creighton 2005; Friend and Hickling
2005).
Use Inclusive Processes to Engage Diversity Productively
Design guideline 8. Employ inclusive processes that invite diverse
participation and engage differences productively.
As the purpose of public participation moves away from simply
complying with mandates to promoting participatory democracy
and participant learning (Deyle and Slotterback 2009; Kirlin
1996), processes and structures are needed that are highly inclusive,
engage diversity and seek advantages from it, and address issues of
confl ict and power diff erences. A key challenge in public participa-
tion is ensuring that the appropriate range of interests is engaged
in the process, including those normally excluded from decision
making by institutionalized inequities (Abers 2000; Parekh 2002;
Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Young 2000). All too often,
supposedly participatory processes end up including the “usual
suspects,” people who are easily recruited, vocal, and reasonably
comfortable in public arenas. Stakeholder identifi cation and analysis
are critical tasks to undertake to ensure that marginalized groups are
at least considered and may have a place at the table.
Practices for increasing participatory representativeness involve bet-
ter outreach and optimizing accessibility of the process so that input
can be more diverse. Advertising is an important but not the only
way to ensure participants’ awareness of opportunities to partici-
pate (Laurian 2004). Other practices include providing language
translation, child care, or transportation assistance and choosing
convenient meeting times and places for various constituencies.
Having diverse voices at the table, however, may be insuffi cient or
even counterproductive without also designing and managing the
process to make use of that diversity, for example, by being open to
changing topics and policy outcomes in order to make connections
among diverse perspectives (Quick and Feldman 2011).
Increased diversity can be expected to lead to increased confl ict, at
least initially. Designing inclusive participation processes requires
explicit attention to managing confl ict (Forester 2009). Establishing
clear ground rules and agendas for how to work together and a
common problem defi nition create a structure for working through
diff erences (Margerum 2002). Clarifying the source of the con-
fl ict—over data, relationships, values, or the decision-making
structure—is a good fi rst step (Crosby and Bryson 2005). When
confl icting facts arise, group learning through interaction among
participants can be further enhanced by taking claims seriously and
developing processes that allow for resolution (Innes and Booher
2010; Lowry, Adler, and Milner 1997).
Facilitators can help participants examine underlying assumptions,
shift from fi rm positions about particular outcomes to a more open-
ended identifi cation of the interests that parties wish to address, and
openly explore multiple options for action (Fisher, Ury, and Patton
2011). Th ese processes should allow for discussion of contingencies
30 Public Administration Review • January | February 2013
Another key question for managers to consider from the outset is
how to evaluate the public participation eff ort. Defi ning evaluation
measures in conjunction with deciding the purposes of engagement
will help managers decide whether to engage in public participation,
anticipate what kinds of results participation will produce, articulate
participation process goals, and align their design and management
strategies accordingly (Nabatchi 2012a). Organizers of participation
eff orts often do not do formal evaluations, but they should consider
doing both formative and summative evaluations (Patton 2010).
Eff ective and operable measures of participation can help policy mak-
ers learn from implementation so that they can enhance the eff ective-
ness of the remainder of the participation eff ort they are currently
working on and build long-term institutional capacity for future
participation (Rowe and Frewer 2004; Laurian
and Shaw 2009). Evaluation may use a combi-
nation of process criteria to determine how well
an organization is implementing its proposed
participation program and impact criteria to
measure the consequences of participation for
decision outcomes (Nabatchi 2012a).
Given the varied and divergent purposes for
public participation described earlier, there
is no single set of evaluation metrics for par-
ticipation. Instead, process designers should
consider which possible outcomes of the
process are most desirable and design measures accordingly (Rowe
and Frewer 2004). Table 2 proposes outcome measures that are
aligned with the various purposes of participation. Existing research
and models support measuring a combination of diff erent types
of outcomes, such as the following (Deyle and Slotterback 2009;
Innes and Booher 1999; Laurian and Shaw 2009; Mandarano 2008;
Margerum 2002; Milward and Provan 2000; Schively 2007):
• Individual-level outcomes (e.g., individuals’ increased knowl-
edge of a policy issue, eff ects on citizenship behavior), group-
level outcomes (e.g., mutual learning within the group about
others’ perspectives), and community-level outcomes (e.g., the
development of new options not previously considered, overall
measures of community betterment)
• Process-oriented outcomes (e.g., building trust among partici-
pants, incorporating a diverse group of stakeholders)
• Content-oriented outcomes (e.g., improving safety or environ-
mental quality)
• User-oriented outcomes (e.g., participants’ satisfaction with the
process, recognizing that diff erent stakeholders have diff erent
criteria for success)
• First-, second-, and third-order outcomes, which are, respectively,
the immediately discernible eff ects of the process (e.g., the
quality of initial agreements), impacts that unfold once the
process is under way (e.g., the formation of new partnerships),
and long-term impacts (e.g., less confl ict among stakeholders
in the future)
It may not be possible to measure the impact of policy choices
made as a result of the participation process within the timeframe
of the participation process itself. In that case, practitioners can
draw on expert opinion to evaluate the outcomes of the process or
to evaluate key technical aspects of the policy, such as its economic
interpersonal behavior, confi dence in organizational competence
and expected performance, and a common bond and sense of
goodwill (Chen 2010). At the same time, trust is problematic in any
process involving people with diverse interests and levels of power
(Huxham and Vangen 2005). Trust can be built by sharing informa-
tion and knowledge and demonstrating competency, good inten-
tions, and follow-through; conversely, failure to follow through and
unilateral action undermine trust (Arinoa and De la Torre 1998).
