week 1 assignment

  Read over the following articles and describe how a different cultural context might play a role in attribution (we will discuss this topic much more in the coming weeks).  Write a 3-page paper (minimum) describing the results and extensions from these studies.

• Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). Situational salience and cultural differences in the correspondence bias and actor-observer bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 949-960. Choi, I., & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). Situational salience and cultural differences in the correspondence bias and actor-observer bias. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 949-960. – Alternative Formats
• Norenzayan, A. & Nisbett, R. E. (2000). Culture and cognition. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9,132-135.

from the SAGE Social Science Collections. All Rights Reserved.

 

 
 

 

 

 
 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Current Directions in Psychological
Science
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Culture and Causal Cognition
Ara Norenzayan and Richard E. Nisbett

Current Directions in Psychological Science 2000 9: 132
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8721.00077

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Psychologists within the cogni-
tive science tradition have long be-
lieved that fundamental reasoning
processes such as causal attribution
are the same in all cultures (Gard-
ner, 1985). Although recognizing
that the content of causal beliefs
can differ widely across cultures,
psychologists have assumed that
the ways in which people come to
make their causal judgments are

essentially the same, and therefore
that they tend to make the same
sorts of inferential errors. A case in
point is the fundamental attribu-
tion error, or FAE (Ross, 1977), a
phenomenon that is of central im-
portance to social psychology and
until recently was held to be invari-
able across cultures.
The FAE refers to people’s incli-

nation to see behavior as the result
of dispositions corresponding to
the apparent nature of the behav-
ior. This tendency often results in
error when there are obvious situ-
ational constraints that leave little
or no role for dispositions in pro-
ducing the behavior. The classic ex-
ample of the FAE was demon-
strated in a study by Jones and
Harris (1967) in which participants
read a speech or essay that a target
person had allegedly been required
to produce by a debate coach or
psychology experimenter. The
speech or essay favored a particu-
lar position on an issue, for ex-
ample, the legalization of mari-
juana. Participants’ estimates of the
target’s actual views on the issue
reflected to a substantial extent the
views expressed in the speech or
essay, even when they knew that
the target had been explicitly in-
structed to defend a particular po-
sition. Thus, participants inferred
an attitude that corresponded to
the target person’s apparent behav-
ior, without taking into account the
situational constraints operating on
the behavior. Since that classic
study, the FAE has been found in
myriad studies in innumerable ex-
perimental and naturalistic con-
texts, and it has been a major focus
of theorizing and a continuing

source of instructive pedagogy for
psychology students.

It turns out, however, that the
FAE is much harder to demon-
strate with Asian populations than
with European-American popula-
tions (Choi, Nisbett, & Noren-
zayan, 1999). Miller (1984) showed
that Hindu Indians preferred to ex-
plain ordinary life events in terms
of the situational context in which
they occurred, whereas Americans
were much more inclined to ex-
plain similar events in terms of pre-
sumed dispositions. Morris and
Peng (1994) found that Chinese
newspapers and Chinese students
living in the United States tended
to explain murders (by both Chi-
nese and American perpetrators) in
terms of the situation and even the
societal context confronting the
murderers, whereas American
newspapers and American stu-
dents were more likely to explain
the murders in terms of presumed
dispositions of the perpetrators.
Recently Jones and Harris’s

(1967) experiment was repeated
with Korean and American partici-
pants (Choi et al., 1999). Like
Americans, the Koreans tended to
assume that the target person held
the position he was advocating.
But the two groups responded
quite differently if they were
placed in the same situation them-
selves before they made judgments
about the target. When observers
were required to write an essay, us-
ing four arguments specified by the
experimenter, the Americans were
unaffected, but the Koreans were
greatly affected. That is, the Ameri-
cans’ judgments about the target’s
attitudes were just as much influ-
enced by the target’s essay as if
they themselves had never experi-
enced the constraints inherent in
the situation, whereas the Koreans

Culture and Causal Cognition
Ara Norenzayan and Richard E. Nisbett1

Centre de Récherche en Epistemologie Appliquée, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris,
France (A.N.), and Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann
Arbor, Michigan (R.E.N.)

Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.