For example, Huxham and Vangen (2005) emphasize the eff ective-
ness of achieving “small wins” together for building trust.
Eff ective confl ict management also can enhance trusting relation-
ships by ensuring that disagreements are problem centered, not per-
son centered. Eff ective management of power
diff erences can help less powerful stakeholders
trust the process and other participants more.
Conversely, some powerful stakeholders might
become more wary of the process if they feel
that their power is being
diminished.
In cycli-
cal fashion, as trust grows, it may substitute
for formal structure in the ways in which it
can control and standardize behavior because
trust facilitates the sharing and diff usion of
values and norms about standards of behavior
(Moynihan 2009).
Use Information, Communication, and Other Technologies
to Achieve the Purposes of Engagement
Design guideline 10. Participation processes should be designed
to make use of information, communication, and other
technologies that fi t with the context and the purposes of the
process.
Participation processes that engage the public can be signifi cantly
enhanced by the use of information, communication, and other
technologies (Wang and Bryer 2012). Th ese technologies include
public participation geographic information systems, computer-
generated visualizations, interactive Web sites, keypad voting, and
strategy mapping tools (Conroy and Evans-Cowley 2006; Howard
and Gaborit 2007). Technology can be particularly eff ective in
providing technical information and enhancing understanding of
context (Appleton and Lovett 2005; Haklay and Tobón 2003),
providing public access to information typically available only to
experts (Al-Kodmany 2000; Elwood 2002), and gathering real-time
feedback from participants (Han and Peng 2003). Visualization
and other technologies can also help build shared understanding
and facilitate interaction among users, as well as with the informa-
tion provided (Bryson et al. 2004; Balram, Dragicevic, and Feick
2009). At the same time, it is important to acknowledge the limits
of access to technology among public participants (Mossberger,
Tolbert, and Gilbert 2006; Pew Foundation 2011) and limitations
in resources available to planners and managers to deploy technol-
ogy (Slotterback 2011).
Develop Participation Evaluation Measures and an Evaluation
Process That Supports the Desired Outcomes
Design guideline 11. Develop participation evaluation measures
and an evaluation process that supports producing the desired
outcomes.
Eff ective management of power
diff erences can help less pow-
erful stakeholders trust the
process and other participants
more. Conversely, some power-
ful stakeholders might become
more wary of the process if they
feel that their power is being
diminished.
Designing Public Participation Processes 31
intended as practical guidance for practitioners to use as they make
decisions about the design of participation processes. Th e guidelines
are necessarily general, but they do off er some important evidence-
based insights into how to approach issues of context, purpose,
stakeholder involvement, leadership, process management, and eval-
uation. Practitioners are encouraged to draw on what the literature
has to off er and to integrate it with their own insights about what
would work best given their specifi c circumstances as they formulate
a specifi c design for participation (while recognizing that the design
may well need to change as the situation changes).
Overall, a number of conclusions fl ow from our literature review
and analysis. Th e fi rst is simply that the design of public participa-
tion processes can be a very complex endeavor, particularly as the
scope and scale of the envisioned processes increase. Process design-
ers can face a substantial challenge in making use of the interrelated
design guidelines to produce a specifi c design that is likely to be
eff ective for fulfi lling purposes and achieving goals within the con-
text at hand and within applicable constraints, satisfying any other
requirements, engaging the appropriate stakeholders in appropriate
ways, and making good use of various activities, methods, tools,
and techniques. Rather than minimizing the complexity of design-
ing participation processes, the design guidelines are intended to
acknowledge that complexity, draw attention to important process
design issues, and then off er practical ways to respond.
Th e guidelines are based on the extant literature, but additional
work needs to be done to strengthen the foundations on which our
design propositions are based and to more
fully specify them. Nonetheless, the fi eld has
advanced enough that the design guidelines
can be off ered with some reasonable faith in
their soundness. Th e purposes to be served
by participation processes are important. We
hope readers will fi nd this literature review
and set of design guidelines useful as they seek
to pursue the purposes—and promises—of
public participation.
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Th e design guidelines outlined here are intended to integrate evi-
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Th e guidelines are based on
the extant literature, but addi-
tional work needs to be done to
strengthen the foundations on
which our design propositions
are based and to more fully
specify them.
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