132 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 4, AUGUST 2000

Abstract
East Asian and American

causal reasoning differs signifi-
cantly. East Asians understand
behavior in terms of complex
interactions between disposi-
tions of the person or other ob-
ject and contextual factors,
whereas Americans often view
social behavior primarily as the
direct unfolding of disposi-
tions. These culturally differ-
ing causal theories seem to be
rooted in more pervasive, cul-
ture-specific mentalities in East
Asia and the West. The West-
ern mentality is analytic, focus-
ing attention on the object, cat-
egorizing it by reference to its
attributes, and ascribing cau-
sality based on rules about it.
The East Asian mentality is ho-
listic, focusing attention on the
field in which the object is lo-
cated and ascribing causality
by reference to the relationship
between the object and the
field.

Keywords
causal attribution; culture; at-
tention; reasoning

CULTURE AND THE FAE

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almost never inferred that the tar-
get person had the attitude ex-
pressed in the essay.
This is not to say that Asians do

not use dispositions in causal anal-
ysis or are not occasionally suscep-
tible to the FAE. Growing evidence
indicates that when situational
cues are not salient, Asians rely on
dispositions or manifest the FAE to
the same extent as Westerners
(Choi et al., 1999; Norenzayan,
Choi, & Nisbett, 1999). The cultural
difference seems to originate pri-
marily from a stronger East Asian
tendency to recognize the causal
power of situations.
The cultural differences in the

FAE seem to be supported by dif-
ferent folk theories about the
causes of human behavior. In one
study (Norenzayan et al., 1999), we
asked participants how much they
agreed with paragraph descrip-
tions of three different philoso-
phies about why people behave as
they do: (a) a strongly disposition-
ist philosophy holding that “how
people behave is mostly deter-
mined by their personality,” (b) a
strongly situationist view holding
that behavior “is mostly deter-
mined by the situation” in which
people find themselves, and (c) an
interactionist view holding that be-
havior “is always jointly deter-
mined by personality and the situ-
ation.” Korean and American
participants endorsed the first po-
sition to the same degree, but Ko-
reans endorsed the situationist and
interactionist views more strongly
than did Americans.
These causal theories are consis-

tent with cultural conceptions of
personality as well. In the same
study (Norenzayan et al., 1999),
we administered a scale designed
to measure agreement with two
different theories of personality:
entity theory, or the belief that be-
havior is due to relatively fixed dis-
positions such as traits, intelli-
gence, and moral character, and
incremental theory, or the belief

that behavior is conditioned on the
situation and that any relevant dis-
positions are subject to change
(Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993). Ko-
reans for the most part rejected en-
tity theory, whereas Americans
were equally likely to endorse en-
tity theory and incremental theory.

The cultural differences in cau-
sal cognition go beyond interpreta-
tions of human behavior. Morris
and Peng (1994) showed cartoons
of an individual fish moving in a
variety of configurations in relation
to a group of fish and asked par-
ticipants why they thought the ac-
tions had occurred. Chinese par-
ticipants were inclined to attribute
the behavior of the individual fish
to factors external to the fish (i.e.,
the group), whereas American par-
ticipants were more inclined to at-
tribute the behavior of the fish to
internal factors. In studies by Peng
and Nisbett (reported in Nisbett,
Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, in
press), Chinese participants were
shown to interpret even the behav-
ior of schematically drawn, am-
biguous physical events—such as a
round object dropping through a
surface and returning to the sur-
face—as being due to the relation
between the object and the pre-
sumed medium (e.g., water),
whereas Americans tended to in-
terpret the behavior as being due to
the properties of the object alone.

The Intellectual Histories of East
Asia and Europe

Why should Asians and Ameri-
cans perceive causality so differ-
ently? Scholars in many fields, in-
cluding ethnography, history, and
philosophy of science, hold that, at
least since the 6th century B.C.,

there has been a very different in-
tellectual tradition in the West than
in the East (especially China and
those cultures, like the Korean and
Japanese, that were heavily influ-
enced by China; Nisbett et al., in
press). The ancient Greeks had an
analytic stance: The focus was on
categorizing the object with refer-
ence to its attributes and explaining
its behavior using rules about its
category memberships. The an-
cient Chinese had a holistic stance,
meaning that there was an orienta-
tion toward the field in which the
object was found and a tendency to
explain the behavior of the object in
terms of its relations with the field.
In support of these propositions,

there is substantial evidence that
early Greek and Chinese science
and mathematics were quite differ-
ent in their strengths and weak-
nesses. Greek science looked for
universal rules to explain events
and was concerned with categoriz-
ing objects with respect to their es-
sences. Chinese science (some
people would say it was a technol-
ogy only, though a technology
vastly superior to that of the
Greeks) was more pragmatic and
concrete and was not concerned
with foundations or universal
laws. The difference between the
Greek and Chinese orientations is
well captured by Aristotle’s phys-
ics, which explained the behavior
of an object without reference to
the field in which it occurs. Thus, a
stone sinks into water because it
has the property of gravity, and a
piece of wood floats because it has
the property of levity. In contrast,
the principle that events always oc-
cur in some context or field of
forces was understood early on in
China.
Some writers have suggested

that the mentality of East Asians
remains more holistic than that of
Westerners (e.g., Nakamura, 1960/
1988). Thus, modern East Asian
laypeople, like the ancient Chinese
intelligentsia, are attuned to the

Copyright © 2000 American Psychological Society

133CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

ANALYTIC VERSUS
HOLISTIC COGNITION

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field and the overall context in de-
termining events. Western civiliza-
tion was profoundly shaped by an-
cient Greece, so one would expect
the Greek intellectual stance of ob-
ject focus to be widespread in the
West.

Attention to the Field Versus
the Object

If East Asians tend to believe
that causality lies in the field, they
would be expected to attend to the
field. If Westerners are more in-
clined to believe that causality in-
heres in the object, they might be
expected to pay relatively more at-
tention to the object than to the
field. There is substantial evidence
that this is the case.
Attention to the field as a whole

on the part of East Asians suggests
that they might find it relatively
difficult to separate the object from
the field. This notion rests on the
concept of field dependence (Witkin,
Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, &
Karp, 1974). Field dependence re-
fers to a relative difficulty in sepa-
rating objects from the context in
which they are located. One way of
measuring field dependence is by
means of the rod-and-frame test. In
this test, participants look into a
long rectangular box at the end of
which is a rod. The rod and the box
frame can be rotated indepen-
dently of one another, and partici-
pants are asked to state when the
rod is vertical. Field dependence is
indicated by the extent to which
the orientation of the frame influ-
ences judgments of the verticality
of the rod. The judgments of East
Asian (mostly Chinese) partici-
pants have been shown to be more
field dependent than those of
American participants (Ji, Peng, &
Nisbett, in press).
In a direct test of whether East

Asians pay more attention to the
field than Westerners do (Masuda
& Nisbett, 1999), Japanese and

American participants saw under-
water scenes that included one or
more focal fish (i.e., fish that were
larger and faster moving than
other objects in the scene) among
many other objects, including
smaller fish, small animals, plants,
rocks, and coral. When asked to re-
call what they had just viewed, the
Japanese and American partici-
pants reported equivalent amounts
of detail about the focal fish, but
the Japanese reported far more de-
tail about almost everything else in
the background and made many
more references to interactions be-
tween focal fish and background
objects. After watching the scenes,
the participants were shown a focal
fish either on the original back-
ground or on a new one. The abil-
ity of the Japanese to recognize a
particular focal fish was impaired
if the fish was shown on the
“wrong” background. Americans’
recognition was uninfluenced by
this manipulation.

Most of the cross-cultural com-
parisons we have reviewed com-
pared participants who were
highly similar with respect to key
demographic variables, namely,
age, gender, socioeconomic status,
and educational level. Differences
in cognitive abilities were con-
trolled for or ruled out as potential
explanations for the data in studies
involving a task (e.g., the rod-and-
frame test) that might be affected
by such abilities. Moreover, the
predicted differences emerged re-
gardless of whether the East Asians
were tested in their native lan-
guages in East Asian countries or
tested in English in the United
States. Thus, the lack of obvious al-
ternative explanations, combined
with positive evidence from intel-

lectual history and the convergence
of the data across a diverse set of
studies (conducted in laboratory as
well as naturalistic contexts), points
to culturally shared causal theories
as the most likely explanation for
the group differences.
But why might ancient societies

have differed in the causal theories
they produced and passed down to
their contemporary successor cul-
tures? Attempts to answer such
questions must, of course, be high-
ly speculative because they involve
complex historical and sociological
issues. Elsewhere, we have sum-
marized the views of scholars who
have suggested that fundamental
differences between societies may
result from ecological and eco-
nomic factors (Nisbett et al., in
press). In China, people engaged in
intensive farming many centuries
before Europeans did. Farmers
need to be cooperative with one an-
other, and their societies tend to be
collectivist in nature. A focus on
the social field may generalize to
a holistic understanding of the
world. Greece is a land where the
mountains descend to the sea and
large-scale agriculture is not pos-
sible. People earned a living by
keeping animals, fishing, and trad-
ing. These occupations do not re-
quire so much intensive coopera-
tion, and the Greeks were in fact
highly individualistic. Individual-
ism in turn encourages attending
only to the object and one’s goals
with regard to it. The social field
can be ignored with relative impu-
nity, and causal perception can fo-
cus, often mistakenly, solely on the
object. We speculate that contem-
porary societies continue to display
these mentalities because the social
psychological factors that gave rise
to them persist to this day.
Several findings by Witkin and

his colleagues (e.g., Witkin et al.,
1974), at different levels of analysis,
support this historical argument
that holistic and analytic cognition
originated in collectivist and indi-

Published by Blackwell Publishers Inc.

134 VOLUME 9, NUMBER 4, AUGUST 2000

ORIGINS OF THE
CULTURAL DIFFERENCE
IN CAUSAL COGNITION

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vidualist orientations, respectively.
Contemporary farmers are more
field dependent than hunters and
industrialized peoples; American
ethnic groups that operate under
tighter social constraints are more
field dependent than other groups;
and individuals who are attuned to
social relationships are more field
dependent than those who are less
focused on social relationships.

A number of questions seem
particularly interesting for further
inquiry. Should educational prac-
tices take into account the differing
attentional foci and causal theories
of members of different cultural
groups? Can the cognitive skills
characteristic of one cultural group
be transferred to another group?
To what extent can economic
changes transform the sort of cul-
tural-cognitive system we have de-
scribed? These and other questions
about causal cognition will provide
fertile ground for research in the
years to come.

Note

1. Address correspondence to Rich-
ard E. Nisbett, Department of Psychol-
ogy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109; e-mail: nisbett@umich.edu.

References

Choi, I., Nisbett, R.E., & Norenzayan, A. (1999).
Causal attribution across cultures: Variation
and universality. Psychological Bulletin, 125,
47–63.

Dweck, C.S., Hong, Y.-Y., & Chiu, C.-Y. (1993).
Implicit theories: Individual differences in the
likelihood and meaning of dispositional infer-
ence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
19, 644–656.

Gardner, H. (1985). The mind’s new science. New
York: Basic Books.

Ji, L., Peng, K., & Nisbett, R.E. (in press). Culture,
control, and perception of relationships in the
environment. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology.

Jones, E.E., & Harris, V.A. (1967). The attribution
of attitudes. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, 3, 1–24.

Masuda, T., & Nisbett, R.E. (1999). Culture and at-
tention to object vs. field. Unpublished manu-
script, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Miller, J.G. (1984). Culture and the development of
everyday social explanation. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 46, 961–978.

Morris, M.W., & Peng, K. (1994). Culture and
cause: American and Chinese attributions for
social and physical events. Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology, 67, 949–971.

Nakamura, H. (1988). The ways of thinking of eastern
peoples. New York: Greenwood Press. (Origi-
nal work published 1960)

Nisbett, R.E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A.
(in press). Culture and systems of thought:
Holistic vs. analytic cognition. Psychological Re-
view.

Norenzayan, A., Choi, I., & Nisbett, R.E. (1999).
Eastern and Western folk psychology and the pre-
diction of behavior. Unpublished manuscript,
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his
shortcomings. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10, pp.
173–220). New York: Academic Press.

Witkin, H.A., Dyk, R.B., Faterson, H.F., Good-
enough, D.R., & Karp, S.A. (1974). Psychological
differentiation. Potomac, MD: Erlbaum.

Copyright © 2000 American Psychological Society

135CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Recommended Reading

Choi, I., Nisbett, R.E., & Noren-
zayan, A. (1999). (See References)

Fiske, A., Kitayama, S., Markus,
H.R., & Nisbett, R.E. (1998). The
cultural matrix of social psychol-
ogy. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, &
G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of
social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2,
pp. 915–981). Boston: McGraw-
Hill.

Lloyd, G.E.R. (1996). Science in an-
tiquity: The Greek and Chinese
cases and their relevance to prob-
lems of culture and cognition. In
D.R. Olson & N. Torrance (Eds.),
Modes of thought: Explorations in
culture and cognition (pp. 15–33).
Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.

Nisbett, R.E., Peng, K., Choi, I., &
Norenzayan, A. (in press). (See
References)

Sperber, D., Premack, D., & Prem-
ack, A.J. (Eds.). (1995). Causal cog-
nition: A multidisciplinary debate.
Oxford, England: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.

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>>
]
>> setdistillerparams
<< /HWResolution [1200 1200] /PageSize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice